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Abstract 
1. Introduction 
This report presents the findings of research which has been undertaken on behalf of the European Commission in-
to the impact of Member States' policies on economic and social cohesion in the European Union (EU). 
The report obviously considers policies which have an explicit spatial dimension - including not only "classic" re-
gional policy measures, but also policies that address specific issues such as rural problems, urban deprivation or 
unemployment blackspots. However, ¡n expenditure terms, such spatially-oriented policies tend to be dwarfed by 
two other aspects of government activity which are likely to have regional implications: on the one hand, sectoral 
and horizontal policies that are pursued "proactively" (eg. R&D, employment, defence); and, on the other, the (main-
ly) automatic, interregional transfers resulting from general public expenditures and central government allocations 
to subnational authorities. 
In considering these four areas of government activity (regional policy; other spatial policies; horizontal policies; and 
overall government expenditures), the key research questions are: 
i. to what extent can policies which have the redress of regional disparities as their objective (ie. regional and 
other spatial policies) be shown to contribute to this end? 
ii. to what extent can it be shown that horizontal or sectoral policies contribute to or undermine spatial policy 
spending and its objectives? 
¡ii. at a global level, what is the spatial distribution of public spending and what is its role in reducing economic 
and social disparities? 
These research questions concern, first, the proactive policies pursued by government, whether or not with spatial 
objectives in mind, and, second, the largely automatic interregional transfers that are the outcome of the differing 
spatial distribution of government taxation and spending. The next three chapters focus on the proactive policies 
of government. They consider, in turn, the regional Impact of Member States' regional policies (Chapter 2), other 
spatial policies (Chapter 3) and selected horizontal policies (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 then reviews those budget-in-
duced interregional transfers which result from government expenditure and taxation policies. A final chapter, Chap-
ter 6, draws together the main findings of the report. 
2. Member States' Regional Policies 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an assessment of the impact of Member States' regional policies on economic 
and social cohesion. This is done by reviewing the objectives of regional policy in the different Member States and 
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the available evidence on the effects of policy, as shown by the regional distribution of national regional policy ex-
penditure and by reviewing recent evaluation studies. 
With respect to the objectives of Member States' regional policies (see Section 2.1), the chapter distinguishes be-
tween four broad groups of countries: 
• the four Cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), where issues of economic development 
are the main preoccupation, but where underemployment and peripherality, and, especially in Spain, unem-
ployment are also concerns. 
• Germany and Italy, which are characterised by the dual nature of their economies. These countries display 
by far the widest internal disparities and expend by far the most on regional policy; both countries extend the 
focus of policy beyond the most underdeveloped regions and also operate regional policies in the disadvan-
taged parts of the more prosperous regions. 
• the central and northern EU countries Rustría, Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom), where employment issues, especially related to industrial restructuring, tend to domi-
nate. However, the nature of the regional problem in these countries is also characterised by its variety, com-
plexity and susceptibility to change; recent years have seen the emergence of acute urban and rural prob-
lems, as well as issues associated with the restructuring of industries such as defence. Moreover, peripher-
ality and rural depopulation are often also concerns. In addition, in some countries, there are special situa-
tions to address, notably Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, and Corsica in France. 
• the Nordic Member States [Finland and Sweden), where peripherality, climate and geography are the princi-
pal issues addressed by regional policy. 
As far as regional policy objectives are concerned, the four Cohesion countries (and especially Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal) are characterised by the problem of implementing a regional development policy in the context of nation-
al economies which are themselves underdeveloped from an EU perspective. This creates tensions between effi-
ciency-related issues and equity-based concerns, between short-term and longer-term considerations and between 
national prosperity and regional disparity - tensions which have resulted in significant shifts in priorities and changes 
in the relationship between national industrial development and regional policies over time. Moreover, these tensions 
reflect the wider picture at the EU level of the potential conflict between competitiveness and cohesion. 
A feature of Germany and Italy is their extreme internal regional disparities; this has resulted in considerable policy 
emphasis on their most underdeveloped regions. In Germany (and in Italy until recently) separate policies are oper-
ated for such regions (the Mezzogiorno in Italy and the new Länder in Germany) in a range of policy areas, although 
regional policy is also among the instruments used. 
In the "northern European" Member States, regional problems tend to comprise a range of concerns, though high 
levels of unemployment are generally at their core; in these countries regional policy tends to have a relatively low 
political profile. There are, however, marked differences between countries with respect to both the objectives and 
substance of policy; at one end of the spectrum is France with the broad concept of aménagement du territoire, 
while at the other comes the United Kingdom with a far narrower policy focus on regional industrial policy. 
In the Nordic Member States the regional problems to be faced are different in both scale and type (sparsely-pop-
ulated areas, harsh climates, distance from population centres etc); regional policy in these countries tends to be 
allocated a higher priority and to include a fairly broad range of policy measures. 
With regard to the instruments of regional policy, the chapter highlights the considerable variety in policy approaches. 
In some countries, national regional policy is essentially comprised of financial incentives to firms investing in the 
problem regions: this is true of Belgium, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, for example. In others, a range of 
non-spatial government policy measures are associated with the objectives of regional policy. In France and Finland, 
for example, regional development legislation makes this link explicit. 
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There are also considerable differences in the institutional arrangements for regional policy between countries. 
Among the federal or quasi federal states, the role of the subnational level is key. For example, in Belgium, policy 
is the responsibility of the regional governments; however, in Germany and Spain responsibility is divided between 
the national and regional governments according to competences defined ¡n the constitution and partnership is a 
core component of policy delivery. In Austria, the organisation and competence for regional policy ¡s not allocated 
constitutionally either to the federal government or to the Länder. In practice, there is an informal allocation both of 
legislative competence and of the administration of public activities affecting regional development between differ-
ent bodies at federal, Land and local level. The remaining countries are organised along unitary lines, but there is 
frequently administrative devolution in the operation of regional policy. This is so, for instance, in France, where the 
préfets play an influential role in regional economic development policy and, more prosaically, in Great Britain where 
government regional offices are largely responsible for administering regional incentive policy. 
As far as regional policy expenditure is concerned (see Section 2.2.1), the chapter focuses on regional grant ex-
penditure, ¡n order to obtain comparable and regionally-disaggregated information. A number of points arise from 
the discussion of the distribution of expenditure at both national and regional levels. 
First, in respect of expenditure trends, regional capital grant expenditure (and, indeed, regional policy spending more 
generally) has been in decline in most countries over the 1989-93 period, with particularly significant falls in Italy and 
Spain; these trends reinforce longer-term developments, especially in the northern Member States where the de-
cline in some countries since 1980 has been more than two-thirds. On the other hand, east Germany stands as an 
obvious exception to these general trends, with major regional development spending from 1990 onwards. Strik-
ingly, some two-thirds of overall regional grant expenditure relates to east Germany and Italy, just under one-fifth to 
the Cohesion countries and some 15 percent to the remaining six EU 12 countries. 
Regarding the scale of regional grant spending, this is, in general, significantly higher in the four Cohesion countries 
than elsewhere in the Member States (except Luxembourg); though spending declined markedly in Spain and in-
creased steeply in east Germany from 1990. However the position at the regional level is more varied. While the 
broad picture is for regions in the four Cohesion countries, in east Germany and in the Italian Mezzogiorno to appear 
towards the top end of the scale ranking - together with Northern Ireland - certain Spanish and Italian regions are 
found towards the lower reaches of the ranking. In similar vein, average per capita spending in a range of northern 
European regions (Wallonia, Saarland, Limburg, Wales) is broadly in line with the country averages of Spain and Italy. 
When considering the intensity of policy, the key point to note is that this involves relating regional incentive spend-
ing to the population of those regions actually in receipt of support (the assisted areas). As a result, those coun-
tries and regions with only limited assisted area coverage move markedly up the rankings. Thus, the intensity of 
regional incentive spending in east Germany, Italy (prior to the demise of Mezzogiorno policy) and Luxembourg ¡s 
significantly higher than in the four Cohesion countries, while the intensity of expenditure in Portugal and Spain is 
not dissimilar to that recorded in many northern Member States. A similarly varied pattern is found at the regional 
level, with the intensity of regional incentive spending in a number of northern regions exceeding, by some way, that 
found in many regions in the Cohesion countries. 
Turning finally to the review of evaluation studies (see Section 2.2.2), in general these provide only limited informa-
tion on the effectiveness of policy. Econometric exercises tend to be constrained by data availability, by the diffi-
culty of establishing the counterfactual and by problems of determining causality, while survey-based research tends 
to have a quite specific focus - on a particular incentive or a particular region or a particular development process 
- which creates difficulties when attempts are made to generalise the results. At the EU level, these difficulties are 
compounded by the lack of EU-wide comparative data and the plurality of evaluation approaches used. Without 
good comparative Information, the systematic and comprehensive appraisal of the relative effectiveness of national 
regional policies will remain elusive. 
3. Other Spatial Policies Operated by the Member States 
In this chapter, the focus is on those spatially-discriminating policies (other than regional policy) which operate in se-
lected Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). The review is concerned 
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with national government policies. However, it is important to note that, in some areas of spatial policy, subnation-
al levels of government also play an important role; this is particularly true of urban policy. In Germany and Spain, 
for example, urban policy operates at the subnational level and is not the responsibility of the national government. 
Moreover, in other areas of spatial policy, EU policies are often important; in some countries, for instance, rural pol-
icy is essentially subsumed within EU policies operated under Objective 5b or within the LEADER Community Ini-
tiative - again this is true of Spain. Similarly, EU policies are also significant in the context of industrial crisis regions 
designated under KONVER, RENAVAL, RESIDER and so on. 
The spatial policies of Member States identified in this study address a variety of objectives. For the purposes of 
this report these have been grouped into urban, rural, crisis area and special status area policies. The distinction 
between regional and other spatial policies is not always a clear one - this is especially so of countries like France 
which take a broader view of regional development policies within the context of aménagement du territoire and 
where there have been increasing moves to integrate spatial policies within a single framework. Nevertheless, there 
is a difference in emphasis between regional and other spatial policies; the essence of this lies primarily in the ex-
tent to which other spatial policies concern issues of social and political cohesion, rather than essentially econom-
ic development objectives. This is not to say that there is not always a mix of rationales and motivating factors un-
derlying policy; however, the four categories of policy identified concern areas where the political dimension of pol-
icy tends to be central - certainly more so than is generally the case with regional policy. 
As far as urban policy is concerned, the discussion in Section 3.1.1 concentrates mainly on the position in France 
and, especially, the United Kingdom where urban policy has been given a relatively high priority. Indeed, in the UK, 
the political imperatives arising from growing unrest in areas of extreme poverty and deprivation have seen urban 
policy expenditure rise to some four times that of the main British regional incentive (Regional Selective Assistance). 
In similar vein, national urban policy spending in France is broadly on a par with the sum expended on the range 
of aménagement du territoire policies (including measures for rural and "crisis" regions as well as regional policy 
support). These two country examples underline the significant social and environmental aspects of national urban 
policy; while economic development instruments are among the measures used, they are generally employed for 
social and political ends. 
Elsewhere in the Member States, urban policy tends to be somewhat different in nature - a response to physical 
planning and environmental pressures rather than social unrest. Moreover, it is often the responsibility of sub-na-
tional levels of government rather than being a national policy initiative. On the other hand, the federal government 
in Germany can grant supplementary aid for urban measures where the investments serve to improve the condi-
tions for growth in the economy as a whole or to equalise economic strength between the regions. 
Regarding rural policy, the emphasis in Section 3.1.2 is very much on France where the speed of agricultural change 
in the post-war period and the stress placed on the rural way of life has resulted in the policy being accorded a 
high national political profile. Elsewhere, rural issues tend to be less politically-sensitive from a national perspective 
and, indeed, much of the policy impetus now comes from EU-level policies (in particular, Objective 5b and the 
LEADER Community Initiative). In general, the objectives of rural policy at the national level tend to reflect social pri-
orities - in particular, the desirability of maintaining population settlements by sustaining standards of living and by 
assuring the provision of public services. While economic development instruments can play a role in achieving such 
objectives, the overall focus of policy is more on social than economic cohesion. 
Policies for "crisis" areas have been a feature in many Member States since the 1980s, particularly in response to 
increasing problems of structural adjustment arising from job losses in the steel, shipbuilding and (most recently) de-
fence industries (see Section 3.1.3). There ¡s usually a clear economic development objective underlying such poli-
cies, reflecting the need to encourage alternative economic activities. However, the intensity of decline (and its spa-
tial focus) is usually such that the policy response also incorporates significant social and political aspects. In the 
case study countries, examples of "crisis" area policies are provided for Germany, France, the United Kingdom and 
Italy, all of which have experienced major plant closures in narrowly-defined localities. Over time, such areas tend 
to be incorporated within designated problem regions. 
Finally, policies for "special status" regions are considered in Section 3.1.4. In such regions - which include the new 
Länder in Germany, Corsica in France, Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom and (historically) the Mezzogiorno in 
Italy - the primary motivation of policy is to contribute to national political cohesion by reducing economic and so-
cial disparities. A feature of policies for special status regions is the sheer scale of the transfers involved, underlin-
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ing the importance attached to national solidarity and political cohesion. The most striking illustration of this Is the 
scale of transfers to the new Länder set alongside the volume of EU spending on the Structural Funds: the gross 
transfers to the new Länder for 1996 alone amount to 101 billion ECU; this compares with Structural Fund spend-
ing for the EU as whole of 64 billion over five years (1989-93). 
As far as the spatial distribution of expenditure is concerned (see Section 3.2.1), comparative regional-level infor-
mation has proven difficult to obtain. Even so, the evidence is that most spatially-discriminating policies tend to 
favour those areas in receipt of regional policy support. This is certainly true of policies for special status regions 
and it is also generally the case for most "crisis" areas. For rural and urban policy areas there may be less coinci-
dence of policy boundaries with designated regional problem areas. That having been said, both policies are very 
clearly focused on economic and social cohesion in its wider sense; they aim to tackle the specific problems of ur-
ban and rural areas and, in so doing, to reduce sources of national discord. 
Considering, finally, the evaluation studies reviewed in Section 3.2.2, the available evidence tends to suggest that 
current policy instruments are of limited impact. In particular, as regards urban policy, the evidence is that proper-
ty-led urban regeneration initiatives generate a large proportion of low quality temporary employment, ill-suited to 
the unemployed people within disadvantaged communities. This ¡s a disappointing finding given the significant so-
cial component to urban policy objectives. A further, more positive finding, at least for regional policy, is the fact that 
the cost per job figures attached to many other spatial policies are generally higher than those found for standard 
regional incentives. 
4. Horizontal Policies with Important Regional Impacts 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider policies which have no intended spatial effects but which, nevertheless, 
have significant regional impacts. Unlike the next chapter which deals with the regional dimension of general gov-
ernment transfers, the focus of this chapter is on the proactive policies of government. Two particular policies are 
reviewed: policies to promote competitiveness (in effect, R&D-oriented policies) and employment policies. 
As far as RTD and innovation policies are concerned, the chapter begins by providing appropriate background con-
text (see Section 4.1.1). The point is made that R&D spending ¡n the four Cohesion countries is significantly less 
than that found elsewhere In the EU Member States - whether measured in relation to GDP or to national popula-
tion. That having been said, Ireland and Portugal were the only OECD countries in which both public and private 
expenditure on R&D increased between the periods 1985-9 and 1990-2, an indication perhaps of the stimulating 
effect of EU policies. With regard to the regional dimension of R&D policy, the emphasis within the Cohesion coun-
tries is clearly on issues of national competitiveness, scarcely surprising given the tensions noted in Chapter 2 be-
tween national prosperity and regional disparity. 
In considering the objectives of R&D and innovation policies (see Section 4.1.2) the grouping of Germany and Italy 
together reflects the common regional features of their economies rather than any similarities in the R&D arena. In-
deed, the two countries currently take quite different approaches to RTD in their problem regions. While in Germany 
a major effort is in train to try to establish an efficient research environment in the new Länder, in Italy there are now 
no separate measures for supporting RTD in the problem regions, following the demise of special intervention in the 
Mezzogiorno. 
With respect to the "northern European" Member States, the focus is on the two case study countries: France and 
the United Kingdom. In terms of the emphasis placed on R&D expenditure (as a percentage of GDP or on a per 
capita basis), both countries are very much towards the top end of the EU Member State range, just behind Ger-
many and Sweden (see Chart 4.1). As far as the regional dimension is concerned the focus, once more, is on na-
tional competitiveness. That having been said, examples are to hand in both countries of initiatives which aim to 
encourage greater participation in innovation in all regions. Moreover, in Northern Ireland, a distinct strategy and en-
hanced funding are available to stimulate RTD in the province. 
Summing up the overall contextual position, it is clear that policies to promote RTD and innovation are generally op-
erated with national policy objectives in mind. While there are some attempts to stimulate innovation in the prob-
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lem regions, this is primarily in the form of encouraging technology transfer and the uptake of innovation rather than 
innovation per se. This broad picture is hardly surprising: research and development policymakers are understand-
ably unlikely to be willing to jeopardise R&D policy objectives for the sake of promoting less viable projects in the 
problem regions. 
Turning to consider the regional distribution of expenditures on R&D, the analysis in Section 4.1.3.1 is restricted to 
four countries for which relevant data is available: France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. The focus is, first, 
on the regional-level distribution of overall R&D expenditure, distinguishing between the private sector, government 
and the higher education sector; and, secondly, on the regional-level distribution of so-called business enterprise 
sector expenditure on R&D (BERD) and the extent to which this is financed by government. 
With regard to the former aspect - the regional distribution of overall R&D expenditure - a number of common 
themes apply across the four case study countries. Of perhaps most significance, R&D expenditure tends to be 
heavily concentrated in more prosperous regions. Thus, Paris (the île de France region) accounts for 43 percent of 
all R&D expenditure in France, Piemonte and Lombardia for almost half private and State R&D expenditure in Italy, 
Madrid for 42 percent of total R&D expenditure in Spain and the South East for some 54 percent of all R&D ex-
penditure in the United Kingdom. 
The reverse side of this coin is that R&D expenditure in the poorest regions is generally very low. By way of exam-
ple, in France the Limousin region accounts for less than 0.2 percent of the national R&D spend and, on a per capi-
ta basis has expenditure levels 20 times lower than in Paris. In similar vein, the eight regions of the Mezzogiorno in 
Italy account for only 8 percent of private and State R&D funding compared with 36 percent of the national popu-
lation. The Spanish Objective 1 regions collectively account for 24 percent of the total R&D spend while contain-
ing almost 60 percent of the national population. Lastly, in the UK, Northern Ireland represents just 0.7 percent of 
overall national R&D expenditure but holds 2.8 percent of the national population. 
A final interesting point regarding the regional distribution of overall R&D expenditure concerns the distribution of pri-
vate and public sector spending by region. While there is considerable variation between regions, there are a sig-
nificant number of instances where relatively prosperous regions benefit particularly from public sector funding. An 
obvious example is Lazio which, on its own, receives over half of the State funding for Italian R&D. In Spain, too, 
over three-fifths of State R&D funding is channelled into Madrid. 
Moving on to consider the regional distribution of government-funded BERD (business enterprise sector R&D) three 
general points can be made. The first is that there is a high degree of complementarity between government R&D 
funding and regional aid at the regional level. Prosperous regions are generally ineligible for regional support but ben-
efit disproportionately from R&D funding; in contrast, poorer regions perform badly in terms of government R&D aid 
for business but generally do well with respect to regional assistance. Second, notwithstanding the general com-
plementarity shown in Chart 4.5 to Chart 4.8, it is important to note the very different scales of R&D and regional 
spend by country. In general terms, R&D spending is far more significant than regional support in the prosperous 
Member States while regional aid is more important than government-funded BERD in many poorer Member States. 
Third, combining these two general points, it is the richest regions in the richest countries and the poorest regions 
in the poorest countries which benefit most from Member State R&D and regional aid in combination. 
Evaluation studies on the regional effects of horizontal policies in general, and competitiveness policies in particular, 
are fairly limited, hampered by the lack of appropriate regional data and by the difficulties of disentangling the im-
pact of what are often wide-ranging policies from other government policies (see Section 4.1.3.2). As a result, the 
focus of most studies is less on the regional effects of competitiveness policies and more on assessing the effec-
tiveness of such policies in different geographical contexts. While it is difficult to generalise, a broad conclusion 
seems to be that competitiveness policies work less well in less-favoured regions. 
Turning, finally, to consider employment policies (see Section 4.2), there is, in practice a serious lack of empirical 
evidence on the effects of most of the measures included in the employment programmes being followed by Mem-
ber States. However, while the effect of present policies on employment growth is uncertain, particularly in terms 
of its scale, their impact on cohesion is less questionable. A common characteristic of most of the measures in 
operation or being planned is to reduce disparities in employment opportunities whether between individuals, social 
groups or regions. While most measures do not have a specific regional dimension, the very fact that many of them 
are aimed at the unemployed - and within this group at the most disadvantaged of those without work - is likely to 
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mean that they benefit regions with the most serious problems of unemployment and inadequate rates of job cre-
ation more than others, so tending to narrow regional disparities. 
5. Interregional Transfes from Central Government Budgets 
Public expenditure in the different Member States of the EU represents a significant proportion of the income of the 
countries concerned; on average, around a quarter of GNP in industrialised countries - more if social security is in-
cluded. Government funds are generated from obligatory contributions across the regions of the countries con-
cerned and are redistributed in expenditures across the regions. This process involves involuntary but significant in-
terregional transfers. The question is whether this redistribution is in or out of line with the objectives of regional pol-
icy. In spite of its Importance as a mechanism to promote cohesion, this issue has been understudied. This chap-
ter presents the results of a research effort to assess these interregional transfer mechanisms in seven EU coun-
tries: France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom . 
A starting point for the discussion of this issue is a simple model of budget-induced transfers (see Section 5.2). 
This shows that national budgets are likely to transfer large amounts of money from richer to poorer regions. Ac-
cording to the model, these transfers are expected to be larger in those countries where the size of the budget (rel-
ative to GDP) is larger, where the tax system is progressive, where the expenditure system is "equalising", and where 
interregional income disparities are greater. 
Measuring interregional transfers induced by a national budget for a given country and a given year is a difficult ex-
ercise. The difficulties to be overcome are both conceptual and statistical (see Section 5.3). At a conceptual level, 
it is often unclear how a particular tax or a particular expenditure should be regionally allocated. Moreover, even if 
and when it is known how, in principle, to allocate a particular type of revenue or expenditure, there may well be 
statistical difficulties in .practice. The methodology adopted in the present study involves three steps: 
• first, detailed national budgets are established. These have to be (i) consolidated (ii) balanced (iii) recent (iv) ex-
ecuted and (v) broken down into as many items of revenue and expenditure as possible. 
• second, to allow the regional allocation of these budgetary items, allocation criteria or "keys" are sought for each 
item. Regional allocation keys are chosen on the basis of their economic sense: the research methodology is 
guided by economic reasoning and by the theory of incidence in the selection of criteria 
• third, for each region, the amounts estimated for each item of revenue and of expenditure are summed with a 
view to indicating how much each region has contributed (in revenues) to the budget and how much it has 
gained (in expenditures) from the budget. 
While of itself simple, the methodology is complicated by two factors. One Is that there is often more than one al-
location key which may be considered appropriate to any given budgetary item. The procedure adopted in the 
study is to allocate these alternative regional keys on the basis of 101 randomly selected combinations and to study 
the distribution of the summed totals. If the distribution of numbers is sufficiently concentrated - that is, if the co-
efficient of dispersion is reasonably low - the conclusion is that the estimates converge and the median or average 
value of the distribution is retained. If, on the contrary, the distributions are extremely dispersed, then it is impos-
sible to say much about the contributions to the budget and the gains from the budget for a given region. 
A second complication arises from the distinction which can be drawn on the expenditure side between a "flow 
approach" - focusing on where expenditure flows in the first instance - and a "benefit approach", concentrating on 
where the ultimate beneficiaries of any given expenditure flow are located. Different allocation keys apply depend-
ing on whether a flow or benefit approach is being utilised. As a consequence, for any given region, two estimates 
of budgetary "gain" are produced: one based on the flow concept, the other on the benefit concept. In similar vein, 
two estimates of budget-induced transfers are produced for each region - "transfers (flow)" (ie. allocated expendi-
tures on the flow concept minus budget contributions) and "transfers (benefits)" (ie. allocated expenditures on the 
benefit concept minus budget contributions). Neither estimate is "better" than the other: they are of equal interest, 
viewing the complex phenomenon of budget-induced interregional transfers from different angles. 
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The main findings from the application of the above methodology are presented in Section 5.4. They are: 
• that there is indeed a concentration of results in practice, making it appropriate to utilise the mean results 
• that budget-induced interregional transfers are large: irrespective of whether the "flow" or the "benefit" concept 
is used, it appears that the richer regions of the countries studied transfer significant sums to the poorer or prob-
lem regions through public funds 
• that the transfers induced by government budgets are clearly related to the GDP per capita of regions: the rich-
er is a region, relative to the national situation, the more its net contribution to the budget; in similar vein, the 
poorer is a region, the more it receives in transfers from the budget 
• that equal regions from an EU perspective are not treated equally: national cohesion machines are unequal at 
the European level. 
Out of these results, it is possible to suggest three broad implications for European regional policies (see Section 
5.5). First, taking into account budget-induced transfers produces a new (different) representation of the relative 
economic situations of the regions of Europe - this point must be borne in mind when designating problem region 
maps at the EU level. Second, when considering pro-active spatial policies, it is important not to lose sight of the 
role of budget-induced transfers within countries, particularly in the less-developed Member States. The measure-
ment of budget-induced transfers shows that some of the richest regions of these countries, though relatively poor 
at the European level, transfer large amounts of money to the rest of their countries. Third, regional policy must 
take into account the fact that changes in institutional or fiscal policies could have direct implications for the level 
of the flows of budget-induced transfers. For example, fiscal decentralisation, which is in progress in many coun-
tries, has a direct implication for the volume of public funds managed at the national level and, related, for the in-
tensity of the interregional redistribution of income. In another field, the EU convergence criteria which aim to re-
duce the public deficit (ie. public expenditures) have a direct impact on the scale of interregional transfers. Any har-
monisation of national tax systems in European countries could also produce changes in the structure of govern-
ment revenues, and thus change the spatial progressivity of the fiscal system. As a result, those in charge of re-
gional policies must develop a better understanding of budgetary cohesion mechanisms and become more involved 
in many, indeed most, non-regional policy changes. 
6. Conclusions 
This report has focused o n t w o principal categor ies of government spend ing that impact on economic and social 
cohes ion in the EU Member States: the automat ic transfers induced by government taxat ion and expendi tures; and 
the spending policies pursued proactively by governments , whether or not w i th cohes ion in m ind . 
A key point to bear in mind in consider ing the overall results of the work (see Sect ion 6.1) concerns the scale of 
the transfers and spend ing conce rned ; budge t induced interregional transfers are massive c o m p a r e d wi th s p e n d -
ing on proact ive government pol icies. This is best i l lustrated by example: the value of the transfer f lows to Lorraine 
is about 40 t imes the spend on regional incentive pol icy in the region. Moreover, this is a modes t example; Lorraine 
is not even one of the principal beneficiaries of transfers in France (transfer f lows to Midi-Pyrénées and Limousin 
amoun ted to 5 and 6 percent of regional GDP, respectively compared to just 2 percent for Lorraine), but Lorraine 
does receive more regional aid as a propor t ion of regional G D P than any other French region. The same calcula-
t ion for L imousin s h o w s that transfers are wor th 600 t imes more than regional incentive spending in the region. 
The same holds t rue for expendi ture on horizontal pol icies. In Chapter 4 , it w a s noted that the contr ibut ion of EU 
governments to private sector spend ing on R&D w a s of the same broad order of magn i tude as their spend ing on 
regional incentive policy. In all the countr ies d iscussed, this spend ing is very heavily skewed in favour of the more 
prosperous regions, even in relation to regional GDP. Taking France as an example again, government funding of 
private sector R&D in île de France amoun ts to a round one-f i f th of the value of the transfer f lows out of the region. 
Again, this is a very conservat ive example . Of the countr ies cons idered in Chapter 4 , government funding of private 
sector R&D accounts for a higher propor t ion of regional G D P (0.57 percent) in the Paris region than anywhere else; 
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the comparable proportions for Madrid and Piemonte are 0.26 percent and 0.13 percent of their regional GDP fig-
ures respectively. Moreover, the value of the transfer flows away from these regions are significantly higher than those 
away from Paris; 10 percent of regional GDP in the case of Piemonte and 9 percent in the case of Madrid. This 
means that the value of the transfer flows away from Madrid is some 70 times the value of government R&D poli-
cy in the region. 
In the wider context of cohesion at the European level, these figures are clearly of considerable significance. Not 
only does île de France receive substantially more in government funded R&D as a proportion of regional GDP than 
does Madrid, but the transfer flows away from Madrid are substantially larger than those away from Paris. All this 
must be set in the context of the fact that the GDP of Madrid is 97 percent of the EU average while that of île de 
France is 166 percent of the EU average. 
Not only do the expenditures considered in this report differ substantially in scale, they also differ in nature. Auto-
matic transfers are the inevitable outcome of differences between the amount of taxation collected in a given re-
gion, which is closely related to the prosperity of that region, and the value of government expenditures in a region, 
which is more closely related to the population of that region. The pattern of much of this expenditure reflects the 
needs arising from the demands made on welfare and public services provision, including health, education and un-
employment benefits. In consequence, in regional terms, transfers flow, in a neutral way, to those regions where the 
need arises. In so doing, they remove much of the Impact on regional incomes of external economic shocks. Also 
key, transfer mechanisms are long-term, providing a kind of mutual insurance policy between the regions of a na-
tion. In France, for example, the status of regions as contributors or beneficiaries from the central government has 
changed over time as the competitive advantage of regions has changed; in the 1960s, the Nord Pas de Calais re-
gion was a contributor to the budget - it is now a beneficiary. It is unclear how common this change of status is; 
however, it is clear that if regions that are beneficiaries are to have any chance of becoming contributors, then gov-
ernment funding must continue to provide for the basic needs of the region, irrespective of how much it currently 
contributes to the central budget. 
Proactive policies contrast sharply with automatic transfers. By their nature, they are explicit and directed at spe-
cific developmental objectives; they tend to be implemented on short to medium-term timescales. Far from being 
neutral and automatic, they frequently involve considerable policymaker discretion and require expert input into pol-
icy design, delivery and implementation. Nevertheless, the impact of proactive policies is unclear. The difficulties in-
volved in policy evaluation mean that an understanding of the real effects of the range of government policies (on 
cohesion or more generally) "remains elusive". 
Notwithstanding the differences in the nature and the volume of the expenditures studied, and the difficulties in-
volved in policy evaluation, it can be said that, overall, national expenditures tend to flow from the more prosperous 
towards the less prosperous regions within a country. Not surprisingly, regional policy spending tends to flow In the 
direction of the worst-off regions within countries although, as has been shown, the patterns of spend are some-
what uneven. Regional policy spending is buttressed by automatic transfers; the results from this part of the study 
are unambiguous - the direction of the flows supports economic and social cohesion within the national context. 
Member States' other spatial policies also support cohesion, although it is notable that, as far as these policies are 
concerned, the overriding objectives are political and social, rather than economic. The pattern for horizontal poli-
cies is less clear cut. Member States' employment policies tend, by their nature, to support social, and perhaps 
economic, cohesion. However, the pattern of expenditures on policies aimed at improving the competitiveness of 
national economies by promoting RTD is virtually a mirror image of patterns of regional disparity; the wealthier a re-
gion is, the more government tends to spend on promoting R&D within that region. Conversely, the poorer a region 
is, the smaller the spend on R&D as a proportion of regional GDP. 
This study has examined the situation of regions primarily within their national contexts. However, it is important to 
stress that, taking an EU perspective, there is no direct relationship between the prosperity of a region and its sta-
tus as a contributor to the national budget or a beneficiary from it; similarly, it does not follow that regions of equiv-
alent prosperity ¡n a European context will be equal beneficiaries of Member States' regional or horizontal policies. 
The Midi-Pyrénées and Cataluña regions, which have the same level of prosperity in relation to the EU average il-
lustrate this point. Midi-Pyrénées is designated for French regional policy purposes and receives a net flow transfer 
from the government budget equal to 5 percent of regional GDP; in contrast, Cataluña is not designated for na-
tional regional policy purposes and makes a net flow contribution to the government budget of 5 percent of its GDP. 
More than this, not only does Cataluña receive nothing from the national regional policy budget, but it also receives 
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less than Midi-Pyrénées in R&D policy spend; the R&D spend in Midi-Pyrénées is worth 0.44 percent of regional 
GDP; in Cataluna it is worth just 0.06 percent. 
Looking to the future (see Section 6.2), the report identifies three sets of issues requiring further work: 
• the need to move from a static analysis to take more account of the impact of history on cohesion mechanisms 
• the desirability of taking "non-spending" policies more into account, given the obvious differential impact of reg-
ulatory and other policies upon different regions 
• and the need for the analysis (especially relating to budget-induced transfers) to take more cognisance of the 
long-term impacts of public expenditures. 
Finally, in Section 6.3, the report draws together four general, but important, policy implications. The first is that it 
is not only regional policy decisions which impact on spatial cohesion: decisions taken in all policy areas have re-
gional and cohesion consequences. Second, the sum of Member States commitments to national cohesion does 
not add up to EU cohesion; indeed national cohesion policies frequently run counter to European cohesion poli-
cies. Third, the role presently played by regional GDP per capita in the design of EU regional policies should per-
haps be reconsidered, not least because GDP per capita is an indicator of the wealth of a region before national 
redistributive policies. Lastly, the analysis suggests that more policymaker attention should be given to the longer-
term impacts of assistance policies. 
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Economie and Social Cohesion in the European Union: 
The Impact of Member States' Own Policies 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Questions 
This report presents the findings of research which has 
been undertaken on behalf of the European Commis-
sion into the impact of Member States' policies on eco-
nomic and social cohesion in the European Union (EU). 
Regional disparities within EU countries are often signif-
icant; indeed, the Internal inequalities expressed in 
terms of income per head and unemployment or other 
measures of disadvantage are of sufficient concern for 
all EU countries to have Introduced regional policies that 
aim to redress such imbalances. In addition to "classic" 
regional policy measures, many countries are also con-
cerned with other types of spatial problem and operate 
policies that address specific Issues such as rural prob-
lems, urban deprivation or unemployment blackspots. 
Government policy responses to regional and other 
spatial problems are often high profile. However, in ex-
penditure terms they tend to be dwarfed by two other 
aspects of government activity which are likely to have 
regional implications: on the one hand, sectoral and 
horizontal policies that are pursued "proactively" (eg. 
R&D, employment, defence); and, on the other, the 
(mainly) automatic, interregional transfers resulting from 
general public expenditures and central government 
allocations to subnational authorities. 
In considering these four areas of government activity 
(regional policy; other spatial policies; horizontal poli-
cies; and overall government expenditures), the key re-
search questions are: 
i. to what extent can policies which have the re-
dress of regional disparities as their objective (ie. 
regional and other spatial policies) be shown to 
contribute to this end? 
ii. to what extent can it be shown that horizontal or 
sectoral policies contribute to or undermine spa-
tial policy spending and its objectives? 
iii. at a global level, what is the spatial distribution of 
public spending and what is its role in reducing 
economic and social disparities? 
These research questions concern, first, the proactive 
policies pursued by government, whether or not with 
spatial objectives in mind, and, second, the largely 
automatic interregional transfers that are the outcome 
of the differing spatial distribution of government tax-
ation and spending. The next three chapters focus 
on the proactive policies of government. They con-
sider, in turn, the regional impact of Member States' 
regional policies (Chapter 2), other spatial policies 
(Chapter 3) and selected horizontal policies (Chapter 
4). Chapter 5 then reviews those budget-induced in-
terregional transfers which result from government 
expenditure and taxation policies. A final chapter, 
Chapter 6, draws together the main findings of the 
report. 
1.2 Country Coverage 
Given the wide-ranging policy focus of the study, it has 
proven necessary to limit the range of countries ex-
amined in detail. While an overview of the position in 
EU 15 is provided wherever possible - and particularly 
in the discussion of regional and employment policies 
- country coverage in most of the chapters which fol-
low is restricted to six countries: France, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. How-
ever, Sweden is also included as a case study country 
in the analysis of budget-induced interregional trans-
fers In Chapter 5. 
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1.3 Relative Policy Weightings 
Before turning to the detail of the individual policy chap-
ters, it is necessary to provide an overview of the broad 
weighting attached to the various elements of policy. A 
breakdown of government expenditures by function is 
set out in Table 1.1 in respect of the standard case study 
countries: France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and 
the United Kingdom. The data are for 1989, the last 
year for which information is available for all six countries. 
Table 1.1: The Distribution of General Government Expenditure by Main Function'1' (percent) 
Services 
General government 
Community and social 
Education 
Economic 
Other 
Portugal 
15.2 
35.8 
13.0 
13.3 
22.8 
Spain 
10.6 
53.0 
9.6 
13.9 
12.9 
Italy 
15.5 
46.6 
9.9 
11.8 
16.2 
Germany 
15.7 
59.7 
9.4 
9.2 
6.0 
France 
16.1 
61.8 
10.5 
6.5 
5.2 
United Kingdom 
19.2 
51.3 
12.0 
7.2 
10.3 
Source: EUROSTAT 
The table distinguishes between five broad functional 
categories. The first heading, General Government 
Services, includes activities undertaken by government 
which are not associated with services to persons or 
to business - including overall monetary and fiscal 
services, the conduct of external affairs, defence activ-
ities and public order and safety. The second head-
ing, Community and Social Services, focuses on serv-
ices supplied to the community and to households and 
persons directly. It incorporates health, social security 
and welfare, housing, community development and 
cultural services. While education services are nor-
mally included within this heading, they have been 
separated out in the table since educational expendi-
ture can be viewed to have both a social and an eco-
nomic role. The fourth heading, Economic Services, 
covers government expenditures associated with the 
regulation and more efficient operation of business. It 
includes spending in respect of government economic 
development objectives as well as services for indus-
try relating to research, trade promotion and sectoral 
regulation. It thus incorporates the proactive policies 
considered in Chapters 2 to 4. The final heading con-
tains public debt interest charges plus general trans-
fers within government. 
Table 1.1 shows clearly the importance of spending on 
community and social services - generally accounting 
for over half and, in a number of instances, for around 
three-fifths of general government expenditure. In 
comparison, the other four headings tend to be far 
less significant. In particular, spending on economic 
services ranges from just 6.5 percent to 13.9 percent 
of the expenditure total. 
A similar picture is shown by Table 1.2 which relates 
the five categories of general government expenditure 
to national GDP. The table shows that the average 
percentage coverage for community and social serv-
ices within the six case study countries is just over 
23 percent compared to an economic services aver-
age of less than 5 percent. In considering differences 
by country, perhaps the most significant point to 
arise is the far greater emphasis on community and 
social services (and accordingly less stress on eco-
nomic services) in the wealthier Member States (and 
particularly in Germany and France). Whereas com-
munity and social service expenditure averaged 3.5 
times spending on economic services in the three 
countries with major Objective 1 regions (Portugal, 
Spain, Italy), it represented almost eight times eco-
nomic services expenditure on average in Germany, 
France and the UK. 
It is clear from the tables that policies pursued proac-
tively by Member State governments with economic 
development objectives in mind (ie. economic services 
to business) are relatively small-scale when set along-
side services supplied to the community and to house-
holds and persons directly (including health, social se-
curity, welfare and housing). There remains, however, 
the issue of the relative importance of those proactive 
policies which have an explicit spatial orientation. 
One EU-wide source of information on this is the Com-
mission's Fourth Survey on State Aids'2'. This Survey 
'1| Information on the functional distribution of government expendi-
tures is contained in the Eurostat publication. General Government Ac-
counts and Statistics 1981-1992 Eurostat, Luxembourg, 1994. The 
breakdown of expenditure by function is based on the United Nations 
Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) (see United 
Nations, Classification ot the Functions of Government, Statistical Pa-
pers, Series M, No. 70, New York, 1980). 
121 Fourth Survey from the Commission on State Aid in the European 
Union in the Manufacturing and Certain Other Sectors (COM (95), 365 
final, Brussels, 26.07.1995). 
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Table 1.2: General Government Expenditure by Main Function as a Percentage of National GDP (1989) 
Services 
General government 
Community and social 
Education 
Economic 
Other 
Total 
Portugal 
6.5 
15.3 
5.6 
5.7 
9.8 
42.8 
Spain 
4.5 
22.5 
4.1 
5.9 
5.5 
42.6 
Italy 
8.0 
24.1 
5.1 
6.1 
8.4 
51.7 
Germany 
6.9 
26.4 
4.2 
4.1 
2.7 
44.3 
France 
8.0 
30.6 
5.2 
3.2 
2.6 
49.6 
United Kingdom 
7.7 
20.6 
4.8 
2.9 
4.1 
40.2 
Source: EPRC calculations from EUROSTAT data. 
covers the period 1990-92 and focuses principally on 
national aid to the manufacturing sector, though It al-
so contains information on certain other aspects of na-
tional aid systems as they relate to agriculture, fish-
eries, transport (railways and inland waterways) and 
coal mining131. 
Limitations on the coverage of the data are made 
clear in the Survey; in particular, the Survey recognis-
es that "the classification of aid is in many cases 
somewhat arbitrary because it is necessary to decide 
which of the objectives declared by a Member State 
Is to be considered as the primary objective"(4). Nev-
ertheless, the Survey is of interest in providing a broad 
indication of the breakdown of State aid spending by 
function, distinguishing in particular between regional 
support, horizontal measures and certain sectoral aids 
(see Table 1.3). 
Table 1.3: 
Horizontal 
Sectoral 
Regional 
State Aid to 
Portugal 
34 
55 
11 ' 
Manufacturing by Objective (percent) (1990-92) 
Spain 
50 
34 
16 
Italy 
30 
8 
62 
Germany 
21 
8 
72 
France 
71 
18 
11 
United Kingdom 
45 
25 
30 
EU 12 
38 
12 
50 
Source: Fourth Survey, Table 6. 
It can be seen that, at the level of EU12, regional ob-
jectives account for half of the manufacturing total, 
with horizontal objectives representing a further 38 
percent. Within the horizontal aid grouping (see Table 
1.4), most emphasis is placed on research and de-
velopment (10 percent of the manufacturing total), 
SME support (9 percent) and export/trade assistance 
(9 percent). However, these broad percentages mask 
very considerable variation at the Member State lev-
el, no doubt in part due to the somewhat arbitrary al-
location of aid by objective. For regional objectives, 
for instance, the range for the case study countries 
is from as low as 11 percent (France, Portugal) to 72 
percent (Germany), while for horizontal aid the varia-
tion is from 21 percent (Germany) to over 70 percent 
(France). 
Table 1.4: Horizontal Aids as a Proportion of Manufacturing State Aid Expenditure (1990-92) 
R&D 
Environment 
SME 
Trade/export 
Energy-saving 
Gen. Investment 
Other 
Source: Fourth Survey, 
Portugal 
3 
0 
1 
0 
1 
18 
10 
Table 6. 
Spain 
17 
3 
10 
1 
2 
6 
10 
Italy 
3 
0 
9 
9 
3 
2 
5 
Germany 
9 
1 
4 
1 
2 
0 
4 
France 
27 
0 
11 
30 
1 
1 
0 
United Kingdom 
7 
1 
15 
15 
0 
6 
0 
EU 12 
10 
1 
9 
9 
2 
2 
4 
a It does not deal with aid where the recipients are not actual enter-
prises (eg. aid to households, the handicapped, infrastructure, univer-
sities, vocational training centres). Nor does it cover general aid meas-
ures, related, for instance, to differences in national tax and social se-
curity systems. Nor does it include aid granted by supranational and 
multinational organisations, including Community aid. Nor does it ex-
tend to certain individual types of aid. Of particular note in the context 
of the current study, training and unemployment measures are ex-
cluded. 
'ï Fourth Survey, page 20 
Introduction 
As well as being aware of the considerable varia-
tion in Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 by country, it is al-
so important - given the emphasis in what follows 
on the spatial orientation of policy - to examine 
more fully the composition of the regional aid 
spending. In Table 1.5 regional aid expenditure is 
presented by country and by country grouping and 
is related to total regional aid for EU12, to manu-
facturing State aid in each country covered and to 
overall State aid by country. As already mentioned, 
the figures presented are annual averages over the 
1990-92 period. 
Table 1.5: Regional State Aid Expenditure by Country (Annual Average 1990-92) 
COUNTRY MECU % of total 
regional State 
aid 
%of 
manufacturing 
State aid 
30 
16 
11 
69 
25 
62 
72 
36 
31 
5 
65 
16 
2 
11 
66 
18 
30 
20 
10 
17 
50 
% of overall 
State aid 
26 
4 
6 
38 
10 
29 
28 
14 
12 
2 
29 
5 
1 
3 
13 
8 
16 
11 
5 
6 
20 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
Ireland 
Cohesion Countries 
Italy 
Germany, of which: 
-East 
-Berlin/ZBA 
-West 
Italy/Germany 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
UK, of which: 
-GB 
- NI 
OtherEU12 
TOTALEU12 
312 
217 
50 
213 
791 
7369 
8568 
4259 
3663 
646 
15938 
-81 
6 
573 
38 
166 
808 
536 
272 
1773 
18502 
2 
1 
0 
1 
4 
39 
46 
23 
20 
3 
86 
1 
0 
3 
0 
1 
4 
3 
1 
10 
100 
Source: EPRC calculations from Fourth Survey, Statistical Annex. 
The key point to arise from Table 1.5 is that no less 
than 86 percent of the regional aid spending is attrib-
utable to just two countries - Italy and Germany. In 
contrast, the four Cohesion countries account for just 
4 percent of the total. Moreover, "regional aid" in such 
countries is often very widely spread, reflecting the fact 
that most or all of the territories of the Cohesion coun-
tries are viewed as problem regions for regional policy 
purposes. While regional aid on average represents 
around half of the manufacturing total, the proportion 
varies from almost two-thirds for Italy/Germany to one-
quarter for the Cohesion countries and an average 17 
percent for the grouping consisting of Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
UK. The picture in respect of overall State aid expen-
diture is similar. Whereas regional aid amounts to 29 
percent of the total in Italy/Germany, it accounts for 
just 10 percent of overall State aid in the Cohesion 
countries and around 6 percent in the remaining Mem-
ber States. 
1.4 Concluding Points 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this brief 
overview of government spending by function: 
• most general government expenditure (on average, 
over three-fifths of the total) focuses on services 
Economic and Social Cohesion in the European Union: The Impact of Member States' Own Policies: Final Report 
supplied to the community and to households and 
persons directly (in the form of education, health, 
social security and welfare, housing etc.); 
by comparison, spending on economic services -
that is, services for business and services meeting 
economic development objectives - is relatively 
small-scale, accounting for around 10 percent of 
the total; 
the proportion of spending on community and so-
cial services compared to economic services is sig-
nificantly higher in the wealthier Member States 
than it is in those countries with major Objective 1 
regions; 
in the context of those proactive policies which 
government undertake primarily with economic de-
velopment objectives in mind, a considerable pro-
portion of expenditure (around half of State aid for 
manufacturing) can be characterised as relating to 
regional objectives, with a further 38 percent asso-
ciated with horizontal aids (in particular, R&D, SME 
and export/trade measures); 
however, there is considerable variation by country 
in the spread of State aid spending within manu-
facturing. Most of the regional spend (over 86 per-
cent) relates to just two Member States - Italy and 
Germany - with regional aid expenditure in these 
countries representing 65 percent of the manufac-
turing State aid total; elsewhere in the Community 
regional aid is far more limited in scale, averaging 
one quarter of State 'aid spending for manufactur-
ing in the four Cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain) and just 17 percent for the re-
maining Member States. 
Having provided a broad Indication of the relative im-
portance of different components of government ex-
penditure and, in the context of proactive government 
policies, of the different weightings attached to State 
aid policies, the remainder of this report focuses on the 
spatial impact of four different aspects of policy: Mem-
ber States' regional policies (Chapter 2), other spatial 
policies (Chapter 3), selected horizontal policies (Chap-
ter 4) and those budget-induced interregional transfers 
which result from government expenditure and taxa-
tion policies (Chapter 5). The main findings of the study 
can be found In Chapter 6. 
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2. Member States' Regional Policies(5) 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an assessment of 
the impact of Member States' regional policies on eco-
nomic and social cohesion. The chapter first sets out 
the objectives of regional policy in the different Mem-
ber States (Section 2.1) before considering the evi-
dence which is available on the regional impact of pol-
icy (Section 2.2). In this latter context, the research 
has been restricted to available evidence and study re-
sults. Accordingly, the focus Is, on the one hand, on 
the distribution of national regional policy expenditure 
by region (Section 2.2.1); and, on the other hand, on 
a review of recent evaluation studies (Section 2.2.2). 
The main points to arise from the chapter are high-
lighted in a concluding section (Section 2.3). 
2.1 The Objectives of Member 
States' Regional Policies 
In considering the objectives of Member States' re-
gional policies, a notable feature is the variety of the 
concerns that are addressed. Taking the European 
Union as a whole, three principal types of regional in-
equality can be identified: 
• disparities in employment, especially high levels of 
unemployment resulting mainly from industrial re-
structuring, but also issues of underemployment, 
especially in the lagging regions 
• economic disparities, expressed in terms of the 
contribution of regions to national GDP and, relat-
ed, the structure of economic activity 
'5I The material in this chapter builds on and develops research on re-
gional policy in the EU undertaken at the European Policies Research 
Centre at the University of Strathclyde since the late 1970s.. The lat-
est published output is Yuill D, Bachtler J and Wishlade F, European 
Regional Incentives: 16'" Edition, Bowker-Saur, London, 1996. 
• demographic and geographical issues, especially 
peripherality, and, associated, outmigration. 
All of these factors are a consideration in most EU 
Member States. Nevertheless, there are very different 
emphases in different countries. In this context it is 
possible to distinguish between four broad groups of 
countries: 
i. The four "Cohesion" countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain), where issues of economic 
development are the main preoccupation, but 
where underemployment and peripherality and, 
to a lesser extent, industrial decline are also con-
cerns. 
ii. Germany and Italy, which are characterised by 
the dual nature of their economies; these coun-
tries display by far the widest internal regional 
disparities. On the other hand, there remain 
problem areas within the more prosperous re-
gions. 
ill. The central and northern EU countries (/Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom), where 
employment issues, especially related to industri-
al restructuring, tend to dominate. However, the 
nature of the regional problem in these countries 
is also characterised by its variety, complexity 
and susceptibility to change; recent years have 
seen the emergence of acute urban and rural 
problems, as well as issues associated with the 
restructuring of industries such as defence. 
Moreover, peripherality and rural depopulation 
are often also concerns. In addition, in some 
countries, there are special situations to address, 
notably Northern Ireland within the United King-
dom and Corsica in France. 
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iv. The Nordic Member States (Finland and Swe-
den), where the effects of peripherality, climate 
and geography are the principal issues ad-
dressed by regional policy. 
This breakdown is in no sense a rigid categorisation, 
but rather is intended to provide a framework for iden-
tifying commonalities and trends across the EU. 
2.1.1 The "Cohesion" Countries 
It is important to recall here that this report is concerned 
with the policies of the Member States; on the other 
hand, the scale of EU Structural Fund expenditure in the 
Cohesion countries (and the influence of the European 
Commission over how this money is expended) makes 
it difficult to disentangle EU regional policy from the im-
plementation of what are ostensibly national policy 
measures. Analysis of the Community Support Frame-
works (CSFs) agreed for Objective 1 regions over the 
1989-93 period shows that, within the Cohesion coun-
tries, Structural Fund support for the productive envi-
ronment (industry and services) is very significant - vary-
ing from 50 percent of the total spend in Spain to over 
65 percent in Portugal. Given such levels of EU funding, 
national and EU regional policy are obviously very close-
ly interrelated in the Cohesion countries. 
The four Cohesion countries are characterised by the 
problem of implementing a regional development poli-
cy in the context of national economies which are 
themselves underdeveloped from an EU perspective. 
In such an environment, arguments for regional policy 
are often hard to sustain: the capital city and other rel-
atively developed areas are, realistically, the only parts 
of the country that are likely to be able to compete in-
ternationally, at least in the short term. It is easy, there-
fore, to argue that the policy focus should be concen-
trated on enabling at least part of the country to be 
competitive, instead of spreading resources thinly 
throughout the country, thereby diluting the concentra-
tion of expenditure and its potential impact. However, 
there are also strong arguments for operating regional 
polices in the context of underdeveloped economies. 
First, there are equity-based concerns: that it is simply 
unjust to abandon large tracts of a country and its 
population to the pressures of market forces and de-
sertification. Second, there are efficiency-related is-
sues: long-term emphasis on the development of al-
ready-prosperous regions may result not only in un-
even levels of development, but also in congestion and 
pollution problems, as well as potential inflationary 
pressures, as a consequence of inter-regional migra-
tion and the overconcentration of activities. 
This tension between national prosperity and regional 
disparity is reflected particularly in the objectives of the 
regional policies of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Over 
time, all three have experienced a significant shift in 
priorities and changes in the relationship between na-
tional industrial development and regional policies. 
In Greece, regional and industrial development policies 
are provided for within a single legislative framework. 
However, the priority accorded to regional policy in 
comparison with national industrial policy has declined 
over the past decade or so. Initially, the aim of the leg-
islation (Law 1262/1982) was to encourage industrial 
development outside the Athens and Thessaloniki ar-
eas (Region A); projects in these areas could only qual-
ify for assistance if they met certain special criteria, 
such as environmental protection or investment in new 
technologies. General regional aid was not available in 
Region A. The objective of this approach was two-fold: 
first, to encourage industrial development in the less-
developed parts of the country; and second, to ease 
congestion in the developed areas, especially Athens, 
by supporting environmental protection investment and 
relocation projects. At the same time, there was an im-
portant national industrial development dimension to 
policy insofar as support for research and development 
and investment in new technologies (so-called "special 
investment") remained available nationwide. 
Over time, the regional policy dimension to the legisla-
tion in Greece has been eroded. The list of exceptions 
to the general rule that Region A does not qualify for 
general regional aid has been progressively extended. 
The most recent changes to Greek industrial and re-
gional policy legislation took place in 1994 and contin-
ued the trend of reinforcing the assistance available in 
Region A and, by implication, reducing the advantages 
supposedly conferred on the problem regions. Law 
2234/1994 added large investment projects aimed at 
improving the international competitiveness of Region 
A firms to the list of project eligible for general region-
al aid, together with a number of other specified proj-
ect types. 
In Ireland, there is currently little emphasis placed on 
regional policy. Since the 1920s, the main objective of 
Irish industrial policy has been the industrialisation of 
the country; regional policy has, to a large extent, been 
viewed simply as an extension of industrial policy. In 
the early 1950s, regionally-differentiated industrial in-
centives were introduced, marking a commitment to 
rectify regional imbalances within the Irish economy. 
However, rising unemployment and large-scale emi-
gration led to a re-evaluation of policy later in the 
decade. Consequently, there was a shift to an export-
led strategy requiring greater participation in the inter-
national economy, supported by an active industrial 
policy and with reduced emphasis on issues of re-
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gional inequality. This approach has been at the cen-
tre of Irish economic policy ever since, with regional 
policy subservient to the pursuit of national economic 
growth, although in the 1970s there was perhaps more 
emphasis on influencing the location of industrial in-
vestment than there is at present. 
Reflecting the low priority given to regional develop-
ment policy in Ireland, measures for promoting indige-
nous development and for attracting inward invest-
ment are operated more or less on a nationwide ba-
sis. Although higher levels of assistance are, in theory, 
available in designated areas, in practice, little or no 
differentiation is made. The approach of the Irish au-
thorities is amply illustrated in the 1994 IDA Ireland An-
nual Report which states that: 
"IDA Ireland cannot, realistically, expect to de-
liver overseas investors in any great volume to 
regions of the country which do not have the 
population or infrastructure from which to oper-
ate competitively in International markets. If a 
conflict arises between winning an investment 
project at all and our regional development re-
sponsibility our priority must be to secure the 
investment for Ireland." 
Where there is an emphasis on the regional problem in 
Ireland, this tends to be in the context of other policies, 
for example, measures for the Gaeltacht regions. 
In Portugal regional policy has a higher profile than in 
either Greece or Ireland and is now essentially distinct 
from national industrial policy. The tensions between 
national economic development and regional policy are 
evident in the recent history of the relationship be-
tween the two policy areas. Portuguese regional poli-
cy was substantially reformed following membership of 
the EU and provided for assistance (the SIBR) to be 
available throughout the country, but to favour the in-
terior. In the late 1980s, a special EC-funded develop-
ment programme for Portuguese industry, the PEDIR 
was introduced and there were concerted efforts to 
co-ordinate and dovetail the two policies. The objec-
tive was to maintain consistency between the two pol-
icy areas (notably by applying the same industrial pol-
icy criteria), whilst ensuring a suitable differential be-
tween the underdeveloped and the more prosperous 
areas by offering higher levels of assistance and oper-
ating less stringent award conditions in the problem re-
gions. In consequence, the SIBR was restricted to the 
interior of the country, while the PEDIP provided in-
vestment assistance in the more prosperous areas, al-
beit with lower levels of support. 
In practice, however, it was argued that the "competi-
tive edge" of the regional policy package was insuffi-
cient in the context of the (EC-funded) industrial sup-
port which was available nationally; in particular, the 
award differential was considered inadequate to offset 
the disadvantages of locating in the interior of the 
country. More significantly, perhaps, the co-ordinated 
approach led to the criticism that regional policy was 
being driven by industrial policy criteria and not by dis-
crete regional development objectives. These and oth-
er related criticisms informed the review of regional and 
industrial policies in Portugal that took place in 1992/3. 
The most significant aspect of the resulting reform was 
the explicit separation of regional and industrial poli-
cies. The main features of the reformed regional poli-
cy, the so-called SIR are: first, the emphasis on en-
couraging indigenous development (assistance is re-
stricted to small projects undertaken by small firms); 
and second, the extent to which support is shaped by 
regional development priorities - regional policy takes 
account of industrial policy in order to avoid policy 
conflicts, but assistance ¡s operated according to the 
needs and potential of the assisted areas. The focus 
of Portuguese regional policy is, then, the encourage-
ment of indigenous SME development in the interior of 
the country. However, it is also worth noting that the 
revised industrial policy, the SINDEPEDIP also com-
prises a regional development dimension; eligible proj-
ects located in the assisted areas qualify for higher lev-
els of support than in the more prosperous regions. 
The dilemma facing all three of these countries in op-
erating regional policies is the inherent conflict be-
tween national industrial competitiveness and regional 
development. Moreover, the difficulties in resolving this 
conflict are heightened by the requirements of the 
Maastricht convergence criteria, since the situation is 
particularly acute when resources are limited, forcing 
governments to choose between various policy op-
tions. Within these three countries, the dilemma is re-
flected in the choice between supporting indigenous 
(usually small) industry and attracting mobile (usually 
large) investments as the main objective of regional 
policy. 
Problems of economic development predominate in 
much of Spain (most of Andalucía, Galicia, Ex-
tremadura, Castilla-León and Castilla La Mancha). Re-
flecting this, a large part of Spain is designated as Ob-
jective 1 while the remainder is mostly covered by Ob-
jectives 2 and 5b. However, from a domestic perspec-
tive, the nature of the regional problem In Spain is 
somewhat different from the other three Cohesion 
countries. First, Spain is a significantly larger country 
and is less geographically peripheral than the other 
three; these two factors have contributed to making 
Spain an attractive location to potential inward in-
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vestors. Second, the nature of the regional problem is 
more diverse; the country comprises regions where the 
issues are more akin to those faced in northern Euro-
pean countries, notably the restructuring of heavy in-
dustry. Third, the role of the subnational level of gov-
ernment, the Autonomous Communities, is significant; 
this reinforces the tension between equity and efficien-
cy arguments for regional policy, with growing pressure 
for a greater independence of action from the more 
prosperous regions. On the other hand, there is, in 
Spain, a constitutional commitment to balanced re-
gional development. 
The constitution specifies that the public authorities will 
"promote the conditions favourable to a more equi-
table distribution of income" and that to guarantee the 
realisation of the principle of solidarity the state will 
"oversee the establishment of a fair and adequate lev-
el of economic equilibrium between the different parts 
of the country". As in the other Cohesion countries, 
Spanish national regional policy is closely related to EU 
policy. Taking account of the Cohesion Fund and 
spending under the three spatial Objectives, EU re-
gional policy spending in Spain is far higher than the 
national spend. The main instrument of regional policy 
in Spain is the regional investment grant. This is oper-
ated by central government in partnership with the Au-
tonomous Communities. An interesting feature of the 
implementation of the scheme is that it is not made 
available in all the areas authorised by the Competition 
Policy Directorate, DGIV; instead, the Spanish authori-
ties restrict national regional policy assistance to re-
gions where it is considered that the Autonomous 
Communities are unable to fund financial assistance 
themselves. In consequence, national regional policy 
assistance Is not offered in Pais Vasco or Cataluña, 
even although DGIV authorised regional aid in these 
areas. 
2.1.2 Germany and Italy 
Germany and Italy are characterised by extreme inter-
nal regional disparities; it is interesting that they should 
both be among the youngest nation states in the EU. 
In Italy, GDP per head in the poorest region (Calabria) 
is just 46.7 percent of that in the richest region (Lom-
bardia); in Germany, the differences are yet more dra-
matic. GDP per head in Thüringen is just under one 
fifth of that in Hamburg. Indeed, these two regions rep-
resent the extremes of EU prosperity; with GDP per 
head at 38 percent and 196 percent of the EU aver-
age, respectively, they are the poorest and the richest 
regions in Europe. The dual nature of the Italian and 
German economies means that the emphasis of re-
gional policy in both countries is very much on the un-
derdeveloped regions. On the other hand, both coun-
tries also operate policy in problem areas within their 
more prosperous regions; Germany has continued to 
assist the west since reunification and Italy has recently 
moved away from a policy focused exclusively on the 
south (the Mezzogiorno). 
Regional policy in Italy has undergone radical change 
since 1992. Its objectives and approach have been 
transformed in this period. From the 1950s until the 
early 1990s, Italian regional policy was synonymous 
with Mezzogiorno policy. The emphasis on the devel-
opment of the south was reflected in the existence of 
quite distinct policies (the so-called intervento straor-
dinario or special intervention) and the establishment 
of separate institutions to manage them. The inten-
tion was that special intervention should be applied 
in the Mezzogiorno over and above standard govern-
ment policies for industry, environment etc. Whether 
or not this really took place is a matter of some dis-
pute; some argue that there was a significant substi-
tution effect with standard (supposedly nationwide) 
government policies in areas such as industrial policy 
being focused on the north. Nevertheless, 1992 saw 
the demise of special intervention and the special in-
stitutions and the introduction of policies for develop-
ment areas throughout the country (aree depresse 
del territorio nazionale). The legal basis for this 
change is Law 488 of 19 December 1992; however, 
the text of the law contains no clear expression of 
the objectives of policy. Moreover, the law is scarce-
ly a coherent basis for regional policy; it provides for 
financial incentives in development areas in Italy and 
measures for water management, but its essential 
purpose is to assure a co-financing counterpart to 
EU regional policy. Reflecting this point, the spatial 
coverage of designated areas under Law 488 was 
closely related to the EU's Objective 1, 2 and 5b ar-
eas and indeed was amended in the course of 1995 
to take account of the new Structural Fund map. As 
a consequence, the coverage of the new Italian re-
gional policy map is 48.9 percent of the national 
population compared with 36.6 percent under the 
previous Mezzogiorno legislation (Law 64). 
In Germany, the lines of responsibility for regional pol-
icy are clearly demarcated; the German constitution 
gives primary responsibility for regional policy to the 
Länder and the districts. The role of the Federal gov-
ernment is to provide "a suitable framework" for the re-
structuring and development activities of the Länder 
and, where appropriate, to offer supporting assistance. 
The rationale for Federal intervention is to assist the re-
gions with structural problems that cannot be over-
come by the regions alone. The core of the regional 
policy activities of the Federal government lies in the 
operation of a partnership arrangement with the Län-
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der, the so-called Gemeinschaftsaufgabe (GA) 
'Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur', or 
"Joint Task". The main policy instrument under this 
system takes the form of financial assistance to firms, 
the so-called investment grant (Investitionszuschuß). 
Some 90 percent of GA spending takes the form of in-
centive support; the remaining 10 percent is in the 
form of business-related infrastructure. 
The main objective of German regional policy is to 
ensure that structurally weak regions can take an 
equal part in the general economic development of 
the country through a reduction of their locational 
disadvantages. Regional policy is also designed to 
support a growth and employment policy. The ration-
ale behind the provision of an active regional policy is 
that structural change can negatively affect regional 
development to such an extent that regions are un-
able alone to overcome structural bottlenecks. From 
a national economic viewpoint, it is more effective to 
provide regional assistance for restructuring to those 
regions particularly affected by structural change, 
rather than provide subsidies to threatened sectors or 
enterprises. The creation of alternative jobs in sectors 
not affected by crisis and the improvement of re-
gional infrastructure provision can alleviate the struc-
tural crisis and provide better preconditions for future 
regional growth. 
Underlying this philosophy is the existence in Ger-
many of the so-called "primary effect" as a central 
condition for firms applying for assistance within the 
GA. The primary effect exists when the goods and 
services produced by an enterprise are exported pre-
dominantly outside the region and there is a conse-
quent significant, long-term increase in the income of 
the local/regional economy. Investments made by 
firms exporting outside the region and facing interna-
tional competition tend to create the greatest number 
of jobs and broaden the income base of the region. 
Assistance to exporting firms provides compensation 
for any locational disadvantages of the region, where-
as aid to locally producing firms can distort internal 
regional competition without contributing to regional 
job creation. 
The reunification of the Germany has placed new de-
mands on structural and regional policy. The econom-
ic transformation of the new Länder requires an all-en-
compassing structural policy. The concept for this 
process rests on three main areas: reconstruction and 
maintenance of a competitive industrial core; an active 
labour market policy to overcome the time gap be-
tween the breakdown of the old and the establishment 
of the new structures; and, an active regional policy to 
improve the locational conditions and create new com-
petitive jobs. Indeed, the GA is one of the primary in-
struments of investment assistance in the new Länder, 
and contributes to the renewal of outdated capital 
stock, a central precondition for the creation of new 
competitive jobs and a self-generating economic up-
turn. 
2.1.3 The "Northern European" Member 
States 
In this group of countries the regional problem tends 
to comprise a range of concerns; however, a common 
theme is the preoccupation with levels of unemploy-
ment arising from industrial restructuring and associat-
ed technological and labour market developments. 
Moreover, for the most part, regional policy has a rel-
atively low political profile. There are, nevertheless, 
marked differences between countries with respect to 
the objectives of regional policy, as well as in the sub-
stance of policy itself. 
At one end of the spectrum is France with the broad 
concept of aménagement du territoire, which en-
compasses spatial development policies in the 
widest sense of the term. New regional development 
legislation in France, the 1995 loi d'orientation pour 
l'aménagement du territoire, describes regional de-
velopment policy as contributing to national unity 
and solidarity and identifies two main objectives: first, 
to ensure equal opportunities throughout the country 
and to create the conditions for equal access to 
"knowledge" (accès au savoir); and second, to 
achieve balanced national development. To these 
ends, regional development policy alms to reduce 
disparities in living standards linked to the geo-
graphical situation and its demographic, economic 
and employment consequences. Policy is to com-
pensate for regional disadvantage by adjusting levels 
of taxation and reducing the disparities in the re-
sources available to local authorities. Moreover, oth-
er policies (economic development, social, cultural, 
sports, education, environment, etc.) are to con-
tribute to the objectives of regional development. Re-
flecting these broad objectives, the new legislation 
refers to a wide variety of existing and new policy in-
struments, ranging from regionally-differentiated busi-
ness taxation to infrastructure and public service 
provision, as well as regional incentive policy meas-
ures common to virtually all EU countries. The main 
regional incentive in France is the regional policy 
grant (prime d'aménagement du territoire, PAT). 
However, as noted earlier, regional policy in France is 
very wide-ranging; as a result, the PAT accounts for 
only a relatively small proportion of that expenditure 
which might be attributed to the regional policy 
budget. This is illustrated by the table below. 
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Table 2.1: Breakdown of Regional Development Spending in France 1989-93 
Local employment initiatives (FRILE) 
Decentralisation (FAD) 
Regional policy grant (PAT) 
Rural SME aid (AIIZR) 
Regional development (FIAT) 
Rural development (FIDAR) 
Mining areas (GIRZOM) 
Other including mountain areas (FIAM) 
Total (FF9.2 billion - 1,388 MECU) 
6.5 % 
1.4 % 
27.4 % 
1.3 % 
33.1 % 
19.9 % 
7.5 % 
2.9 % 
100.0 % 
Source: DATAR 
Notes: Figures refer to actual payments. The FAD and the AIIZR did not run for the whole period considered. 
In contrast with the situation in France, regional policy 
in the United Kingdom is narrowly defined in terms of 
its objectives and comprises few policy instruments. 
The objectives of regional policy in the Great Britain 
were reformulated as follows in the 1983 White Paper 
Regional Industrial Development: 
"Although an economic case for regional policy 
may still be made, it is not self-evident. The 
Government believe that the case for continuing 
the policy is now principally a social one with 
the aim of reducing, on a long term basis, re-
gional Imbalances in employment opportuni-
ties." 
This statement remains the current basis for regional 
policy; it was restated in 1988 and most recently in 
1995, although with a greater emphasis on the issue 
of regional competitiveness. The government has also 
stressed that regional industrial policy should be seen 
as part of the wider government approach to "regen-
eration policy" which has an explicitly-stated objective 
of competitiveness. (In this context, it is important to 
note that urban policy spending has become of in-
creasing importance in the United Kingdom, an issue 
discussed further in Section 3.1.1). Policies for North-
ern Ireland are operated separately, but here too there 
has been growing policymaker interest in stimulating 
competitiveness. 
Unlike France, where regional policy comprises a wide 
range of instruments and approaches, regional policy 
in the United Kingdom is equated directly with financial 
incentives to firms for investment and job creation in 
the assisted areas. The main policy instrument in Great 
Britain is Regional Selective Assistance, a capital grant 
scheme; in addition, more low-key support is available 
in the form of business premises and Regional Enter-
prise Grants to small firms in the assisted areas. Se-
lective Financial Assistance provides broadly similar, 
but higher value, support to firms in Northern Ireland. 
The remaining five "northern European" countries fall 
somewhere between France and the United Kingdom 
within the policy spectrum. In considering policy ob-
jectives, it is useful to divide these countries into two 
groups: the federal countries (Austria and Belgium); 
and the remaining centralised states (Denmark, Lux-
embourg and the Netherlands). 
The two federal states present quite different regional 
policy experiences, although the involvement of the 
subnational level is, not surprisingly, a notable feature 
of both. 
In Austria, clear objectives for regional policy are diffi-
cult to isolate because of the fragmentation of compe-
tence across different levels of government and organ-
isation; however, in terms of breadth of objectives, the 
Austrian approach tends more towards the French no-
tion of aménagement du territoire than the narrower 
UK view of regional policy. Nevertheless, it should be 
stressed that regional policy has a relatively low politi-
cal profile in Austria and that regional disparities are 
not considered significant. The so-called ÖROK con-
cept (Österreichische Raumordnungskonferenz - Aus-
trian conference on regional planning) presents three 
broad requirements for regional economic policy: 
• that it should cover not only regional subsidies to 
firms, but also support for the business environ-
ment and locational factors such as transport, ed-
ucation, quality of life; 
• that regional enterprise promotion should encom-
pass more than investment subsidies, given that 
areas such as overcoming regional barriers to in-
formation and advice and creating co-operative 
networks are key to enterprise development; and 
• that regional investment assistance should aim to 
support endogenous development potential as well 
as attracting mobile investment. 
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Regional policy in Belgium is the responsibility of the 
regional governments of Flanders and Wallonia (there 
are no assisted areas in the Brussels region). Policy is 
based on the (national) 1970 Economic Expansion 
Law, but the regional governments are responsible for 
the implementation of policy within their jurisdictions. 
This means that, in practice, the concern is with re-
gional disparities at the subnational level, ie. within the 
regions. For the most part, the regional problem in 
both Flanders and Wallonia is a consequence of the 
restructuring of heavy industry notably coalmining in 
Limburg and steel-making in the more extensive de-
velopment areas in Wallonia. In the case of Hainaut, 
industrial decline is long-standing and its problems 
were considered of sufficient severity to merit Objec-
tive 1 designation. In considering the assisted areas 
map as a whole, it is noticeable that most of the bor-
der areas are designated. Moreover, the designation of 
the European Development Pole is shared between 
Belgium and neighbouring areas in France and Lux-
embourg. 
In terms of policy instruments, Belgium is very much 
towards the United Kingdom end of the spectrum. The 
1970 Economic Expansion Law provides for a pack-
age of incentives comprising grants, interest subsidies 
and associated tax relief measures; these constitute 
the main instruments of regional policy. These incen-
tives are implemented somewhat differently in the two 
regions. In Flanders, the emphasis has increasingly 
been on encouraging investment of "strategic impor-
tance" involving, for example, new production meth-
ods or the establishment of R&D facilities, but employ-
ment creation also plays a key role. In Wallonia, em-
ployment creation is the main criterion for assistance, 
but more "strategic" factors, such as the application of 
new technologies, also play a part. 
In the three remaining countries (Denmark, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands) regional policy has a low-
er profile and priority than elsewhere. This is in part as-
sociated with the relative prosperity of the countries 
concerned, their small geographical size and the ab-
sence of severe regional disparities. 
In Denmark, concern at nationwide levels of unem-
ployment led to the abolition of all regional policy 
measures in 1991; the assisted areas map was re-
tained as a precautionary measure to enable assis-
tance to be offered to large mobile investments on an 
ad hoc basis (in practice, this facility has not been 
used). The objectives of Danish regional policy are to 
identify the strengths and opportunities existing in the 
assisted areas. However, aside from EU regional poli-
cy operated under Objectives 2 and 5b, the only re-
gional policy instruments that can be identified relate to 
business support through the creation of enterprise 
zones and regional development companies; in prac-
tice, the implementation of these measures has pro-
gressed only slowly. 
The nature and objectives of regional policy in Luxem-
bourg are fundamentally affected by the small size of 
the economy and the fact that the whole country is ef-
fectively a border region. The regional problem is main-
ly associated with the restructuring of heavy industry, 
especially steel, in the south-west of the country where 
Luxembourg shares the designated European Devel-
opment Pole with neighbouring Belgium and France; 
however, there are also areas affected by the decline 
in agriculture, especially in the north. The main instru-
ment of regional policy is financial assistance to firms 
in the form of capital grants, and, to a lesser extent, 
tax relief. However, the way in which assistance is ad-
ministered reflects issues arising from the size of the 
economy. In particular, very large projects are treated 
with considerable caution because of the potential 
negative impacts of subsequent withdrawal or ratio-
nalisation. In addition, sectoral issues are considered 
very carefully; the number of firms involved in a given 
activity is likely to be small, so the domestic competi-
tion implications of subsidising one firm may be con-
siderable, especially if the products involved are pri-
marily for domestic consumption. Moreover, the fact 
that the Luxembourg frontier is entirely surrounded by 
assisted areas in countries with comparable or lower 
labour costs means that border effects are acutely felt. 
Regional policy in the Netherlands has been broad-
ened in scope in recent years so that it now tends to-
wards the wider French philosophy of aménagement 
du territoire. Indeed, the current basis for Dutch re-
gional policy is the 1995 Memorandum on Spatial Eco-
nomic Policy; in the past, this has been known as the 
regional policy memorandum. The principal focus of 
Dutch regional policy is on the north of the country, re-
flecting the good economic development progress 
made by the central regions that were previously des-
ignated. However, it is interesting to note that parts of 
the south, notably in Limburg, remain designated as 
assisted areas (even if only on a temporary, transition-
al basis). The designation of such areas does not re-
flect domestic regional policy considerations, but 
rather is justified by the fact that the neighbouring re-
gions of Belgium and Germany are assisted; a further 
instance of border effects in northern Europe. 
The aim of Dutch spatial economic policy is to cre-
ate the physical conditions which best support 
growth in employment, the principal policy goal in the 
Netherlands. In consequence, the recent Memoran-
dum on Spatial Economic Policy is primarily con-
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cerned with infrastructure provision, the focus of 
which is not necessarily on the assisted areas; for 
example, key objectives include the strengthening of 
Schiphol airport and the port of Rotterdam. The main 
instrument of regional policy per se, as in the United 
Kingdom, is the provision of financial incentives to 
firms under the investment premium (IPR). This ac-
counts for only just over one-third of Dutch expendi-
ture on spatial economic development, as the table 
below shows. 
Table 2.2: Breakdown of Future Spatial Development Spending in the Netherlands (1995-99) 
Space for economic activity (StiREA) 
Northern development programme (ISP) 
Investment premium (IPR) 
Regional development companies (ROMs) 
Co-financing 
Research and evaluation 
Total (Fl 1,430 million - 656 MECU) 
25.6% 
25.5% 
35.5% 
4.5% 
7.0% 
1.7% 
100.0% 
Source: Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
2.1.4 The Nordic Member States 
Enlargement of the EU to encompass two of the 
Nordic countries brought with it regional problems of 
a scale and type previously unknown in the European 
Community; this is borne out by the fact that EU 
competition policy rules on regional aid had to be 
adapted to take account of the specific circumstances 
of the new Member States. Both Finland and Sweden 
contain vast sparsely-populated areas which have 
harsh climates and are distant from the main popula-
tion centres and national and international markets. 
However, both countries also share some of the em-
ployment problems arising from industrial restructur-
ing. This has been an issue in parts of central and 
southern Sweden. Similarly, the south-west of Finland 
is affected by industrial restructuring and consequent 
high levels of unemployment; moreover, in the south-
east of the country, the impact of structural adjust-
ment in traditional heavy industries has been exacer-
bated by the loss of the Soviet market. 
The objectives of regional policy in Finland embrace 
both efficiency and equity considerations. The priority 
attached to these twin aims has tended to vary ac-
cording to the prevailing economic climate. In the 
current situation of high national levels of unemploy-
ment, priority is given to macroeconomic policies as 
a means of promoting regional economies; however, 
in the past, when the economic situation has been 
more favourable, measures to reduce regional dispar-
ities (in income, for example) have tended to be 
viewed more sympathetically. The current legal basis 
for regional policy in Finland is the 1994 Regional De-
velopment Act; this outlines three aims for regional 
policy: 
• balanced regional development; 
• independent development activities of regions; and 
• job creation. 
To achieve these objectives, the law states that re-
gional policy should focus on: 
• the improvement of living conditions and the avail-
ability of basic services; 
• the infrastructure necessary for regional develop-
ment; 
• the renewal of the production structure of the re-
gions, improvement of the operating conditions of 
firms and the creation of new jobs; and 
• the reinforcement of the regional economy and the 
skills of the population 
Regional policy is viewed as important in the Finnish 
context; indeed, legislation requires that sectoral policies 
take account of regional development objectives. More-
over, regional policy in its broad sense is considered to 
extend beyond regional economic measures aiming at 
industrialisation and structural adaptation to include the 
spatial dimension of the Nordic welfare state. 
Historically, regional policy in Sweden was aimed at ex-
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panding industrial production to help the lagging areas. 
Peripheral area problems have been a regional issue 
since the 1950s, with regional policy seeking to achieve 
a regional balance, rather than promoting the develop-
ment of all regions simultaneously. Priority was given to 
the more locationally-disadvantaged regions (ie. the pe-
ripheral areas), resulting in a north-south dichotomy 
which placed large parts of the country outside the 
designated areas. Policy initiatives in the early years 
were directed mainly at stimulating jobs in manufactur-
ing in the designated areas, with the goal of contribut-
ing towards more evenly-spread economic growth. 
Over time, Swedish regional policy has become 
more ambitious, incorporating a focus on social con-
ditions (ie. people have the right to public sector fi-
nancial support, the right to continue living in the 
area they were born etc.) and environmental ques-
tions. Often based on the theme of territorial equali-
ty for all parts of Sweden, the highest point was 
reached four years ago, with the stated objective of 
creating regions which were "economically, ecologi-
cally, industrially and socially equal". 
Whereas Swedish regional policy until recently em-
phasised freedom of choice for individuals with re-
gard to type and location of work (resulting in a spe-
cial focus on rural areas), the latest regional policy 
legislation formulated by the new Social Democratic 
government and approved by Parliament in June 
1995 identifies the need to support sustained eco-
nomic growth, equality of opportunity for different re-
gions and the even distribution of wealth. 
2.2 The Impact of Regional Policy 
In addition to providing an overview of the objectives 
of Member States' regional policies, this project in-
volves an assessment and summary of available evi-
dence and study results with a view to determining the 
impact of Member States' regional policies. For these 
purposes, impact refers to: 
i. the distribution of national regional policy expen-
ditures between the regions; and 
il. the effecf of these expenditures. 
These are now discussed in turn. 
cussion above that, in many countries, the scope of re-
gional policy extends well beyond the provision of fi-
nancial incentives to firms. Nevertheless, in all EU 
countries (with the exception of Denmark since 1991) 
regional incentives are a key instrument (sometimes the 
only instrument) of regional policy and as such, analysis 
of this expenditure is a useful focus for comparisons. 
A key objective in this part of the work has been to ob-
tain an accurate picture of regional incentive spending 
in the recipient regions. To this end, regional break-
downs (to NUTS II where possible) have been sought 
and obtained for all but one of the countries where this 
is relevant (the exception is Greece); for the most part 
this data has not hitherto been published. The obser-
vations made here are based on the tables and charts 
provided in Annex I. 
The study focuses on three aspects of regional incen-
tive expenditure: 
• first, trends in regional incentive spending. Has ex-
penditure been increasing or decreasing in the pe-
riod under review and are there significant differ-
ences in expenditure trends both between and 
within countries? 
• second, the scale of regional incentive spending. 
How significant is the level of regional incentive ex-
penditure in relation to population at the national 
and regional levels and in relation to national and 
regional GDP? 
• third, the intensity of regional incentive spending. 
How does regional incentive expenditure relate to 
the population in the assisted areas of those re-
gions in receipt of support? 
Before considering these issues a number of cau-
tionary points must be borne in mind. One is that the 
data in the tables and charts in Annex I generally re-
late to expenditure committed under the main re-
gional capital grant(s) of the countries concerned (EU 
12). The focus is on capital grants for two main rea-
sons: first, such grants are far and away the most 
significant regional incentive measure in nearly all of 
the countries covered; and second, it is only in re-
spect of regional capital grants that information is 
available at the regional level on the spatial distribu-
tion of expenditure. 
2.2.1 The Regional Distribution of 
Expenditure 
This section considers regional incentive expenditure in 
the EU of twelve. It will have become clear from the dis-
In Annex I, the coverage of the data in the tables and 
charts is reviewed in detail, country-by-country. Infor-
mation on the broad relationship between regional cap-
ital grant expenditure and regional incentive spending 
more generally is provided in the Fourth Commission 
Member States' Regional Policies 15 
Survey on State Aids161. This shows, over the 1990-92 
period, between 97 percent and 100 percent of region-
al State aid spending took the form of grant support in 
five countries: Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Portugal. In a further two countries (Belgium 
and Great Britain), around 90 percent of expenditure 
was grant-based, while in another four countries (Ire-
land, west Germany, Northern Ireland and Greece) 
around three-quarters of the regional State aid spend 
was attributable to grants. Only in parts of three coun-
tries - Germany (in the east and along the now-defunct 
Zonal Border Area), France and Italy - have grants 
played a lesser role in expenditure terms. In general, 
grants very much represent the mainstay of regional in-
centive spending across the EU Member States. 
Another cautionary point to note is that some of the 
expenditure on national regional incentives may be co-
financed by the Structural Funds, particularly in Objec-
tive 1 regions. Unfortunately, information on this is not 
readily available. Statistics have, however, been pro-
duced on the degree of Structural Fund support for the 
productive environment (industry and services) over 
the 1989-93 period as part of the CSFs agreed for Ob-
jective 1 regions. The percentage contribution of the 
Structural Funds is set out in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: Structural Fund Contribution to Support for Productive Investment 
Country Grouping Objective 1 CSF Percent 
Cohesion countries 
Italy/Germany 
Other Member States 
Greece 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Italy 
Germany 
Northern Ireland 
Corsica 
62.2 
61.7 
65.8 
50.0 
42.5 
50.0 
54.8 
50.0 
Source: Directorate-General for Regional Policy 
While these percentages give some indication of the po-
tential for Structural Fund support for the main regional 
incentives on offer in those regions which qualify for Ob-
jective 1 support, no information is available on the ac-
tual levels of co-financing which have taken place. 
A final note of caution in relation to the tables and 
charts in Annex I concerns the extent to which mean-
ingful international comparisons can be made. One 
problem area relates to the fact that, in some regions 
and in some years, very large awards to single projects 
may lead to a distortion of both overall trends and the 
mean level of expenditure. A further issue concerns 
the various adjustments which must be made to the 
data to allow international comparisons (for details, see 
Annex I). In addition, for most countries there are spe-
cific qualifications which must be borne in mind when 
analysing the data (again detailed in Annex I). Notwith-
standing these cautions, the picture presented in the 
annex is such that it remains possible to draw clear 
and robust comparative conclusions - albeit focusing 
on broad trends and broad country groupings rather 
than on the specific detail of individual cases. 
161 Fourth Survey from the Commission on State Ad in the European 
Union in the Manufacturing and Certain Other Sectors (COM (95). 365 
final, Brussels, 26.07.1995). 
2.2.1.1 Regional Incentive Expenditure Trends 
As far as regional incentive expenditure trends are 
concerned, these are best reviewed initially at the 
country level. Although regional-level trends are obvi-
ously more variable, in the main they tend to mirror the 
overall spending pattern for the nation as a whole (see 
the regional charts in Annex I). 
Trends in overall levels of spending can be seen from 
Table 1b and the associated chart (reproduced here 
as Chart 2.1). The chart groups the EU countries in-
to the three categories identified earlier as being of 
relevance to EU12: the four Cohesion countries; Italy 
and Germany; and the remaining northern European 
countries. With respect to trends, the clear develop-
ment across all categories has been for regional cap-
ital grant spending to decline, often from a 1990 
peak. Decline has been particularly significant in Italy, 
as a consequence of the demise of the previous 
Mezzogiorno- based policy in 1992/93 and the delay 
in implementing the new legislation (Law 488/1992), 
and also in Spain, following particularly high expendi-
ture in 1990. Only in east Germany has expenditure 
risen since 1989 - an obvious consequence of re-uni-
fication. 
16 Economic and Social Cohesion in the European Union: The Impact of Member States' Own Policies: Final Report 
Chart 2.1 
Main regional incentive expenditure trends in the Member States, 1989­1993 (1993 prices, ECU, millions) 
See Member State Table 1 b 
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The clear picture, then, has been for the emphasis on 
direct financial support for the problem regions in the 
form of capital grants to be in decline. This view is con­
firmed also when a longer­term perspective is taken. In 
many countries, and particularly those in the northern 
European group, regional incentive spending has fallen 
markedly since the early 1980s. This is especially true 
In countries like Denmark, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom where the decline over this period has 
been more than two­thirds (Yuill et al 1995, CEC 1994). 
As well as highlighting trends in regional capital grant ex­
penditure, Table 1 b and the associated chart (in Annex I) 
display the breakdown of expenditure by country. Over 
the 1989­93 period, two­thirds of the expenditure 
recorded was in respect of east Germany and Italy, with 
a further quarter being accounted for by Spain, west 
Germany and Great Britain. While expenditure in Spain 
was high in the early part of the period, it fell to the broad 
level of the other Cohesion countries after 1990. As a 
group, the four Cohesion countries represent less than 
one fifth of the overall regional grant expenditure total. 
2.2.1.2 The Scale of Regional Incentive 
Expenditure 
Moving on to consider the scale of regional incentive 
spending ­ that is, the volume of expenditure adjusted 
to take account of country size ­ two measures of 
scale are utilised in the tables and charts of Annex I: 
one which relates regional incentive spending to GDP 
in the recipient country or region; and the other which 
focuses on per capita spending by country and region. 
The results on both measures are broadly similar, as 
the Annex I charts based on Tables 2 and 3 illustrate. 
These charts are reproduced here as Chart 2.2 and 
Chart 2.3. They show that, over the 1989­93 period, 
the scale of regional capital grant expenditure in the 
four Cohesion countries was, in general, significantly 
higher than elsewhere in the EU, particularly when 
measured in relation to GDP. However, a number of 
qualifications must be made to this broad picture. First, 
as already mentioned, the scale of spending in Spain 
fell markedly after 1990 and, thereafter, was on a par 
with a number of the northern Member States. Sec­
ond, the scale of Italian expenditure was not dissimilar 
to the Cohesion countries in 1990 but in subsequent 
years was significantly reduced prior to the ending of 
/Wezzog/omo­based policy in 1992/93. Third, the high 
scale of expenditure in Luxembourg directly reflects 
the size of the country. Finally, from 1990 onwards, per 
capita spending levels for east Germany are notewor­
thy, underlining the major emphasis placed on the de­
velopment of the new Länder following unification. 
At the regional level, it can be seen from the Annex I 
charts that there is considerable variation around the 
country averages. Some of this variation reflects large 
"one­off" expenditures in particular regions in particu­
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lar years. In Italy, for instance, there was massive re-
gional incentive spending in parts of the northern Mez-
zogiorno prior to the de-designation of certain areas 
over the 1990-92 period (see, for instance, the entries 
for Lazio, Abruzzi and Marche in 1989 and 1990). In 
Spain, the figure for Murcia in 1989 is almost one hun-
dred times higher than the entry for subsequent years; 
in similar vein, spending in Asturias in 1990 was well 
over ten times the average figure recorded for the re-
mainder of the period. In France, too, expenditure in 
the Pays de la Loire region in 1990 was some ten 
times subsequent spending levels. 
Chart 2.2 
Expenditure on main regional incentives 1989-93, as a percentage of national GDP 
See Member States Table 2 
1.0% 
0.9% 
C D 
CD 
en 
en 
CO 
en 
£L 
Q 
o 
co 
o 
o 
rx 
Chart 2.3 
Main regional incentive expenditure in the Member States, per capita of the national population, 1989-1993 
(ECU, 1993 prices) 
See Member States Table 3 
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Notwithstanding the above, the broad picture is for re­
gions in the Cohesion countries, as well as in Italy and, 
particularly, east Germany, to appear towards the top 
end of the scale ranking (see Chart 2.4). That having 
been said, a significant number of regions in Spain (es­
pecially) and in the Centre-North of Italy are also found 
towards the lower reaches of the ranking. By the same 
token, average per capita spending in northern Euro­
pean regions like Saarland In Germany, Wales in the 
UK, Limburg in the Netherlands and Wallonia in Bel­
gium are broadly in line with the country averages of 
Italy and Spain. 
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2.2.1.3 The Intensity of Regional Policy 
Expenditure 
Turning, finally, to the intensity of regional Incentive 
spending, as noted earlier, this measure involves relating 
national and regional-level expenditure not to all of the 
population in the nation/region but only to that propor­
tion of the population located in designated assisted ar­
eas. A feature of regional incentive policy in countries 
where spending is anyway low (and falling) is that there 
is often an attempt to focus assistance on those areas 
where it is viewed to be most needed. Accordingly, as­
sisted area coverage can often be quite limited in such 
countries. By way of example, according to DGIV fig­
ures, the Dutch problem regions (the IPR areas) current­
ly hold just 17.3 percent of the national population, 
while in Ireland the entire country is eligible for support 
(see Table 2.4). Taking such differences in coverage into 
account can significantly influence the ranking of coun­
tries and regions in terms of policy intensity. 
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Table 2.4: Population Coverage of National Designated Areas Approved by DGIV 
PERCENTAGE COVERAGE 
COUNTRY GROUP 
Cohesion Countries 
Germany/Italy 
Centre/North 
Nordic Countries 
COUNTRY 
Greece 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Italy 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
France 
UK 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Finland 
Sweden 
OVERALL COVERAGE 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
75.9 
48.9 
37.6 
42.7 
42.4 
38.1 
35.2 
35.0 
19.9 
17.3 
41.6 
18.5 
ART 92 3(a) 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
59.6 
34.2 
20.8 
0 
2.5 
2.9 
3.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
ART 92 3(c) 
0 
0 
0 
16.3 
14.7 
16.8 
42.7 
39.9 
35.2 
31.7 
35.0 
19.9 
17.3 
41.6 
18.5 
Source: Directorate­General for Competition 
As far as country groupings are concerned, it can be 
seen from Table 4 and the associated chart in Annex I 
(reproduced here as Chart 2.5) that the intensity of 
spending in east Germany, in Italy (prior to the demise 
of Mezzogiorno policy) and in Luxembourg is signifi­
cantly higher than in the four Cohesion countries. More 
than this, the intensity of expenditure in at least two of 
the Cohesion countries ­ Portugal and Spain ­ is not 
dissimilar to that recorded in many northern Member 
States. Indeed, the intensity of spending in both Bel­
gium and Northern Ireland generally exceeds that 
found in most Cohesion countries. 
Chart 2.5 
Main regional incentives: Expenditure per capita in the recipient assisted areas only, 1989­93 (ECU, 1993 prices) 
See Member States Table 4 
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A similar pattern is found at the regional level, with cer­
tain regions in more prosperous countries (where poli­
cy is often more spatially focused) moving markedly up 
the intensity listing. For instance, average regional in­
centive spending in Flanders over the 1989­93 period 
rises to be on a par with spending in regions like Sar­
dinia and Campania in Italy and Asturias in Spain once 
account is taken of the relatively narrow spatial cover­
age of policy in Flanders. In similar vein, the intensity 
of policy in a number of west German Länder moves 
above that found In most of the Autonomous Com­
munities in Spain. An overview of policy intensity at the 
regional level is provided on a country­by­country ba­
sis in Annex I (Chart 5). This relates expenditure at the 
regional level to the population located in designated 
problem areas within those regions. While the intensi­
ty of policy is generally higher in poorer regions ­ most 
obviously the east German regions ­ the chart shows 
clearly that there are a significant number of regions in 
the northern Member States where policy intensity is 
comparable with or above that found in many Cohe­
sion country regions. This point is underlined by Chart 
2.6 which sets out the relationship between the inten­
sity of regional incentive spending (as measured by re­
lating expenditure to the population of those assisted 
areas in receipt of aid) and regional GDP per capita. 
Chart 2.6 
Regional incentive expenditure per head of eligible population versus regional GDP 
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2.2.2 The Effect of Regional Policy 
In the previous section, the impact of Member States' 
regional policies on cohesion was considered in terms 
of the regional distribution of national regional policy 
expenditures. In this section, the emphasis is on re-
views of recent evaluation literature. Existing evaluation 
studies can usefully be broken down into two groups: 
those commissioned and undertaken on behalf of pol-
icymakers; and those undertaken more or less inde-
pendently by academic researchers. 
As far as policymaker-driven studies are concerned, lit-
tle in the way of systematic evaluation is carried out by 
EU Member States. The apparent paucity of the infor-
mation available partly reflects the relatively low priori-
ty accorded to evaluation by regional policymakers in 
many countries. The United Kingdom does have a now 
long-standing practice of evaluating government poli-
cies; however, policymakers in other EU countries tend 
to be more sceptical about the reliability of evaluation 
results and are quick to identify the disadvantages in-
herent in the different methodological approaches. In 
consequence, in many countries (such as France and 
Spain) there are no "official" or commissioned evalua-
tion studies on the effects of national regional policy. 
There are signs that this may change in the future if 
policymakers are influenced by the evaluation require-
ments of the Structural Fund regulations. However, for 
the time being, there is little national policymaker com-
mitment to systematic evaluation. 
In contrast with the virtual absence "official" studies at 
the national level, in most countries there is a growing 
body of evaluation work by academics. Such studies 
use a variety of research methods, policy indicators 
and spatial scales, when examining regional policy. 
Broadly speaking, however, there are two main types 
of evaluation conducted on national regional policy: 
• quantitative or macro-level studies examining poli-
cy outputs such as employment creation, cost per 
job or the movement of industry 
• qualitative or micro-level studies using various 
qualitative research techniques detailing the effects 
regional policy has on particular localities 
Research methods used in the former usually take a 
highly aggregated approach towards data analysis. 
Longitudinal government statistics are used to track 
the way regional policy affects the performance of var-
ious indicators in assisted areas. Common measure-
ments used to evaluate the effectiveness of regional 
policies are employment levels or measurements of the 
movement of industry. Econometric techniques in-
volving regression analysis and other quantitative re-
search techniques are then used to establish the out-
puts achieved by any given policy (eg. employment 
creation, cost per job and regional growth). Owing to 
the degree of statistical aggregation, this type of study 
provides only preliminary insight into the effectiveness 
of regional policy. For example, it says little about the 
causality between policy instruments and the behav-
iour of firms. Industrial surveys, on the other hand, can 
improve knowledge of the motivational forces under-
pinning either location decisions or issues which gen-
erate corporate growth. 
One seminal study, Moore ef al (1986), examined the 
effectiveness of British regional policy using time se-
ries data over the period 1960-81. The authors 
claim that during this period regional policy created 
a total of 430,000 manufacturing jobs in assisted ar-
eas. According to their research, nearly 2000 man-
ufacturing establishments are estimated to have 
moved to the assisted areas during this period as a 
result of regional policy instruments (ie. investment 
incentives, labour subsidies and location controls in 
non-assisted areas). In common with other evalua-
tion studies, Moore ef al calculated the cost per job 
of Britain's regional policy instruments, suggesting 
that Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) had a much 
lower cost-per-job than most other investment in-
centives such as the, now defunct, Regional Em-
ployment Premium. 
The optimistic findings of the study (Moore ef al, 
1986) were in sharp contrast to the British govern-
ment's declared objective of reducing the extent and 
remit of national regional policy during this period. 
Nevertheless, other work undertaken on the efficacy 
of British regional policy (see, eg. Wren and Water-
son, 1991) concurred with the study that RSA was 
the most cost-effective policy instrument. More re-
cently, an evaluation of British RSA (PACEC, 1993), 
discovered that the cost-effectiveness of RSA had 
been maintained and that, on average, the cost per 
job in assisted areas was between £5,000 and 
£7,000. Although selective policy instruments are 
generally deemed most cost-effective, it is difficult as-
sessing the reliability of the figures given the inherent 
fallibility of cost per job data. Another problem with 
this type of historical data is the time-lag between re-
search publication (1993) and the time period scruti-
nised (1985-1988). 
Typically, policy evaluation has focused on the cost-ef-
fectiveness of capital subsidies as a policy instrument. 
However, studies have also investigated the efficacy of 
labour subsidies in assisted areas. Roper and O'Shea 
(1991), for example, use a full econometric model to 
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analyse the historical effects on jobs and output of 
labour subsidies in Northern Ireland. According to the 
authors, whilst effective in stimulating jobs and output, 
labour subsidies have only a small effect on unem-
ployment. This owes to the fact that the subsidies led 
to a reduction in out-migration from the province. The 
increased supply of labour in the province partially 
negated the positive effects of the policy in creating 
jobs (Roper and O'Shea, 1991). 
Although there has been academic debate over which 
policy instrument is better equipped at promoting re-
gional development, the problems of measuring policy 
outputs are equally onerous for both labour and capi-
tal subsidies. One method increasingly used when 
evaluating such instruments is to undertake industrial 
surveys. This approach has the benefit of being able 
to provide qualitative information on a sample of firms 
in receipt of incentives, thus giving insights into how 
much the aid altered firm behaviour. A major European 
Commission sponsored study, evaluating national re-
gional policies throughout the EU, used this methodol-
ogy (PACEC, 1990). The benefit of this study was its 
use of the same methodology throughout all EU Mem-
ber States. Not only does this help to address some 
of the problems associated with the reliability of find-
ings, it also allows for comparative examination of na-
tional regional policies. 
Overall, the study claims that the cost-effectiveness of 
regional policy varied considerably across EU Member 
States. Essentially the researchers found that the less 
developed the economy and the less favoured the re-
gions within it, then the less effective or efficient was 
regional policy. Basically, Member States with high lev-
els of economic development are not required to lever 
In the private sector to the same degree that less 
favoured regions must do. It was also suggested that 
the most cost-effective incentives were those which 
were paid as one-off subsidies on capital investment 
and those which contain employment creation criteria. 
Overall, more companies favour capital subsidies than 
favour labour subsidies; however, this is not the case 
for the Mediterranean countries where the preference 
is reversed (PACEC, 1990). 
A benefit derived from survey research is the findings 
they provide on the motivational reasons firms have for 
investing. For example, around 30 percent of respon-
dent firms reported that between 40 percent and 50 
percent of their investment was attributable to region-
al policy (PACEC, 1990). Hypothetical questions allow 
policymakers insight into how location incentives inter-
act with possible future location decisions. The PACEC 
(1990) study revealed how cross country differences 
arose in this respect. For example, In Belgium only 39 
percent of firms said they would be influenced by the 
offer of assistance, while in Britain 80 percent of com-
panies indicated they would be strongly influenced in 
their location decisions by the availability of regional 
policy. 
Although PACEC (1990) is a rare example of pan-Eu-
ropean evaluation, the poor response rate of the sur-
vey, together with reliance on the attitudes of individual 
respondents, must circumscribe the reliability of the 
data collected. Although industrial surveys provide 
useful information on certain qualitative issues, they 
suffer some drawbacks (e.g. respondent bias etc.). 
Another failing of all the studies mentioned above is 
the lack of information generated on the exact nature 
of employment developed through regional policy. In-
deed, given the problems associated with regional pol-
icy evaluation more generally, it is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that little quantitative evaluation work is currently 
undertaken by many EU Member States. 
A second strand of academic evaluation research -
and one in tune with the shift towards more discre-
tionary regional policies throughout the EU Member 
States - aims to evaluate the level and nature of in-
dustrial development arising from regional policy in-
centives using micro-level data collected via qualitative 
research techniques. Rather than trying to quantify the 
efficacy of any given regional policy instrument, these 
studies commonly aim to understand the qualitative 
nature of development generated by regional policy, 
using interview methods and case studies. 
A major study undertaken for the European Commis-
sion (Amin ef al, 1994) evaluated the role played by in-
ward investment in stimulating regional development in 
order to gauge whether regional incentives were eco-
nomically effective. Given that the attraction of FDI re-
mains the central thrust of regional industrial policy for 
many of Europe's less favoured regions (see Section 
2.1), evaluation of this kind seems particularly perti-
nent. Amin ef al (1994) discovered that the quality of 
FDI varies significantly throughout Europe's regional 
economies. Whereas the Rhone Alpes is inhabited by 
a number of "quality" plants displaying high levels of 
decision-making autonomy, Innovative capacity in 
terms of R&D, considerable stress on human resource 
development, and extensive high quality localised sup-
plier linkages, Objective 1 regions such as Branden-
burg and Portugal were characterised by lower quality 
plants with heavily-truncated decision-making struc-
tures, often displaying low levels of material integration. 
Countries and regions with a longer history of FDI at-
traction had benefited from pro-active regional devel-
opment agencies in developing the qualitative nature 
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of incoming FDI. Hence, countries such as Ireland and 
Scotland fell somewhere between the two extremes 
highlighted above. This variegated picture is particu-
larly stark between core regions such as the Rhone 
Alpes and peripheral Objective 1 countries such as 
Portugal. This in-depth empirical work provides evi-
dence of the weak development effects generated by 
FDI in many of Europe's less favoured regions. 
The report concludes that intense inter-regional com-
petition for FDI results in high levels of deadweight re-
gional incentive spending on behalf of less favoured re-
gions. This was particularly acute in very weak indus-
trial milieus such as Portugal. In regions offering a va-
riety of locational attributes (particularly skilled labour) 
over and above financial incentives, such as Scotland 
and Ireland, incentives were found to play a less cen-
tral role (Amin et al, 1994). One of the study's main 
conclusions, therefore, was the need to calibrate dis-
cretionary regional incentives towards upgrading the 
'quality' of FDI in Europe's less favoured regions: "to 
attract investments likely to have the potential to con-
tribute to the build-up and improvement of a region's 
knowledge, research and skill-base, its management 
and entrepreneurial capability, and the quality of its 
business services and supplier firms" (Amin ef al, 
1994, p. 52). 
Numerous other studies have attempted to evaluate 
the role played by inward investment in regional eco-
nomic development throughout Europe. As with pre-
vious evaluative research most of this work is concen-
trated on empirical data from the UK's peripheral re-
gions. This is not surprising given the UK's dispropor-
tionate share of incoming FDI. In practice, most eval-
uation studies seek to provide fresh empirical evidence 
of multiplier effects or indirect effects generated by FDI 
in Europe's regional economies, often using survey 
methods. The findings of these surveys generally con-
firm the view that regions such as the Northern Region 
in England and Scotland face continuing problems as-
sociated with weakly embedded multinationals 
(Phelps, 1993; Turok, 1993). These sourcing patterns 
dramatically reduce the economic impact FDI has on a 
region. 
While these studies provide useful data on aggregate 
sourcing trends, case study analysis has tended to 
reveal more in-depth information on the underlying 
dynamics affecting intra-regional linkage formation. 
This includes analysis of industrial organisation fac-
tors which currently shape linkage configuration. In 
fact, the trend towards global sourcing, coupled with 
an increased intra-corporate division of labour, is ar-
guably leading to a situation of increased dependen-
cy on branch plant subsidiaries with low levels of de-
cision-making autonomy. Empirical evidence from 
firms within the automotive industry in Spain (La-
gendijk and van der Knaap, 1995) and various 
branch plant sectors in the Mezzogiorno (Giunta and 
Martinelli, 1995) confirms this picture and reveals 
continuing weak material integration in Europe's less 
favoured regions. Giunta and Martinelli (1995) claim 
that branch plants in these areas exhibit certain or-
ganisational attributes: 
• the absence of strategic functions at the plant level 
• subordinate status of plants within the corporate 
division of labour 
• low propensity to stimulate local linkages 
Such results cast obvious doubt on the efficacy of FDI 
as a "solution" to regional development ills and, by im-
plication, on the role of regional policy in the attraction 
of FDI. 
Having briefly highlighted some key evaluative studies, 
it is worth commenting on their effectiveness in as-
sessing regional policies. It was noted earlier how 
quantitative evaluations often lacked sufficiently robust 
data with which to assess fully the effectiveness of re-
gional policies. The problem of additionality is partic-
ularly difficult to resolve because any evaluation is 
faced with obvious counterfactual problems: namely, 
what would have happened if the policy had not been 
implemented? Determining how much expenditure is 
'additional' and how much is 'dead-weight' is ex-
tremely difficult. One final problem Is the lack of EU-
wide comparative data and the plurality of evaluative 
approaches used in different studies. Without good 
comparative data, systematic and comprehensive ap-
praisal of the relative effectiveness of different national 
regional policies remains elusive. 
2.3 Concluding Points 
The aim of this chapter has been to provide an as-
sessment of the impact of Member States' regional 
policies on economic and social cohesion. This has 
been done by reviewing the objectives of regional pol-
icy in the different Member States and the available ev-
idence on the effects of policy, as shown by the re-
gional distribution of national regional policy expendi-
ture and by reviewing recent evaluation studies. 
With respect to the objectives of Member States' re-
gional policies, the chapter distinguishes between four 
broad groups of countries: 
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• the four Cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal and Spain), where issues of economic devel-
opment are the main preoccupation, but where un-
deremployment and peripherality, and, especially in 
Spain, unemployment are also concerns. 
• Germany and Italy, which are characterised by the 
dual nature of their economies. These countries 
display by far the widest Internal disparities and ex-
pend by far the most on regional policy; both coun-
tries extend the focus of policy beyond the most 
underdeveloped regions and also operate regional 
policies in the disadvantaged parts of the more 
prosperous regions. 
• the central and northern EU countries i/Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom), where employ-
ment issues, especially related to industrial restruc-
turing, tend to dominate. However, the nature of 
the regional problem in these countries is also 
characterised by its variety, complexity and sus-
ceptibility to change; recent years have seen the 
emergence of acute urban and rural problems, as 
well as issues associated with the restructuring of 
industries such as defence. Moreover, peripherality 
and rural depopulation are often also concerns. In 
addition, in some countries, there are special situ-
ations to address, notably Northern Ireland within 
the United Kingdom, and Corsica in France. 
• the Nordic Member States (Finland and Sweden), 
where peripherality, climate and geography are the 
principal issues addressed by regional policy. 
As far as regional policy objectives are concerned, the 
four Cohesion countries (and especially Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal) are characterised by the problem of Im-
plementing a regional development policy in the con-
text of national economies which are themselves un-
derdeveloped from an EU perspective. This creates 
tensions between efficiency-related issues and equity-
based concerns, between short-term and longer-term 
considerations and between national prosperity and 
regional disparity - tensions which have resulted in sig-
nificant shifts in priorities and changes in the relation-
ship between national industrial development and re-
gional policies over time. Moreover, these tensions re-
flect the wider picture at the EU level of the potential 
conflict between competitiveness and cohesion. 
A feature of Germany and Italy is their extreme internal 
regional disparities; this has resulted in considerable 
policy emphasis on their most underdeveloped re-
gions. In Germany (and in Italy until recently) separate 
policies are operated for such regions (the Mezzo-
giorno in Italy and the new Länder in Germany) in a 
range of areas, although regional policy Is also among 
the instruments used. 
In the "northern European" Member States, regional 
problems tend to comprise a range of concerns, 
though high levels of unemployment are generally at 
their core; in these countries regional policy tends to 
have a relatively low political profile. There are, howev-
er, marked differences between countries with respect 
to both the objectives and substance of policy; at one 
end of the spectrum is France with the broad concept 
of aménagement du territoire, while at the other comes 
the United Kingdom with a far narrower policy focus 
on regional industrial policy. 
In the Nordic Member States the regional problems to 
be faced are different in both scale and type (sparse-
ly-populated areas, harsh climates, distance from pop-
ulation centres etc); regional policy in these countries 
tends to be allocated a higher priority and to include a 
fairly broad range of policy measures. 
With regard to the instruments of regional policy, the 
chapter has highlighted the considerable variety in pol-
icy approaches. In some countries, national regional 
policy is essentially comprised of financial incentives to 
firms investing in the problem regions: this is true of 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, for 
example. In others, a range of non-spatial government 
policy measures are associated with the objectives of 
regional policy. In France and Finland, for example, re-
gional development legislation makes this link explicit. 
There are also considerable differences in the institu-
tional arrangements for regional policy between coun-
tries. Among the federal or quasi federal states, the 
role of the subnational level is key. For example, in Bel-
gium, policy is the responsibility of the regional gov-
ernments; however, in Germany and Spain responsi-
bility is divided between the national and regional gov-
ernments according to competences defined in the 
constitution and partnership is a core component of 
policy delivery. In Austria, the organisation and com-
petence for regional policy is not allocated constitu-
tionally either to the federal government or to the Län-
der. In practice, there is an informal allocation both of 
legislative competence and of the administration of 
public activities affecting regional development be-
tween different bodies at federal, Land and local level. 
The remaining countries are organised along unitary 
lines, but there is frequently administrative devolution in 
the operation of regional policy. This is so, for instance, 
in France, where the préfets play an influential role in 
regional economic development policy and, more pro-
saically, ¡n Great Britain where government regional of-
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fices are largely responsible for administering regional 
incentive policy. 
As far as regional policy expenditure is concerned, the 
chapter has focused on regional grant expenditure, in 
order to obtain comparable and regionally-disaggre-
gated information. A number of points arise from the 
discussion of the distribution of expenditure at both 
national and regional levels. 
First, in respect of expenditure trends, regional capital 
grant expenditure (and, indeed, regional policy spend-
ing more generally) has been in decline in most coun-
tries over the 1989-93 period, with particularly signifi-
cant falls in Italy and Spain; these trends reinforce 
longer-term developments, especially in the northern 
Member States where the decline in some countries 
since 1980 has been more than two-thirds. On the 
other hand, east Germany stands as an obvious ex-
ception to these general trends, with major regional 
development spending from 1990 onwards. Strikingly, 
some two-thirds of overall regional grant expenditure 
relates to east Germany and Italy, just under one-fifth 
to the Cohesion countries and some 15 percent to the 
remaining EU12 countries. 
Regarding the scale of regional grant spending, this is, 
in general, significantly higher in the four Cohesion 
countries than elsewhere in the Member States (ex-
cept Luxembourg); though spending declined marked-
ly in Spain and increased steeply in east Germany from 
1990. However the position at the regional level is 
more varied. While the broad picture is for regions in 
the four Cohesion countries, in east Germany and in 
the Italian Mezzogiorno to appear towards the top end 
of the scale ranking - together with Northern Ireland -
certain Spanish and Italian regions are found towards 
the lower reaches of the ranking. In similar vein, aver-
age per capita spending in a range of northern Euro-
pean regions (Wallonia, Saarland, Limburg, Wales) is 
broadly in line with the country averages of Spain and 
Italy. 
When considering the intensity of policy, the key point 
to note is that this involves relating regional incentive 
spending to the population of those regions actually in 
receipt of support (the assisted areas). As a result, 
those countries and regions with only limited assisted 
area coverage move markedly up the rankings. Thus, 
the intensity of regional incentive spending in east Ger-
many, Italy (prior to the demise of Mezzogiorno policy) 
and Luxembourg is significantly higher than in the four 
Cohesion countries, while the intensity of expenditure 
in Portugal and Spain is not dissimilar to that record-
ed in many northern Member States. A similarly var-
ied pattern is found at the regional level, with the in-
tensity of regional incentive spending in a number of 
northern regions exceeding, by some way, that found 
in many regions in the Cohesion countries. 
Turning finally to the review of evaluation studies, in 
general these provide only limited information on the 
effectiveness of policy. Econometric exercises tend to 
be constrained by data availability, by the difficulty of 
establishing the counterfactual and by problems of de-
termining causality, while survey-based research tends 
to have a quite specific focus - on a particular incen-
tive or a particular region or a particular development 
process - which creates difficulties when attempts are 
made to generalise the results. At the EU level, these 
difficulties are compounded by the lack of EU-wide 
comparative data and the plurality of evaluation ap-
proaches used. As mentioned earlier, without good 
comparative information, the systematic and compre-
hensive appraisal of the relative effectiveness of na-
tional regional policies will remain elusive. 
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3. Other Spatial Policies Operated by the Member 
States 
In this chapter, the focus is on those spatially-discrimi-
nating policies (other than regional policy) which oper-
ate in selected Member States (the six case study 
countries identified earlier: France, Germany, Italy, Por-
tugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). The review is 
concerned with national government policies. However, 
it is important to note that, in some areas of spatial pol-
icy, subnational levels of government also play an Im-
portant role; this is particularly true of urban policy. In 
Germany and Spain, for example, urban policy oper-
ates at the subnational level and is not the responsibili-
ty of the national government. Moreover, in other areas 
of spatial policy, EU policies are often important; in 
some countries, for instance, rural policy is essentially 
subsumed within EU policies operated under Objective 
5b or within the LEADER Community Initiative - again 
this ¡s true of Spain. Similarly, EU policies are also sig-
nificant in the context of industrial crisis regions desig-
nated under KONVER, RENAVAL, RESIDER and so on. 
The spatial policies of Member States identified in this 
study address a variety of objectives. For the purposes 
of this review these can usefully be grouped as follows: 
• urban policy 
• rural policy 
• policies for "crisis" areas, essentially closely-de-
fined areas seriously affected by closures in a dom-
inant sector in the region 
• policies for particular regions, especially those en-
joying a special status arising from a particular his-
torical or political context 
The chapter is in three main sections. The first, Sec-
tion 3.1, considers the broad objectives of Member 
States' spatial policies, focusing ¡n turn on each of the 
above policy areas (urban, rural, "crisis" areas and 
"special status" regions). Section 3.2 then reviews the 
evidence available on the spatial impact of these vari-
ous policies. As was the case with Member States' 
regional policies, the review centres on two main as-
pects: the distribution of national expenditures on oth-
er spatial policies (Section 3.2.1); and evaluation stud-
ies on the effect of such expenditures (Section 3.2.2). 
The concluding section, Section 3.3, brings together 
the main points made. 
3.1 The Objectives of Member 
States' Other Spatial Policies 
The distinction between Member States' regional poli-
cies and other spatial policies is not always a clear 
one. This Is particularly true of France where, as de-
scribed in the last chapter, a broad view of regional de-
velopment policy is taken within the concept of amé-
nagement du territoire. In this context, the 1995 re-
gional development framework law in France makes 
reference to, and provides for, the designation of three 
types of assisted area: regional development areas; 
priority rural development areas; and urban regenera-
tion areas. In contrast, in the United Kingdom, other 
spatial policies are, for the most part, designed and 
operated separately from regional policy. 
Although the distinction between regional policy and 
other spatial policies is not always immediately appar-
ent, there is a difference in emphasis between the two. 
The main objective of Member States' regional policies 
is economic development and economic development 
instruments (ie. subsidies to businesses) are the main 
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measures in place. For other spatial policies, social 
and political objectives are more immediate; although 
economic development instruments are usually among 
the measures used, they are primarily employed for 
social and political ends. 
The multiplicity of policy objectives often appears to be 
reflected in the policies themselves. For the most part, 
urban, rural and, to a lesser extent, crisis area policies 
are characterised by the disparate nature of the policy 
instruments utilised, the large number of agencies in-
volved in the delivery of policy and the apparent ab-
sence of policy co-ordination. On the other hand, a no-
table recent trend is the degree to which this lack of 
policy coherence appears to be being addressed. In 
the United Kingdom, for example, the so-called Single 
Regeneration Budget has brought together a wide 
range of funds and governments agencies with a view 
to rationalising the implementation of regeneration pol-
icy. Similarly, in France, a more co-ordinated and inte-
grated approach has been sought by incorporating 
measures within the five-year State-Regional planning 
contracts; these provide for so-called PACTs (concert-
ed territorial action programmes) which seek to ad-
dress rural and urban policy objectives. 
3.1.1 Urban Policy 
In countries where urban policy is given a high priority, 
the impetus for policy often stems from the political 
imperatives arising from growing unrest in areas of ex-
treme poverty and deprivation. There is frequently an 
economic development aspect to the objectives of 
policy but, where this is so, the emphasis is often on 
local employment initiatives, partly In recognition of the 
limited extent to which large-scale manufacturing proj-
ects can readily be assimilated within an urban envi-
ronment. 
Among the case study countries, national urban policy 
measures are of most significance in the United King-
dom. Indeed, during the course of the 1980s and 
1990s, urban policy expenditure has risen at the same 
time as regional policy expenditure has declined. By 
1991-2, Department of the Environment spending on 
the range of urban regeneration policies had reached 
an estimated £884 million (1,133 MECU); this com-
pares with regional aid spending of around £210 mil-
lion (269 MECU) under Regional Selective Assistance 
in the same period. In France too, national urban pol-
icy has been of growing importance. Expenditure on 
urban policy (other than major urban projects) doubled 
to FF 9.5 billion (1,432 MECU) for the period 1994-99, 
compared with 1989-93. This is broadly similar to the 
sum expended on the range of aménagement du ter-
ritoire policies in 1989-93 (which include measures for 
rural and "crisis" regions). Given the relative impor-
tance of national urban policy in the UK and France, 
the remainder of this section focuses mainly on these 
two countries. 
The basis for urban policy as currently operated in 
France was introduced in 1988. Responsibility for pol-
icy is "interministerial" and involves a number of insti-
tutions. This reflects the various objectives of urban 
policy which encompass both the physical environ-
ment and social issues. The policy focus is on priority 
areas which are designated on the basis of socio-eco-
nomic criteria such as levels of unemployment, the size 
of the youth population and the proportion of immi-
grants. Policy is operated in a "deconcentrated" man-
ner involving local representatives of central govern-
ment in multi-annual partnership arrangements with lo-
cal authorities. The latter are primarily responsible for 
policy implementation. 
Policy is operated through two main programmes: ur-
ban contracts (contrats de ville); and major urban proj-
ects (grands projets urbains, GPU). Urban contracts 
date back to 1992 and followed on from a previous 
programme of urban social development. The con-
tracts are now incorporated into the wider State-region 
planning contracts (contrats de plan État-Régions). For 
1994-99, 214 contracts have been concluded involv-
ing some 1,300 areas. The GPU aim at the radical 
transformation of large residential areas and improve-
ments in physical infrastructure. Central government 
commitment for the period 1994-98 is FF 2.25 billion 
(339 MECU). The interministerial committee for urban 
policy has designated 12 areas for the GPU policy: 
eight in the Paris region; two in Rhône-Alpes; one in 
Provence-Alpes-Côte-d'Azur; and one in Nord-Pas-
de-Calais. 
In addition to these two major urban programmes, an 
"urban solidarity grant" (dotation de solidarité urbaine, 
DSU) was established in 1990. The DSU is aimed at 
disadvantaged suburban areas and is not financed by 
central government but rather by a levy on the receipts 
of the more prosperous regions. In 1994 around 100 
towns contributed to the fund (Paris being the main 
one) and some 500 communes benefited from it. In 
1995 the value of the fund was FF 1.3 billion (196 
MECU). Finally, certain residential areas in France have 
been designated as urban renewal areas under the 
1995 framework law for regional development. These 
areas already benefited from a range of fiscal and fi-
nancial measures which will be enhanced with the im-
plementation of the new law. 
In the United Kingdom, as in France, urban policy is 
primarily concerned with social objectives and the im-
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provement of the physical environment. A different 
range of urban policy measures is operated in the four 
parts of the United Kingdom, although in practice there 
is substantial common ground between them. A no-
table characteristic of UK urban policy is the large 
number of measures being implemented, the range of 
organisations involved in policy and the apparent lack 
of co-ordination between them. 
This multiplicity of policy frameworks has been the 
source of criticism in the past. In response to this, ur-
ban regeneration initiatives in England were ratio-
nalised in April 1994 along with a range of other eco-
nomic development initiatives. The so-called Single 
Regeneration Budget (SRB) was introduced to inte-
grate the various existing initiatives, many of which will 
be phased out over time. At the same time, the re-
gional offices of four government departments were in-
tegrated with a view to improving the delivery of pro-
grammes at the local level and ensuring "flexible and 
effective use of public money". The objectives of the 
initiatives within the SRB are intended to: 
• "enhance the quality of life of local people 
• Improve the physical environment 
• attract private sector investment 
• harness the talents of the voluntary sector and the 
community" (Department of Environment Annual 
Report, 1995). 
The key urban policy measures now subsumed within 
the SRB and the expenditure incurred in 1993-4 are 
set out in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 : Main Urban Policy Measures and Spending in England 
Measure 
Urban Development Corporations and Docklands Light Railway 
English Partnerships 
City Grant 
Derelict Land Grant 
Housing Action Trusts 
Estate Action 
City Challenge 
Urban Programme 
Inner City Task Forces 
City Action Teams 
1993-4 Outturn 
£ million 
371.2 
24.2 
24.4 
104.3 
78.1 
357.4 
206.6 
166.5 
18.0 
3.4 
MECU 
476 
31 
31 
134 
100 
458 
265 
213 
23 
5 
Source: Department of the Environment Annual Report, 1995. 
The table illustrates clearly that the main Items of ex-
penditure are the Urban Development Corporations 
(1993-4 expenditure on the Docklands Light Railway 
was some £28 million - 36 MECU) and Estates Action. 
Together, these accounted for well over half of the 
1993-4 urban policy spend in England. 
The twelve Urban Development Corporations are limit-
ed-life bodies that are all due to be wound up between 
March 1995 and 1998. Their objectives are the regen-
eration of designated areas by bringing land and build-
ings into effective use; the encouragement of industri-
al development; the improvement of the environment; 
and ensuring that housing and social facilities are avail-
able to encourage people to live and work in the area. 
The UDCs are currently responsible for the regenera-
tion of some 16,000 hectares of inner city land which 
was previously derelict. The Estates Action programme 
is different in nature; it aims to assist local authorities 
in transforming unpopular housing estates. It provides 
resources to improve the physical condition and the 
management of estates, to secure greater tenant in-
volvement and provide greater variety and choice of 
housing. 
Of the remaining measures listed in Table 3.1, the two 
most significant are the City Challenge scheme and 
the Urban Programme, accounting for 15.3 percent 
and 12.3 percent respectively of the 1993-4 urban pol-
icy expenditure total. The City Challenge scheme in-
volves allocating funds to local authorities on a com-
petitive bidding basis. The aim is to encourage the 
submission of "ambitious and realistic" proposals for 
the revitalisation of key areas of urban deprivation. The 
Urban Programme is the longest-running of the gov-
ernment programmes dealing with urban deprivation in 
England; however, since 1993-4, the programme has 
only been meeting its existing commitments. The pro-
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gramme is targeted at some 57 designated inner city 
areas and aims to revive local economies, foster en-
terprise, improve the environment, rebuild confidence 
and encourage investment. Grants are given through 
local authorities to support a range of projects in the 
field of health, education, job creation and training, and 
environmental improvement. 
In Scotland, most central government-led urban policy 
is carried out under the aegis of the Scottish Office In-
dustry Department, although schemes that are con-
cerned only with housing are directed by the Scottish 
Office Environment Department. Key features of recent 
initiatives are the multi-faceted approach which has 
been adopted and the promotion of partnership across 
a wide range of agencies. Regeneration in Scotland 
has followed similar patterns to that in England and 
has even led the way in terms of integrated regenera-
tion, with the experimental GEAR project in the East 
End of Glasgow in the 1980s. The 1988 Scottish Of-
fice publication New Life for Urban Scotland signalled 
a shift in the emphasis of urban policy away from the 
inner cities to the peripheral housing estates. In 1993-
4, urban policy expenditure in Scotland amounted to 
£65 million (83 MECU), most of which was allocated to 
the Urban Programme. This aims to tackle multiple 
deprivation in urban areas of exceptional need and 
gives priority to projects which have a strategic focus 
and are part of a multi-agency approach. 
In Wales, the main urban policy measures are as set 
out in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Main Urban Policy Measures in Wales 
Measure 1993-4 Outturn 
£ million 
MECU 
Urban Programme (now the Strategic Development Scheme) 
Urban Investment Grant 
Cardiff Bay Development Corporation 
16.7 
n.a. 
46.9 (net) 
21 
n.a. 
60 
Source: Welsh Office Departmental Report, 1995. 
The Welsh Urban Programme aims to promote eco-
nomic, social and environmental developments which 
benefit areas of social need and assist local authorities 
with funding for capital projects that cannot be met out 
of their own budgets. The Urban Investment Grant is 
intended to encourage private sector development on 
derelict or run-down sites to assist the economic re-
generation and environmental improvement of de-
prived urban areas of Wales. Last, the Cardiff Bay De-
velopment Corporation was set up to enhance the im-
age and economic well-being of the city and to estab-
lish its international profile; most of the funding allocat-
ed by the Corporation is assigned to infrastructure 
projects, including housing. 
for the Länder. Nevertheless, the federal government 
can grant supplementary aid for urban measures 
where the investments serve to Improve the conditions 
for growth in the economy as a whole or to equalise 
economic strength between the regions. Such meas-
ures are intended to contribute to the following objec-
tives: 
• developing the physical environment to meet so-
cial, public health, economic and cultural needs 
• developing the structure of residential areas in line 
with environmental requirements and the needs of 
the population 
Urban policy in Northern Ireland is principally operated 
by the Department of the Environment for Northern Ire-
land. A key feature of policy is that it is implemented 
through programmes directed at specific areas, no-
tably parts of Belfast and Londonderry as well as some 
smaller settlements. These include the Making Belfast 
Work scheme; Belfast Action Teams; arid the Lagan-
side Corporation. In addition, there is a large number 
of apparently disparate programmes involving relative-
ly small sums of expenditure. 
Finally in this country review, it is worth making brief 
mention of urban policy in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. In Germany, urban policy is primarily a matter 
• preserving, renovating and developing existing lo-
calities. 
These various country examples help underline the sig-
nificant social, environmental and, in some instances, 
political aspects of national urban policy. As men-
tioned earlier, although economic development instru-
ments are usually among the measures utilised, they 
are employed mainly for social and political ends. 
3.1.2 Rural Policy 
Like urban policy, rural policy combines economic and 
social cohesion objectives although, once more, it can 
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be argued that the latter are the prime motivating force 
for policy. Economic development instruments have a 
role in reducing social disparities, especially in reduc-
ing levels of underemployment and encouraging alter-
natives to agriculture. Again, however, as is the case 
with inner urban areas, large scale industry is unlikely 
to be suited to rural areas and the emphasis is often 
on the development of crafts and tourism. Moreover, 
the objectives of rural policy are generally as much po-
litical or social as economic. The speed of agricultural 
change in predominantly rural countries like France in 
the post-war period has often resulted in unrest and in 
rural issues being given a high political profile. Further-
more, the emphasis of policy often has a significant 
social component, associated with maintaining popu-
lation settlements by sustaining standards of living and 
by assuring the provision of public services. 
Among the case study countries, national rural devel-
opment policy is of most significance in France. Rural 
areas cover 80 percent of the French national territory 
but contain just 20 percent of the population. More-
over, the rural population in France continued to de-
cline into the 1980s. In practice, however, the charac-
teristics of rural areas in France, and, associated, the 
nature of the rural problem, vary widely. A study by 
DATAR in 1993 established a socio-economic typolo-
gy of cantons and identified the following: 
• certain cantons are dynamic (mainly those In the 
bassin Parisien: île de France; Picardie; Cham-
pagne-Ardennes) 
• certain cantons are in an "intermediate situation" 
(these are spread throughout the country) 
• other cantons are deemed to be "fragile" (these are 
mainly in the west and south-west: Basse Nor-
mandie; Bretagne; Pays de la Loire; Poitou-Char-
entes are particularly affected) 
• last, a number of cantons are considered to be in 
a crisis situation (mainly in Limousin; Auvergne; 
Corse; and Languedoc-Roussillon). 
Until relatively recently the policy response to rural 
problems in France tended to be sectoral in approach. 
Under the influence of EC policies, such as the IMPs, 
recent policy has adopted a more integrated ap-
proach. This is reflected in the main policy decisions 
taken by the CIDAR (interministerial committee for ru-
ral development) at its June 1993 meeting. These in-
volved the following measures: 
ers, relaxation of the rules on indebtedness in the 
case of young farmers, start up assistance for firms 
in the agricultural sector, and the development of 
the hotel and tourism industries) 
• the designation of priority rural development areas 
(TRDPs) as the basis for government policy in rural 
areas. These areas qualify for contributions from 
various interministerial funds, for tax concessions 
and for certain financial measures 
• land and forest management (a three-year pro-
gramme involving FF 80 million (12 MECU), of 
which FF 39 million (6 MECU) is contributed by 
central government) 
• housing (including tax exemptions for vacant prop-
erty put up for rent; some FF 300 million (45 
MECU) for 150 housing improvement projects; and 
an increase in the rate of housing improvement 
grants in communes with fewer than 5,000 inhab-
itants). 
• public services (updating and reinforcement of the 
departmental plans for the organisation and im-
provement of public services; establishment of 
contracts for the maintenance of the education 
services in rural areas; improvement of health serv-
ices). 
The main instruments of French rural policy are: 
• the FIDAR (Interministerial fund for rural develop-
ment - now subsumed into the national regional 
development fund, FNADT) which amounted to FF 
1.8 billion (271 MECU) for the period 1989-93 
• the FGER (rural area management fund, provided 
for under the new regional development framework 
law) for which the initial 1995 allocation of FF 500 
million (75 MECU) was reduced to FF 313 million 
(47 MECU) in June 1995. 
• the DDR (rural development allocation), distributed 
through the budget of the ministry for the interior 
and modified under the new framework law for re-
gional development; the measure seeks to pro-
mote economic development by encouraging col-
laboration between communes (intercommunalité). 
A quarter of the budget is allocated to communes 
with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants and three-quar-
ters to groups of communes with fewer than 
35,000 inhabitants. 
economic development that encourages "pluriac-
tivity" (incentives for collaboration between employ-
Rural policy in the United Kingdom has a lower profile 
than policy in France, in large measure reflecting earli-
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er industrialisation processes in the UK and the small 
proportion of the population still engaged in agricul-
ture. In addition, for the most part, the United Kingdom 
is considerably more densely populated than France. 
As with urban policy, the instruments and implementa-
tion of rural policy differ between the different parts of 
the United Kingdom. Of most interest are the policy 
approaches in England and Wales. 
In England, rural policy is the responsibility of the Rur-
al Development Commission (RDC), a government 
agency grant-aided by the Department for the Envi-
ronment. The RDC's stated goals are that the country-
side should be a place where: 
• people both live and work, and villages and small 
towns provide for the varied needs of people in a 
wide range of circumstances; 
• the economy of all rural areas provides a broad 
range of job opportunities and makes the most ef-
fective possible contribution to the national econo-
my; 
• residents are not unduly disadvantaged as a result 
of living in rural areas, while rural communities have 
reasonable and affordable access to services; and 
• development respects and, wherever possible, en-
hances the environment. 
In 1993-4 RDC expenditure amounted to £38.3 million 
(49 MECU) - little more than one tenth of the expendi-
ture committed under Regional Selective Assistance to 
firms in the same year. Policy instruments include the 
provision of funded workspace; small business sup-
port; and loans to rural businesses. 
Reflecting the different geography of the country, rural 
policy in Wales is markedly more significant than in 
England. Rural development policies are co-ordinated 
under the Rural Initiative, the aim of which is to "cre-
ate a self-supporting market economy in rural Wales". 
The Welsh Office works in co-operation with local au-
thorities, government agencies and other bodies, in-
cluding the Welsh Development Agency and the De-
velopment Board for Rural Wales. The total Welsh 
budget for rural support in 1992-3 was around £56 
million (72 MECU). 
Finally in this rural policy review, it should be noted that 
in Spain, national rural policy is largely subsumed with-
in wider measures undertaken in the context of the 
Objective 1 and 5b plans. In addition, a number of 
measures are provided for in the LEADER Community 
Initiative. There is, however, no national rural develop-
ment policy that is distinct from EU measures. 
3.1.3 Policies for "Crisis" Areas 
Policies for crisis regions are those operated in areas 
that have generally been dominated by a single indus-
try that has undergone often rapid restructuring and, 
sometimes, terminal decline. There is usually a clear 
economic development objective underlying such poli-
cies in the sense that their primary purpose is to en-
courage alternative economic activities. However, the 
intensity with which such policies are implemented 
(usually the focus is on closely-defined areas and for a 
set time period) reflects concerns at the devastating 
effects on the community at large of the collapse of the 
dominant, sometimes the only, industrial activity. As 
with urban policy, there is an important social and po-
litical aspect to the motivation for action, although in 
the case of crisis regions the main policy instruments 
tend to be primarily economic. 
In Germany, it was noted in Section 2.1.2 that region-
al policy is the responsibility of a joint Federal-Land 
partnership arrangement, the so-called Gemeinschaft-
saufgabe (GA). During the 1980s, the rundown of the 
steel and shipbuilding industries created severe prob-
lems of structural change in specific localities which re-
sulted in a series of special fixed-term programmes. 
Although to some extent distinct from standard re-
gional policies, these programmes made use of GA 
policy instruments and funding. Their prime objective 
was to create alternative employment opportunities 
outside of those sectors experiencing industrial de-
cline. 
Such programmes were at their peak in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. They included a Steel Location Pro-
gramme (1982-90) for the creation of alternative em-
ployment opportunities outside the iron and steel sec-
tors, a Special Programme for Bremen (1984-89) re-
sponding to problems created by job losses in the 
shipbuilding and steel sectors, a more general Ship-
building Area Programme (1987-89) and a Special 
Programme for Aachen-Juelich (1988-91) reflecting 
coalmine closures (OECD, 1989). More recently, spe-
cial measures have been adopted in response to more 
general decline in the coal-mining and defence sec-
tors, often with EU support (RESIDER, KONVER). A 
feature of these measures is their increasingly close re-
lationship to the GA. In particular, it is no longer the 
case that such crisis areas can be designated addi-
tional to the GA Areas. Instead, and this was made 
explicit in the last area designation review approved by 
the European Commission, the designation of such ar-
eas must fall within the overall population ceiling for GA 
Area coverage agreed between the GA and the Com-
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mission. In other words, should the need arise for new 
crisis areas to be designated this will only be allowed 
at the expense of the de-designation of previously-
designated areas, leaving the overall population cover-
age of those areas approved for regional aid purposes 
unchanged. 
In France, policies for crisis areas had a profile in the 
early to mid-1980s, although a special fund for the re-
structuring of mining areas (the GIRZOM) had been In 
place earlier. The main focus of policy was the desig-
nation of a number of pôles de conversion; (for the 
most part, the areas concerned were affected by the 
restructuring of the coal, steel and shipbuilding sec-
tors). The interest of this as a policy approach lies in 
the fact that no new policy instruments were intro-
duced, but that existing measures were co-ordinated 
and focused on closely-defined areas of industrial de-
cline - involving, for example, accelerated award pro-
cedures under the regional policy grant (PAT) scheme 
and the establishment of a small task force based in 
the locality. 
Although pôles de conversion have never been for-
mally dedesignated, policy has been relaxed over time; 
in some of the areas there was considerable success 
in attracting new investment and in redeploying the 
workforces affected by restructuring. In others, the cri-
sis has remained severe and additional policy meas-
ures have largely superseded the pôles de conversion 
policy. Between 1987 and 1993 enterprise zones were 
operated in three shipbuilding closure areas. In 1993 
two "privileged investment zones" (ZIP) were designat-
ed in mining areas in the Nord-Pas de Calais region, 
providing automatic tax relief for the three years fol-
lowing establishment. 
Besides these relatively high-profile approaches to fo-
cusing policy on closely-defined areas, a number of 
other measures are operated more widely and are of-
ten incorporated within the State-region planning con-
tracts. These include: 
• the use of the regional development fund (FIAT) for 
derelict land and site clearance 
• the industrial redevelopment fund (FRI) which pro-
vides assistance to SMEs in areas undergoing re-
structuring (FF458 million - 69 MECU - over the 
period 1989-92) 
• the GIRZOM, involving FF700 million (106 MECU) 
in 1989-93 
• the industrialisation of mining areas (FIBM) which 
allocated funding of FF1.8 billion (271 MECU) over 
a decade (1984-94) 
• and the industrialisation of the Lorraine region (FIL) 
which involved FF1.3 billion (196 MECU) for the pe-
riod 1984-92. 
In addition to these measures, which are primarily tar-
geted at economic development, a significant spend 
was allocated to a wide range of essentially social 
measures providing for early retirement, mobility, long-
term retraining, etc. 
In the United Kingdom, policies for crisis regions have 
also tended to have a high profile. There is a now long-
standing policy of designating enterprise zones cover-
ing closely-defined areas affected by acute industrial 
decline. The aim of enterprise zone status is to stimu-
late private investment in target areas by lifting certain 
financial burdens and administrative controls. The main 
incentives take the form of tax relief and a concession 
on business rates; these apply for a period of ten years 
from the date of designation. In addition, the planning 
regime is greatly simplified: developments conforming 
to the published scheme for each zone do not require 
individual planning permission, and, where planning 
regulations remain in force, procedures are accelerated. 
The first round of enterprise zones were created In 
1981 and expired in 1991-2; the second round expired 
in 1993-4. There have been 28 zones designated to 
date. Current zones include Sunderland, Inverclyde 
and Lanarkshire; and extensions in North West Kent 
and Swansea. Further zones are being designated in 
the colliery closure areas of East Midlands, Dearne Val-
ley and East Durham. 
A separate initiative, the Programme for the Valleys, 
was launched by the Welsh Office in 1993. This cov-
ers some 2,230 square kilometres and a population of 
700,000 (about 25 percent of the Welsh population), 
comprising some of the most disadvantaged commu-
nities in an area formerly dominated by the coal and 
steel Industries. The programme aims to improve the 
"social, environmental and economic well-being of the 
Valleys" through job creation, training, environmental 
improvements and improvements In health and hous-
ing provision. Total public expenditure on the pro-
gramme in 1993-4 was £345 million (442 MECU); the 
programme is expected to involve £1 billion (1,282 
MECU) over its lifetime and aims to attract a similar 
sum in private sector investment. 
In Italy support for steel closure areas is provided for 
under Law 181 of 1989 in Terni and Genoa in the Cen-
tre-North and Taranto and Naples in the Mezzogiorno. 
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As elsewhere, the main objective is to provide alterna-
tive activities for those made jobless by the decline in 
the steel sector. 
3.1.4 Policies for Special Status Regions 
A final category of spatially-oriented policies arises 
from the special status of certain regions. Although 
there is an economic and social cohesion dimension to 
policy, the primary motivation is to contribute to na-
tional political cohesion by reducing economic and so-
cial disparities. Moreover, such is the priority accorded 
to this form of solidarity that separate transfer mecha-
nisms as well as explicit policy measures are usually in 
place, with the consequence that public expenditure 
per head in such regions is significantly above the na-
tional average. 
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom all op-
erate (or have operated) distinct policies for particular 
parts of their territories. In France, Corsica has a sep-
arate legal status from the remaining 21 regions and 
special economic development measures are in place 
to reflect this and the particularities that arise from its 
island status. In Germany, following reunification, spe-
cial measures apply in the so-called new Länder aimed 
at facilitating the adjustment process. In Italy, the em-
phasis on the development of the south (the Mezzo-
giorno) from the 1950s to the early 1990s was reflect-
ed in the existence of quite distinct policies (the so-
called intervento straordinario or special intervention) 
and the establishment of separate institutions to man-
age them. In the United Kingdom, for well-known po-
litical reasons, distinct packages of measures are op-
erated in Northern Ireland in many areas of govern-
ment policy. 
The most significant policies in this category are oper-
ated in Germany in the context of reunification. Indeed, 
in terms of scale, the provisions made for the new Län-
der overshadow any regional or other spatial policy in 
the European Union. The central objective of policy is 
to overcome the internal division in standards of living. 
It was apparent even before unification that the exist-
ing system of horizontal and vertical fiscal equalisation 
would be overwhelmed by the inclusion of the new 
Länder, with most western Länder becoming net con-
tributors. When the Unification Treaty was drawn up 
the western Länder negotiated the provision of special 
arrangements for the new Länder, in compensation for 
a five year exclusion of the new Länder from the fiscal 
equalisation schemes provided for in the Basic Law. 
The resultant Unity Fund (Fonds Deutsche Einheit), 
which ran from 1990 to 1994, was initially to be fi-
nanced in three equal parts by the western Länder, the 
eastern Länder and the federal government. Howev-
er, when the full scale of the financial burden became 
clearer, alterations were made in 1992 which increased 
the total funding volume from DM 115 billion to DM 
146.3 billion (75,413 MECU) and allowed the new Lan-
der to retain their full VAT revenue. These sums are ex-
tremely significant when set alongside total general 
government expenditure of DM1,084 billion (558,763 
MECU) In 1990 and regional incentive spending of just 
DM110 million (57 MECU) in the same year. A further 
special fund, the Gemeinschaftswerk Aufschwung Ost 
provided for a further DM 12 billion (6,186 MECU) in 
both 1991 and 1992 for investment and work pro-
grammes. 
The Unification Treaty provided for the following: 
• a special programme of economic assistance for 
the new Länder 
• measures to improve the general economic condi-
tions in the communes, with particular emphasis 
on infrastructure 
• measures to encourage the rapid development of 
SMEs 
• measures to promote the modernisation and re-
structuring of the economy 
• debt relief for enterprises. 
A key feature of the approach under the Unification 
Treaty is that all formerly west German federal laws 
and institutions were applied to the east; with the ex-
ception of the Treuhand, there are no separate institu-
tional structures with responsibility for policy in east 
Germany. A further notable feature is the explicit deci-
sion to use regional policy as a component of policy 
(this is reflected in the very high levels of spend dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.1 above). 
Policy for the new Länder based on the Unification 
Treaty is centred around a range of instruments, some 
of which are exclusive to east Germany and some of 
which involve enhancements to measures that are 
available throughout the Federal Republic. The key 
measures include: 
• tax relief in the form of an investment allowance (In-
vestitionszulage) 
• a special depreciation allowance 
• soft loans from the Credit Bank for Reconstruction 
(Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, KfW); the German 
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Equalisation Bank (Deutsche Ausgleichsbank, DtA); 
and the ERP Fund (ERP Sondervermögen) 
sphere of general government affairs such as defence 
and external relations which are UK-wide policies. 
• product development measures aimed principally 
at SMEs 
• measures to Improve sales of east German prod-
ucts 
• a package of research and development measures 
together with the establishment of Fraunhofer and 
Max-Planck Society institutions in the new Länder 
• wage cost reductions in respect of recruitment in 
specific areas 
According to a report by the Deutsche Bundesbank 
(7/95) gross transfers to the new Länder amounted to 
DM 840 billion in the period 1991 to 1995. The flow 
of payments has Increased steadily each year, as has 
the share of spending by the federal government (from 
54 percent in 1991 to 75 percent in 1995). In 1991, 
DM 139 billion (71,649 MECU) was transferred: DM 75 
billion from the federal government, DM 5 billion from 
the western Länder authorities, DM 31 billion from the 
Unity Fund, and the remainder from the EC budget 
and the federal labour office. By 1995 it is estimated 
that transfers will rise to DM 200 billion (over 103,000 
MECU), with DM 151 billion coming from the federal 
government and DM 14 billion from the western Län-
der and local authorities, the rest from the EC, feder-
al labour office and statutory pension insurance insti-
tutions. 
In the United Kingdom, separate measures are oper-
ated for Northern Ireland in most spheres of govern-
ment policy and implemented through a system of ad-
ministrative devolution. According to the expenditure 
plans for Northern Ireland(7), "The government's poli-
cies for law and order, political and social affairs... 
...must be recognised as making complementary con-
tributions to meeting the overall objective of achieving 
peace, stability and prosperity in Northern Ireland." 
The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has discre-
tion to allocate resources within the so-called NI Block 
(with the exception of social security benefits which are 
mainly determined by the level of demand) in response 
to local needs and priorities. The NI Block amounted 
to over £7 billion (8,974 MECU) in 1993-4; in addition, 
social security spending involved a further £0.52 billion 
(667 MECU). These sums are used to operate distinct 
policies for the province, except, obviously, in the 
"> Expenditure Plans and Priorities, Northern Ireland, The Govern-
ment's Expenditure Plans 1995-6 to 1997-8, Cm 2816, March 1995. 
Separate arrangements and, to a lesser extent, sepa-
rate policies are also operated for Scotland and Wales 
where the allocations to the Scottish and Welsh Offices 
are calculated on the basis of the so-called Barnett 
formula. In part, this is intended to take account of the 
disadvantage resulting from peripherality and, for much 
of Scotland, long distances and low population densi-
ty. As for Northern Ireland, however, there is also an 
important political dimension to the special public ex-
penditure provisions made; indeed, the formula was 
devised shortly after an upsurge of support for inde-
pendence in both countries. 
The UK arrangements are, however, far from repre-
senting transfers along the lines of the system for the 
new Länder. The NI Block constitutes the bulk of gov-
ernment spending with respect to Northern Ireland. 
Similarly, for Wales and Scotland, the funding relates to 
policies that are implemented by the respective territo-
rial administrations in place of, and not in addition to, 
UK-wide policies. Nevertheless, it is the case that the 
formulae applied result ¡n higher per capita levels of 
spend in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales than In 
England. 
The political dimension has also been central ¡n France 
where special measures for Corsica have encom-
passed both institutional reform and special funding 
provisions. In 1991 Corsica's status as a local author-
ity (collectivité locale) was reinforced by the loi Joxe 
which provided for greater autonomy for Corsica in the 
fields of education, energy, culture and communica-
tions. Since 1992, central government has adopted a 
more interventionist stance to economic development 
¡n partnership with the Corsican authorities. The ob-
jectives are to create the conditions for economic de-
velopment through structural reforms and the achieve-
ment of the 15 year social, cultural and economic de-
velopment plan approved by the Corsican assembly in 
September 1993. 
There are three principal types of measure operated in 
Corsica: 
• the State-local authority planning contract for Cor-
sica and the additional measures 
• the fiscal status of Corsica 
• the "territorial continuity" grant 
The planning contract for Corsica is broadly similar to 
those concluded with the other 21 French regions. 
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However, the element of central government funding is 
significantly higher than for other regions: for 1989-93, 
the total State contribution was FF517 million (78 
MECU). This amounted to FF2.068 (312 ECU) per in-
habitant; in only one other region (Limousin) did the 
State contribution exceed FF 1,500 per head. For the 
1994-98 contract, central government funding has 
been raised to FF695 million (105 MECU). In addition, 
a further FF380 million (57 MECU) has been commit-
ted by central government to priorities decided by the 
Corsican authorities; most of this (FF250 million) will be 
allocated to a road-building programme. 
Legislation passed in December 1994 accorded spe-
cial fiscal status to Corsica with a view to compensat-
ing for geographical handicaps and promoting eco-
nomic and social development. The main measure in-
volves contributing to local authority budgets to enable 
local business tax rates to be reduced by 60 percent. 
Moreover, there is corporation tax relief available to 
new activities and a portion of the duty on fuel sales is 
received by the Corsican authorities. These measures 
together cost central government some FF350 million 
(53 MECU). In addition, the so-called "territorial conti-
nuity" grant (dotation de continuité territoriale), which 
has been in place for some 20 years, aims to com-
pensate for the additional transport costs associated 
with island status. The 1995 allocation to this fund was 
FF850 million (128 MECU). 
In Italy, it was noted earlier that, over most of the post-
war period, policies for the development of the south 
(the Mezzogiorno) took the form of "special interven-
tion" (intervento straordinario), with quite distinct poli-
cies and separate institutions to manage them. How-
ever, over time, the issue of the cost and effectiveness 
of policies for the Mezzogiorno became a growing 
theme in Italian politics and the source of considerable 
antagonism between the north and south of the coun-
try. At the same time, there was significant dissatisfac-
tion with the institutional structure operating Mezzo-
giorno policy, part of a wider antipathy towards the role 
of the public administration in the Italian economy. The 
combination of these domestic tensions with European 
Commission pressures for there to be a review of Italian 
regional policy resulted in the demise of a distinct Mez-
zogiorno policy in 1992 and of the related Mezzogiorno 
institutions as from 1 May 1993. Thus, while the Mez-
zogiorno clearly represented a "special status" region 
for more than 40 years, it is no longer in that position. 
Finally in this review of regions with special status, it is 
worthwhile returning to the theme highlighted at the 
start of the section - namely the significant political 
motivation for such policies in the context of national 
solidarity. As just noted, three of the Member States 
studied currently operate special policies in respect of 
parts of their territories: France (Corsica); Germany 
(new Länder); and the United Kingdom (Northern Ire-
land). In all three cases, the policies lead to a very sig-
nificantly higher level of spending per capita than 
would otherwise be the case. However, the scale of 
the transfers are not always in evidence. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, little is made of the scale of 
funding for Northern Ireland. Similarly, in Corsica, fund-
ing is provided through a range of sources so that the 
scale of funding is not immediately apparent and, as 
for Northern Ireland, it is not always easy to distinguish 
the extent to which special policies and measures are 
substituting for nationwide ones. In contrast, the scale 
of the transfers to east Germany is frequently the sub-
ject of media reports, a fact which is leading to in-
creased dissent in some sections of the west German 
population. Interestingly, it might be argued that the 
high profile of the special policies for the Mezzogiorno, 
together with the absence of concrete evidence on the 
effectiveness of policy, was a major factor in growing 
political opposition to special policies for the south of 
Italy and to their ultimate demise. 
3.2 The Impact of Member States' 
Other Spatial Policies 
In addition to providing an overview of the objectives 
of Member States' other spatial policies, this research 
involves an assessment and summary of available ev-
idence and study results with a view to determining the 
impact of those policies. For these purposes, impact 
refers to: 
i. the distribution of national expenditures on other 
spatial policies between the regions; and 
ii. the effect of these expenditures. 
These are now discussed in turn. 
3.2.1 The Regional Distribution 
of Expenditure 
A broad indication of overall levels of expenditure can 
be found in the discussion of the objectives of other 
spatial policies provided above. However, going be-
yond this presents a number of methodological prob-
lems and a number of cautionary remarks are in order, 
especially with respect to the regional breakdown of 
such information. 
First, it has proven difficult to obtain detailed expendi-
ture data in many areas. This reflects the disparate na-
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ture of many of the policies concerned and the fre-
quent use of tax concessions where levels of revenue 
foregone are seldom calculated. Second, it is not al-
ways evident where there are overlaps in policy ex-
penditure and to what extent transfers substitute for 
rather than are additional to general government 
spending; this is particularly true of policies operated 
for special status regions. Third, a regional breakdown 
of such expenditure does not always provide a useful 
indication of the significance of spending in relation to 
issues of economic and social cohesion. For example, 
the data below show high levels of urban policy 
spending in île de France and south-east England, the 
richest regions in France and the UK respectively. 
However, this is not necessarily indicative of an inap-
propriate distribution of resources since both regions 
contain some of the worst urban problems. A further 
difficulty ¡s that, unlike the analysis of regional policy 
spending, it has not proven possible to obtain the in-
formation necessary to measure the intensity of other 
spatial policy spending. Little or no data is available on 
the proportion of the national population covered by 
other spatial policies, and none is to hand on the pro-
portion of regional populations covered. 
In spite of the constraints on the analysis of the da-
ta, there is still evidence that other spatial policy 
spending tends to flow towards the problem regions. 
Although in France, under the contrats de ville pro-
gramme, the île de France region is the principal 
beneficiary, receiving over a quarter of total funds, 
along with Rhône-Alpes, Nord Pas de Calais and 
Provence Alpes Côte d'Azur (PACA), it has to be 
recognised that these four regions are the most ur-
banised regions in France. Moreover, the least pros-
perous of the four, Nord-Pas de Calais, is the princi-
pal beneficiary in terms of expenditure per head. The 
extent to which cohesion is favoured is more marked 
in the context of the DSU. The Paris region, again 
along with Nord-Pas de Calais and PACA, is the prin-
cipal beneficiary. However, when the data is viewed 
in per capita terms, the main beneficiary is Nord-Pas 
de Calais, followed by Corsica, PACA and Langue-
doc-Roussillon. In addition, among the more ur-
banised of the French regions, île de France and Al-
sace are net contributors to the fund. 
Under the PACTs contained in the State-region plan-
ning contracts which encompass some of the policies 
for crisis areas, urban areas and rural areas described 
above, a similar pattern is in evidence. Average per 
capita spending under the PACTs is FF 210 (32 ECU); 
however, the levels of spend are significantly higher in 
Corsica (FF 890 - 134 ECU), Limousin (FF 422 - 64 
ECU), Lorraine (FF393 - 59 ECU) and Nord Pas de 
Calais (FF302 - 46 ECU), all regions with significant ru-
ral, urban or industrial reconversion problems and re-
gional per capita GDP of less than the national average. 
The statistics available (which are limited) are more dif-
ficult to interpret for the United Kingdom, partly be-
cause urban and rural policies are the responsibilities 
of different territorial administrations. In addition, the 
nature of urban problems is such that they concern 
geographically small areas for which data are fre-
quently not available. Information available on the re-
gional breakdown of urban policy measures shows the 
following shares for London (figures are not available 
for the Urban Programme which involved expenditure 
of £166.5 million (213 MECU)): 
Table 3.3: London's Share of Urban Policy Expenditure 
Programme Total 1993-4 Outturn 
(MECU) 
2,263 
450 
38 
96 
12 
134 
4 
23 
440 
295 
36 
% allocated 
30 
24 
4 
41 
20 
4 
15 
28 
31 
23 
100 
Housing investment programme 
Estate Action 
Housing Partnership Fund 
Housing Action Trusts 
Flats over Shops 
Derelict Land Grants 
City Action Team 
Task Forces 
Urban Development Corporations 
City Challenge 
Docklands Light Railway 
Source: EPRC calculations based on Secretary of State for the Environment response to Parliamentary question. 
These figures show that London receives a significant 
proportion of urban spending in the United Kingdom, 
and a particularly large share of the larger sums. This 
appears to sit uneasily with the fact that Greater Lon-
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don accounts for just 14 percent of the English popu-
lation and that per capita GDP is 143 percent of the 
EU average compared with just 98 percent for the UK 
as a whole. However, on other measures, notably 
those relating to social deprivation, parts of London 
are acutely disadvantaged, in spite of their location 
within a region that is prosperous overall. Any consid-
eration of the extent to which such expenditure is con-
sistent with cohesion must take account of this policy 
context. 
The most striking levels of expenditure on other spatial 
policies concern special status regions. The gross 
transfer to the new Länder for 1996 amounts to some 
DM 196.5 billion (101.3 billion ECU); this compares 
with Structural Fund spending for the entire period 
1989-93 of 64 billion ECU for the EU as a whole. The 
force of political considerations and issues of national 
solidarity are also In evidence in the high levels of 
spend in Corsica compared to the French average and 
in Northern Ireland, and to a lesser extent Scotland 
and Wales, in the United Kingdom, where specific 
transfer mechanisms are in place. 
More generally, the point is worth making that most 
spatially-discriminating policies tend to favour those ar-
eas in receipt of regional policy support. This is cer-
tainly true of policies for special status regions, all of 
which are located firmly within nationally-designated 
problem regions (and, indeed, also within EU Objective 
1 areas). It is also true of the vast majority of "crisis" 
areas. While such areas occasionally are located out-
side national problem regions, this generally is resolved 
the next time the assisted areas are reviewed. More 
than this, with the recent move towards agreed popu-
lation ceilings for nationally-designated problem re-
gions, it is increasingly common for any short-term 
designation of areas outside previously-agreed prob-
lem region boundaries to be accompanied by the de-
designation of assisted areas (see, for instance, the 
1993 agreement between the Commission and the 
German authorities). 
For rural and urban policy areas there may be less co-
Incidence of policy boundaries with designated region-
al problem areas, not least because rural and urban 
policies generally have a significant social and environ-
mental component and are less-focused on large-
scale economic development than is often the case 
with regional policy. That having been said, the focus 
of both policies is very clearly on economic and social 
cohesion. Urban policy in the United Kingdom, for in-
stance, is very closely related to the need to remove 
the causes of social unrest in various inner city areas. 
In similar vein, rural policy generally reflects the need 
to retain a degree of balance between rural and non-
rural activities and to help maintain otherwise fragile 
population settlement structures. 
3.2.2 The Effect of Other Spatial Policies 
This section highlights recent evaluation studies in re-
spect of other spatial policy instruments. For the most 
part, the evaluation focus has been on urban policy 
measures, though certain policies for crisis areas are 
also covered. Given the significant increase in the im-
portance attached to urban policy in Great Britain (and 
the concomitant decline in the significance of regional 
policy) it is perhaps unsurprising that most evaluative 
work has been concentrated on the UK. 
As with regional policy instruments (see Section 2.2.2), 
official evaluation work in respect of urban policy has 
often taken a relatively narrow perspective, measuring 
effectiveness according to a narrow range of policy in-
put and output criteria. Typical of this approach is ear-
ly work evaluating the Urban Development Grant 
(UDG) in Britain. Eligible for a number of designated 
local authority areas with "serious social needs", the 
UDG is allocated on a competitive basis to projects (in-
dustrial, commercial, housing or recreational) providing 
employment opportunities in depressed inner city ar-
eas. 
One important evaluative study (PSMRU, 1988) exam-
ined the operation of the UDG between 1982 and 
1986 and discovered a significant level of deadweight 
spending on projects assisted under the programme. 
For the projects studied, the cost per job seemed rel-
atively high in comparison with British regional policy 
instruments (ie. between £11,800 and £16,500). The 
study found that most jobs were filled by residents liv-
ing in or near inner city areas, although only 18 per-
cent of the jobs created employed previously unem-
ployed people. This may reflect the high number of 
temporary construction jobs (ie. 2478 person-years) 
generated by the UDG projects (PSMRU, 1988). Al-
though the study concluded that the scheme be re-
tained, the researchers felt better appraisal techniques 
were needed to reduce deadweight spending on proj-
ects that could have gone ahead without assistance. 
PSMRU claim that, without better scrutiny of project 
additionality, governments are able to overestimate job 
creation levels attributable to public policies. 
Interestingly, a follow up study was conducted on the 
UDG - now the City Grant - by Price Waterhouse 
(1993). Although the Price Waterhouse research fol-
lowed a similar methodological route as the PSMRU 
study, greater emphasis was laid on net additional job 
creation as the key evaluative criteria. The study dis-
covered that the net public sector cost per job was 
£14,280. Interestingly this falls mid-way between the 
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cost per job range estimated by the earlier study by 
PSMRU (1988). Overall, the research concluded that 
the UDG/City Grant compares favourably with other 
public sector job creation initiatives. It ¡s important to 
note that the Price Waterhouse study included a tele-
phone survey component, not normally deemed as re-
liable as traditional survey techniques. However, the 
study was useful because it provided additional longi-
tudinal data with which to compare the effectiveness 
of policy instruments over a number of years. 
Further studies of the grant in specific localities took a 
different approach. Cebulla's (1995) study of the op-
erational effectiveness of the UDG in Belfast sought to 
evaluate the programme by comparing UDG-assisted 
businesses with non-assisted businesses. This study 
claims that, although halting the decline of indigenous 
businesses, UDG-assisted firms did not generate 
greater employment growth. According to Cebulla, 
both national economic forces and indigenous eco-
nomic strengths play a larger role in explaining firm 
growth. The strength of Cebulla's Belfast case study 
was the insight this gave into the local economic and 
property market circumstances of one particular local-
ity. Given the limitations of property-led economic de-
velopment strategies ¡n alleviating inner city deprivation 
(see, Turok, 1992), the UDG seems to be a limited pol-
icy instrument if unaccompanied by more comprehen-
sive policy action. 
Another component of spatially-targeted policy in 
Britain was the designation of enterprise zones. En-
terprise zones provide firms with a host of fiscal and 
property-related incentives. Although enterprise zones 
also operate in France, the majority of evaluative work 
has been conducted in Britain. One of the key official 
evaluations undertaken in Britain (PACEC, 1987) ex-
amined the effectiveness of the zones during the early 
1980s. Between 1981 and 1986, the study found that 
63,000 jobs were located in the twenty-three zones 
studied. Of these, about 35,000 were a direct result 
of the enterprise zone policy. However, the study 
found quite high levels of displacement (23.7 percent) 
among firms which had moved into the enterprise 
zone. In other words, incoming firms were damaging 
local businesses quite considerably. Another problem 
when evaluating enterprise zones is the fact that many 
local firms move short distances into the designated 
areas in order to take advantage of the various tax 
concessions available. Such displacement of employ-
ment clearly erodes the overall contribution of an en-
terprise zone in its sub-regional economic context. 
Rather than generating new employment, zones may 
actually redistribute employment through opportunistic 
'boundary-hopping' 
An important aspect of this study was the inclusion of 
secondary factors when evaluating the economic im-
pact zones had on the local economy. Secondary fac-
tors take account of the two main multiplier effects 
(supplier and income) created by developments in the 
zone. In comparison with other evaluation studies a 
low supplier multiplier was identified for enterprise 
zones (ie. 0.048). This is possibly due to the high pro-
portion of externally-owned plants which locate in en-
terprise zones which in turn have highly globalised pro-
curement structures. The direct or income multiplier 
was line with other evaluation studies (ie. 1.1). Al-
though inclusion of secondary effects in the evaluation 
provides a better picture of the overall economic im-
pact produced by the zones, it does not inform poli-
cymakers about the reasons supplier linkages remain 
low or the qualitative nature of employment generated 
In firms. 
More recently, a study sponsored by the British gov-
ernment evaluated 22 of the 25 enterprise zones (HM-
SO, 1995). Overall the study analysed similar indica-
tors (employment, number of firms established and 
property impact analysis) as the study outlined above 
(see, PACEC, 1987). This data allows the evolution of 
the programme to be compared over different time pe-
riods. The recent study estimates that the zones cre-
ated 125,700 jobs of which 58,000 jobs were addi-
tional to those which would have been created. The 
cost per job at 1994/95 prices is estimated to have 
been in the region of £17,000, which is high in com-
parison with British regional policy instruments such as 
RSA. Notwithstanding the problems of calculating 
'true' additionality, the study depicts a relatively posi-
tive view of enterprise zones and their efficacy. 
Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) have now 
taken over from enterprise zones as Britain's key spa-
tially targeted policy instrument. Primarily, these were 
designed to stimulate the private sector property mar-
ket in areas of severe economic and social hardship by 
redeveloping areas of derelict urban land. Owing to 
the institutional nature of UDCs, assessing the effec-
tiveness of these bodies is difficult. Usually, a case 
study approach is adopted. Owing to their politically-
sensitive role vis-à-vis local authorities, many academ-
ic evaluations have taken a highly critical 'political 
economy' approach when assessing their effective-
ness. This partly owes to the lack of objective data on 
their performance outputs. 
One such study (Robinson ef al, 1994) evaluated two 
UDCs in the northern region of England: Tyne & Wear 
and Teeside. Robinson ef al claim that the employ-
ment creation impact of both UDCs was relatively low. 
The study also suggests that official UDC figures ex-
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aggerate their employment creation impact. While the 
UDC claim that 3,143 jobs have been created on New-
castle Business park, a survey conducted by the au-
thors found only 2,447 new jobs. Of 17 firms sur-
veyed, 11 firms had relocated from elsewhere in Tyne 
& Wear or from other parts of the region - suggesting 
a high level of displacement. The authors also found 
that the most expensive flagship projects, e.g. Tees-
dale shopping centre and Hartlepool Marina, were par-
ticularly weak in generating new employment. Finally, 
the authors believe that poor official data coupled with 
the problem of disentangling the work done by UDCs 
from other publicly funded bodies reduces current 
knowledge of the policy's overall effectiveness. 
Another case study assessment of UDCs (Atkinson 
and Moon, 1994) looked at the London Docklands De-
velopment Corporation (LDDC). This flagship UDC is 
well known for the Canary Wharf project and is gener-
ally viewed as an excellent example of property-led ur-
ban regeneration. Using data published by the LDDC, 
the researchers found that 41,000 jobs had been cre-
ated in the area; 17,000 of which were new. There had 
also been a 56 percent increase in the local population 
from 39,400 to 61,000. According to the authors, 
these figures represent quite dramatic economic and 
social restructuring. On the downside, only 9 percent 
of construction workers on the Canary Wharf project 
were from the local Borough of Tower Hamlets. In line 
with other property-led regeneration projects, LDDC 
paid very little attention to matching the employment 
needs of developers with local unemployed people 
through training etc. There are also some doubts over 
the low quality nature of the 'back-office' jobs which 
the property has attracted. Finally, the researchers 
criticise the LDDC for being insensitive to the needs of 
local authorities over local planning issues 
On the whole UDCs and other private-sector-led re-
generation institutions have come in for considerable 
criticism from the research community. The general 
view is that the overall effectiveness of property-led ur-
ban regeneration must be open to question. Owing to 
the speculative nature of projects such as Canary 
Wharf, success depends heavily on the vagaries of na-
tional and international economic factors outwith the 
control of local economic development institutions. 
The policy instrument is susceptible to outside vari-
ables and local economic development is heavily de-
pendent on the trickle-down of wealth and employ-
ment. In the absence of a fully-rounded measures de-
signed to obtain maximum benefit for the local econo-
my, UDCs tend to be viewed as unlikely to achieve 
their objectives of aiding the local regeneration 
process. Nevertheless, the ten year life-span of UDCs 
makes a comprehensive assessment impossible until 
they are finally wound up near the end of the century. 
Other national spatially-oriented policies include those 
designed to aid the process of economic restructuring 
in regions experiencing severe economic disadvan-
tage. Areas such as these receive heavy levels of sub-
vention from national governments to ensure social 
stability. A good example of this is Northern Ireland 
where public spending per capita is substantially 
above the national average. The fiscal transfer from 
Whitehall at the end of the 1960s amounted to 5 per-
cent of regional GDP, but by the start of the 1990s it 
stood at about 37 percent (Yeague, 1994). According 
to one observer, this level of subsidy can generate 
false assumptions among local businesses: "the exis-
tence of extensive subsidies has created a climate of 
dependency and has sapped the competitive vigour of 
many firms" (Teague, 1994, p. 284). Clearly, evaluating 
this type policy is more difficult than assessing the im-
pact of more targeted policy Instruments, a problem 
made the more difficult by the interplay of identifiable 
public expenditure with less regionally-sensitive areas 
of public expenditure. 
The above evaluation studies illustrate some of the 
problems when trying to assess the effectiveness of 
other spatial policies. Few studies have tried to under-
stand the full complexity of forces generating spatial in-
equalities and how policy interacts with these factors. 
Instead, the easier option of measuring certain quantifi-
able policy outputs has been the preferred method of 
evaluation. Although giving some insight into the short 
term impact policy has on areas of economic disad-
vantage, this narrow view does not allow the sort of in-
depth understanding needed to improve spatial policy-
making. The relatively new status of some policy instru-
ments may account for this situation however. 
Notwithstanding this, available evidence shows current 
policy instruments to be of limited impact. In particu-
lar, the effectiveness of British urban policies seems to 
be questionable: placing too much emphasis on the 
private sector property market as a source of wealth 
and employment creation. Property-led urban regener-
ation initiatives often generate a large proportion of low 
quality temporary employment, ill suited to the unem-
ployed people within disadvantaged communities. This 
result is disappointing given the heavy social compo-
nent of urban policy objectives. Also worth noting 
(though any such comparisons must be treated with 
caution) is the considerably higher cost per job figures 
which have been calculated for both UDGs and enter-
prise zones. At least within the UK, the standard re-
gional policy incentive, RSA, appears to be a more 
cost-effective economic development instrument. 
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3.3 Concluding Points 
The focus of this chapter has been on spatially-dis-
criminating policies other than regional policies. For 
the purposes of this report these have been grouped 
into urban, rural, crisis area and special status area 
policies. The distinction between regional and other 
spatial policies is not always a clear one - this is es-
pecially so of countries like France which take a broad-
er view of regional development policies within the 
context of aménagement du territoire and where there 
have been increasing moves to integrate spatial poli-
cies within a single framework. Nevertheless, there is 
a difference in emphasis between regional and other 
spatial policies; the essence of this lies primarily in the 
extent to which other spatial policies concern issues of 
social and political cohesion, rather than essentially 
economic development objectives. This is not to say 
that there is not always a mix of rationales and moti-
vating factors underlying policy; however, the four cat-
egories of policy identified concern areas where the 
political dimension of policy tends to be central - cer-
tainly more so than is generally the case with regional 
policy. 
As far as urban policy is concerned, the discussion in 
Section 3.1.1 concentrates mainly on the position in 
France and, especially, the United Kingdom where ur-
ban policy has been given a relatively high priority. In-
deed, in the UK, the political imperatives arising from 
growing unrest in areas of extreme poverty and depri-
vation have seen urban policy expenditure rise to some 
four times that of the main British regional incentive 
(Regional Selective Assistance). In similar vein, nation-
al urban policy spending in France is broadly on a par 
with the sum expended on the range of amenagement 
du territoire policies (including measures for rural and 
"crisis" regions as well as regional policy support). 
These two country examples underline the significant 
social and environmental aspects of national urban 
policy; while economic development instruments are 
among the measures used, they are generally em-
ployed for social and political ends. 
Elsewhere in the Member States, urban policy tends to 
be somewhat different in nature - a response to phys-
ical planning and environmental pressures rather than 
social unrest. Moreover, it is often the responsibility of 
sub-national levels of government rather than being a 
national policy initiative. On the other hand, and as al-
ready mentioned, the federal government in Germany 
can grant supplementary aid for urban measures 
where the investments serve to improve the conditions 
for growth in the economy as a whole or to equalise 
economic strength between the regions. 
Regarding rural policy, the emphasis in Section 3.1.2 
is very much on France where the speed of agricultur-
al change in the post-war period and the stress placed 
on the rural way of life has resulted in the policy being 
accorded a high national political profile. Elsewhere, 
rural issues tend to be less politically-sensitive from a 
national perspective and, indeed, much of the policy 
impetus now comes from EU-level policies (in particu-
lar, Objective 5b and the LEADER Community Initia-
tive). In general, the objectives of rural policy at the na-
tional level tend to reflect social priorities - in particu-
lar, the desirability of maintaining population settle-
ments by sustaining standards of living and by assur-
ing the provision of public services. While economic 
development instruments can play a role in achieving 
such objectives, the overall focus of policy is more on 
social than economic cohesion. 
Policies for "crisis" areas have been a feature in many 
Member States since the 1980s, particularly in re-
sponse to increasing problems of structural adjustment 
arising from job losses in the steel, shipbuilding and 
(most recently) defence industries (see Section 3.1.3). 
There is usually a clear economic development objec-
tive underlying such policies, reflecting the need to en-
courage alternative economic activities. However, the 
intensity of decline (and its spatial focus) is usually 
such that the policy response also incorporates signif-
icant social and political aspects. In the case study 
countries, examples of "crisis" area policies are provid-
ed for Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy, 
all of which have experienced major plant closures in 
narrowly-defined localities. Over time, such areas tend 
to be incorporated within designated problem regions. 
Finally, policies for "special status" regions are consid-
ered in Section 3.1.4. In such regions - which include 
the new Länder ¡n Germany, Corsica in France, North-
ern Ireland in the United Kingdom and (historically) the 
Mezzogiorno In Italy - the primary motivation of policy 
is to contribute to national political cohesion by reduc-
ing economic and social disparities. A feature of poli-
cies for special status regions is the sheer scale of the 
transfers involved, underlining the importance attached 
to national solidarity and political cohesion. The most 
striking illustration of this is the scale of transfers to the 
new Länder set alongside the volume of EU spending 
on the Structural Funds: the gross transfers to the new 
Länder for 1996 alone amount to 101 billion ECU; this 
compares with Structural Fund spending for the EU as 
whole of 64 billion over five years (1989-93). 
As far as the spatial distribution of expenditure is con-
cerned (see Section 3.2.1), comparative regional-level 
information has proved difficult to obtain. Even so, the 
evidence is that most spatially-discriminating policies 
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tend to favour those areas in receipt of regional policy 
support. As mentioned earlier, this is certainly true of 
policies for special status regions and it is also gener-
ally the case for most "crisis" areas. For rural and ur-
ban policy areas there may be less coincidence of pol-
icy boundaries with designated regional problem ar-
eas. That having been said, both policies are very 
clearly focused on economic and social cohesion in its 
wider sense; they aim to tackle the specific problems 
of urban and rural areas and, in so doing, to reduce 
sources of national discord. 
Considering, finally, the evaluation studies reviewed in 
Section 3.2.2, the available evidence tends to suggest 
that current policy instruments are of limited impact. In 
particular, as regards urban policy, the evidence is that 
property-led urban regeneration initiatives generate a 
large proportion of low quality temporary employment, 
ill-suited to the unemployed people within disadvan-
taged communities. As noted above, this is a disap-
pointing finding given the significant social component 
to urban policy objectives. A further, more positive find-
ing, at least for regional policy, is the fact that the cost 
per job figures attached to many other spatial policies 
are generally higher than those found for standard re-
gional incentives. 
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4, Horizontal Policies with Important Regional 
Impacts 
This chapter deals with policies which have no intend-
ed spatial effects. The focus is on policies for compet-
itiveness and employment, reflecting not only the prin-
cipal policy concerns of many Member States, but al-
so the key themes of the Commission's recent White 
Paper8. 
These two policy areas cover a wide range of govern-
ment activities aimed at .influencing the business envi-
ronment and the labour market. It Is important to 
stress that this chapter focuses on the proactive poli-
cies of government; in other words, those policies that 
are intended to improve the climate for firms and affect 
the way in which the job market functions. Policies in 
these two areas are operated largely without reference 
to their spatial effects; in contrast, the previous two 
chapters have been concerned with policies which 
specifically address spatial disparities. Nevertheless, in 
practice, spatial cohesion, employment and competi-
tiveness are intrinsically linked and potentially ¡n con-
flict. 
The regional policy chapter of this report (Chapter 2) 
described the policy dilemma faced by the poorest EU 
Members ¡n balancing short-term competitiveness 
against internal regional disparity, a dilemma exacer-
bated by the poverty of the countries concerned in an 
EU context. However, such policy choices are by no 
means limited to the poorer EU countries. A problem 
common to all Member States is that policies to pro-
mote competitiveness may, in the short term, have 
detrimental effects on regional economic disparities 
and a negative impact on the labour market. Similarly, 
there is a perception that policies that aim to promote 
·" Commission of the European Communities (1993) Growth, Com-
petitiveness and Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward in-
to the 21" Century, OOPEC, Luxembourg. 
regional and social cohesion may, at least in the short 
term, jeopardise competitiveness by diverting re-
sources. The promotion of economic cohesion, social 
cohesion and competitiveness might be conceptu-
alised as a triangle of policy tensions where the pursuit 
of each objective impacts directly on the other two. 
This chapter considers policies to promote competi-
tiveness and employment policies in turn. The discus-
sion of competitiveness policies in Section 4.1 focus-
es on the spatial impact of RTD and innovation poli-
cies in the Member States. It deals first with the con-
text for such policies (Section 4.1.1), then with the ob-
jectives of policy (Section 4.1.2) and finally with their 
regional impact (Section 4.1.3). A review of employ-
ment policies is provided in Section 4.2. The final sec-
tion, Section 4.3, draws together the main points 
made in the chapter. 
4.1 Policies to Promote 
Competitiveness 
In recent years growing attention has been paid to the 
promotion of "competitiveness". This is reflected in a 
range of government reports and policy statements in-
cluding Competitiveness: Helping Business to Win in 
the UK, and the German Bericht der Bundersregierung 
zur Zukunftssicherung des Standortes Deutschland (the 
safeguarding of Germany's future as an industrial loca-
tion), as well as the Commission's own White Paper. 
Although the term "competitiveness" has entered into 
common parlance among policymakers, there is no 
clear definition of its meaning in policy terms and no 
definitive listing of the policy instruments designed to 
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promote competitiveness. Nevertheless, a common 
theme among the policies that fall within the scope of 
"competitiveness" policies concerns research and de-
velopment, technological change and the capacity to 
diffuse R&D results into products and processes. This 
section takes the science and technology policies of 
the Member States as its main focus. 
4.1.1 RTD and Innovation Policies 
in Context 
Spending on research and development by govern-
ment, universities and the business sector is signifi-
cant; in 1991 it accounted for 2.1 percent of GDP in 
the European Union. However, there is a striking vari-
ation in levels of overall spend on R&D across the EU: 
Germany spends five times as much on R&D relative 
to its GDP as does Greece. Indeed, the four Cohesion 
countries form a clear grouping, all spending around 1 
percent or less of GDP on research and development. 
Italy and four of the smaller continental Member States 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands) each 
spend between 1.3 percent and 1.9 percent of GDP 
on R&D. A third grouping comprises France, Germany, 
the UK and the two Nordic Member States, which all 
spend in excess of 2 percent of GDP on research and 
development. Sweden is the only EU country where 
R&D expenditure as a proportion of GDP exceeds that 
of the United States. Variations in spending as a pro-
portion of GDP are broadly mirrored in expenditure per 
head of population. Both of these indicators are illus-
trated in Chart 4.1. Following the approach adopted in 
Chapter 2, this chart groups countries into four broad 
categories: the Cohesion countries, Germany/Italy, the 
"northern European" countries and the Nordic Member 
States. The first three of these groupings are also 
utilised in the discussion of policy objectives which fol-
lows. Given the focus of this report, the policies of the 
three new Member States are not considered further in 
this section. 
Chart 4.1 
Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D 
GERD % of GDP 
GERD per capita 
PPP$ 
Source: OECD (1995) 
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4.1.2 The Objectives of R&D and Innovation 
Policies 
4.1.2.1 The Cohesion Countries 
From Chart 4.1 it is clear that ­ in relation to both GDP 
and national population ­ R&D spending in the four 
Cohesion countries is significantly less than that found 
elsewhere in the EU Member States. Having said this, 
it is important to note that there is a substantial differ­
ence in the overall scale of R&D spending between 
Spain, on the one hand, and the remaining three coun­
tries, on the other. Clearly, this reflects differences in 
population size and in the size of the economy as a 
whole. The different levels­ of general and business­re­
lated R&D expenditure in the four Cohesion countries 
are illustrated in Chart 4.2. 
Chart 4.2 
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The overall size of the Spanish economy also has an 
impact on RTD priorities. Unlike the other Cohesion 
countries, there is greater emphasis on the promotion 
of basic research in Spain; in the late 1980s this ac­
counted for around 19 percent of the R&D budget 
(OECD, 1994). Indeed, the basic legislation governing 
science, technology and research policies in Spain (the 
1986 "Law of Science") stresses the need to maintain 
and support basic research in order to develop new 
knowledge. Moreover, like most of the larger EU Mem­
ber States, R&D policy is focused on a number of des­
ignated key themes and programmes. In contrast, in 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland, the emphasis is on two 
main areas: the expansion of the scientific and techni­
cal capacity of the country ­ the science base; and 
support for innovation and technology transfer. 
A further common feature of these three wholly Objec­
tive 1 countries is the role played by EU policies in 
stimulating R&D. CIENCIA and PEDIP in Portugal; 
EPET in Greece and STRIDE in all three countries have 
involved significant levels of funding for RTD and inno­
vation. Perhaps related to this, Ireland and Portugal 
were the only OECD countries in which both public 
and private expenditure on R&D increased between 
the periods 1985­9 and 1990­2. In the context of co­
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hesion at the European level, this is clearly of interest 
insofar as it seems unlikely that such levels of spend 
would have been sustainable through national re­
sources alone. 
With respect to sectors of activity, two points are worth 
making. First, and this is illustrated in Chart 4.2, in both 
Portugal and Greece, a very small proportion of R&D 
is undertaken by the private sector; just 27 and 22 
percent respectively. This contrasts with a share of al­
most two­thirds in Ireland (among the highest in the 
OECD) and nearly one half in Spain. The second point 
concerns the areas on which R&D expenditure is fo­
cused. This ¡s illustrated in Chart 4.3. 
Chart 4.3 
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Note: General University Funds are part of the funds assigned to "Advancement of Knowledge". 
There are a number of interesting features of these ex­
penditure priorities. Of particular note, Ireland and 
Spain are the highest spenders on industrial R&D (as 
a proportion of domestic expenditure) in the EU 12 
while Greece and Portugal are the highest spenders on 
agricultural R&D. 
As far as the regional dimension of policy is con­
cerned, within the Cohesion countries, the emphasis is 
clearly on issues of national competitiveness. Indeed, 
as discussed earlier in this report, arguments for re­
gional policy can be difficult enough to sustain in 
economies that are as whole underdeveloped in a Eu­
ropean context. It is, therefore, scarcely surprising that 
regional development Issues do not have a high profile 
in RTD policies in the Cohesion countries. Having said 
this, there are examples of attempts to dilute the con­
centration of RTD activities in the more prosperous re­
gions. In Greece, part of the EU STRIDE funding is as­
signed to special measures for the most disadvan­
taged regions. However, this accounts for only a small 
proportion of the budget (3 percent) and seems un­
likely to have any significant impact; as far as national 
policy is concerned there is no regional RTD policy in 
Greece. In Portugal, the focus Is also on national RTD; 
however, the EU­funded CIENCIA Programme has 
been systematically oriented to try to redress regional 
imbalances in science and technology by ensuring that 
50 percent of investment under the programme is out­
side the Lisbon region and by supporting specific proj­
ects in the least­favoured regions. At the same time, 
since the 1970s Portugal has been establishing higher 
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education establishments in regions where previously 
none existed. In Spain, too, RTD ¡s a national policy 
and there is no regional policy orientation to policy. 
However, virtually all of the Autonomous Communities 
have established organisations to promote R&D and 
technological innovation at the regional level. Probably 
the most high profile technology initiative to take place 
in the problem regions is the Málaga technology park 
in Andalucía. Finally, in Ireland, there has been an at­
tempt to bring R&D policy and industrial development 
policy closer together by restructuring the activities of 
the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) and the Sci­
ence and Technology Agency (EOLAS). Two new 
agencies have been created ­ IDA­lreland, concentrat­
ing on multinational firms, and Forbairt, concerned with 
the development of indigenous industry. While the re­
gional orientation of policy remains limited (see Section 
2.1.1 above), a feature of Forbairt is its strong region­
al organisation. 
4.1.2.2 Germany and Italy 
In the discussion of regional policy in Chapter 2, Ger­
many and Italy were characterised as dual economies. 
The issues arising from the reunification of Germany 
and the Italian experience with implementing special 
policies for the Mezzogiorno make these two countries 
a pertinent grouping for the purposes of considering 
the regional impact of R&D policies. Indeed, it must be 
stressed that it is really only in this context that the 
grouping is relevant. As far as RTD policy per se is 
concerned, there is no convincing rationale for consid­
ering Germany and Italy as a distinct group, not least 
given that the relative importance of RTD spending dif­
fers widely between the two countries as do their 
overall budgets. These differences can be seen clear­
ly from Chart 4.4. 
Chart 4.4 
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Both this chart and the earlier Chart 4.1 make clear 
that support for R&D and innovation is a major fo­
cus of government policy ¡n Germany. At the fed­
eral level, the BMBF (ministry for education, sci­
ence, research and technology) is the main body 
responsible for policy, although specialist organisa­
tions are frequently used in its implementation and 
most of the SME research promotion programmes 
are operated by the AiF, an umbrella organisation 
for industrial research. The main objectives of the 
BMBF are: 
• to support the transfer of scientific research results 
into competitive production 
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• to develop an efficient research infrastructure in the 
new Länder 
• to support fundamental research and technology 
promotion concentrated on selected high tech­
nologies and the expansion of "precautionary" re­
search, especially in the area of the environment 
• to improve the basis for product­oriented R&D in 
firms through the promotion of pre­competitive re­
search in key technologies such as IT, biotechnol­
ogy, materials. Such research is mainly earned out 
in universities, national research centres and the 
Fraunhofer and Max Planck institutes 
• to encourage the increased participation of SMEs 
in the innovation process by making the instru­
ments of science and technology promotion sim­
pler and more flexible 
• to extend international co­operation in the areas of 
education, science and research. 
In Italy, the main responsibility for science and tech­
nology policy rests with MURST, the ministry for uni­
versities, scientific and technological research. A num­
ber of public research bodies also operate in specific 
fields, such as space research. In addition, the nation­
al research council (CNR) utilises a network of several 
hundred research institutes and funds private and pub­
lic sector research as well as "mission­oriented" re­
search projects. The main emphasis of policies to pro­
mote RTD in the business sector is on applied indus­
trial research and Innovation, reflecting the status of 
Italy as a net importer of technology. The main policy 
instrument is the Applied Research Fund which sup­
ports international and European collaboration, basic 
research projects carried out by industry, national re­
search programmes for strategic technologies, training 
in R&D and participation in RTD activities by public in­
stitutions and consortia. 
In terms of overall shares of spending between the pub­
lic and the private sectors, a much higher proportion of 
the R&D spend is accounted for by the private sector in 
Germany than in Italy; 60.8 percent and 51.1 percent 
respectively. This places Germany towards the top of 
the range within the OECD and Italy around the median. 
Regarding sectors of R&D spend, Germany, like Spain 
(although on a much larger scale), focuses much of 
public and private sector research activity around a 
number of advertised priorities including renewable en­
ergy, Information technology and aerospace. In addi­
tion, there are State long­term research programmes in 
marine, polar and space research and technology. In 
Italy, research into specified fields is primarily carried out 
in the public sector; the main programmes to encour­
age RTD in the private sector do not operate around 
prescribed areas of research. The overall distribution of 
government R&D expenditure is set out in Chart 4.5. 
Chart 4.5 
Government R&D Expenditure by Socio­Economie Objective 
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As in the Cohesion countries, most expenditure is 
accounted for by "advancement of knowledge" which 
includes general university funding. However, unlike 
the Cohesion countries, spending on agricultural re-
search Is relatively small. In common with the other 
larger European economies, both Germany and Italy 
spend significant sums on defence and civil space 
research. 
As far as the regional dimension is concerned, the 
similarities in the regional economic structures of Ger-
many and Italy are not reflected ¡n current approach-
es to RTD in the problem regions. The OECD's reg-
ular review of science and technology policies noted 
that: 
"The primary goal of German research and develop-
ment policy over the last few years has been to es-
tablish an efficient research environment in the new 
German Länder..."w 
In contrast, the same report noted the demise of spe-
cial RTD policies for the Mezzogiorno in the context of 
the ending of the separate policies for the south of Italy 
(see Section 2.1.2 above). 
Following German reunification, the Science Council 
drew up recommendations which led to the formation 
of 24 new "blue list" institutes; 21 Fraunhofer Society 
institutions and working groups; two institutes and 28 
working groups of the Max Planck Society. Industrial 
R&D In the new Länder is supported by a set of co-
ordinated measures including R&D advisory agencies, 
and demonstration centres, support for new technolo-
gy-based firms, assistance for increasing R&D staff re-
sources and support of the award of R&D contracts by 
firms to research institutes. In 1992, planned measures 
to promote R&D in the new Länder amounted to some 
313 MECU. In addition to the measures specific to the 
new Länder, firms in the east also have preferential ac-
cess to all the specialised programmes operated by 
the BMBF. 
In Italy, there are no separate measures for support-
ing RTD in the problem regions (other than those 
contained in the Objective 1, 2 and 5b plans and co-
financed by the EU). In the past, separate support for 
research centres had been available in the context of 
intervento straordinario for the Mezzogiorno. There 
were also initiatives to develop science parks in the 
south; however, none of the measures introduced 
seemed capable of preventing research resources 
from migrating towards the Centre-North. For the 
most part, RTD and industrial development policies in 
Italy have always been operated with national eco-
nomic development priorities in mind. In practice, this 
led to a striking imbalance in spending on research: 
in 1987 the public sector spent just 9 percent of to-
tal research funds ¡n the Mezzogiorno (which contains 
36 percent of the national population); private sector 
investment in industrial research in the Mezzogiorno 
accounted for a mere 3 percent of the national total 
(OECD, 1992). 
Although there is no regional RTD policy in Italy, the 
link between national regional policy and EU policy 
has been strengthened in the context of RTD policy 
by favouring projects located in Objective 1, 2 and 
5b areas. Projects in these areas qualify for higher 
rates of award under the main programmes to sup-
port industrial R&D - the FRA (fund for applied re-
search) and the FIT (fund for technological innova-
tion). In fact, these programmes have always been 
available on a nationwide basis in Italy; however, the 
uptake of assistance by Mezzogiorno firms has al-
ways been significantly lower than would have been 
expected - accounting for just 5 percent of total 
spend under the FIT in 1990-94. 
4.1.2.3 The "Northern European" Member 
States 
There are five "northern European" Member States for 
which R&D expenditure data is available: Belgium, 
Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. It will be recalled from Chart 4.1 that relative 
spending on R&D in France and the UK - at over 2 
percent of GDP - is in excess of that found in the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium (all around 1.7 
percent). The differences are even more stark in ab-
solute terms, as Chart 4.6 shows. 
'OECD, 1994. 
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As can be seen, France and the UK spend consider-
ably more than the remaining northern European Mem-
ber States in respect of both overall and business-re-
lated R&D expenditure. These two countries are the 
focus of discussion in the remainder of this section. 
In France, responsibility for RTD policies rests with the 
Ministries for Industry and Research, the latter incorpo-
rating higher education. The objectives of R&D policy 
were most recently defined in June 1994. These involve 
the promotion of research with a view to assuring the 
competitiveness of the country, reinforcing the national 
R&D effort to keep pace with main competitors, making 
up the shortfall In research undertaken by firms, and re-
inforcing and "federating" public research. This con-
trasts with the philosophy expressed by the UK gov-
ernment. In the United Kingdom, the Department of 
Trade and Industry is the main government department 
responsible for policies promoting innovation and tech-
nology. The areas where it is believed DTI resources will 
be used to the best advantage are set out in two White 
Papers, one on science, engineering and technology 
(issued by the DTI in April 1993) and the second on 
"competitiveness" referred to above. In the former, it 
was announced that the partnership between govern-
ment, industry and academia would be strengthened to 
ensure that the nation's science and technology is bet-
ter geared to stimulating wealth creation. In the latter, 
action was announced to create the climate for indus-
try to invest more of its own resources profitably on in-
novation and research and development. 
DTI resources are to an increasing extent being tar-
geted on: 
• promoting innovation 
• encouraging best practice 
• simplifying access to sources of help 
• facilitating the exploitation of technology, from the 
science base in the UK, in Europe or elsewhere. 
In adopting these priorities, there has been a shift of 
resources away from technology development, where 
industry already invests considerable resources, to-
wards technology transfer. This is best illustrated by 
the closure of the Advanced Technology Programmes. 
In France, support for RTD covers the spectrum of ac-
tivity from basic industrial research through to technol-
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ogy transfer. General support is provided in the form of 
a tax credit for research expenditure of up to FF40 mil-
lion (6 MECU) per firm per year. In addition, a number 
of major targeted programmes are operated in the 
fields of healthcare, transport, electronics and informa-
tion technology through co-ordinated programmes in-
volving a range of relevant ministries. The "technologi-
cal leaps" Initiative aims to encourage basic industrial 
research in areas put forward by Industry, mainly large 
firms. The programme is run by the ministry for re-
search. There is a continuum between this programme 
and the major innovative projects scheme which is pri-
marily the responsibility of the ministry of industry. Both 
of these initiatives are mainly of relevance to large firms 
and are administered centrally. In addition, however, 
there has been growing emphasis in recent years on 
technology transfer, innovation and technology dis-
semination. This has involved a wide range of initiatives 
which are targeted towards SMEs to a greater extent 
and which are delivered at the regional level by local 
delegations of the ministries of research and industry 
and by the national agency for Innovation, AN VAR. 
In the field of research and development, the emphasis 
of UK policy is on promoting collaborative research. 
The main programme in this vein is LINK which sup-
ports pre-competitlve R&D in specified spheres of ac-
tivity and aims to encourage the rapid uptake of re-
search ideas. Government funding covers up to 50 
percent of the cost of each programme. LINK initiatives 
are restricted to closely-defined areas of research such 
as optoelectronics systems, structural composites and 
ventilation, air-conditioning and refrigeration. In contrast 
with countries such as France and Germany, support in 
the UK for applied research and development is virtual-
ly non-existent. This is particularly so with respect to 
non-activity-specific research and large firms. There is 
limited support for R&D to be undertaken by SMEs, the 
main measures being the SMART and SPUR pro-
grammes. Under SMART, individuals or firms with few-
er than 50 employees are invited to compete for R&D 
funding. Successful proposals can receive grants of up 
to ECU 200,000 to enable an innovative idea to be fol-
lowed through from concept to production. SPUR pro-
vides grants of up to 30 percent of eligible costs (sub-
ject to an award ceiling of £150,000 (0.2 MECU)) for 
the development of new products and processes In-
volving a significant technological advance; it is limited 
to firms with fewer than 250 employees. 
As noted earlier, the focus of UK policies to promote 
competitiveness has been increasingly on technology 
transfer. Measures include: 
• Innovation and Technology Counsellors in 22 so-
called Business Links to ensure that businesses 
have full local access to the range of information, 
advice and services they require. 
• Teaching Company Scheme (TCS) - this scheme 
assists the transfer of technology and expertise 
from universities into industry by placing graduates 
into firms for two-year secondments to carry out 
projects under the joint supervision of academics 
and company staff. It operates UK-wlde. 
In terms of sectoral emphasis, it has already been not-
ed that France operates a number of targeted techno-
logical development programmes and that the UK 
LINK programme addresses very specific research ob-
jectives. However, the most striking feature of R&D 
spending in the two countries is the extent to which it 
is defence-related (see Chart 4.7). Only the US assigns 
a greater proportion of the R&D spend to defence 
within the OECD group. On the other hand, these fig-
ures can be expected to decline; the latest data relates 
to expenditure in 1992 and 1993, since when defence 
spending in both the UK and France has been signifi-
cantly reduced. 
As far as the regional dimension is concerned, RTD 
and innovation policies in both countries are primarily 
concerned with national competitiveness. All the 
measures described above are operated on a nation-
wide basis in the two countries. That having been said, 
it is clear that the allocations made are likely to be 
greater where there are concentrations of appropriate 
business and research institutions and an innovation-
friendly operating climate. Moreover, by their nature, 
defence and space-related research are particularly 
unlikely to be evenly distributed. 
There are, however, initiatives to encourage greater 
participation of all regions in innovation in both coun-
tries. In France, the R&D policy statement referred to 
earlier emphasised the role of R&D in regional devel-
opment through the diffusion of technologies and 
through a new instrument, the regional plans for the 
development of higher education and research. In ad-
dition, for a number of years there has been an explicit 
policy aimed at relocating public research institutes 
away from Paris. In the UK, 12 regional technology 
centres have been established with joint industry and 
government funding. These cover most of the country 
and seek to encourage the flow of knowledge between 
institutes of higher education and business, and to 
provide training for the introduction and management 
of technology, especially in SMEs. In addition, in 1992 
a new strategy for research and technological devel-
opment entitled "Innovation 2000"was launched In 
Northern Ireland. This outlines the way in which gov-
ernment intends to stimulate technical change to ad-
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Chart 4.7 
Government R&D Expenditure by Socio-Economie Objective 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Netherlands 
UK 
Source: OECD (1994) 
dress the region's low average level of productivity and 
growth rate. At the same time as this strategy was 
launched in Northern Ireland, more prominence was 
being given to Northern Irish RTD in both a UK and an 
EU context. The RTD strategy is one of several strate-
gy documents published as part of the reorientation of 
industrial policy in Northern Ireland which has taken 
place since 1990. The documents fit within the com-
mon framework outlined in "Competing in the 
1990s"·10'. Policy changes were accompanied by insti-
tutional changes as responsibility for RTD measures 
was given to a single body, the Industrial Research and 
Technology Unit (IRTU) in March 1992. The unit gives 
"strategic focus and increased impetus to the use of 
R&D for wealth creation and industrial innovation". 
4.1.3 The Regional Impact of 
Competitiveness Policies 
The focus of the previous section was on RTD and in-
novation policies operated by the Member States, and 
in particular on the extent to which, if at all, there is a 
regional dimension to policy. Overall, it is clear that poli-
10 Department of Economic Development, 1990. 
cies to promote RTD and innovation are operated with 
national policy objectives in mind. There are some at-
tempts explicitly to stimulate innovation in the problem 
regions, but, where this does take place, it is primarily 
in the form of encouraging technology transfer and the 
uptake of innovation rather than innovation per se. 
The picture which emerges is scarcely surprising: re-
search and development policymakers are under-
standably unlikely to be willing to jeopardise R&D pol-
icy objectives for the sake of promoting less viable 
projects In the problem regions. Moreover, in Italy, 
where in the past there was a practice of reserving a 
quota of R&D spend for the Mezzogiorno, this led to 
an overall underspend on policy. This illustrates very 
clearly the reason for the lower levels of spending in 
the problem regions; R&D policy is essentially demand 
led, and demand is more likely to emanate from re-
gions that are already prosperous. Moreover, for the 
prosperous regions, this promotes the trends towards 
a "virtuous" cycle of innovation and competitiveness. 
The reverse is true in the less prosperous regions; in-
deed, the uptake of R&D programmes should perhaps 
be interpreted as a measure of the regional problem, 
rather than a form of covert discrimination against 
problem regions by national policymakers. In the con-
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text of the problem regions, the tendency is more like­
ly to be towards a vicious circle of lack of innovation 
and increasing inability to compete. 
In spite of the emphasis of competitiveness policy on na­
tional objectives, there is, in many countries, explicit 
recognition of the need to sustain national competitive­
ness by improving the competitiveness of the problem 
regions. The United Kingdom and Germany both oper­
ate special and distinct policy measures for parts of their 
territories (Northern Ireland and the new Länder) on more 
generous terms than in the remainder of the country. 
Also widespread is the Increasing emphasis on the "re­
gionalised" delivery of competitiveness policies. In France, 
following the decentralisation and déconcentration 
processes of the early 1980s SME, technology transfer 
and diffusion have increasingly been operated at the re­
gional level. In the United Kingdom, the TECs and LECs, 
and, more recently, the Business Link network have 
sought to make policy delivery more sensitive to local 
needs. In Germany and, to a lesser extent, in Spain, this 
approach is partly inherent in the institutional structure. 
In this section, the impact of competitiveness policies 
on cohesion is considered. For these purposes, im­
pact refers to: 
i. the distribution of national expenditures between 
the regions; and 
ii. the effecf of these policies. 
4.1.3.1 The Regional Distribution of 
Expenditure 
Relatively little information is available on the regional 
distribution of expenditure on RTD and innovation in 
the EU. This is understandable since the policies con­
sidered for the most part explicitly do not address spa­
tial objectives. Nevertheless, the EU's REGIO database 
provides some data on the regional distribution of re­
search personnel and expenditure in the private, gov­
ernment and higher education sectors. This section 
begins by considering the overall levels of spend on 
R&D for the regions for which data are available and 
the different sectors of the economy from which that 
expenditure is derived. The second part of this section 
considers the so­called business enterprise sector ex­
penditure on R&D (BERD) and focuses on the extent 
to which this is financed by government. 
4.1.3.1.1 Regional Expenditure on R&D 
On the REGIO database, regional­level Information on 
overall R&D expenditure ­ broken down into higher ed­
ucation, State and private enterprise spending ­ is 
available for three of the case study countries covered 
in this report: France, Italy and Spain. In addition, 
equivalent information has been generated for the 
United Kingdom utilising CSO sources. 
Chart 4.8 
France: Regional Expenditure on Research and Development 
1000 
D Ü 
ι Higher Education 
ι State 
ι Private Enterprise 
Source: REGIO, EUROSTAT 
Horizontal Policies with Important Regional Impacts 03 
The data for France are particularly striking. R&D ex­
penditure is very heavily concentrated In the Paris re­
gion, île de France. This is illustrated in Chart 4.8. 
The Paris region accounts for some 43 percent of all 
R&D expenditure in France and an even higher pro­
portion of R&D financed by the private sector. The 
R&D spend in the next highest spending region (in 
per head terms), Midi­Pyrénées, is just 11 percent of 
the spend in Paris. Expenditure in the Midi­Pyrénées 
region is clearly affected by the concentration of 
aerospace activities in the Toulouse area. The next 
highest spending region in France is Rhône­Alpes. 
This accounts for just 7.5 percent of the national 
R&D spend while the per capita expenditure is a third 
of that in Paris. At the other end of the spectrum, the 
less prosperous regions fare less well in the distribu­
tion of R&D expenditure. In Nord­Pas de Calais, ex­
penditure per head on R&D is only 6.4 percent of 
that in Paris. In Limousin the figure is even lower with 
the region accounting for less than 0.2 percent of the 
national R&D spend; per capita spending on R&D is 
20 times higher in Paris than in Limousin. 
Expenditure by sector (ie. higher education, State, pri­
vate enterprises) varies widely between regions. In all 
regions except Languedoc­Roussillon, most R&D ex­
penditure takes place in the private sector; indeed, 
Languedoc­Roussillon ¡s the only region in which pri­
vate sector spending accounts for less than 30 per­
cent of the total. In Bretagne, too, the private sector 
contribution is small at only around half of the total. On 
the other hand, in a number of the more prosperous 
regions (île de France, Basse­Normandie, Alsace, and 
Rhône­Alpes) less than 80 percent of the spend is 
contributed by the private sector. This contrasts with 
the position in a number of the less prosperous regions 
(Nord­Pas de Calais, Limousin and Auvergne) where, 
although the overall spend tends to be lower, a greater 
proportion of the total comes from private rather than 
public sources. 
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In Italy, the data available on the regional distribution of 
R&D expenditures do not include the higher education 
sector; this accounts for around 21 percent of the na­
tional R&D spend. Information is, however, available on 
the distribution of private sector and government 
spending. This is presented in Chart 4.9 on a per capi­
ta basis. As in France, the notable feature is the con­
centration of spending in the more prosperous regions. 
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Almost half of State and private sector R&D expendi­
ture is accounted for by two regions, Piemonte and 
Lombardia. In contrast, ¡n the eight regions of the Mez­
zogiorno, expenditure per head on R&D is very signifi­
cantly below the national average. Indeed, in absolute 
terms, these regions account for only eight percent of 
private and State R&D funding (compared with 36 per­
cent of the national population). 
As in France, the distribution of funding between the 
public and private sectors also varies between regions. 
Lazio alone receives over half of the State funding of 
R&D in absolute terms. Moreover, the relative share in 
the region is skewed very markedly towards the pub­
lic sector which, as Chart 4.9 shows, accounts for 
around a third of the R&D spend in the region; similar 
proportions are found in Basilicata and Sardegna. 
However, in Abruzzi and Molise, a higher proportion of 
R&D is funded by private industry than the national av­
erage (elsewhere in the Mezzogiorno, a greater pro­
portion of R&D funding is by the State than the na­
tional average). In terms of overall shares, the Mezzo­
giorno accounts for 7 percent of private sector R&D 
spending and 11 percent of State funding. 
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In common with Italy and France, R&D expenditure in 
Spain is concentrated in the more prosperous regions 
of the country. In per capita terms, spending in Madrid 
is significantly higher than in any other Spanish region, 
followed by other prosperous regions, Cataluña, Pais 
Vasco and Navarra ­ see Chart 4.10. Indeed, Madrid 
alone accounts for 42 percent of total R&D expendi­
ture (against a share of 13 percent of the national pop­
ulation) whilst the Objective 1 regions collectively ac­
count for 24 percent of the total R&D spend and al­
most 60 percent of the national population. 
With respect to the distribution of expenditure between 
the private and public sectors, on average, around 55 
percent of the national spend is accounted for by the 
private sector. However, there are considerable region­
al variations in the composition of the spend. In a num­
ber of the Objective 1 regions (Galicia, Cantabria, Va­
lencia, Andalucía and Murcia), the private sector con­
tribution is well under 40 percent of the regional total. 
On the other hand, the proportion of private sector 
funding in Madrid is close to the national average and 
on a par with the proportion contributed by the private 
sector in Castilla­La Mancha, an Objective 1 region. 
Moreover, it is notable that 61 percent of State fund­
ing is channelled into Madrid while the private sector 
spend for the region amounts to only 43 percent of the 
national total. Conversely, ¡n Castilla­León, also Objec­
tive 1, business in the region accounts for 3.4 percent 
of the Spanish private sector R&D spend whereas 
State spending in the region amounts to only 1.8 per­
cent of the total. 
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In common with the other countries for which reglon­
alised R&D expenditure data are available, spending in 
the UK is concentrated on the most prosperous re­
gions, and especially the South East of England. Per 
capita spending across the regions is illustrated in 
Chart 4.11. In absolute terms, the South East ac­
counts for some 54 percent of total R&D expenditure; 
the region contains just over 30 percent of the nation­
al population. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
Northern Ireland, the least prosperous region in the 
UK, accounts for just 0.7 percent of the total national 
spend on R&D, but 2.8 percent of the national popu­
lation. 
The composition of expenditures across sectors also 
varies between regions. On average, around 70 per­
cent of R&D expenditure is accounted for by the pri­
vate sector. However, less than 50 percent comes 
from the private sector in three regions: East Anglia 
(the second most prosperous region in the UK, with 
GDP higher than the EU average), Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. In the East and West Midlands, the 
South East and the North West (the second poorest 
English region), the private sector contribution exceeds 
70 percent of the total spend. State expenditure also 
varies widely. In considering the relative contributions 
of the public and private sectors, there are some par­
allels with Spain. For example, East Anglia receives al­
most 6 percent of State R&D funding, but businesses 
In the region contribute just 3 percent of private R&D 
spending; in contrast, in the North West, businesses 
accounted for 10.5 percent of the national private sec­
tor spend, but just 3 percent of State R&D expenditure 
is channelled into the region. 
4.1.3.1.2 Government Funding of Private 
Sector R&D 
The section above has focused on overall levels of 
R&D spend in the regions, considering the distribution 
of expenditure between regions and sectors. This sec­
tion looks at the extent to which business enterprise 
sector R&D (BERD) is financed by government and the 
regional distribution of such finance. The aim here is to 
provide some basis for comparing, in a regional con­
text, levels of regional aid with levels of government 
funding of R&D. 
There are two principal sources of information on gov­
ernment funding of R&D in the business sector. First, 
the European Commission undertakes regular surveys 
of the State aid spending of the EU countries, includ­
ing R&D aid. Second, the OECD also undertakes sta­
tistical work in the field. The main disadvantage with 
the Commission surveys for the purposes of this study 
is that substantial amounts of government funding of 
R&D in the private sector are excluded from the analy­
sis because the funding does not constitute State aid 
for the purposes of Article 92 of the EC Treaty. This 
section, therefore, takes the OECD figures as its start­
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ing point. Before proceeding to consider the regional 
distribution of expenditures, it is worth providing some 
indication of overall orders of magnitude of R&D and 
regional aid spending. 
Chart 4.12 
R&D and Regional Aid funding as a % of National GDP 
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In terms of overall government funding of BERD, the 
OECD figures suggest that expenditure in the EU11 <11> 
amounted to some 8,311 MECU, around 0.15 percent 
of total EU GDP<12>. Expenditure on regional incentives 
by the same Member States is of a similar order of 
magnitude; the mean spend over the period 1989­93 
was 7,229 MECU or equivalent to about 0.13 percent 
of EU GDP. 
However, the distribution of spending on the two poli­
cy areas Is by no means even. Chart 4.12 shows very 
wide variations in the relative importance of R&D and 
regional aid expenditures between countries. As a pro­
portion of national GDP, the four Cohesion countries 
spend significantly more on regional aid than do the 
northern European countries. Moreover, all four coun­
tries spend in excess of 0.15 percent of national GDP 
on regional aid while spending less than 0.05 percent 
of national GDP on R&D support. In the five northern 
>"> Data are not available for Luxembourg. 
1,21 For most countries the data relate to 1992. For Belgium, Denmark 
and Greece the data are for 1991; for Portugal the data relates to 
1990. 
European countries, the position is reversed; four of 
the five (Belgium is the exception) spend very signifi­
cantly more on R&D support to firms than they do on 
regional incentives. In the two so­called dual 
economies, the position is different again. Both spend 
significant sums on regional aid as a proportion of na­
tional GDP (more than Spain, but not as much as the 
other three Cohesion countries), but both also spend 
significant sums on R&D. In short, the poorer countries 
of the EU channel a large proportion of national re­
sources towards regional policy, while the more pros­
perous countries focus principally on R&D; in between, 
in the two dual economies, there are significant levels 
of intervention in both policy areas. 
Chart 4.12 focuses on the relative importance of R&D 
support and regional aid in relation to the size of the 
national economies; however, it is important to re­
member that the national economies vary considerably 
in size and that a consideration of the absolute levels 
of spend gives a very different picture. One illustration 
of this is that French government expenditure on 
BERD amounted to 2,916 MECU, whilst the equivalent 
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figure for Greece is 3.6 MECU. Even in per capita 
terms, this means that France spends 146 times as 
much on R&D support as does Greece. 
An illustration of the relative expenditures in absolute 
terms is given in Chart 4.15 and Chart 4.16. For the 
purposes of comparison, similar illustrations of shares 
of population and GDP in the Community are given in 
Chart 4.13 and Chart 4.14 respectively. 
Chart 4.15 shows that, in spite of the high levels of ap-
parent spend on regional aid by the Cohesion Four, in 
absolute terms, this expenditure is about on a par with 
the share of population of those countries in the EU to-
tal. Similarly, while expenditure on regional aid in Italy 
and Germany appears low compared with the Cohesion 
country spend illustrated in Chart 4.12, the real volume 
of spending involved only becomes apparent when con-
sidered in absolute terms; these two countries together 
account for 72 percent of regional incentive spending in 
the EU, compared with shares of 40 percent and 45 
percent of EU population and GDP respectively. 
Chart 4.13 Shares of EU12 Population (1993) 
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Source: EUROSTAT 
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Chart 4.15 Shares of Regional Incentive Expenditure 
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Chart 4.16 shows that spending on R&D in Italy and 
Germany combined is slightly less than what would be 
expected on the basis of their shares of population 
and GDP in the EU total. However, the situation in the 
Northern Countries and the Cohesion Four is dramat-
ically different. Indeed, Chart 4.16 illustrates the extent 
to which Chart 4.12 underplays the scale of R&D fund-
ing in the north and exaggerates the R&D spend in the 
Cohesion Countries; this is a direct consequence of 
the small size of the Cohesion Four economies com-
pared with the Northern Countries. Chart 4.16 shows 
Cohesion country spend on R&D support accounting 
for just 3 percent of the EU total, about a quarter of 
what would be expected on the basis even of their 
share of EU GDP, let alone population. Conversely, the 
higher spend on R&D support in the Northern coun-
tries and the larger size of those economies is reflect-
ed in a significantly larger share of overall R&D spend 
than would be expected on the basis of GDP or pop-
ulation. 
Chart 4.16 Shares of Government Funded Business Enterprise R&D 
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Source: OECD (1995), EUROSTAT, EPRC Calculations 
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As far as the regional distributions of government fund­
ing of BERD are concerned, calculations are based on 
the spread of private sector spending on R&D set out 
in the charts discussed earlier. Clearly, this assumes 
that the availability and uptake of government funding 
of BERD remains the same across regions; in fact, this 
may not be so given the different sectoral emphases 
of government R&D policies and the different sectoral 
concentrations of the various regions. Nevertheless, 
the approach remains the best approximation of gov­
ernment spending on BERD in the regions, in the ab­
sence of more concrete data. 
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In considering Chart 4.17, it is essential to note that 
the scales for R&D and regional aid are different; in­
deed, the R&D scale is ten times the scale for re­
gional aid funding. The scale chosen is obviously de­
termined by the volume of spend and reflects the far 
higher levels of R&D expenditure compared to re­
gional aid funding in France (see Chart 4.12). It is no­
table that, in virtually all regions (data are not avail­
able for Corsica), government funding of BERD rep­
resents a larger proportion of regional GDP than is 
contributed by regional aid; this is so even in the 
least prosperous regions such as Nord Pas de Calais 
and Limousin. The chart shows that the highest con­
tribution of regional aid to regional GDP is in the Lor­
raine region; however, it is striking that the contribu­
tion of government funding of BERD in the Paris re­
gion is more than 10 times the value of regional aid 
in Lorraine. In spite of the difference in scales ne­
cessitated by the very different volumes of funding in­
volved, there is a visible complementarity in the rela­
tionship between the two sources of funds; those re­
gions that receive most in regional aid as a propor­
tion of GDP tend to receive least in R&D aid. Per­
haps surprising, however, is the extent to which the 
more prosperous regions benefit from R&D funding 
as expressed in regional GDP terms. In absolute 
terms, it is to be expected that expenditure on R&D 
would be concentrated in the more prosperous re­
gions; however, Chart 4.17 shows that, for the most 
part, the more prosperous regions benefit much more 
from R&D funding as a percentage of regional GDP 
than do the poorer ones from regional aid. 
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Chart 4.18 
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For the Italian data presented in Chart 4.18, the scales 
for measuring assistance also differ between the two 
policy types. However, reflecting the very different vol­
umes of spending on the two policy areas (see Chart 
4.12), compared with France, the positions are re­
versed. As discussed in the chapter on Member 
States' regional policies (Chapter 2), Italian regional 
policy accounts for a significant proportion of regional 
GDP in some parts of the Mezzogiorno, although there 
is not always a direct correlation between prosperity 
and the contribution of regional aid to regional GDP. In 
Abruzzi, for example, regional GDP is 90 percent of the 
EU average and regional aid represents 1.2 percent of 
GDP; in contrast, regional GDP in Calabria is just 60 
percent of the EU average and regional aid amounts to 
only 0.2 percent of (a substantially smaller) regional 
GDP. 
Taking the Mezzogiorno as a whole, the contribution of 
government funding of BERD to regional GDP is very 
small; only in Abruzzi ­ soon to lose its Objective 1 sta­
tus ­ does the contribution even approach 0.05 per­
cent of regional GDP. In contrast, and as in France, in 
the more prosperous regions R&D funding makes a 
larger contribution to regional GDP than in the poorer 
regions; indeed, the pattern in France is replicated in 
Italy. In Piemonte and Lombardia, the wealthiest re­
gions, the share of regional GDP accounted for by 
government funding of BERD is substantially greater 
than elsewhere and this even although regional GDP is 
itself, by definition, substantially bigger. 
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Chart 4.19, which presents the data for Spain, uses 
the same scale as the chart for Italy. Thus, the re­
gional aid scale is ten times the scale used for gov­
ernment funding of BERD, a reflection of the relative­
ly low spend on support for business R&D in Spain 
(see Chart 4.12). Comparing the Spanish and Italian 
charts reveal considerable similarities in the overall 
patterns of expenditure. In general there are very low 
levels government funding of BERD as a proportion 
of regional GDP across the Objective 1 regions (Gali­
cia, Asturias, Cantabria, Extremadura, Andalucía, 
etc.), but a very high contribution in the richest re­
gions (Madrid, País Vasco, Cataluña). Again, it is 
worth stressing that these figures represent not only 
larger shares of regional wealth, but also that the lev­
el of prosperity in which those shares are larger is al­
so higher. 
Unlike France, however, and in common with Italy, 
even in the regions which gain most from R&D spend­
ing, the level of spending is less significant than spend­
ing on regional aid in the poorer regions. 
The data for the UK presented in Chart 4.20 are partic­
ularly interesting since levels of spending on the two 
policy areas are such as to enable them to be present­
ed on the same scales. As elsewhere, the more pros­
perous regions (notably the South East of England) gain 
more government support for BERD relative to regional 
GDP than the poorer regions. Indeed, the South East 
receives more as a proportion of (a very high level of) 
regional GDP in terms of government funding of R&D 
than does Northern Ireland in regional aid. Further, the 
share of BERD funded by government in the South 
East exceeds regional and R&D aid combined in North­
ern Ireland. Again, it should be stressed that, as far as 
the poorer regions are concerned, the R&D spend rep­
resent very small shares of relatively low levels of re­
gional GDP; in contrast, in the richer regions, GDP is, 
by definition higher, but the share of spend related to 
regional GDP is also substantially higher. 
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Chart 4.20 
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4.1.3.2 The Regional Effects of 
Competitiveness Policies 
The second aspect of the impact of horizontal policies 
involves considering the effects of those policies based 
on a review of published studies. Research examining 
the spatial impact of spending on R&D is, almost in­
evitably, hampered by a lack of comparative regional 
data. As a result, evaluations have tended to be fairly 
limited in scope. Nevertheless, many researchers feel 
that non­spatial policy expenditure is potentially a pow­
erful determinant of regional economic development 
throughout the EU (Amin and Tomaney, 1995). 
Although measurement problems undoubtedly curtail 
(aggregate) research in this area, some evaluative work 
undertaken examines the effectiveness of national 
technology policy from a regional perspective. Stud­
ies assessing the impact of national R&D expenditure 
on regional economic development show that national 
policy towards problem regions is often poorly re­
sourced and badly co­ordinated. One area frequently 
considered is the effectiveness of science parks. One 
study examining technology parks in Spain discovered 
that such parks tend to be located in more advanced 
areas with a history of technological innovation (Ybar­
ra, 1991) and those which had located in such regions 
showed limited development effects. Many science 
parks in less favoured regions are characterised by 
poor linkages with the local region (academic institu­
tions and suppliers) and perform little strategic R&D 
(Massey and Weild, 1992). 
One ¡η­depth case study of Spain's technology park in 
Andalucía (Peck, ef al, 1996) found that policymakers 
had largely failed to create a genuine technology­led 
complex. The park is primarily seen as a location for 
incoming inward investment. Given the truncated na­
ture of decision making within multinational sub­
sidiaries most firms in the park do little in the way of 
R&D. Although some firms undertake some design 
work at their plant, this is mostly adaptive design for 
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specific customers rather than fundamental product 
development (Peck ef al, 1996). Low levels of suppli-
er linkages further reduce the scope for technology 
transfer between FDI and local suppliers. Peck ef al 
conclude that Andalucia's technology park is ultimate-
ly based on 'knowledge produced elsewhere'. 
Hasslnk's (1993) comparative study of technology pol-
icy in three European regions (North East of England, 
the Ruhr and Baden-Wurrtemberg) shows how region-
al technology policy is often an amalgamation of na-
tional and local initiatives. Hassink (1993) claims that 
the region with the most effective regional technology 
programme, Baden-Wurrtemburg, is also the territory 
with the most substantive regional autonomy in this 
area. According to Hassink (1993), the centralised na-
ture of the UK, coupled with the low priority Britain ac-
cords to regional technological development, under-
mines local capacity building in the north east of Eng-
land. 
Other studies assessing the effectiveness of Member 
State regional technology policy have tended to focus 
on case study assessments of individual programmes 
or policies. An example of this was Sternberg's (1995) 
study of innovation centres in Germany. Using a vari-
ety of research techniques - such as before and after 
analysis, control groups and case studies - Sternberg 
examined the effectiveness of this policy and the im-
pact these institutions had on regional economic de-
velopment. Sternberg believes that innovation centres 
play an important role in promoting industrial efficiency 
and claims that, after leaving the innovation centre, 
successful firms employed more people, needed more 
office space, and experienced higher turnover. 
Interestingly, Sternberg claims that nationally funded 
programmes are much more important for the new 
Länder than the more prosperous western and south-
ern Länder. He concedes, however, that evaluations of 
this kind are invariably dogged by numerous method-
ological problems that make data reliability problemat-
ic. Another evaluative study of Emilia-Romagna, con-
cludes that national innovation policy plays a vital role 
in developing the local technological base (Bianchi and 
Girodani, 1993). This owes to the fact that local initia-
tives are inevitably constrained by lack of available 
funding. However, Bianchi and Girodani believe that 
local business service centres such as CITER (Textile 
Information Centre, Emilia-Romagna) can play a pow-
erful role in boosting the innovative capacity of local 
textile manufacturers through the provision of common 
services. Although not an evaluation per se, this study 
highlights how regional innovation policy must be seen 
as a complex network of initiatives operated by policy 
bodies on various spatial scales. In a regional devel-
opment context, however, it is important to note that 
Emilia-Romagna is among the more prosperous re-
gions of the EU, a fact which inevitably impacts on its 
innovative capacity. 
Although most research in this area tends to focus on 
the role SMEs play in developing regional technologi-
cal capabilities, the role played by multinationals is al-
so of interest to policymakers in regions dominated by 
FDI. In these regions multinationals are the main 
source of local technological development. This is 
particularly interesting because some claim multina-
tionals are pushing more of their R&D towards their lo-
cal subsidiaries. This development is associated with 
moves towards more decentralised forms of industrial 
organisation which multinationals are supposedly 
adopting. This organisational transformation is not, 
however, accepted by all researchers and case stud-
ies of plants throughout Europe show a continuing re-
gional hierarchy between core and peripheral regions 
in terms of MNC R&D (Amin ef al, 1994). 
While some observers note that this regional hierarchy 
may be becoming less clear cut, research conducted 
on multinationals in the Mezzogiorno discovered that 
this was not part of a comprehensive upgrading of the 
R&D capacity of firms in the region (Giunta and Mar-
tinelli, 1995). Others, meanwhile, conclude that tech-
nology transfer between multinationals and indigenous 
industry remains weak, especially in Objective 1 re-
gions such as Portugal and Ireland (see respectively, 
Amin ef al, 1994; Kenny, 1995). Furthermore, weak 
linkages between FDI and local suppliers undermine 
technology transfer in many Objective 2 regions (see 
Amin ef al, 1994). These findings are particularly im-
portant for European regions where FDI is often the 
main source of R&D within the regional economy. 
Moving beyond R&D policies to horizontal policies 
more generally, other evaluative work has shown how 
national policies on defence have uneven regional im-
pacts (Lovering, 1991), especially important for EU 
Member States with sizeable defence industries (eg. 
Britain and France). In Britain, for example, the main 
beneficiaries of government defence-related spending 
are concentrated in the southern regions (South East 
and South West) where most high technology research 
is conducted. Although many people are employed in 
defence establishments in northern parts of the UK, 
these jobs comprise the lower value aspects of the 
production process. Meanwhile, the bulk of high-end 
R&D takes place in the more prosperous parts of the 
country, particularly the South East (Lovering, 1991). 
This spatial division of labour has important conse-
quences for regional development. Given that almost 
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half UK government spending on R&D goes on de-
fence-related projects, some regions will dispropor-
tionately benefit from this element of government ex-
penditure. One recent study reveals how large 
amounts of aerospace defence expenditure is ab-
sorbed by firms and research institutes in the South 
West near Bristol, while the same is true for electron-
ics R&D in the Thames Valley area near London (Sim-
mie, 1995). The high skills profile of this research 
means that defence-dependent regions disproportion-
ately benefit from this element of national expenditure. 
This uneven spatial distribution of government R&D 
spending has an important downside, however. These 
localities are now highly sensitive to the current reduc-
tions in defence expenditure: reductions which could 
have serious knock-on effects for employment, skills 
and regional technological capacity in these areas 
(Simmie, 1995). 
Another element of national public expenditure thought 
to impact regions differently is training. Although little 
evaluative work has been undertaken in this area, one 
study found the spatial impact of national training 
schemes to vary according to the level of unemploy-
ment within the region (Peck, 1990). Peck's study of 
the British government's Youth Trainee Scheme (YTS) 
discovered that the employer-led nature of this scheme 
meant that employers use trainees differently across 
the country. On one hand employers in areas of low 
unemployment and tight labour markets, such as the 
South East of England, often used the programme as 
a means of screening trainees for full time employment 
and offer genuine job-related training. Employers in 
depressed northern regions, on the other hand, pre-
dominantly used the scheme as a form of job substi-
tution or 'cheap labour'. According to Peck, higher 
unemployment rates in the latter area reduced the 
need for recruitment and proper training. This study is 
interesting because it shows that national policies do 
not operate uniformly across countries and that policy 
effectiveness is often geographically uneven. 
In the main, the studies reported within this review did 
not attempt to evaluate the regional effects of horizon-
tal policies. Instead they mostly attempted to assess 
the effectiveness of horizontal policies in different geo-
graphical contexts. The studies examined point to-
wards the fact that horizontal policies do not always 
work well in less favoured regions. The unique char-
acteristics and circumstances of less favoured regions 
mean that national policy often neglects or works 
poorly when implemented in these areas. Various fac-
tors circumscribe current levels of understanding of 
these issues: the lack of regional sensitive data; the 
wide ranging nature of these policies; and the difficul-
ty in disentangling their effects from other government 
policies. For these reasons little or no comprehensive 
evaluations have been attempted. Given the impor-
tance of such policies from a regional development 
perspective, this seems a worrying omission. 
4.2 Employment Policies 
The achievement of an acceptable level of employment 
and its counterpart, a low level of unemployment, ¡s 
perhaps the most important objective of economic pol-
icy across the European Union. While the pursuit of this 
objective remains the responsibility of individual Mem-
ber States, with the increasing recognition of the com-
mon nature of economic problems facing governments 
across Europe and of the high degree of interdepend-
ence of national economies, there is a growing aware-
ness of the value of developing a common strategy. 
At the same time, it is accepted that such a strategy 
has to take account of the major differences which re-
main in the stage of economic development attained 
by Member States and in their social, cultural and in-
stitutional characteristics, which mean that the appro-
priate form of the measures to be taken will vary from 
country to country. Although the general nature of 
problems faced may be similar, their manifestation, in 
terms, for example, of the social groups most affect-
ed, tends to differ as does the policy response likely to 
prove effective. Measures which work well ¡n one 
country will not necessarily have a similarly beneficial 
effect somewhere else if the underlying conditions, in-
cluding social behaviour and attitudes as well as insti-
tutional arrangements, are different. 
A common approach to employment policy was given 
impetus by the publication at the end of 1993 of the 
Commission White Paper, Growth, competitiveness, 
employment, which outlined a European strategy for 
achieving a higher rate of growth and job creation and, 
thereby, for combating unemployment, ensuring a 
more equitable distribution of employment opportuni-
ties and for increasing economic and social cohesion. 
The general thrust of this strategy was endorsed by 
the Member States at the Edinburgh Council meeting 
in December of that year and has been reiterated and 
elaborated at subsequent meetings. 
In particular, the Essen Council at the end of 1994 listed 
a number of key areas of policy as being of major im-
portance for tackling the Union's employment problems: 
• improving employment opportunities for the labour 
force, by promoting investment in vocational train-
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ing. To that end a key role falls to the acquisition of 
vocational qualifications, particularly by young peo-
ple. As many people as possible must receive ini-
tial and further training which enables them through 
life-long learning to adapt to changes brought 
about by technological progress, in order to reduce 
the risk of losing their employment; 
• increasing the employment intensity of growth, in 
particular by: 
— a more flexible organisation of work, in a way 
which fulfils both the wishes of employees and 
the requirements of competition; 
— a wage policy which encourages job-creating 
investments and in the present situation re-
quires moderate wage agreements below in-
creases in productivity; 
• the promotion of initiatives, particularly at regional 
and local level, that create jobs which take account 
of new requirements, e.g. in the environmental and 
social-service spheres 
• reducing non-wage labour costs extensively 
enough to ensure that there is a noticeable effect 
on decisions concerning the taking on of employ-
ees and in particular of unqualified employees; 
• increasing the effectiveness of employment policy 
by avoiding practices which are detrimental to the 
readiness to work, and by moving from a passive 
to an active labour market policy. The individual in-
centive to continue seeking employment on the 
general labour market must remain. Particular ac-
count must be taken of this when working out in-
come-support measures. The need for, and effi-
ciency of, the instruments of labour market policy 
must be assessed at regular intervals; 
• implementing particular measures necessary to 
help young people, especially school leavers who 
have virtually no qualifications, by offering them ei-
ther employment or training. The fight against long-
term unemployment must be a major aspect of 
labour market policy. Varying labour market policy 
measures are necessary according to the very var-
ied groups and requirements of the long-term un-
employed. Special attention should be paid to the 
difficult situation of unemployed women and older 
employees. 
As part of a policy of giving priority to action in these 
areas, Member States undertook to develop multi-an-
nual employment programmes spelling out the meas-
ures introduced or planned. Further, they agreed at the 
Cannes Council meeting to present these in the Au-
tumn of 1995. This section is largely based on the 
contents of these presentations. 
The employment policy agreed at Essen was elaborat-
ed further at the Madrid Summit in December 1995, 
where it was reaffirmed that the fight against unem-
ployment and for equal opportunities is the priority task 
for the Community and its Member States. At the 
same time, there was a convergence of views on the 
approach to be followed in carrying out this task. In 
particular, common emphasis was placed on the need 
for a co-ordinated strategy combining, on the one 
hand, macro-economic policies which would create 
the conditions for sustained growth of output and em-
ployment and, on the other hand, structural measures 
which would ensure that the opportunity for accelerat-
ed job creation afforded by the creation of these con-
ditions was realised in practice. 
Nevertheless, despite agreement on these two broad 
aspects of policy, there is somewhat less unanimity on 
their precise interpretation in terms of the concrete 
measures which they imply. This is less the case as re-
gards the contents of macro-economic policy, where 
the constraints imposed by the general commitment to 
low inflation, financial stability and the achievement of 
the conditions for monetary unification as set out in the 
Maastricht Treaty limit the scope for independent dis-
cretionary action. In all Member States, therefore, 
monetary policy is aimed at maintaining low rates of in-
flation and stable exchange rates and, accordingly, at 
expanding credit and setting interest rates at rates and 
levels which are consistent with this, while fiscal policy 
is aimed at reducing, or containing, budget deficits, 
with the emphasis on restricting public expenditure 
growth and limiting increases in taxes (though more in 
some countries than others). 
As regards structural policies, however, differences in 
emphasis are more apparent. While there is broad 
agreement on the aim of eliminating rigidities and 
achieving better operation of labour markets, the ap-
proach adopted and the measures implemented in 
pursuit of this aim vary significantly across the Union. 
This reflects, in part, differences in underlying philoso-
phy as well as differences in economic conditions, so-
cial attitudes, cultural traditions and institutional char-
acteristics, which, with practical experience, both help 
to shape that philosophy and are influenced by it. 
In particular, a major difference concerns the role of 
government and the extent of State involvement in pol-
icy, with some countries attempting to reduce this, 
others to reform the way in which it operates to make 
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it more effective. At one extreme, the UK approach ¡s 
to minimise State intervention and both the fiscal bur-
den and regulatory constraints imposed on business 
and to rely largely on market forces to achieve em-
ployment alms. In most other parts of the Union, there 
is greater acceptance of the need for intervention to 
ensure that both economic and social objectives are 
pursued effectively - and, indeed, to ensure that the 
labour market functions efficiently - though there are 
differences in the extent of intervention thought neces-
sary. 
Such differences are reflected not only in the form of 
policies adopted, but also ¡n the scale of public ex-
penditure incurred in carrying them out. For example, 
in Denmark or Sweden, where there is a high degree 
of social consensus in favour of the State Intervening 
to help people Into work through training and other 
measures, government expenditure on active labour 
market measures is considerably higher than else-
where in the Union. By contrast, in countries like the 
UK, where active labour market measures take the 
form of deregulation and a low level of fiscal and oth-
er charges on business, comparatively little is spent (in 
terms of monetary outlays if not of foregone tax rev-
enue) on employment policy. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the same tends to be true of 
countries with relatively highly regulated labour mar-
kets, those in the South of the Union especially, where 
objectives are pursued partly through imposing obliga-
tions on businesses. This is often compensated, how-
ever, by concessions or State support in other areas, 
which is sometimes reflected in a relatively high ex-
penditure on subsidies and other State aids, whether 
explicit or implicit, to encourage firms to maintain em-
ployment levels and avoid redundancies. 
Analogous differences also apply to the scale of so-
called passive expenditure on labour market policy. In 
countries where spending on active measures is rela-
tively high, there is some tendency for expenditure on 
unemployment benefits and other forms of income 
support for those out of work also to be high in rela-
tion to the number of people unemployed. This partly 
reflects a concern to assist people in their efforts to 
find work and to enable them to spend sufficient time 
looking for a suitable job, so helping to improve the 
functioning of the labour market. By contrast, in coun-
tries where reliance is placed more on the unrestricted 
interplay of market forces to balance labour demand 
and supply, there tends to be more emphasis on the 
avoidance of any disincentive for the unemployed to 
look for a job. Income support, therefore, tends to be 
maintained at a minimum acceptable level to encour-
age people to find employment as quickly as possible. 
Nevertheless, in all countries, there has been an in-
creasing shift of policy emphasis from passive labour 
market measures of income support for the unem-
ployed to active measures designed to help them into 
work. In large measure, however, this has been frus-
trated by the sharp rise ¡n pnemployment in the early 
1990s which added considerably to the funds required 
for income support and correspondingly limited those 
available for active measures. 
in all countries, whatever the approach followed, spe-
cific measures for boosting employment are con-
strained not only by the intermediate macro-economic 
objectives of reducing budget deficits but also by the 
imperative to maintain cost competitiveness, which has 
tended increasingly to limit the extent to which taxes 
and other charges can be raised, especially on busi-
nesses. The funds available for labour market pro-
grammes are, therefore, restricted, as also is the scope 
for reducing existing charges falling on employment, 
any reductions necessitating compensatory increases 
elsewhere to prevent budget deficits from rising. 
Similar constraints exist on other measures to maintain 
employment levels, such as regulations restricting lay-
offs and redundancies, which effectively shift the cost 
burden onto the private sector and tend to add to the 
costs of production. 
4.2.1 Job Creation or Job Diversion? 
Although the employment strategy first outlined in the 
White Paper and elaborated at subsequent European 
Council meetings, culminating in the two-pronged ap-
proach agreed in Madrid, has the general aim of in-
creasing the net rate of job creation ¡n the Union and, 
thereby, reducing unemployment, there is a question-
mark over how far the structural aspects of the policy 
serve to redistribute jobs rather than expand their over-
all number. At the same time, even if the effect is to re-
distribute jobs rather than to increase them, this would 
not necessarily negate the value of implementing such 
measures, given the explicit objective of achieving a 
more equitable distribution of employment opportuni-
ties in the interests of improving economic and social 
cohesion in the Union. 
In practice, there is a serious lack of empirical evidence 
on the effects of most of the measures included in the 
employment programmes being followed by Member 
States. Thus in the case of greater investment in vo-
cational training, while increasing the number of young 
people receiving initial and further training Is likely to 
give them more chance of finding an acceptable job, it 
does not necessarily follow that in itself it will create 
significantly more jobs. This is especially so in the 
short-term before the availability of a better trained 
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work force has time to filter through into an increase in 
the competitiveness of producers and, therefore, im-
proved trade performance. The results of most re-
search studies seem to show that while increased 
training tends to have a positive effect on employment, 
the scale of the effect is extremely variable and de-
pends on the quality and content of what is being 
taught. 
According to a recent Swedish study (Calmfors and 
Skedinger, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 11, 
No.1), for example, more training can sometimes in-
crease unemployment by raising employees' expecta-
tions of earnings above what employers are prepared 
to pay. Moreover, predicting what skills will be required 
by business in future years is by no means straight-for-
ward when the pace of technological change is tend-
ing to alter the nature of jobs radically in a short peri-
od of time and to create employment opportunities 
which simply did not exist before. (The enormous ex-
pansion in the use of PCs, for example, and their far-
reaching effect on working methods and the demand 
for skills throughout the economy, which has occurred 
over the past ten years was almost Impossible to pre-
dict In the early 1980s when the technology was in its 
infancy.) 
A labour market survey carried out in 1994 across the 
European Union (see Commission of the European 
Communities, 1995a) indicated that only 7 percent of 
businesses questioned regarded a shortage of ade-
quately skilled applicants as being a very important ob-
stacle to employing more people in industry and less 
than 30 percent considered it to be of any importance 
at all. Although this survey was conducted at a time 
when the European economies were only slowly be-
ginning to recover from recession and skill shortages 
were found to be a more important factor in 1989 
close to the peak of the economic cycle, it indicates 
that in itself more training cannot add significantly to 
job availability, except perhaps in the longer term. At 
the same time, a survey of nine countries (carried out 
by the McKinsey Global Institute) concluded that the 
crucial determinant of productivity, and, therefore, of 
competitiveness, was not so much the skills of the 
labour force as the ability of management to devise 
successful business strategies. 
Job subsidies or job creation schemes of various kinds 
also have a questionable impact on overall job avail-
ability. According to most studies, most schemes 
seem to involve substantial 'dead-weight' losses (in 
the sense that many of the people assisted would 
have found jobs anyway) and significant substitution 
effects (in the sense that to a large extent the people 
assisted or the jobs created displace other people in 
work or other jobs). On the other hand, evidence 
seems to show that dead-weight losses can be re-
duced markedly by targeting subsidies on the most 
disadvantaged groups, though displacement effects 
are liable to remain important as employers take on 
workers who cost them less at the expense of existing 
staff or others who might have been recruited in their 
place. 
Similar considerations apply to measures to reduce in-
direct labour costs, and employers' social contribu-
tions in particular, which have become a widespread 
means of encouraging firms to take on more people, 
especially new entrants to the labour market and those 
who have been unemployed for a long time. Though 
these might add to the numbers employed in the 
short-term by reducing the overall cost of employment, 
their net effect depends on how the associated reduc-
tion in State revenue is made good (ie. on what other 
taxes or charges are increased to prevent budget 
deficits from expanding) and, in the longer-term, on the 
extent to which they result in higher wage levels. 
(Cross-country comparisons seem to indicate that 
countries with relatively low indirect labour costs, such 
as Denmark, for example, where employer's social 
contributions are much smaller than elsewhere, do not 
tend to have correspondingly lower total labour costs 
but rather higher levels of direct labour costs - or gross 
wages - which are required to pay the higher Income 
taxes or taxes on expenditure needed to compensate 
for low social contributions.) 
Equally, measures aimed at expanding employment 
through stimulating the growth of environmental activ-
ities or social and local services, the development of 
which cannot readily be left to market forces because 
of the externalities involved and the collective nature of 
the goods and services produced, justifiable as they 
may be, will only tend to add to the number of avail-
able jobs, in the context of an overall budget con-
straint, if they result in a higher employment content of 
output or if they serve to shift the pattern of expendi-
ture towards domestic production and away from im-
ports. A key question in this regard, as in the case of 
reductions in employer's contributions, concerns the 
public expenditure which they effectively displace (or 
the higher taxes which they necessitate) and its com-
parative effect on employment. 
Other measures have, perhaps, a less questionable ef-
fect on the overall level of employment, particularly if 
this is defined in terms of the number of people in work 
rather than the volume of work performed. This is most 
clearly the case as regards reductions in working time, 
whether achieved through a growth of part-time work-
ing or shortening the length of the normal working 
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week. In most Member States, average hours worked 
per person have declined over the past decade - by 
just over 4 percent between 1983 and 1994 for the 
Union as a whole - so adding to the number of peo-
ple with jobs (unless it is argued that the reduction in 
hours stimulated a gain in labour productivity of equal 
or greater proportions which would not otherwise have 
occurred). Nevertheless, the reduction has varied sig-
nificantly between Member States, from 6 percent or 
more in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands to 1 
percent or less in the UK and Italy. 
At the same time, deliberate measures to reduce 
working time against the wishes of employers and/or 
employees run the risk of reducing efficiency and 
adding to costs (especially if there is no compensating 
reduction in average earnings), so damaging competi-
tiveness and the potential for employment creation. 
Government policy In this area, therefore, can perhaps 
be most effectively concentrated on encouragement, 
education and example rather than on regulation (ex-
cept where health and safety Is at stake) and on help-
ing to separate the issue of plant or business operat-
ing times from that of the hours worked by employees. 
Policies of wage moderation, of keeping pay rises in 
line with or below the growth of labour productivity, al-
so seem to have less uncertain effects, insofar as they 
serve to increase the profitability of operations and the 
prospective returns to investment and, therefore, 
should encourage companies to expand employment. 
In effect, if workers accept pay rises below the rate of 
productivity growth, then a given wage bill can fund 
more people in employment. Equally, however, wage 
moderation might simply lead to higher profits and a 
lower growth of aggregate demand, so depressing the 
rate of economic growth. 
4.2.2 Employment Policy and Cohesion 
If the effect of present policies on employment growth 
is uncertain, particularly in terms of Its scale, their im-
pact on cohesion is less questionable, as noted above. 
A common characteristic of most of the measures in 
operation or being planned is to reduce disparities in 
employment opportunities whether between individu-
als, social groups or regions. 
Increased access to training, both initially for young 
people and for people already in work, stands to widen 
the job options available, especially to those with rela-
tively few qualifications and low skill levels. Similarly, 
targeting support, in the form of subsidies, training 
programmes or reductions in indirect labour costs on 
the unemployed, particularly the young, the elderly, 
those out of work for long periods as well as women 
entering the labour market after a spell of inactivity, 
stands to improve the position of both those without 
jobs relative to those in employment and those most 
disadvantaged among the unemployed relative to 
those they are competing with for work. Moreover poli-
cies of wage moderation and of encouraging greater 
flexibility in working time arrangements, especially if 
accompanied by reductions in average hours worked, 
stand to spread the available work more equally be-
tween those wanting a job. 
At the same time, while most measures do not have a 
specific regional dimension, the very fact that many of 
them are aimed at the unemployed, and within this 
group at the most disadvantaged of those without 
work, is likely to mean that they benefit regions with 
the most serious problems of unemployment and in-
adequate rates of job creation more than others, so 
tending to narrow regional disparities. 
The main elements of the employment programmes in 
operation in Member States are described below, tak-
ing each broad kind of measure in turn and indicating 
the countries in which it has been implemented and 
the form which it has taken. It should be emphasised, 
however, that this is based on the presentations of 
programmes made by Member States and, therefore, 
on their choice of the measures to include. In conse-
quence, the fact that a particular country is not men-
tioned In the context of any particular measure does 
not necessarily signify that it has not in practice intro-
duced ¡t in some form or other, merely that ¡t does not 
figure in their choice of what to mention. 
4.2.3 Summary of Employment Policies in 
Member States(13) 
4.2.3.1 Education and Training 
The Essen Council identified two objectives in this area 
for priority policy action: 
• better education and training for young people en-
tering the labour market 
• the provision of lifelong training 
One of the main concerns of Member States is the 
proportion of young people who leave the education 
system with few or no qualifications, whose chances 
of finding employment are made much more difficult by 
the shift ¡n favour of skilled work in the labour market. 
Participation rates in full-time education have risen in 
ll3> The description of employment programmes below relates to all the 
Member States apart from Austria and Sweden. 
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recent years in most Member States, which has served 
to stem the flow of early school leavers. This, however, 
is partly due to economic recession in the early 1990s 
and the lack of jobs for them to go into; it remains to be 
seen whether the increase in participation will continue 
as recovery strengthens and more jobs become avail-
able for young people. Moreover, in addition to encour-
aging young people to stay longer in education, there is 
a continuous need to improve its quality and gear it 
more towards the skills required by the labour market. 
To this end, initial education systems in a number of 
Member States have been adapted to incorporate 
more opportunity for vocational training. 
The use of apprenticeships, or dual systems of work 
experience and on-the-job training, is widely regarded 
as a successful way of integrating young people Into 
working life, as evidenced most especially by the Ger-
man system. Employers in the Benelux countries as 
well as in Spain are, therefore, being encouraged by 
reductions or exemptions in social security contribu-
tions either to hire apprentices or retain them after their 
training period. 
The UK has set up Modern Apprenticeships for 16-17 
year olds and Accelerated Modern Apprenticeships for 
18-19 year olds. France has recently lowered the age 
to 14 at which preparation for apprenticeships can 
take place. Ireland is aiming to expand its apprentice-
ship system with greater emphasis on quality rather 
than time served. There is also to be a new vocation-
al training qualification under TEASTAS - the Irish Na-
tional Certification Authority. 
Both Greece and the UK are pursuing the idea of train-
ing credits or vouchers which have a financial value 
and can be presented to an employer or training 
provider in exchange for an approved course of train-
ing. In Greece vouchers may also be used for work ex-
perience as well. This system is being used already in 
the UK for 16 and 17 years olds and consideration is 
being given to extending it to 18 and 19 year olds. In 
Greece the target group is the young unemployed. 
The opportunities for second-chance education or fur-
ther and re-training for the unemployed are also being 
widely increased. Often their unemployment is the re-
sult of skills that are no longer required by the labour 
market and their only chance of finding a job is through 
learning new skills. In this context, in some Member 
States entitlement to unemployment benefits has been 
made more flexible to allow receipt of support while 
the person concerned is undergoing education and 
training. 
In all Member States, there is recognition of the need 
for continued training during working life to allow em-
ployees to adapt to technological change in the work-
place and a variety of methods are being used to 
achieve this. 
In both the UK and the Netherlands, it has largely been 
left to businesses or, in the latter, to the social partners 
to decide vocational training arrangements. On the 
other hand, in Germany, Denmark and Belgium, career 
breaks for further training are being encouraged by 
government through the payment of allowances. In 
Italy, consideration is being given to making the costs 
of training to both employers and employees tax de-
ductible. 
The provision of additional vocational training by the 
State, of course, entails increased public expenditure 
and somehow this has be financed.. In most Member 
States, the resources earmarked for vocational training 
have been increased - notably in Spain, Denmark and 
Finland. However other ways - beyond State assis-
tance - are being sought for its funding. In Greece, 
employers' contributions were more than doubled In 
1994 to 0.45 percent of the wage bill to finance train-
ing. In the UK, in contrast to the general tendency In 
the rest of the Union to fund training by levies on firms, 
consideration is being given to the establishment of 
voluntary individual training accounts to help employ-
ees pay for their own training. 
4.2.3.2 The Employment Intensity of 
Production 
Over the past 20 years or so, labour productivity in the 
Union has shown an upward trend of around 2 percent 
a year, signifying that GDP has to grow by more than 
2 percent a year on average to expand the number of 
people in employment. (Though the underlying rate of 
productivity growth varies from country to country, no 
Member State has succeeded in achieving employ-
ment growth over the past decade without having 
GDP growth of at least 2 percent a year). In the US, 
the rate of overall growth of GDP per person employed 
has been much less over the same period at less than 
1 percent a year, leading to calls in some quarters for 
the Union to follow similar kinds of policies of employ-
ing many people on low pay in marginal activities. The 
challenge facing European countries is to achieve a 
similar rate of job creation as in the US without expe-
riencing the same phenomenon of large numbers of 
working poor. 
At Essen, Member States were encouraged to focus 
policy action on three broad ways of increasing em-
ployment-intensity: 
• encouraging wage moderation 
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• increasing the flexibility of work organisation 
• promoting employment Initiatives at the regional 
and local level 
Creating jobs while maintaining profit levels requires re-
al wage restraint, but this can be difficult when wage 
setting is decentralised. On the other hand, centralised 
pay bargaining does not necessarily allow for variations 
in sectoral or regional economic conditions. Given that 
average real labour costs per person employed need 
to increase at a slower rate than productivity if em-
ployment expansion is to take place, pay rises need to 
vary from firm to firm and industry to industry. 
A principal element of employment programmes is, 
therefore, the pursuit of decentralisation in pay deter-
mination. In some Member States, this is left purely to 
the social partners to bring about. In others, however, 
especially in the South of the Community, there is a 
gradual conversion taking place from pay determina-
tion at the national level to the active promotion of col-
lective bargaining at the local level. 
In contrast to this approach, Ireland operates a na-
tional pay agreement, whereby wage rises are limited 
to a cumulative amount linked to the expected rate of 
inflation over a three-yeár period. This has been in 
force since 1987 and is designed to maintain overall 
cost competitiveness. In Belgium also, a general pay 
policy is in force restricting wage increases across the 
economy to a small percentage a year. 
With regard to more flexible forms of pay determina-
tion, the extent to which excessive labour costs hinder 
job creation, especially for the low-skilled and low-
paid, has been the focus of policy attention in a num-
ber of Member States. In the Netherlands, there is 
concern that remuneration for low-paid work is often 
well above the level that employers are prepared to 
pay given the productivity of the employees in ques-
tion. Hence apart from trying to close this gap by a 
downward convergence of wages at the lower end, 
the possibility of employers departing temporarily from 
paying the minimum wage has also been considered. 
In Germany, the use of start-up wages, amounting to 
90 percent of regular wages for the first year, was in-
troduced in the West German paper and chemicals in-
dustries in 1994. 
Another method of increasing the flexibility of pay de-
termination, encouraged in the UK, is through profit-re-
lated pay, where a basic wage can be topped up with 
a tax-free share of a company's profits, so allowing 
wage bills to be at least partly related to company per-
formance. 
Efforts are being made in some countries to make 
working arrangements more flexible and more in tune 
with the demands of the market, while, where possi-
ble, reducing the average amount of time each person 
works, so encouraging an expansion in the number of 
jobs. These take two main forms: 
• an increase ¡n part-time working 
• greater flexibility in working hours including shorter 
working weeks and less overtime 
The expansion of part-time working not only allows 
greater flexibility for both employers and employees 
but it also creates opportunities for integration into the 
labour market, especially for the young and the unem-
ployed for whom part-time working may provide valu-
able workplace experience. 
In the Netherlands, the UK and Denmark, part-time 
working accounts for over 20 percent of employment 
(in the Netherlands, around 36 percent). In these coun-
tries, labour market regulations and prevailing attitudes 
are already highly conducive to this form of employ-
ment. In the rest of the Union, however, it is less com-
mon. In Belgium, France and Ireland, it is generally be-
low the Union average of 15 percent, but still above 10 
percent, while in Germany, it is only slightly above the 
average. Elsewhere - including in all of the Southern 
Member States - part-time working represents no 
more than 8 percent of total employment. 
For the majority of Member States, therefore, the ex-
pansion of part-time working is regarded as a key ele-
ment in the changing pattern of employment. In these 
cases part-time working ¡s generally being promoted, 
though employment protection legislation is also being 
extended to accompany this. 
A number of different ways are being used to promote 
part-time working: In Germany, Belgium and Luxem-
bourg, as In the Netherlands, the public sector Is set-
ting an example by creating new part-time jobs, in 
large measure by converting existing full-time ones in-
to part-time. 
One particular problem being addressed in Ireland, 
Italy and again in Germany is the combination of 
part-time working and receipt of social security ben-
efits. At present, entitlement to benefit may be en-
dangered by working part-time and these Member 
States are therefore implementing changes to their 
social protection systems to reduce or eliminate this 
possible disincentive for workers to take part-time 
employment. 
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In France, part-time working is being encouraged 
through exempting employers from social security con-
tributions for employees working between 16 and 32 
hours a week. Furthermore, efforts are being made here, 
as well as in Spain, to increase flexibility through the an-
nualisation of working time (¡e. by allowing employees 
some choice over how they organise the total number of 
hours they are contracted to work over the year). 
In Greece and Portugal - where part-time working is 
under-developed - a cautious approach is being 
adopted. In Greece, moves towards part-time working 
are subject to the agreement of the social partners, 
while Portugal is promoting part-time working only as 
a means of creating flexibility for parental leave. 
Most Member States have the aim of improving the 
flexibility of working hours so that they are more com-
patible with the demands of business. In both the 
Netherlands and Finland, working time legislation is in 
preparation designed to increase flexibility in working 
hours at the company level and to allow their determi-
nation by collective agreement. In Germany, agreement 
on a change In working hours was reached in 1994 at 
the industry level in response to the recession, en-
abling hours, and wages, to be reduced in order to 
preserve jobs. This approach is also being recom-
mended in Italy, where it appears that, given the 
choice, many employees would accept a reduction in 
working hours and pay in crisis industries if this was 
necessary to preserve their jobs. 
At the same time, there are moves to make the open-
ing or operating hours of businesses more flexible in a 
number of Member States. This is particularly the case 
in Germany, Finland, Greece and the Netherlands, 
where more weekend and public holiday working is 
being encouraged. 
Only In France, do there seem to be serious proposals 
to shorten the working week as a whole with the pro-
vision of state aid for firms willing to experiment with 
reducing weekly working hours by 15 percent while at 
the same time increasing the numbers employed by 10 
percent for a three year period. In Greece, Italy and 
Finland, however, there are proposals to attempt to re-
duce overtime working - in the former, by a half. 
In Belgium, Portugal and Luxembourg, there are 
moves to shorten working hours for those nearing re-
tirement, or opting for early retirement, so that job 
sharing may take place and at the same time the skills 
and knowledge of the people concerned can be 
passed on to their successors. 
In this context, it is worth noting that according to a 
labour market survey carried out across the Union in 
1994 (European Economy, op cit), only 29 percent of 
respondents wished to work less (only 21 percent in 
France where a general reduction in working time is 
being considered) and almost twice as many ex-
pressed a preference for more pay rather than a re-
duction in working time. 
A number of Member States have the aim of increas-
ing occupational and geographical mobility by reduc-
ing the obstacles preventing people from moving more 
readily between jobs and regions. In many, both the 
unemployed and existing employees are being offered 
the opportunity to retrain in another profession. In Bel-
gium, Denmark and the Netherlands, career breaks 
and job rotation are encouraged to give people the op-
portunity for vocational training,. In Denmark, this is 
coupled with a policy of encouraging their jobs to be 
filled temporarily by the unemployed, who can thereby 
gain valuable work experience. 
Geographical mobility is also being encouraged in 
Greece, Spain and Portugal with financial assistance 
for removal and travel costs. While this may encourage 
a flow of labour supply from high to low unemployment 
areas, any such tendency is offset through the pay-
ment in Greece and Portugal of allowances to maintain 
seasonal employment In sectors such as tourism dur-
ing the off-season. 
A further area of action concerns the reduction of reg-
ulatory barriers. To the extent that legislation can have 
adverse effects on the flexibility of working arrange-
ments and on the ability of companies to determine 
their employment policy, in the Netherlands, Finland 
and the UK, the government is aiming to reduce these 
barriers either through specific restructuring of legisla-
tion on dismissals (in the former two cases), or by 
close examination of employment legislation to assess 
its effectiveness and cost and abolishing that which is 
considered insufficiently effective or too costly to ad-
minister (in the UK). 
4.2.3.3 Developing Initiatives at the Local 
Level 
A point highlighted in the Commission White Paper on 
Growth, competitiveness, employment was the poten-
tial boost to job creation of initiatives taken at the local 
level. This was reiterated in 1995 in a Commission 
Communication (COM 273, June 1995). A range of 
measures to create jobs, particularly in local services,, 
have been introduced in most Member States. They 
involve: 
• expanding and legitimising domestic service em-
ployment 
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• increasing socially-useful work 
• promoting the creation of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) 
Jobs in domestic services are being promoted in a 
number of Member States. Though such work is often 
already being carried out, it is not always formal or 
even legal employment and the unofficial nature of this 
type of working combined with the administrative bur-
den of formalising or legitimising it may hinder its 
growth. In most cases, the work involves a relatively 
low level of skills and therefore creates opportunities 
for the unskilled among the unemployed who repre-
sent a sizeable proportion of those looking for work. 
The expansion of domestic working appears, however, 
to be a mainly a feature of employment programmes 
in Northern Europe. In Denmark, the domestic servic-
es scheme, under which households are given subsi-
dies to reduce the cost of hiring casual labour for ac-
tivities such as gardening and cleaning, was intro-
duced in 1994 and is expected to become permanent 
in the near future. In Finland, the domestic service 
scheme, which encourages domestic working through 
employment subsidies and tax exemptions, is also to 
become permanent in 1996. In the Netherlands, a 
study ¡s being carried out to examine the legitimisation 
of domestic working for the long-term unemployed, 
while in Luxembourg, an inter-ministerial group has re-
cently submitted a report on new areas of job creation, 
which examines the possibilities for domestic working 
and Its possible negative social effects. 
Both France and Belgium have introduced measures 
to simplify the administrative procedure for domestic 
working and, therefore, promote its use. In France, 
since 1994, household employers have been granted 
tax deductions, while administrative procedures have 
been simplified through the use of an employment-
service voucher which obviates the need for employ-
ment contracts or pay slips. In Belgium, the Agences 
locales de l'emploi (ALE) - where unemployed people 
are placed into personal service jobs - has been in op-
eration in the majority of communities since 1994 and 
is to be the subject of evaluation during 1996. De-
pending on the results of this evaluation, domestic 
service working may be encouraged through the use 
of fhe chèque multi-service for the long-term and old-
er unemployed. 
Schemes to support socially-useful work usually cover 
social services, environmental protection, tourism and 
leisure, and, more specifically, activities in these areas 
which would not develop without public funding. In 
Denmark, pool jobs are being created for the unem-
ployed to care for the elderly, sick and small children 
as well as working on environmental protection proj-
ects. In Luxembourg, a socially-useful jobs scheme 
was introduced in 1984 but its use declined in the late 
1980s with the rapid increase in employment across 
the Union. Socially useful jobs, not already carried out 
by the public or private sectors, are now to be ex-
panded again to provide work for the unemployed and 
those threatened with unemployment. 
In Germany, local employment initiatives have been 
promoted in environmental protection, social services 
and child and youth welfare. Launched initially in 1993 
in the new Länder, this scheme which provides lump-
sum wage subsidies to provide work for the unem-
ployed was extended in 1995 to the western part of 
Germany. It was expected that 140,000 unemployed 
people would benefit from this scheme during 1995. In 
Portugal, Local Initiative Development Programmes are 
intended to boost local services to help ¡n the devel-
opment of rural areas and the stimulation of local com-
munities. 
In Italy, there is to be a gradual shift from passive 
measures of income support for those out of work to 
measures to support the development of socially-use-
ful jobs for which benefits are paid to those taking 
them up. This is particularly the case In areas deemed 
to be crisis regions, such as in the Mezzogiorno. 
One of the main areas for employment creation identi-
fied in the White Paper was in small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Indeed in many of the Member States, 
SMEs already account for a large proportion of total 
employment. SMEs, however, tend to suffer from low 
survival rates. According to the Finnish experience, for 
example, one in three new firms folds within three 
years and one in two folds within five years. Not only 
is this costly in terms of jobs lost and the associated 
time out of work for those becoming unemployed, but 
¡t also creates an atmosphere of low business confi-
dence for those remaining and for potential new en-
trants. Confidence is reduced further during times of 
recession. Business uncertainty can then lead on fur-
ther to a reluctance to hire employees even where in-
creased demand justifies it. 
In Portugal, a number of tax incentive measures were 
introduced in 1995 to stimulate the creation of small 
and very small businesses (between 3 and 20 em-
ployees). These Include a 95 percent reduction in prof-
its subject to profits tax for the financial years 1995, 
1996 and 1997, the exemption from fees for setting up 
new businesses and increases in the tax allowance 
limits for new investment. In addition, an incentive 
scheme was introduced in 1995 to support investment 
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projects in small enterprises that employ workers 
made redundant as a result of restructuring in the steel 
industry. A scheme to boost small businesses run by 
young entrepreneurs was also introduced in 1995 to 
provide grants, loans and risk capital guarantees for 
the creation, modernisation and internationalisation of 
these firms. 
In France, measures have recently been introduced to 
ease the financial position of SMEs through lightening 
the tax burden - and so reducing the number of bank-
ruptcies - and providing easier and cheaper access to 
loans and better loan guarantees. In Finland, similar 
measures are planned to be introduced in 1997. 
In the UK, local enterprise is encouraged through 
Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), which are pri-
vately-run training establishments maintaining close 
links with local business. Regional regeneration is sup-
ported by the Single Regeneration Budget available to 
promote urban and rural renewal. Five 'enterprise 
zones' offering temporary tax incentives for business 
creation have already been established and three more 
are planned in areas affected by the closure of coal 
mines. 
In Ireland, plans are drawn up by the County Enter-
prise Boards and Partnership Companies at the re-
gional level to promote urban and village renewal, with 
the aim of regenerating these communities so as to at-
tract employers and develop tourism. 
In Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portu-
gal, financial incentives are available to encourage the 
unemployed, especially the long-term unemployed, to 
start up their own business. In both Germany and Lux-
embourg, this bridging assistance was extended to 26 
weeks in 1994. In Belgium, there are plans to evaluate 
the introduction of bridging loans to the unemployed 
for the same purpose. 
4.2.3.4 Reducing Non-Wage Labour Costs 
In most parts of the Union, there is increasing concern 
about the level of charges imposed on employers 
which add to non-wage labour costs and widespread 
attempts to reduce them. The only exceptions are Den-
mark, where social contributions are already at a very 
low level in comparison to the rest of the Union, Fin-
land, where the efficacy of such reductions relative to 
lower income taxes is questioned, and Greece, where 
they do not seem to figure in the policy debate at all. 
The relatively high level of social charges imposed on 
business in Europe reflects the extensive systems of 
social protection which are distinguishing feature of 
Union Member States as compared with other coun-
tries. The cost of such systems is an increasing focus 
of policy debate as the provision of resources for pen-
sions, health and unemployment insurance mounts. 
Most Member States, however, have a deliberate pol-
icy aim of maintaining the prevailing level and extent of 
social protection, though there is a widespread ten-
dency to target expenditure more effectively. At the 
same time, efforts are being made to achieve a more 
efficient functioning of the system. 
The Netherlands and the UK are doing most to open 
up provision to the free market, eg. by privatisation of 
health insurance and retirement pensions. In Germany, 
reform of the health sector is intended to make the 
system more efficient, although here there is a basic 
understanding that to maintain given standards of so-
cial protection requires more people in employment 
contributing to its funding and fewer people being sup-
ported. In Italy, the aim is to revise the incentive sys-
tem to encourage part-time and more flexible working. 
With respect to employment creation measures most 
Member States have introduced reductions in employ-
ers' contributions to induce firms to take on more em-
ployees. In some cases - as in Spain, Portugal, Lux-
embourg, Ireland and the UK - this has been an 
across-the-board reduction for all employees. In Lux-
embourg, the funding of family allowances has been 
shifted from employers' contributions to the State. In 
Finland, employers' social contribution rates are pro-
gressive and increase more than in proportion to the 
total wage bill for the company, which serves to favour 
small companies. 
In other countries - the majority - reductions in em-
ployers' contributions have been targeted on specific 
groups, especially on the low-paid and unskilled. In 
Belgium, Spain, Portugal, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the UK, employers can benefit from 
reductions in contributions - or even exemptions for a 
limited period - if they hire someone who is long-term 
unemployed. In most cases, schemes apply to those 
who been out of work for a year or more, although in 
the UK the requirement is two years without work. 
Such incentives are also often conditional upon a min-
imum period of employment - usually between 1 and 
3 years, though in the Netherlands, where long-term 
unemployment, is above-average for the Union, this 
has recently been reduced from a year to 6 months. 
In the context of tight budgetary constraints and the 
maintenance of levels of social protection, curs in em-
ployers' contributions have to be financed by increas-
ing taxes or reducing public expenditure. In both the 
UK and the Netherlands, there are plans to introduce 
energy and/or environmental taxes to offset the cost (in 
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the UK a landfill tax is due to come into effect in Oc-
tober 1996). In Luxembourg and ¡n France - for the 
low-paid only - employers' social security contributions 
will be transferred from employers to the State. In the 
case of Luxembourg, a solidarity tax levied on all sec-
tions of the community will also be introduced. 
The size of the overall tax wedge - the difference be-
tween what employers have to pay for labour and the 
net wage an employee receives - rather than merely 
the scale of charges falling directly on employers is al-
so of relevance for the process of job creation. A high 
tax wedge Is particularly important in the case of rela-
tively low skilled, and therefore low paid workers, 
whose productivity, and contribution to the value-
added of a business, might not merit the costs of em-
ploying them. 
A widespread aim of policy has been to encourage the 
employment of the lower skilled by reducing the cost 
of employing them without reducing their take-home 
pay - in other words, to reduce the size of the tax 
wedge. In Ireland, this has been pursued as part of an 
ongoing policy of tax reform, whereby the lowest paid 
are taken out of the tax net, standard tax rate bands 
are widened and personal allowances are increased. In 
Denmark, basic tax rates have been reduced marked-
ly, by 12-14 percentage points. This approach is also 
being followed in Finland where the main target is the 
reduction in direct taxation rather than in employers' 
contributions since ¡t ¡s believed that the latter would 
be offset up by pay rises. 
4.2.3.5 Improving Effectiveness of Labour 
Market Policy 
Improving the effectiveness of labour market policy can 
be achieved ¡n two ways: 
• by a shift from passive to active labour market pol-
icy 
• through increased efficiency in the functioning of 
social welfare systems of income support 
Throughout the Union, there have been efforts to shift 
expenditure from passive income support of the un-
employed to active labour market measures to help 
them find work. Such measures include counselling 
and guidance, education and vocational training, tem-
porary work placements or subsidised employment. 
In Denmark, an early, needs-oriented approach has 
been adopted in an attempt to prevent long-term un-
employment. This will result in 1998 in full-time training 
or jobs being provided to all those unemployed for two 
years or more. In France, the UK and Finland, relax-
ation of unemployment benefit rules is being consid-
ered to allow entitlement to allowances to those on 
training courses. 
In the UK, the introduction of the Jobseeker's al-
lowance aims to provide more help to the unemployed 
to find work while Imposing more pressure on them to 
seek employment and to take jobs which are offered 
and, at the same time, making work more financially 
attractive than unemployment. In Ireland and Finland, 
studies are being carried out to assess the disincentive 
effects of social benefits. Ways are, therefore, being 
examined to provide greater distinction between in-
come from benefits or social allowances and earnings 
from employment. A revision to the Income Support 
Act came into force in 1996 in the Netherlands requir-
ing everyone receiving income support to accept suit-
able job offers. 
In Ireland, concern about the level of replacement rates 
for the unemployed with dependants has resulted in 
greater incentives being introduced for the low-paid 
through family income supplement (FIS) - on the lines 
of a similar scheme in the UK - and an increase in child 
benefit rates for those in work, while child dependent 
payments to the unemployed have been frozen. 
In Ireland also, earnings-related benefits are to be dis-
continued and unemployment benefits to be taxed, 
while in France, unemployment compensation has 
since 1992 declined with the duration of unemploy-
ment. Only in Greece has the daily rate of unemploy-
ment benefit been raised in real terms in recent years 
- by 30 percent in 1994 and a further 10 percent in 
1995. 
In a number of Member States, social welfare systems 
are being modified to take account of the growth in 
atypical working, which, by extending entitlement to 
benefits, should provide a greater incentive for people 
to accept part-time work. 
A further priority is that of achieving greater efficiency 
in the functioning of the welfare system. With the ris-
ing cost of providing welfare systems in the face of 
higher levels of unemployment, national governments 
generally are seeking to tighten up and make the func-
tioning of the system more efficient. This is being 
achieved either through closing loopholes and reduc-
ing abuse of the system or increasing the efficiency 
with which the system works. 
A number of Member States - Germany, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, for example - are aiming to reduce abuse 
of the system in terms of fraud and illegal employment. 
At the same time, in both Denmark and the Nether-
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lands, rules for benefit entitlement are being tightened 
through stricter definition of availability for work and 
through requiring the unemployed to accept suitable 
offers of employment if they are in receipt of benefits. 
There has also been widespread realisation that em-
ployment agencies are likely to operate more effective-
ly if they are decentralised. In Germany, Spain and Italy, 
employment placements were subject to national mo-
nopoly and these structures have been dismantled in 
recent years to allow the development of more locally-
based agencies. Furthermore, in Spain, temporary em-
ployment agencies have been legalised, in part to help 
fill vacancies in the skilled professions. 
In the Netherlands, more responsibility has been given 
to local authorities to manage income support sys-
tems, partly in order to introduce a greater incentive to 
reduce the amount paid out in benefits. Since 1994, 
they have had an incentive budget to fund measures 
to encourage people to move off of income support. 
4.2.3.6 Helping Those Hard-Hit by 
Unemployment 
Employment measures have been increasingly target-
ed on those hit hardest by unemployment, who in 
most cases are: 
• young people under 25 
• the long-term unemployed 
• older people who have not yet reached retirement 
age 
• women seeking to enter or rejoin the labour mar-
ket after a period of inactivity 
• disabled people 
• ethnic minorities 
The measures introduced by Member States for each 
category are summarised below. In Member State pre-
sentations of their programmes, however, some gen-
eral measures were listed where specific groups were 
not identified. These include the creation of public sec-
tor jobs in Denmark for those people who are difficult 
to place, grants to employers for hiring those with spe-
cial needs in Greece, part-time community work and 
training in the voluntary or public sector in Ireland and 
socially-useful work programmes in the South of Italy. 
In Ireland, a Local Employment Service (LES) is being 
introduced to identify the needs of target groups. The 
LES will provide guidance, training and employment 
support at the local level and is being piloted in 14 ar-
eas of high unemployment. The LES project is part of 
a wider-ranging programme of Integrated Develop-
ment, which seeks to tackle long-term unemployment 
and social exclusion at the local level by addressing 
the underlying causes of economic and social margin-
alisation especially in disadvantaged areas. 
The large numbers of long-term unemployed (those 
who have been out of work for a year or more) has 
been a serious problem in nearly all Member States for 
some time. These people find it increasingly difficult to 
find a job the longer they are out of work and greater 
attention is being focused on how their prospects can 
be improved. 
As noted above, many Member States have intro-
duced temporary reductions in employers' social se-
curity contributions if they hire someone who is long-
term unemployed. In Denmark, in addition to the 
planned scheme for guaranteeing all those out of work 
for two years a job or training place, public sector jobs 
have been created for the most difficult-to-place of the 
long-term unemployed, which is also the case in the 
Netherlands, while in Portugal, Ireland and Greece, fi-
nancial help is available for them to become self-em-
ployed. In the UK, companies are able to take on a 
long-term unemployed person for a three-week free 
trial, and the very long-term unemployed are permitted 
to work part-time while still receiving income support. 
In Germany, wage subsidies have been introduced to 
encourage employers to take on the long-term unem-
ployed. These amount to DM 3 billion (1,546 MECU) 
over the period 1995 to 1999 and are expected to pro-
vide employment to some 180,000 people. 
The problems faced by young people ¡n finding em-
ployment, as noted above, are often due to insufficient 
education and training, but the lack of work experience 
can also pose a significant obstacle. 
The integration of young people into work is promoted 
in most Member States through financial incentives to 
employers. In Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portu-
gal, employers can benefit from temporary reductions 
in social security contributions when they hire a 
younger person. Alternatively, in Germany, Belgium, 
France, Greece, and again in Spain, employers receive 
subsidies for taking on younger people. For unem-
ployed young people in the UK, there is the guarantee 
of full-time education, vocational training or a job. 
Member States have different approaches to the prob-
lem of unemployment among older people. A number 
- such as Greece and Portugal - still encourage older 
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people - especially if unemployed - to take early retire-
ment, despite the mounting cost of such a policy with 
the growing numbers of people close to or above re-
tirement age. In Denmark and Germany, on the other 
hand, measures have been introduced to enable them 
to remain in the labour force for longer, often with more 
flexible pension options. 
In other Member States, employers are given financial 
incentives to hire older workers. Mostly this amounts 
to reducing employers' contributions. In Luxembourg, 
however, a more graduated system of benefit incen-
tives has been introduced, with firms hiring long-term 
unemployed people over the age of 50 having their so-
cial security contributions reimbursed for seven years, 
while for those over 40 the time period is three years. 
Disabled people face considerable barriers to finding 
employment, but only a few Member States have spe-
cific policies for tackling the problem. Lower employ-
ers' contributions are used as an incentive to hire dis-
abled people in Portugal and Luxembourg, though in 
the latter case rules also exist for providing a minimum 
number of jobs for disabled people in public and pri-
vate organisations employing more than 25 people. 
In the Netherlands, legislation is being prepared to pro-
mote the integration of the disabled into working life 
through increased wage subsidies and probationary 
periods of employment. 
In the UK, unemployed disabled people have priority 
on government-funded employment and training pro-
grammes, and legislation is being prepared to combat 
discrimination against their employment. In Finland, the 
number of vocational training places for the disabled is 
planned to be expanded. 
There are two main problems facing women in the 
labour market. First, there remains a demarcation be-
tween male and female jobs and limited opportunities 
exist for women in those that are traditionally male-
dominated. Secondly, career breaks to have children 
pose a double problem, in the form of a loss of skills 
during absence from work and difficulties of finding a 
suitable job which is compatible with childcare re-
sponsibilities. 
In Luxembourg, Portugal, the Netherlands and the UK, 
measures have been introduced to provide women re-
joining the labour market with greater opportunities for 
training, especially in new professions. In the Nether-
lands, efforts are being made to promote the role of 
women in business. Equal opportunities in Germany are 
being promoted on the basis of women receiving labour 
market support equal to their share of total unemploy-
ment. In the UK, women returning to the labour market 
may still receive benefits (to the extent that they are en-
titled to them) while undergoing vocational training. 
Only in the Netherlands presentation is there explicit 
mention of measures to promote job creation for eth-
nic minorities. In 1995, legislation came into effect to 
promote the 'fair participation' of ethnic minorities in 
employment. This will be supplemented in 1996 by the 
provision of grants for the settling-in and education of 
immigrants. 
4.3 Concluding Points 
The purpose of this chapter has been to consider poli-
cies which have no intended spatial effects but which, 
nevertheless, have significant regional Impacts. Unlike 
the next chapter which deals with the regional dimen-
sion of general government transfers, the focus of this 
chapter has been on the proactive policies of govern-
ment. Two particular policies have been reviewed: 
policies to promote competitiveness (in effect, R&D-
oriented policies) and employment policies. 
As far as RTD and innovation policies are concerned, 
the chapter begins by providing appropriate back-
ground context. The point is made that R&D spending 
in the four Cohesion countries is significantly less than 
that found elsewhere in the EU Member States -
whether measured in relation to GDP or to national 
population. That having been said, Ireland and Portu-
gal were the only OECD countries in which both pub-
lic and private expenditure on R&D increased between 
the periods 1985-9 and 1990-2, an indication perhaps 
of the stimulating effect of EU policies. With regard to 
the regional dimension of R&D policy, the emphasis 
within the Cohesion countries is clearly on issues of 
national competitiveness, scarcely surprising given the 
tensions noted in Chapter 2 between national pros-
perity and regional disparity. 
The grouping of Germany and Italy together reflects 
the common regional features of their economies 
rather than any similarities in the R&D arena. Indeed, 
the two countries currently take quite different ap-
proaches to RTD in their problem regions. While in 
Germany a major effort is in train to try to establish an 
efficient research environment in the new Länder, in 
Italy there are now no separate measures for support-
ing RTD in the problem regions, following the demise 
of special intervention in the Mezzogiorno. 
With respect to the "northern European" Member 
States, the focus is on the two case study countries: 
France and the United Kingdom. In terms of the em-
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phasis placed on R&D expenditure (as a percentage of 
GDP or on a per capita basis), both countries are very 
much towards the top end of the EU Member State 
range, just behind Germany and Sweden (see Chart 
4.1). As far as the regional dimension is concerned the 
focus, once more, is on national competitiveness. 
That having been said, examples are to hand in both 
countries of initiatives which aim to encourage greater 
participation in innovation in all regions. Moreover, in 
Northern Ireland, a distinct strategy and enhanced 
funding are available to stimulate RTD in the province. 
Summing up the contextual position, it is clear that 
policies to promote RTD and innovation are general-
ly operated with national policy objectives in mind. 
While there are some attempts to stimulate innova-
tion in the problem regions, this is primarily in the 
form of encouraging technology transfer and the up-
take of innovation rather than innovation per se. This 
broad picture is hardly surprising: research and de-
velopment policymakers are understandably unlikely 
to be willing to jeopardise R&D policy objectives for 
the sake of promoting less viable projects in the 
problem regions. 
Turning to consider the regional distribution of expen-
ditures on R&D, the analysis in Section 4.1.3.1 is re-
stricted to four countries for which relevant data is 
available: France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
The focus is, first, on the regional-level distribution of 
overall R&D expenditure, distinguishing between the 
private sector, government and the higher education 
sector; and, secondly, on the regional-level distribution 
of so-called business enterprise sector expenditure on 
R&D (BERD) and the extent to which this is financed 
by government. 
With regard to the former aspect, the regional distri-
bution of overall R&D expenditure, a number of com-
mon themes apply across the four case study coun-
tries. Of perhaps most significance, R&D expenditure 
tends to be heavily concentrated in more prosperous 
regions. Thus, Paris (the île de France region) accounts 
for 43 percent of all R&D expenditure in France, 
Piemonte and Lombardia for almost half private and 
State R&D expenditure In Italy, Madrid for 42 percent 
of total R&D expenditure in Spain and the South East 
for some 54 percent of all R&D expenditure in the Unit-
ed Kingdom. 
The reverse side of this coin is that R&D expenditure 
in the poorest regions is generally very low. By way of 
example, in France the Limousin region accounts for 
less than 0.2 percent of the national R&D spend and, 
on a per capita basis has expenditure levels 20 times 
lower than in Paris. In similar vein, the eight regions of 
the Mezzogiorno in Italy account for only 8 percent of 
private and State R&D funding compared with 36 per-
cent of the national population. The Spanish Objective 
1 regions collectively account for 24 percent of the to-
tal R&D spend while containing almost 60 percent of 
the national population. Lastly, in the UK, Northern Ire-
land represents just 0.7 percent of overall national R&D 
expenditure but holds 2.8 percent of the national pop-
ulation. 
A final interesting point regarding the regional distribu-
tion of overall R&D expenditure concerns the distribu-
tion of private and public sector spending by region. 
While there is considerable variation between regions, 
there are a significant number of instances where rela-
tively prosperous regions benefit particularly from pub-
lic sector funding. An obvious example is Lazio which, 
on its own, receives over half of the State funding for 
Italian R&D. In Spain, too, over three-fifths of State 
R&D funding is channelled into Madrid. 
Moving on to consider the regional distribution of gov-
ernment-funded BERD (business enterprise sector 
R&D) three general points can be made. The first is 
that there is a high degree of complementarity be-
tween government R&D funding and regional aid at the 
regional level. Prosperous regions are generally Ineligi-
ble for regional support but benefit disproportionately 
from R&D funding; in contrast, poorer regions perform 
badly in terms of government R&D aid for business but 
generally do well with respect to regional assistance. 
Second, notwithstanding the general complementarity 
shown in Chart 4.5 to Chart 4.8, it is important to note 
the very different scales of R&D and regional spend by 
country. In general terms, R&D spending is far more 
significant than regional support in the prosperous 
Member States while regional aid is more important 
than government-funded BERD in many poorer Mem-
ber States. Third, combining these two general points, 
it is the richest regions in the richest countries and the 
poorest regions in the poorest countries which benefit 
most from Member State R&D and regional aid in 
combination. 
Evaluation studies on the regional effects of horizontal 
policies in general, and competitiveness policies in par-
ticular, are fairly limited, hampered by the lack of ap-
propriate regional data and by the difficulties of disen-
tangling the impact of what are often wide-ranging 
policies from other government policies. As a result, 
the focus of most studies is less on the regional effects 
of competitiveness policies and more on assessing the 
effectiveness of such policies in different geographical 
contexts. While it is difficult to generalise, a broad con-
clusion seems to be that competitiveness policies 
work less well in less-favoured regions. 
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Turning, finally, to consider employment policies, there 
is, in practice a serious lack of empirical evidence on 
the effects of most of the measures included in the em-
ployment programmes being followed by Member 
States. However, while the effect of present policies on 
employment growth is uncertain, particularly in terms of 
its scale, their impact on cohesion is less questionable. 
A common characteristic of most of the measures in 
operation or being planned is to reduce disparities in 
employment opportunities whether between individu-
als, social groups or regions. While most measures do 
not have a specific regional dimension, the very fact 
that many of them are aimed at the unemployed - and 
within this group at the most disadvantaged of those 
without work - is likely to mean that they benefit regions 
with the most serious problems of unemployment and 
inadequate rates of job creation more than others, so 
tending to narrow regional disparities. 
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5. Interregional Transfers from Central Government 
Budgets 
5.1 Introduction 
Public expenditure in the different Member States of 
the EU represents a significant proportion of the in-
come of the countries concerned; on average, around 
a quarter of GNP in industrialised countries - more if 
social security is included. Government funds are gen-
erated from obligatory contributions across the regions 
of the countries concerned and are redistributed in ex-
penditures across the regions. This process involves 
involuntary but significant interregional transfers. The 
question is whether this redistribution is in or out of line 
with the objectives of regional policy. In spite of its im-
portance as a mechanism to promote cohesion, this 
issue has been understudied. This chapter presents 
the results of a research effort to assess these Interre-
gional transfer mechanisms in seven EU countries: 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom (302 million inhabitants). 
Relatively little is known about budget-induced interre-
gional transfers because so few studies have been un-
dertaken on the subject. The reason for the lack of re-
search in this area lies primarily in the conceptual and 
statistical difficulties involved ¡n measuring who, and 
which region, pays into and/or gains from public funds. 
There are, however, some important, if relatively old, 
research results available. In the United States, 
Mushkin (1956, 1957) conducted seminal research on 
the State by State allocation of the federal budget. 
Mushkin appears to be the first to have made a clear 
distinction between two conceptual approaches to the 
regional allocation of government expenditure: one is 
the "dollar flow" approach which indicates where pub-
lic money is physically going; the second is the "ben-
efit" approach which indicates the location of those 
who benefit from public expenditure. This distinction is 
important and means that an accounting approach is 
necessarily partial and limited and has to give way to 
economic analysis integrating various conceptual ap-
proaches of the regional incidence of expenditures. For 
this reason, Mushkin concluded that it was necessary 
to undertake two sets of calculations (although ulti-
mately she was only able to undertake the "flow" cal-
culation because of insufficient regional data to calcu-
late the "benefit"). The result of the study was clearly 
that the richer US regions were subsidising the poorer 
ones. The same kind of study, with the same conclu-
sions, was published in 1967 by the US Congress. 
Thanos Catsambas (1978) produced broadly similar 
results, but went further into the methodological and 
conceptual issues. In considering the US federal budg-
et, he identified four conceptual approaches: 
i. an accounting approach; 
il. a "flow" approach; 
iii. a "benefit" approach; and 
¡v. an "impact on the general equilibrium" approach 
In practice he used only the second and third of these 
approaches. The first has little economic meaning; and 
the fourth is impossible to calculate. A further impor-
tant point made by Catsambas concerns the concep-
tual difficulties and statistical uncertainties of the budg-
et allocation. As a result, he argued that it was neces-
sary to produce several different results; his calcula-
tions on the US budget involved 10 different alloca-
tions and a rank-Spearman correlation analysis. 
In 1969, a similar study was undertaken in respect of 
a particular region: the British Treasury made an analy-
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sis of the situation of Scotland regarding the UK budg-
et. The methodology involved combining, in the same 
analysis, a "flow" approach (for clearly regionalised ex-
penditures such as capital expenditures or grants) and 
a "benefit" approach for "indirect" expenditures (such 
as defence, foreign policy or debt). It appeared that if 
Scotland was not a part of UK, it should have in-
creased its public revenues or reduced its public ex-
penditures by 30 percent (HM Treasury, 1969). 
But the main studies on European countries were 
conducted for the so-called MacDougall report 
(1977), by the European Commission working party 
on the role of public finances in European integration. 
This report gives estimates of interregional transfers 
for four European countries: France, Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom. The methodologies for 
these studies are quite different, mixing, and not al-
ways clearly, the benefit and flow concepts. For this 
reason, it is questionable to compare the budgetary 
transfers across countries. However, the general re-
sults were clear once more: public funds contribute 
to reducing disparities in regional incomes. This is il-
lustrated in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 : The Role of Public Funds in Reducing Interregional Disparities in Income. 
Average reduction in regional per 
capita income Var. Coef. 
(non-weighted by population) 
Variation of the Gini coefficient 
of regional per capita income 
(weighted) 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
UK 
Australia 
Canada 
USA 
54 
29 
47 
36 
53 
32 
28 
52 
39 
44 
31 
53 
28 
23 
Source: Rapport du Groupe de Réflexion sur le rôle des finances publiques dans l'integration européenne(1977). 
Other country studies can also be quoted. Van 
Rompuy & Verheirstraeten (1979), on Belgium, calcu-
lated the budget-induced transfers from Flemish to 
Walloon regions in 1974. They measured the net trans-
fer benefiting Wallonia as 90 billion Belgium francs (11 
percent of the budget). Coopers & Lybrand (1985), on 
the United Kingdom, produced similar results for the 
1984 budgetary year: the net estimated contribution of 
the South East region to the UK budget was £3.7 bil-
lion, ie. nearly 4 percent of government expenditures. 
In France, INSEE made a first effort to build CRAPUC 
(Regionalised Accounts of Central Public Administra-
tion) and to produce a regional allocation of both rev-
enues and expenditures for the 1982-1984 central 
government budgets. The results (Donnelier and 
Garagnon, 1989'14»), relate the same kind of story: the 
richest region, Ile de France, transferred in 1984, 
through the central government budget, around 90 bil-
lion francs (8,000 francs/capita) to the rest of the coun-
try (ie. 7.5 percent of the Ile de France GDP or 7 per-
cent of government expenditures). Poor regions such 
as Languedoc Roussillon or Bretagne gained through 
these transfers around 5,500 francs/capita. This effort 
i""> The results of this study, available on the quoted 1989 working pa-
per at INSEE, produced by the authors, have been published in 
Godineau (1992). 
is currently continuing at INSEE. Recently, new provi-
sional and partial results were published (INSEE, 1995): 
the Ile de France region, in 1988, according to INSEE 
calculations, would have transferred, through the cen-
tral government budget and social security funds, 197 
billion francs to the rest of the country. 
A number of studies, referred to in the "Sound Money-
Stable Finances" (1994) report, have drawn attention 
to the balancing role of a central budget in a given 
country when a particular region suffers from an asym-
metrical shock. In this case, it is argued, the central 
budget will play a buffer role, cushion the impact of the 
shock and more generally assist the region in need. 
There is but one step from this type of short term 
analysis to a more structured approach of the Impact 
of the national budget on weaker regions. It is this that 
this study aims to do, by using a common conceptu-
al and methodological approach to estimate the re-
gional budgetary balances of regions In seven large 
European countries. 
Section 5.2 presents a theoretical approach to budget 
induced interregional transfers (BUT). The general 
methodology proposed and the way it has been ad-
justed and implemented in each country is presented 
in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the main findings 
of the research. Finally, Section 5.5 begins to discuss 
some of the implications of these results. 
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5.2 A Simple Model of Budget­
Induced Interregional Transfers 
A starting point for the discussion of this issue is a sim­
ple model of budget­induced transfers (Prud'homme, 
1993). Consider a country (or a federation) with a pop­
ulation P, of per capita GDP y and of GDP Y, com­
posed of regions (or of states) i, of population P¡, of per 
capita GDP y¡, and of income Y¡. The budget E of this 
country is balanced. Let: 
t¡ be the per capita taxes paid by region i to the cen­
tral budget; 
e­ be the per capita expenditures or benefits of the 
central budget in region i; 
g¡ be the per capita budget­induced transfers for re­
gion i; 
G¡ be the budget­induced transfers for region i; 
a, b, c, d, be parameters describing the tax and ex­
penditure systems. 
Then: 
t¡ = a y b 
e¡ = c + d y¡ 
9¡ ­ e¡ " *¡ 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
a is an indicator of the budget size. 
b reflects the progressivity of the tax system. 
b=1 means a proportional tax system; 
b>1 a progressive one. 
d denotes what could be called the "equalising 
nature" of the expenditure system; 
d=0 means that expenditures per capita bene­
fit equally all regions and are independent of re­
gional per capita Income; 
d<0 that they decrease with income; and 
d>0 that they increase with income. 
Figure 5.1 gives a graphic presentation of the model. 
In Figure 5.1 b is taken to be equal to one (the tax sys­
tem is assumed to be proportional) and d is taken to 
be equal to zero (the expenditure system is assumed 
to be of an equalising nature). 
g¡ = c + d y¡ ­ a y¡b 
G¡ = c P¡ + d y¡ P¡ ­ a y¡b Pi 
E = a Syb P¡ 
c can be eliminated by introducing the balanced budg­
et constraint SG,=0: 
c Ρ + d Y ­ a Syb Ρ = 0 
c = E/P ­ d y 
g, = E/P ­ a yb ­ d (y ­y¡) (4) 
(3) becomes: 
Equation (4) shows that the budget­induced transfers 
for region i are a function of four factors: 
i. they are a function of the size of the budget E of 
the country (or federation), or, to put it otherwise, 
a function of the total taxes raised, which in turn 
depend upon a and b, the parameters of the tax 
system and upon the regional Income distribu­
tion; the higher the budget, or the budget per 
capita, the greater the transfers; 
ii. the magnitude of the transfers also depends 
upon the progressivity of the tax system, as 
indicated by b. For b>1 and for higher values 
of y¡, a yb will be large, and the transfer neg­
ative; 
iii. transfers are also a function of the equalising na­
ture of the expenditure system, represented by 
d, the slope of the expenditure curve; if the ex­
penditure system is equalising, that is if expendi­
tures are greater in low income regions, then the 
lower the income of region i, the greater the pos­
itive transfer it will receive; 
¡v. for a given region i, the transfer is of course also 
related to its relative per capita income, or more 
precisely to the difference between its income 
and the average country income. 
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Figure 5.1 : Graphic Presentation of the 
Simple Model 
This simple model can be further simplified. If the tax 
system is proportional, b=1, and (4) becomes: 
g, = FTP - a y. - d (y -y) (4a) 
The assumption can also be made that the expendi-
ture system is equalisation-neutral, that is independent 
of regional income. In this case, d=0, and (4) becomes: 
g, = E/P - a y,1 (4b) 
The two modifications can also be considered jointly. 
In this case, (4) becomes: 
9¡ = a (y - y¡) (4c) 
This is the simple case represented by Figure 5.1. In 
this case, there will be a positive transfer for all the re-
gions with a regional income lower than the average 
income y*, and a negative transfer for all the regions 
with an income higher than y*. It is interesting to note 
that there can be transfers from richer to poorer re-
gions even with a regressive tax system and a non-
equalising expenditure system, as in the case repre-
sented by Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2: The Simple Model, with 
Regressive Taxation and Non-
Equalising Expenditures 
ic t.e 
* - y 
The most important lesson to be drawn from this sim-
ple exercise is that national budgets are likely to trans-
fer large amounts of money from richer to poorer re-
gions. These transfers should be expected to be larg-
er in the countries where the size of the budget (rela-
tive to GDP) is larger, where the tax system is pro-
gressive, where the expenditure system is equalising, 
and, of course, where inter-regional income disparities 
are greater. The calculations that follow should verify 
these assertions. 
5.3 Methodology 
Measuring Interregional transfers induced by a nation-
al budget for a given country and a given year is a dif-
ficult exercise. The difficulties to be overcome are both 
conceptual and statistical. 
5.3.1 Conceptual and Statistical Difficulties 
At the conceptual level, it is often unclear how a given 
budget tax, or a given budget expenditure should be 
regionally allocated. Consider, for instance, the corpo-
rate income tax paid by a multi-regional enterprise, 
which is usually paid at the location of the company's 
headquarters; what is clear is that it should not be al-
located to the region where it is paid and collected. 
The tax paid is obviously not contributed or borne by 
that region alone, but by all the regions that have con-
tributed to the taxed profit of the company. Or consid-
er expenditures on agricultural research undertaken in 
region A; should they be allocated to region A, or to 
region B, which is predominantly agricultural and will 
presumably benefit from agricultural research, or per-
haps to region C, which happens to be a heavy con-
sumer of agricultural products? 
Then, even if and when it is known how, in principle, 
to allocate a particular type of revenue or expenditure, 
there may well be statistical difficulties in practice. The 
figures required to implement a correct conceptual 
procedure may well not exist at the appropriate re-
gional level. 
These difficulties have two implications. One is that 
there are not many studies of the regional allocation of 
national budgets. The second is that these studies 
cannot readily be compared. This is why it was felt im-
portant to develop a unified methodology, and to ap-
ply it to seven European countries: the UK, France, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden, Germany and Portugal. This 
methodology is based on work previously undertaken 
at L'OEIL, mostly but not only on France 
(Prud'homme, Rochefort and Nicol 1973, Davezies 
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1993; Davezies 1991; Davezies, Nicot, Pouliquen & 
Prud'homme, 1987; Davezies Nicot & Prud'homme, 
1985). It is Important to try and understand this 
methodology, because the findings are only as good 
and creditworthy as the methodology. The methodolo-
gy involves three steps. 
5.3.2 Budget Breakdown 
The first step involves the establishment of detailed na-
tional budgets. These budgets have to be: (i) consoli-
dated, (ii) balanced, (Hi) recent, (¡v) executed, and (v) 
broken down into as many items of revenue and ex-
penditure as possible. 
The need for consolidation of a budget refers to the 
extra-budgetary accounts, often subsidised by the 
budget, that may exist; there is a danger of double-
counting that must be avoided. This raises the issue of 
the "perimeter" of the national budget, which varies 
from country to country, particularly with respect to the 
so-called "social security" accounts (the meaning of 
the concept itself varies from country to country). In 
principle, we have not included social security in this 
study; in practice, however, the UK, Italian, Por-
tuguese, Spanish and Swedish budgets which have 
been used do include social security; this is one of the 
reasons why they represent a higher share of GDP 
than in France and Germany. In France, the social se-
curity system is distinct from the government budget. 
The last regional allocation of the social security funds 
in France is for 1990; no figures were available for 
1993. It is important to notice that the German budg-
et studied is the official one, ie. it does not include the 
Länder share of the tax sharing mechanism. This 
mechanism could be better considered as a part of 
national public finance, in which the central govern-
ment decides the tax rates, collects all the taxes sub-
ject to the tax sharing system, and distribute grants to 
Länder. The accounts used in Germany, and it is these 
that were utilised in this study, consider that the share 
of taxes benefiting the Länder are in the local public fi-
nance system. 
The budgets used are balanced. Some studies of in-
terregional "transfers" are restricted to expenditures, or 
to certain types of expenditures. It should be clear, 
however, that such studies cannot, by definition, pro-
duce interregional transfers. To show that some re-
gions "transfer" income to others, It is necessary to 
start with a balanced budget. The expenditures that 
are not financed by taxes are necessarily financed by 
borrowing, even though the regional allocation of this 
borrowing may raise some difficult theoretical issues. 
The budgets examined are ex-post, effective, execut-
ed budgets, not budgeted budgets. It seems obvious 
that it should be so, but it is interesting to note that, in 
many countries, it is much easier to have access to 
budgeted budgets than to executed budgets. 
The budgets studied are the most recent that could be 
found: they are for the year 1993. 
Finally, these budgets have been decomposed into as 
many items as convenient from the viewpoint of re-
gional allocations. The basic principle used in these 
decompositions (which are of course constrained by 
the availability of data) is to produce items that can 
convincingly be regionally allocated. The resulting 
number of items appear in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Decomposition of National Budgets 
Expenditure items 
312 
106 
140 
82 
478 
80 
850 
Revenue items 
62 
37 
24 
198 
66 
49 
56 
Total number of items 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
370 
150 
186 
137 
540 
130 
887 
In many cases, a relatively small number of items -
about a dozen - account for a large share - about half 
- of expenditures or of revenues. Table 5.3, for the UK, 
is illustrative of this feature. Comparable Information for 
the other case study countries can be found in Annex 
HD. 
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Table 5.3: Main Items of the UK Budget, 1993 
C billion Percent 
Revenues 
Income tax 
Value-added tax 
Social security contributions 
Corporation tax 
Business rates 
Fuel duties 
Tobacco duties 
Sub-total 
Total 
58.4 
39.0 
38.7 
14.9 
12.6 
8.9 
6.5 
178.4 
249.5 
23.4 
15.6 
15.5 
6.0 
5.0 
3.6 
2.6 
71.9 
100.0 
Expenditure 
Retirement pensions (basic) 
Payments to health authorities 
Revenue support grant to LA 
Income support (non pensioners) 
Non domestic rates payments to LA 
Equipment 
Armed forces: personnel 
Child benefits 
Invalidity benefits 
Payments on domestic rates to LA 
Sub-total 
Total 
26.5 
21.4 
17.1 
12.2 
11.6 
8.0 
6.9 
6.0 
5.9 
4.8 
120.3 
249.5 
10.6 
8.6 
6.8 
4.9 
4.6 
3.2 
2.8 
2.4 
2.3 
1.9 
48.2 
100.0 
5.3.3 Regional Allocation Procedure 
The second step consists in the regional allocation of 
these budgetary items. For each of them, allocation 
criteria or keys are sought. Let Τ be the total amount 
of a tax item collected at the national level, Κ an allo­
cation criteria, Ki the value of this criteria for region i, 
Ti the amount of taxes allocated to or, put another 
way, contributed by region i: 
Ti = T*Ki/K 
Much depends on the selection of appropriate criteria. 
The criteria selected must be (i) economically mean­
ingful and (ii) multiple. 
It is essential to understand that the criteria retained for 
the regional allocation of a particular item are chosen 
because they make economic sense. The work done 
is not an exercise in accounting. The research method­
ology is guided by economic reasoning, and by the 
theory of incidence in the selection of criteria. 
In selecting appropriate criteria, a distinguishing feature 
of this study is that it does not limit itself to a single al­
location key when a number of alternative allocations 
may seem theoretically appropriate. The reason for 
adopting this approach is that all of these criteria may 
be equally meaningful, either because there is a con­
ceptual uncertainty as to the appropriate criteria, or 
because it has been necessary to use statistical prox­
ies that are equally imperfect although acceptable. In 
other words, for a number of items, rather that provid­
ing just one "best" regional allocation, several "good" 
allocations are used. This is an important characteris­
tic of the methodology. 
Some examples might be useful in clarifying this point. 
For certain items of revenue or of expenditure, such as 
personal income tax or transfers to local governments 
(one of the most important types of expenditure every­
where), the actual recorded figures are utilised. The 
personal income tax paid and collected in region A can 
meaningfully be said to be contributed by region A. 
Similarly, the transfers to the local governments of re­
gion A can clearly be said to benefit region A. In such 
cases, the criteria used is hardly a criteria; it is the ac­
tual regional value, and it is of course singular. 
For other items, such as corporate income tax, the ac­
tual regional values, as indicated above, are meaning­
less, and are simply ignored. The theory of incidence 
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suggests that a tax paid by an enterprise is borne by 
the workers of the enterprise (in the form of reduced 
wages), by the owners of the capital of the enterprise 
(in the form of reduced profits) and by the consumers 
of the products of the enterprise (in the form of higher 
prices). The theory suggests that the relative share of 
these tax bearers varies with the structure of the mar-
kets for labour, capital and goods, but it is not very 
helpful in providing percentages. In this study three cri-
teria for the regional allocation of corporate income tax 
are adopted. The first assumes that the tax is borne 
50 percent by workers and 50 percent by capital own-
ers, and allocates half the national proceeds of the tax 
pro rata in line with the regional allocation of wages, 
and the remaining half pro rata according to the re-
gional allocation of the stock of private capital. The 
second assumes that the tax is borne 50 percent by 
workers, 25 percent by capital owners, and 25 percent 
by consumers. The third assumes that the tax is borne 
50 percent by capital owners, 25 percent by workers, 
and 25 percent by consumers. 
For yet other items, there are no actual regional val-
ues available. This is, for instance, often the case 
for education expenditures in those countries where 
this is a national budget expenditure. In such a 
case, criteria such as the number of pupils by re-
gion (more precisely: the share of the region in the 
national total) or the number of teachers by region, 
can be utilised. 
Table 5.4 indicates the number of criteria, or proxies, 
which have been produced and utilised for each coun-
try. For each criteria, the value for each region has 
been identified. In other words, for France, with 22 re-
gions, a 22x135 matrix of criteria has been utilised. 
These matrices constitute, by themselves, an interest-
ing regional statistical yearbook. 
Table 5.4: Number of Criteria Used by Country 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
135 
111 
200 
45 
180 
110 
316 
5.3.4 Summing Procedure 
The last step consists in adding up, for revenues, and 
then for expenditures, for each region, the amounts 
estimated for each item of revenue and of expenditure, 
in order to know how much each region has con-
tributed (in revenues) to the budget, and how much it 
has gained (in expenditures) from the budget. If only 
one criteria had been used for each item, this task 
would be easy. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, 
several criteria have been used for a number of items. 
The addition of items can therefore be done in millions 
of different ways. Consider a country in which there are 
only two taxes: a business tax and a value-added tax. 
Assume that three criteria have been identified to allo-
cate to region A the national proceeds of the business 
tax, and that these criteria yield 20, 22 and 23 as es-
timates of the contribution of A to the business tax. 
Assume that there are also three criteria for the re-
gional allocation of VAT, that yield 30, 35 and 38 as es-
timates of the contribution of region A to VAT. It is easy 
to see that there are nine combinations of these two 
sets of figures. They will yield 50, 55, 58, 52, 57, 60, 
53, 58 and 61 as estimates of the contribution of re-
gion A to the national budget. Instead of having just 
one figure, there are nine figures that are equally mean-
ingful or at least plausible. 
The essence of the procedure adopted in this study ¡s 
to produce, for each region, all these estimates, and to 
study the numbers thus obtained. If the distribution of 
numbers is sufficiently concentrated - that is, if the co-
efficient of dispersion is reasonably low - the conclu-
sion is that the estimates converge, and the median or 
the average value of the distribution is retained. This 
value is considered sufficiently robust to be meaning-
ful and significant. The hypothesis behind this proce-
dure is that the practical importance of some of the 
hard conceptual choices is often not great. It is not 
clear whether business taxes should be allocated pro 
rata with wages, capital or consumption; but in prac-
tice, it does not matter as much as might be feared 
because, for most regions, the share of wages is not 
very different from the share of capital nor from the 
share of consumption. If, on the contrary, the distribu-
tions are extremely dispersed, it will be impossible to 
say much about the contributions to the budget and 
the gains from the budget for a given region. 
There are so many possible combinations that in prac-
tice it would be impossible to produce and study all the 
associated distributions. Accordingly the research has 
been limited to 101 randomly selected combinations, 
that produce, for each region, 101 estimates of its con-
tribution to the budget and 101 estimates of its gain 
from the budget. For each region, the distribution of 
these 101 values is examined. As a check, for several 
cases the same operation has been carried out with 
1001 randomly selected combinations. The results did 
not differ significantly from the results obtained by 
means of 101 randomly selected combinations. 
Once estimates have been obtained for each region of 
what it contributes to the budget, and of what it gains 
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from the budget, it is easy to define a budgetary trans-
fer, which is the difference between the two. Such 
transfers are positive when the region gains more than 
it contributes and negative when it contributes more 
than it gains. 
5.3.5 Flow Approach and Benefit Approach 
The procedure just described is, in fact, refined and 
enriched in the case of expenditures (or, to take the 
viewpoint of regions, in the case of gains from the 
budget) by a distinction between a "flow approach" 
and a "benefit approach". When the regional allocation 
of a given item of expenditure is considered, there are 
two basically different ways of looking at the regional 
gains. First, the question can be posed: where does 
the money go? Where is the expenditure actually 
made? This the flow approach. Second, where are the 
actual beneficiaries of this item of expenditure? Whose 
welfare is actually increased by it? This is the benefit 
approach. 
The flow and benefit concepts can perhaps be made 
clearer by a few examples. Take the case of expen-
ditures on agricultural research mentioned above: in 
a flow approach the amount will be allocated to the 
reglon(s) where research centres are located; in a 
benefit approach the amount will be allocated to the 
regions where agricultural goods are produced and/or 
in the regions where agricultural goods are con-
sumed. Take the case of military expenditures: in a 
flow approach; this item will be allocated to the re-
gions where arms are being made, or soldiers sta-
tioned; in a benefit approach, it will be assumed that 
all citizens are equally protected all over the country, 
and the expenditure will be allocated pro rata in line 
with population. Take expenditures in central govern-
ment ministries: in a flow approach, they will be allo-
cated to the city where wages are paid; in a benefit 
approach, they will be allocated all over the country, 
with the help of criteria reflecting the benefit that 
each region draws from the services performed by 
the particular ministry. 
The flow approach and the benefit approach will 
therefore usually imply the use of different criteria for 
the allocation of most items of expenditure. Rather 
than utilising all the possible criteria for a given item, 
it was found useful to perform two distinct alloca-
tions, one for each approach. The work described 
above is thus done twice for expenditures. Distinct 
criteria are used, different summations are made, dif-
ferent sets of 101 distributions are randomly select-
ed, different distributions of estimates are produced 
and analysed, different median values of the gains of 
each region from the national budget are retained. 
For a given region, two estimates of the budgetary 
"gain" are produced: the "gain (flow)" and the "gain 
(benefit)". The comparison with the contribution to 
the budget will yield two estimates of budget-induced 
transfers: "transfers (flow)" and "transfers (benefits)", 
that is transfers in the flow approach and in the ben-
efit approach. 
Which is best? The question is futile. They are equally 
interesting but they tell different stories. They look at 
the complex phenomenon of budget-induced interre-
gional transfers from different angles. The two ap-
proaches incorporate two conceptual approaches that 
are so different that it would not be reasonable to try 
and mix them. A corollary of this is that the dispersion 
of the 101 figures obtained for "gains" in both ap-
proaches will be narrower than would be the case if 
this distinction were not made. 
Why is there not a similar distinction introduced for rev-
enue items? For revenues items, use is made basical-
ly of a benefit approach. A flow approach would allo-
cate revenues at the place where they are collected. 
For Institutional reasons, this would not have much 
meaning, because the location of tax collection (or tax 
payment), at least for certain taxes, has little econom-
ic significance. In Portugal, due to the lack of existing 
regional data, the regional allocation of the budget and 
Social Security was implemented for the "flow" ap-
proach and not for the "benefit" one (which requires 
more data). 
5.3.6 Treatment of Debt-Related Items 
Borrowing (on the revenue side), debt reimbursements 
and interest on the debt (on the expenditure side) -
which might be called debt-related items - present a 
special problem, all the more important because of the 
magnitude of such amounts in many countries. Lend-
ing money to the government is not the same thing as 
paying taxes to it. Receiving interest on such loans is 
not the same thing as benefiting from government ex-
penditures. 
Debt repayment on the expenditure side is allocated 
differently between the flow and the benefit calcula-
tions. For the benefit approach, regional proxies re-
flecting the incidence of debt financing are used. Debt 
financing increases the level of expenditure from which 
the population can benefit. Accordingly, debt pay-
ments have been allocated in proportion to the re-
gional distribution of expenditures. These figures are 
based on a "first round" of calculations of the région-
alisation of taxes and spending. This process assumes 
implicitly that (i) the regional distribution of marginal 
taxes or expenditures is the same as the mean of re-
gional taxes and expenditures; and (ii) that the region-
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al allocations of the expenditure benefits of previous 
years are not different from those of 1993. For the flow 
approach, debt financing is allocated according to the 
regional distribution of savers or shareholders. The 
deficit, on the revenue side, is allocated according to 
the tax contributions of the regions. 
were considered as a single region, the total 
value of the transfer from this "new" region to 
the rest of Sweden would be affected signifi­
cantly. This means that it is not conceptually 
very meaningful to compare the general amount 
of transfers between countries. 
5.4 Main Findings 
Many millions of calculations have been computed to 
produce regional budgetary balances in the seven 
countries. The general results, for each country, are 
presented in Annex IIB, in absolute terms (national cur­
rency, ECU and PPS) and in relative terms (relative to 
regional GDP and to total budget expenditures). Annex 
IIC displays a cartography of the results (see also Fig­
ures 5.5 to 5.12 at the end of this chapter). It is im­
portant, before presenting and discussing these re­
sults, to remember that they are not regional "ac­
counts", but the outcome of economic analysis. The 
figures presented are mean results of various concep­
tual or statistical choices of allocation. 
A number of observations and cautionary remarks 
should be made concerning the use of these results. 
i. the type of government spending analysed dif­
fers between countries. In Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, social securi­
ty revenues and expenditures are included; in 
France and Germany they are essentially distinct. 
Attempts to compare the distributions between 
countries must take account of the different 
types of expenditure assessed in different coun­
tries and of the relative weight of the budget in 
the national GDP. 
ii. similarly, the intensities of the interregional 
transfers are a function of the territorial break­
downs used in the different countries. This is 
always a concern in undertaking regional analy­
ses of any kind; however, it ¡s important to un­
derline the significance of this issue. For statis­
tical reasons, the breakdowns used vary con­
siderably: 18 regions in Spain; 22 in France; 17 
in Germany, 5 in Portugal, 20 in Italy; 11 in the 
United Kingdom; and 8 in Sweden. The inten­
sity of the transfers measured is directly related 
to the territorial units employed; as such, com­
paring the intensity of the transfers is broadly 
equivalent to comparing regional breakdowns. 
For example, if the two neighbouring regions of 
Stockholm (which is a net contributor) and 
east­mid Sweden (which is a net beneficiary) 
Hi. although the basic methodology adopted for 
the regional distribution of the budgets of the 
seven countries is the same, certain differences 
in the implementation of the methodology 
should be noted (as mentioned in the previous 
section). They result from differences in the 
quality and availability of the statistical informa­
tion, especially at the regional level. For exam­
ple, in the Spanish case, the regional criteria 
used for civil servants' wages is the number of 
employees in non­market employment. Annex 
IID displays the allocation choices made for the 
main expenditures and contributions of each 
country. It is easy to verify, on the basis of da­
ta for those countries where the regional statis­
tical coverage is better, that there is, at the re­
gional level, a very large convergence of the re­
gional values for various analogue indicators. 
For example in France, the difference between 
the percentage of civil servants in He de France 
and the percentage of civil servants' wages is 
only one percentage point. 
In spite of this somewhat lengthy list of caveats, the re­
sults presented provide, for the most part, a robust 
measure of the interregional transfers of the countries 
under study. 
5.4.1 The Concentration of the Results 
In the course of this study 101 regional allocations of 
expenditures on the "flow" and "benefit" approaches 
and 101 allocations of regional contributions have 
been calculated. It is appropriate to use the mean re­
sults as long as there is a concentration of these re­
sults. Such concentration was found in practice. An­
nex HE gives, for each region, the variation coefficient 
(standard error/average: σ/Μ) and the Min/Max of the 
three sets of calculations. Table 5.5 gives an example 
of these tables for the UK case. Table 5.6 presents the 
national average and standard error of these regional 
coefficients. 
All the values of the concentration coefficients indicate 
a good convergence of the results. The most concen­
trated results are for contributions, then for "flow" ex­
penditures and "benefit" expenditures. Spain is the 
country where the results are the least concentrated, 
but even in this country, the regional contributions vary, 
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Table 5.5: Concentration of Results of 101 Regional Allocations of Budget Expenditures ("Bene-
fit" and "Flow" Approaches) and Contributions: the Case of the UK 
Exp(benef) Exp(benef) Exp(flow) Exp(flow) Contributions Contributions 
s/M Min/Max s/M Min/Max s/M Min/Max 
North 
Y&H 
E. Mids 
E. Anglia 
South East 
South West 
W. Mids 
North West 
Wales 
Scotland 
N. Ireland 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.91 
0.95 
0.94 
0.90 
0.96 
0.90 
0.95 
0.93 
0.95 
0.96 
0.94 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.97 
0.98 
0.98 
0.97 
0.98 
0.98 
0.99 
0.98 
0.95 
0.97 
0.98 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.97 
0.98 
0.98 
0.98 
0.98 
0.98 
0.96 
0.98 
0.99 
0.99 
0.97 
Mean 
Standard error 
0.02 
0.01 
0.94 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.98 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.98 
0.01 
Table 5.6: Concentration of Results of 101 Regional Allocations of Budget Expenditures ("Bene-
fit" and "Flow" Approaches) and Contributions: National Coefficients of Concentration 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
U.K. 
Average 
Std. Err. 
Average 
Std. Err. 
Average 
Std. Err. 
Average 
Std. Err. 
Average 
Std. Err. 
Average 
Std. Err. 
Average 
Std. Err. 
Exp(benef) 
s/M 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.10 
0.01 
-
0.04 
0.02 
0.03 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
Exp(benef) 
Min/Max 
0.91 
0.04 
0.93 
0.04 
0.80 
0.08 
-
0.82 
0.06 
0.88 
0.07 
0.94 
0.02 
Exp(flow) 
s/M 
0.01 
0.01 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.02 
0.03 
0.01 
0.05 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.01 
0.00 
Exp(flow) 
Min/Max 
0.97 
0.01 
0.91 
0.06 
0.86 
0.05 
0.88 
0.03 
0.82 
0.09 
0.92 
0.06 
0.98 
0.01 
Contributions 
s/M 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.02 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.06 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.00 
Contributions 
Min/Max 
0.98 
0.01 
0.92 
0.05 
0.98 
0.01 
0.97 
0.01 
0.86 
0.10 
1.00 
0.00 
0.98 
0.01 
on average, from -7 percent to +7 percent around the 
mean contribution and from -9 percent to +9 percent 
around the average for regional expenditures ("flow" 
and "benefit"). The results of regional allocations of ex-
penditures in Italy show the same levels of deviation. 
For the other countries, the level of difference of the re-
sults is very small. The statistical convergence of the so-
cial and economic characteristics of regions makes the 
results generally insensitive to conceptual differences of 
allocation. For example, in all countries, the three syn-
thetic proxies used to allocate corporate taxes (three 
different combinations of regional proxies on capital, 
wages and consumption) give almost the same result. 
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5.4.2 Budget-Induced Interregional 
Transfers are Large 
Irrespective of whether the "flow" or the "benefit" con-
cept is used, it appears that the richer regions of the 
countries studied transfer significant sums to the poor-
er or problem regions, through public funds. The im-
plicit transfers involved are in line with regional policies 
implemented at national and European levels. This 
confirms the conclusion of the MacDougall report 
which highlighted the regional redistributive effects of 
the budget in the 1970s. There is a lack of technical 
vocabulary to define this mechanism, because the 
concepts of "progressivity" or "regressivity" apply only 
to tax matters. It is possible to enlarge this vocabulary 
to expenditures and even to interregional transfer sys-
tems. On this basis, a transfer system can be said to 
be interregionally progressive if and when richer re-
gions subsidise poorer regions. This is the case for the 
Member States studied. 
Detailed results of the regional allocations of national 
budgets are provided in Annex IIB (expenditures, rev-
enues and balances, in terms of local currencies, ECU, 
PPS and relative to regional GDP and budget expen-
ditures). Table 5.7 summarises the results of selected 
richer and poorer regions. Table 5.9 presents the bal-
ances of all the regions in terms of percentage of re-
gional GDP and in ECU. 
Table 5.7: Budget-Induced Interregional Transfers in MECU, as a Percent of Regional GDP and in 
k. ECU per capita: Selected Regions 
Andalucía 
Galicia 
Madrid 
Cataluña 
Midi Pyrenees 
Languedoc R 
Ile de France 
Rhône-Alpes 
Thüringen 
Mecklen-Vor. 
Baden-Württ. 
Hessen 
Sicilia 
Campania 
Lombardia 
Piemonte 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
Norte 
Lisboa e V.T. 
North Norrland 
N.Mid Sweden 
Stockholm 
West Sweden 
North West 
Wales 
South East 
East Anglia 
transí 
(benef) 
MECU 
9,178 
3,185 
-8,455 
-4,302 
2,158 
2,649 
-17,806 
-673 
6,883 
5,225 
-11,071 
-6,778 
12,151 
11,891 
-23,436 
-6,778 
-
-
-
-
1,210 
1,585 
-3,493 
-76 
4,368 
3,603 
-21,524 
-426 
transí 
(flow) 
MECU 
7,435 
2,078 
-6,041 
-4,113 
2,137 
2,760 
-8,848 
-1,655 
5,111 
3,970 
-10,128 
-6,112 
8,955 
10,117 
-20,051 
-6,945 
629 
209 
-547 
-657 
1,257 
1,625 
-2,058 
-670 
3,530 
2,704 
-15,176 
-748 
transí 
(benef) 
%GDPreg. 
17% 
14% 
-13% 
-6% 
6% 
8% 
-6% 
- 1 % 
28% 
29% 
-5% 
-4% 
24% 
21% 
-14% 
-9% 
-
-
-
-
13% 
11% 
-10% 
0% 
6% 
11% 
-8% 
- 1 % 
transí 
(flow) 
%GDPreg. 
14% 
9% 
-9% 
-5% 
6% 
9% 
-3% 
-2% 
21% 
22% 
-4% 
-4% 
17% 
18% 
-12% 
-10% 
26% 
10% 
-2% 
-2% 
14% 
11% 
-6% 
-2% 
4% 
8% 
-5% 
-3% 
transf 
(benef) 
k ECU/cap 
1.30 
1.20 
-1.70 
-0.70 
0.90 
1.20 
-1.60 
-0.10 
2.71 
2.82 
-1.09 
-1.14 
2.40 
2.10 
-2.60 
-1.50 
-
-
-
-
2.30 
1.80 
-2.10 
0.00 
0.70 
1.20 
-1.20 
-0.20 
transf 
(flow) 
k ECU/cap 
1.10 
0.80 
-1.20 
-0.70 
0.90 
1.30 
-0.80 
-0.30 
2.01 
2.14 
-0.99 
-1.03 
1.80 
1.80 
-2.20 
-1.60 
1.18 
0.61 
-0.16 
-0.20 
2.40 
1.90 
-1.20 
-0.40 
0.60 
0.90 
-0.90 
-0.40 
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Before analysing and comparing the results, particular-
ly between different countries, it must be recalled, as 
explained in Section 5.2, that the level of interregional 
transfers depends on the weight of the government 
budget in national income. In this research, due to lack 
of statistics on the regional allocation of social securi-
ty in France and Germany, there is a great disparity of 
these weights (see Table 5.8). Before comparing, for 
example, the relative subsidy of Stockholm or Lom-
bardia to the Ile de France it is necessary to bear in 
mind the relative amounts of public finance included. 
In fact, previous studies (Davezies, 1993) showed that 
the transfer induced by French social security from He 
de France to other regions is even bigger than budg-
et-induced transfers. It is possible to take this different 
weighting of the budget effect into account, and to cal-
culate "virtual" transfers by point of GDP financing the 
budget studied (see Table 5.8). 
Table 5.8: The Weight in National GDP of Public Funds Analysed by Country and the Value of the 
Transfers per point of GDP of the National Budget 1993 
Budget analysed 
in % of GDP 
ECU/cap. of "flow" 
transfers/point 
of GDP in budget 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
25% 
14% 
48% 
46% 
32% 
53% 
40% 
Ile de France 
Hessen 
Lombardia 
Lisboa e V.T. 
Madrid 
Stockholm 
South East 
-33 
-73 
-46 
-4 
-37 
-23 
-23 
Considering the results in Table 5.9 in detail, there are 
16 out of the 100 studied regions where the "flow" and 
"benefit" results display different signs (for the five Por-
tuguese regions, out these 100, the "benefit" has not 
been calculated). This situation occurs in Intermediate 
income or very small regions. The number of regions 
in this position is low, given the big conceptual differ-
ences between the "flow" and "benefit" approaches. In 
the countries studied, there are 10 instances where re-
gions were net beneficiaries in benefit terms and net 
contributors in flow terms. This means that in these re-
gions, there are less flows of public money - relative to 
their contributions to the budget - than the amount of 
benefits obtained from government policies. Six of the 
regions in this case are in France where the social se-
curity funds are not regionally allocated; ¡f this had 
been done, there would probably be a better conver-
gence of the "flow" and "benefit" approaches. The re-
verse situation, in which "flow" transfers exceed "ben-
efit" ones, arises in only six instances. There is, then, 
a considerable coherence in the results, in spite of the 
fact that the two types of regional allocation are based 
on quite distinct hypotheses. 
pie, in the United Kingdom, almost half of civil service 
salaries are accounted for by the South-East. 
The "central" regions appear to be the main contribu-
tors: Madrid and Cataluña in Spain; Lombardia, Emil-
ia-Romagna and Piemonte in Italy; Stockholm in Swe-
den; île de France in France; the South-East in the 
United Kingdom. On the basis of the "flow" concept, 
the net contribution varies between 2 percent (Lisbon 
& VT) and 12 percent (Lombardia) of the value of the 
regional GDP (the transfer financed by île de France is 
three percent of its GDP, but probably more than dou-
ble this figure if social security were included). In Ger-
many, where social security funds are not included, the 
net contributors regions are less concentrated: four 
Länder share the same level of effort: Baden-Wurtten-
berg (4 percent of the regional GDP), Hessen (4 per-
cent), Bayern (3 percent), Rheinland Pfalz (3 percent). 
In Portugal, because of the geographical breakdown of 
the regions, where the two main economic regions 
contain more than 70 percent of the population and 
comprise a mixture of rich and poor areas, the calcu-
lated Interregional transfers are of course very small. 
Not surprisingly, the transfers accruing to net benefici-
ary regions are consistently higher in "benefit" terms 
than ¡n "flow" terms. However, the net contributor re-
gions generally receive a greater proportion of the 
flows of public money than of the benefits. For exam-
A secondary point is that a small number of other re-
gions also appear as net "flow" contributors in the 
countries studied. This is true of four French regions 
(with two others near zero), four Italian, seven Spanish, 
one Swedish and three British regions. 
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Although caution is required in aggregating these re­
sult, it Is interesting to have an order of magnitude of 
the redistributive mechanism by calculating the fol­
lowing overall results: for the "flow" approach, which 
minimises the transfers, the seven richest regions (île 
de France, Hamburg, Lisbon & VT, Lombardia, 
Madrid, Stockholm and the South East), which rep­
resent 16 percent of the overall population of the 
seven countries and 19 percent of their GDP, fi­
nanced (in 1993) 54 billion ECU of budget induced 
interregional transfers. This is equal to six percent of 
their regional GDP and 1.1 percent of the total GDP 
of the five countries. The 29 net contributing regions, 
with 55 percent of the population of the seven coun­
tries and 64 percent of their total GDP, financed 128 
billion ECU. This represents four percent of their re­
gional GDP and three percent of the total GDP of the 
five countries. 
These figures confirm that national public funds play a 
very significant role in cohesion processes, transferring 
huge amounts of money from richer to poorer regions, 
more than twice the amount of the national contribu­
tions of these countries to the budget of the EC. If the 
other Member States produce the same level of budg­
et­Induced transfers, one could estimate that these 
transfers are something like more 20 times the Euro­
pean budget of the Structural Funds! 
Of course, the flows are symmetrical in the sense that 
the poorer regions tend to be the largest net benefici­
aries: Languedoc­Roussillon, Midi Pyrénées and Lim­
ousin in France; the eastern Länder in Germany, the 
Italian Mezzogiorno regions, Alentejo, Algarve and 
Centro regions in Portugal, Andalucía and Extremadu­
ra in Spain; the north of Sweden; northern regions and 
Wales in the United Kingdom. 
Table 5.9: Budget­Induced Interregional Transfers: France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Swe­
den and United Kingdom 1993 
France transf(benef) 
% reg. GDP 
transf(flow) 
% reg. GDP 
transf(benet) 
k ECU/cap 
transfíflow) 
k ECU/cap 
Alsace 
Aquitaine 
Auvergne 
Bourgogne 
Bretagne 
Centre 
Champagne­A 
Corse 
F.­Comte 
Ile de France 
Languedoc­R. 
Limousin 
Lorraine 
Midi­R 
Nord­P.C. 
B.­Normandie 
H.­Normandie 
P.­de­la­Loire 
Picardie 
Poitou­C. 
Prov.­A.C.A. 
Rhône­A. 
-1% 
3% 
2% 
3% 
3% 
0% 
1% 
15% 
2% 
-6% 
8% 
6% 
3% 
6% 
5% 
4% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
3% 
1% 
-1% 
0% 
2% 
1% 
0% 
3% 
1% 
0% 
10% 
-2% 
-3% 
9% 
6% 
2% 
5% 
1% 
3% 
-1% 
0% 
-3% 
1% 
2% 
-2% 
■0.2 
0.4 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.0 
0.2 
1.9 
0.3 
1.6 
1.2 
0.9 
0.5 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.4 
0.2 
•0.1 
0.0 
0.3 
0.2 
-0.1 
0.4 
0.1 
0.0 
1.4 
-0.4 
-0.8 
1.3 
0.9 
0.4 
0.9 
0.2 
0.5 
-0.2 
-0.1 
-0.4 
0.1 
0.3 
-0.3 
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Germany 
Baden-Württ. 
Bayern 
Berlin 
Brandenburg 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
Hessen 
Mecklen.-Vor. 
Niedersachsen 
Nordrh.-West. 
Rhein. -Pfalz 
Saarland 
Sachsen 
Sach.-Anhalt 
Schles.Holst. 
Thüringen 
transf(benef) 
% reg. GDP 
-5% 
-4% 
9% 
22% 
- 1 % 
-5% 
-4% 
29% 
- 1 % 
-2% 
-3% 
6% 
24% 
26% 
-3% 
28% 
transffflow) 
% reg. GDP 
-4% 
-3% 
12% 
17% 
1 % 
- 1 % 
-4% 
22% 
- 1 % 
-2% 
-3% 
4% 
17% 
19% 
- 1 % 
2 1 % 
transffbenef) 
k ECU/cap 
-1.09 
-0.93 
1.73 
2.39 
-0.37 
-1.77 
-1.14 
2.82 
-0.28 
-0.32 
-0.55 
1.10 
2.34 
2.57 
-0.50 
2.71 
transf(flow) 
k ECU/cap 
-0.99 
-0.72 
2.16 
1.79 
0.16 
-0.43 
-1.03 
2.14 
-0.15 
-0.33 
-0.54 
0.85 
1.67 
1.95 
-0.25 
2.01 
Italy transf(benef) 
% reg. GDP 
18% 
49% 
37% 
2 1 % 
-10% 
-2% 
-2% 
-4% 
-14% 
1 % 
4 1 % 
-9% 
18% 
23% 
23% 
-7% 
-2% 
2% 
-3% 
-8% 
transf(flow) 
% reg. GDP 
10% 
27% 
20% 
18% 
-10% 
0% 
10% 
-4% 
-12% 
-2% 
17% 
-10% 
9% 
19% 
17% 
-7% 
10% 
0% 
12% 
-9% 
transf(benef) 
k ECU/cap 
2.3 
4.6 
3.2 
2.1 
-1.8 
-0.3 
-0.3 
-0.7 
-2.6 
0.1 
4.5 
-1.5 
1.8 
2.5 
2.4 
-1.1 
-0.3 
0.2 
-0.5 
-1.3 
transfíflow) 
k ECU/cap 
1.2 
2.5 
1.7 
1.8 
-1.7 
0.1 
1.7 
-0.6 
-2.2 
-0.2 
1.9 
-1.6 
1.0 
2.1 
1.8 
-1.0 
1.8 
0.1 
2.2 
-1.4 
Abruzzo 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Campania 
Emilia R. 
Friuli V.G. 
Lazio 
Liguria 
Lombardia 
Marche 
Molise 
Piemonte 
Puglia 
Sardegna 
Sicilia 
Toscana 
Trentino A.A. 
Umbria 
Valle d'Aosta 
Veneto 
Portugal transf(benef) 
% reg. GDP 
-
-
-
-
-
transffflow) 
% reg. GDP 
26% 
10% 
4% 
-2% 
-2% 
transffbenef) 
k ECU/cap 
-
-
-
-
-
transf(flow) 
k ECU/cap 
1.18 
0.61 
0.22 
-0.20 
-0.16 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
Centro 
Lisboa e V.T. 
Norte 
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Spain 
Andalucía 
Aragon 
Asturias 
Baleares 
Canarias 
Cantabria 
Castilla LMa. 
Castilla Leon 
Cataluña 
Ceuta Y Melil. 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
La Rioja 
Madrid 
Murcia 
Navarra 
Pais Vasco 
Valencia 
transf(benef) 
% reg. GDP 
17% 
-7% 
1 % 
-8% 
13% 
0% 
5% 
1 % 
-6% 
3% 
18% 
14% 
-6% 
-13% 
3% 
-6% 
-9% 
0% 
transfíflow) 
% reg. GDP 
14% 
-3% 
1 % 
-7% 
1 1 % 
- 1 % 
3% 
2% 
-5% 
14% 
15% 
9% 
-3% 
-9% 
2% 
-6% 
-9% 
0% 
transf(benef) 
k ECU/cap 
1.3 
-0.8 
0.1 
-1.0 . 
1.3 
0.0 
0.4 
0.1 
-0.7 
0.2 
1.3 
1.2 
-0.7 
-1.7 
0.2 
-0.8 
-1.1 
0.0 
transf(flow) 
k ECU/cap 
1.1 
-0.4 
0.1 
-1.0 
1.2 
-0.1 
0.3 
0.2 
-0.7 
1.3 
1.1 
0.8 
-0.3 
-1.2 
0.2 
-0.8 
-1.1 
0.0 
Sweden transf(benef) 
% reg. GDP 
-9% 
4% 
2% 
1 % 
0% 
1 1 % 
9% 
13% 
transf(flow) 
% reg. GDP 
-6% 
3% 
0% 
0% 
-2% 
1 1 % 
8% 
14% 
transf(benef) 
k ECU/cap 
-2.1 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 
1.8 
1.6 
2.3 
transf(flow) 
k ECU/cap 
-1.2 
0.5 
-0.1 
0.0 
-0.4 
1.9 
1.4 
2.4 
Stockholm 
E.Mid Sweden 
Smal/lslands 
South Sweden 
West Sweden 
N.Mld Sweden 
Midden 
Norrland 
United Kingdom transf(benef) 
% reg. GDP 
9% 
1 % 
1 % 
- 1 % 
-7% 
0% 
3% 
5% 
1 1 % 
6% 
18% 
transf(flow) 
% reg. GDP 
9% 
- 1 % 
-2% 
-3% 
-5% 
1 % 
1 % 
4% 
8% 
5% 
17% 
transf(benef) 
k ECU/cap 
1.1 
0.2 
0.1 
-0.2 
-1.2 
-0.1 
0.3 
0.7 
1.2 
0.9 
2.0 
transfíflow) 
k ECU/cap 
1.2 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.4 
-0.9 
0.1 
0.1 
0.6 
0.9 
0.6 
1.9 
North 
Y. &H. 
E. Midlands 
East Anglia 
South East 
South West 
W. Midlands 
North West 
Wales 
Scotland 
N. Ireland 
Source: OEIL Calculations 
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These transfers produce a large reduction of interre-
gional disparities within countries. The best way to 
analyse this reduction would be to use regional data on 
the disposable income of households, because these 
transfers are generally oriented more towards regional 
income or standard of living than towards regional pro-
duction. However, due to unavailable regional income 
data on the five countries, it has proven necessary to 
use a comparison of regional GDP per capita "before" 
and "after" budget transfers. This way of proceeding is 
conceptually questionable because GDP already in-
cludes public funds (taxes on production, public value 
added,...), and because the income oriented transfers 
weigh less in GDP than in income (national income is 
around two-thirds of national GDP), but it is neverthe-
less convenient to use this "mix" of data to produce a 
general indicator of regional disparity reduction. The 
term "budgetary adjusted GDP" (BAGDP) consists of 
the regional GDP plus transfers. Table 5.10 shows the 
result of an analysis in term of Gini coefficients: 
Table 5.10: The Impact of Budget-Induced Interregional Transfers on Regional Economic Dispar-
ities in France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 1993. (GDP and 
Budget Adjusted GDP per capita) 
Gini 
GDP 
Gini 
BAGDP 
benefit 
Gini 
BAGDP 
flow 
%of 
reduction 
benefit 
%of 
reduction 
flow 
France (a) 
Germany (a) 
Italy (a) 
Portugal (a) 
Spain (a) 
Sweden (a) 
United Kingdom (a) 
Weighted by pop mean 
reduction on seven countries (b) 
7 countries (ECU) 
6 countries (ECU) (b) 
7 countries (PPS) 
6 countries (PPS) (b) 
0.121 
0.147 
0.132 
0.149 
0.110 
0.051 
0.065 
0.187 
0.098 
0.116 
0.068 
-
0.060 
0.034 
0.035 
0.109 
0.123 
0.095 
0.133 
0.069 
0.043 
0.044 
0.169 
-18.4% 
-21.0% 
-48.5% 
-
-45.4% 
-33.8% 
-46.9% 
-34.3% 
-9.9% 
-16.2% 
-28.0% 
-10.8% 
-37.4% 
-14.4% 
-32.7% 
-22.8% 
-9.5% 
0.178 
0.143 
0.140 
0.152 
0.105 
0.120 
-14.8% 
-25.2% 
-16.5% 
(a) Gini in ECU or in PPS are the same 
(b) Benefit calculated on 6 countries (without Portugal) 
Wore: French and German social security are not taken into account. 
Source: OEIL Calculations 
The reduction of interregional disparities appears very 
important, and of the same order of magnitude as the 
figures of the MacDougall report (Table 5.1), taking into 
account the fact that the MacDougall report measured 
the reduction of interregional disparities of income, 
which are less important before the budget than GDP 
disparities, and because the transfers have a larger im-
pact on regional income than on regional GDP. Before 
comparing the intensity of the national budget redistri-
butions, it must be recalled again that a part of the dif-
ferences are due to differences in the degree of region-
al breakdown (in the UK for example, the breakdown is 
into eight regions whereas it is in 22 in France). 
Table 5.10 shows the mean national reduction of dis-
parities weighted by population. This is a good indicator 
of the mean national ability to reduce interregional dis-
parities via the national budget. It is possible to com-
pare this reduction with the reduction of Gini coefficients 
calculated on the GDP and BAGDP of the 101 regions. 
It appears clearly that the cohesion machine is more a 
national machine than an European one. A large part of 
the cohesion effect remains at the national level and 
does not play a role with respect to European cohesion. 
When a richer region of a poorer country subsidises an 
even poorer region, this mechanism has most impact 
on national rather than European cohesion. 
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5.4.3 Budget-Induced Interregional 
Transfers are Related to GDP 
The transfers induced by government budgets are 
clearly related to the GDP per capita of regions. The 
richer is a region, relative to the national situation, the 
more Its net contribution to the budget is negative. In 
similar vein, the poorer is a region, the more it receives 
in transfers from the budget. 
There is a quite homogeneous transfer mechanism 
among the seven countries. It is possible to show, 
referring to the simple model set out in Figure 5.1 
that this mechanism reflects a steady combination of 
the regional incidence of the tax system and expen­
diture allocations: richer regions contribute more to 
the budget than poorer regions, and in a larger pro­
portion than they gain from'the budget. Table 5.11 
gives the slopes and coefficients of determination 
(R2) of the linear regressions linking respectively 
budget contributions and gains of the regions at their 
GDP per capita. 
Table 5.11: Statistics of Linear Regressions Between Budget Contribution per capita and 
Gains(flow) per capita ν GDP per capita in the Regions of France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and United Kingdom (1993) 
x=GDP/cap 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Slope 
[R2] 
Slope 
[R2] 
Slope 
[R2] 
Slope 
[R2] 
Slope 
[R2] 
Slope 
[R2] 
Slope 
[R2] 
y=contribution/cap 
0.18 
[0.92] 
0.12 
[0.98] 
0.53 
[0.96] 
0.32 
[0.97] 
0.36 
[0.88] 
0.60 
[0.96] 
0.46 
[0.96] 
y=gain(flow)/cap 
0.06 
[0.10] 
0.00 
[0.0001] 
0.25 
[0.40] 
0.01 
[0.30] 
-0.02 
[0.02] 
0.24 
[0.15] 
-0.01 
[0.001] 
Source: OEIL Calculations 
The linear regression is very good for contributions (R2 
near 1) and the slopes are steeper than the slopes for 
gains, even in Italy and Sweden where gains are in­
creasing with GDP per capita. The role of contributions 
in the redistributive mechanism seems more important 
also in Sweden and Italy. These statistics show that 
while contributions are a function of income, expendi­
tures do not follow the same rule (the R2 is near 0) and 
are distributed quite differently, without any regular pat­
tern. There are at least four combined trends regard­
ing regional gains from the budget in the flow ap­
proach: (i) some richer regions in Italy and Sweden re­
ceive relatively more per capita than the average, (ii) 
the same can be said of regions with political problems 
such as Corsica and Northern Ireland, and to a certain 
extent Trentino; (lii) and of regions with natural handi­
caps such as Canarias, Ceuta and Melilla, Val d'Aos­
ta, or the three northern region of Sweden; (iv) for the 
other regions, it seems that the gains are related more 
to population than to any other indicator. 
5.4.4 Equal Regions are not Treated Equally 
One of the most important findings of this evaluation of 
budget-induced interregional transfers is the fact that 
national cohesion machines are unequal at the Euro­
pean level. As observed above in the context of the 
analysis of the difference of the mean Gini coefficient 
reduction in the seven countries compared with the Gi­
ni calculated on the 101 regions, the transfers produce 
more national cohesion than European cohesion. This 
means that transfers from regions are limited by na-
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tional borders. It is a well-known finding of tax ana-
lysts: the more a tax system is decentralised, the less 
the system redistributes between populations and ar-
eas. The European Union, at the public finance level, 
functions as a very decentralised space. There is, on 
this point, a great difference with the United States of 
America where the Federal budget induces huge 
transfers between States: it can be seen from Table 
5.1 (MacDougall report, 1977) that the US budget in-
duced a reduction of the interregional income dispari-
ties index of 28 percent (variation coefficient) to 23 per-
cent (Gini coefficient). 
The fact that the main cohesion systems within Europe 
are implemented at the national level produces para-
doxical mechanisms at the European level: some equal 
regions, in terms of GDP per capita, are not treated 
equally by their respective national budgets. Table 5.12 
gives some examples with respect to selected regions. 
Table 5.12: Equal Regions Regarding GDP per capita Are Treated Unequally by National Budgets: 
Selected Regions 
transf(flow) 
% reg. GDP 
transf(flow) 
ECU/cap 
GDP 
ECU/cap 
BAGDP (flow) 
ECU/cap 
Lisbon &VT 
Brandenburg 
Wales 
Aragon 
Pals Vasco 
North 
NW 
Cataluña 
WMids 
EAng 
Languedoc-R. 
Toscana 
Bretagne 
Midi-P 
-2% 
17% 
8% 
- 3 % 
-9% 
9% 
4% 
-5% 
1% 
- 3 % 
9% 
-7% 
3% 
5% 
-187 
1,807 
932 
-379 
-1,079 
1,176 
552 
-675 
75 
-358 
1,272 
-1,025 
395 
869 
10,270 
10,637 
11,734 
11,776 
12,347 
12,433 
12,507 
12,658 
12,722 
14,140 
14,500 
15,450 
15,621 
15,842 
10,019 
12,444 
12,666 
11,398 
11,268 
13,609 
13,058 
11,983 
12,797 
13,782 
15,771 
14,425 
16,016 
16,711 
Relatively rich regions at the national level can be rela-
tively poor regions at the European level. Similarly, poor 
regions at the national level can be rich regions at the 
European level. For example, the richer regions in 
Spain (as in Portugal, and probably Ireland or Greece), 
such as Cataluña, are financing (-5 percent of its GDP) 
poorer Spanish regions despite the fact that they have 
the same level of GDP per capita as Midi Pyrénées (on 
ECU basis) or Lorraine (on PPS basis), which are both 
financed by the French budget (respectively +5 per-
cent and +2 percent of their GDP). 
This is the major reason for the weak result in terms of 
European cohesion induced by the interregional redis-
tribution of national budgets. 
Figure 5.3 gives a general view of this unequal - at the 
European level - ability of national budgets to con-
tribute to European cohesion. Annex IIF provides an 
exhaustive list of GDP per capita and net transfers 
(flow) per capita for all the regions within the case 
study countries. 
A feature of Figure 5.3 is that it shows clearly that re-
gions which have the same levels of GDP per capita 
can be treated very differently in terms of budget-in-
duced interregional transfers. In considering this point, 
it is useful to distinguish between two sets of country: 
Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom on the one 
hand and Italy, Sweden, France and Germany on the 
other. 
The first three countries have regions which are rela-
tively poor from a European perspective (on the basis 
of GDP per capita figures) but which are net contribu-
tors in terms of interregional transfers. In Spain, 
Cantabria, La Rioja, Aragón, Pais Vasco and Cataluña 
finance other Spanish regions despite the fact that 
they have on average, a GDP/capita of 78 percent of 
the European (12 countries) GDP per capita, 92 per-
cent in terms of PPS. In the United Kingdom, Yorkshire 
& Humberside, East Midlands and East Anglia, are in 
the same situation, albeit at a lesser degree, as net 
contributors to the budget with a mean GDP per capi-
ta of 83 percent of the European average (94 percent 
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Figure 5.3: Budget-Induced Interregional Transfers Related to GDP per capita in France (18 840 
ECU), Germany (20 070), ltaly(14 586), Portugal (7 466), Spain (10 434), Sweden (18 
134) and United Kingdom (13 858) 
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in PPS). In Portugal, Lisbon and Norte are net contrib-
utors with a very low GDP/capita (64 and 47 percent 
in ECU, 70 and 96 percent in PPS). It is certain that 
the same kind of figures would be found in other coun-
tries such as Ireland or Greece. 
In contrast, the other four countries have regions with 
a relatively high level of GDP per capita and a net 
gain from their national budgets. This is true of re-
gions with a GDP/capita higher than the European 
average of 15,830 ECU: in Sweden, Mid Norrland, 
North Norrland and North Mid Sweden gain between 
8 and 10 percent of their GDP; in Italy, the regions 
in this situation are mainly "special" regions like Val 
d'Aosta, for natural reasons, Trentino, for political rea-
sons and Lazio for institutional reasons; in Germany, 
there are two net beneficiary Länder, Bremen and 
Saarland, which both have GDP per capita above the 
European average (352 and 244 percent in ECU, 155 
and 107 percent in PPS). Berlin and the new Lander 
are all net beneficiaries, with a GDP per capita high-
er than the European average in term of ECU (226 
percent in Berlin, around 120 percent in the new 
Länder), but lower in terms of PPS (99 percent in 
Berlin, around 50 percent in the new Lander); in 
France, there are five regions which are both above 
the European average of GDP per capita and net 
beneficiaries from the budget, without any particular 
"special" reason: Basse-Normandie, Centre, 
Aquitaine, Provence-Alpes - Côte d'Azur and Midi-
Pyrénées. It is probable that the same kind of situa-
tion occurs in the regions of other richer European 
countries like the Netherlands or Austria. The case of 
Belgium is probably very different because the coun-
try is no longer unitary since the 1988 reform, which 
means that the Flanders to Wallonia transfers have 
probably been significantly reduced. 
5.4.5 Additional Confirmation in the Cases 
of France and the UK 
This research is a first attempt to measure, using a 
common methodology, the transfers induced by pub-
lic funds in European countries. The main conclusion 
is that GDP/capita disparities are lessened by the 
mechanisms of budget. This implies that regional dis-
parities in household incomes are less significant than 
GDP interregional disparities. It Is possible to verify this 
point with respect to the cases of France and UK 
where these data are available (see Table 5.13). 
Table 5.13: Interregional Disparities of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Personal Disposable 
Income (PDI) in France and UK (1993 for UK, 1992 GDP and 1991 PDI for France): Regions 
Ranked by Growing GDP per capita. 
North Ireland 
Wales 
North 
North West 
West Midlands 
York & Humb. 
East Midlands 
South West 
Scotland 
East Anglia 
South East 
% 
share of UK GDP 
2.24 
4.23 
4.78 
9.94 
8.35 
7.92 
6.58 
7.80 
8.65 
3.67 
35.85 
Source: On France INSEE/Statistiques et 
% 
share of UK PDI 
2.62 
4.52 
4.86 
10.34 
8.72 
8.07 
6.60 
8.22 
8.93 
3.65 
33.46 
Indicateurs des Régions 
Corse 
Picardie 
Nord Pas de Calais 
Pays de la Loire 
Franche Comte 
Languedoc Rouss. 
Poitou Charentes 
Bretagne 
Basse Normandie 
Auvergne 
Haute Normandie 
Limousin 
Bourgogne 
Midi Pyrennees 
Lorraine 
Rhône Alpes 
Centre 
Provence Aca 
Aquitaine 
Champagne Ard. 
Alsace 
Ile de France 
% 
share of Fr GDP 
0.30 
2.67 
5.53 
4.60 
1.74 
2.90 
2.21 
3.94 
2.08 
1.83 
3.07 
0.97 
2.47 
3.63 
3.40 
9.39 
3.82 
6.91 
4.33 
2.29 
2.87 
29.03 
Française; on the UK: Regional Trends (1995) 
% 
share of Fr PDI 
0.39 
2.81 
6.17 
4.88 
1.75 
3.40 
2.58 
4.58 
2.28 
2.20 
2.93 
1.23 
2.74 
4.15 
3.94 
9.16 
4.09 
7.39 
4.88 
2.36 
2.98 
23.12 
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There is no direct linkage from GDP to Personal Dis-
posable Income (PDI). This is because not only do 
budget transfers play a role, but also private interre-
gional and international transfers. Even so, the figures 
are very clear: income disparities are much smaller 
than GDP disparities. In both countries and without ex-
ception, the poorer a region in terms of GDP/capita, 
the more it augments its share of income. In similar 
vein the richer is a region, the more its income is re-
duced. In the UK, the GDP/capita of Northern Ireland, 
the poorest region, is 68 percent of the South East fig-
ure while disposable income is 85 percent. In France, 
Languedoc-Roussillon, the poorest region (after atypi-
cal Corsica) moves from 55 percent of the GDP/capi-
ta of île de France to 71 percent of the Income/capita. 
The literature too often ignores the difference between 
GDP and income, perhaps because of old macroeco-
nomic habits (at the national level, GDP and GNP are 
close, because there are no interregional transfers). 
The other reason ¡s that too few Member States pro-
duce regional income/capita data. This is a pity, be-
cause this kind of figure offers direct evidence of the 
reality of progressive transfers between regions. Fur-
ther, it is possible to show, in the case of France, that 
the evolution of interregional disparities is moving in 
opposite directions for GDP and DPI per capita (Figure 
5.4). During the 1980s, interregional disparities in 
GDP/capita were growing whereas, at the same time, 
income disparities were decreasing. It is difficult to 
measure the factors of this double mechanism without 
knowing anything about the evaluation of annual pub-
lic and private transfers, but this finding confirms that 
these transfers play a major role, in a static or dynam-
ic approach, in the cohesion process between regions. 
Figure 5.4: Coefficient of Variation, Weighted by Population, of Gross Domestic Product per 
capita (1975-1990) and Disposable Personal Income per capita (1962-1990) Within 
French Regions. 
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5.5 Concluding Points 
of the Findings 
Implications 
There are a lot of discussions which have still to be de-
veloped regarding the mechanism of interregional pro-
gressivity of budget-induced transfers. The first one, of 
course, ¡s about the importance of an improvement in, 
and a periodic production of, such calculations. This 
study is a first attempt to measure these transfers, 
done thanks to the cooperation of seven academic 
teams, in a very short time period. The role played by 
such transfers in the cohesion process between Euro-
pean regions requires that they be taken into account 
by European policymakers on a regular basis. 
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Out of these first results, it is already possible to sug-
gest three broad implications, regarding European re-
gional policies. 
5.5.1 A New Ranking of the Regional 
Economic Situations in Europe 
As has been shown, taking into account budget-in-
duced transfers produces a new representation of the 
relative economic situations of the European regions. It 
is important for European regional policy to keep in 
mind this new ranking (see Annex IIG). In the current 
methodology of designating problem region maps, the 
use of GDP (either in ECU or in PPS) gives the same 
status to regions which are equal in terms of GDP but 
which are unequal once transfers are taken into ac-
count. It could be argued that this introduces unfair-
ness into the system; moreover, this could be correct-
ed by a better measure of the real economic situation 
of the regions, one which included measures of both 
production and income. Budget-induced transfers, im-
plicitly but politically conducted, play only a partial role 
in the formation of income. International and interre-
gional private transfers, which are impossible to meas-
ure at the regional level, also play an important role in 
the state of development of a region. European re-
gional policymakers may need to consider reviewing 
their method of defining the economic situation of Eu-
ropean regions; and in particular, they may need to in-
troduce into the definition of problem regions (i) the 
amount of public funds that implicitly benefit the re-
gions and (ii) in the longer term, once it becomes avail-
able, the personal income of households (which take 
into account both private and public interregional 
transfers). 
5.5.2 An Alternative Regional Development 
Strategy in the Poorest Regions 
Another important discussion suggested by the find-
ings presented in this chapter concerns the most effi-
cient way of speeding up the development of the pe-
ripheral regions of Europe - in particular, the poorest 
regions of the less developed Member States. The 
measurement of budget-induced transfers shows that 
some of the richest regions of these countries, though 
relatively poor at the European level, transfer large 
amounts of money to the rest of their countries (see 
Figure 5.3). This Implicit phenomenon suggests at 
least two conclusions: 
(i) If the main obstacle to regional cohesion in Eu-
rope is international economic disparities, and if 
the main economic growth ¡n the poorest coun-
tries is due to their most developed and produc-
tive regions - which both improve European eco-
nomic cohesion and their own national interre-
gional cohesion through national budgets - it is 
possible to conceive at the theoretical level, a 
policy alternative: (a) either to go on transferring 
direct European regional support to the poorest 
regions which have a low rate of return, in value-
added terms, due to their low productivity and 
which have a small impact on European cohesion 
at both national and interregional levels, or (b) to 
reorientate European regional support towards the 
most productive regions of these countries. This 
second policy option can both maximise national 
growth - which is good for European cohesion -
and maximise the income surplus a large part of 
which is redistributed (through production as well 
as social expenditures) to less developed regions 
- which is good for both national and European 
cohesion. To go further in this analysis, and to 
have a solid basis for making a choice between 
these two strategies, it would be necessary to 
build a dynamic model explaining what is the best 
strategy, and in what countries, according to in-
terregional differences in marginal productivity and 
the marginal propensity of the budget to redis-
tribute money between regions. 
(ii) A second argument of relevance to the current fo-
cus of European regional policy, in relation to budg-
et-induced transfers, lies in the fact that the richest 
regions of various countries are in very unequal sit-
uations. Both fiscal theory and common sense 
converge to explain that, ¡f redistribution is operat-
ed at a decentralised level, some agents in net 
contributor regions located in poorer parts of the 
EU will migrate to richer areas where they can be 
net beneficiaries. The European public finance sys-
tem is, by construction, decentralised. Assuming 
all the mobility obstacles were abolished at the Eu-
ropean level (language, size of markets...), a firm lo-
cated in Madrid or Barcelona (but also in a city like 
Lisbon or Thessalonika), could easily understand 
that it is better to operate and pay taxes in a place 
where it receives more money back through public 
expenditures, like Toulouse, Glasgow or Lille. The 
unfair competition between equally productive re-
gions induced by budget transfers is a bias which 
may fuel a particular process of economic concen-
tration, slowing down the growth of the most pro-
ductive regions in poorer countries, and benefiting 
regions in the wealthiest countries. Such a devel-
opment would run counter to cohesion. It may be 
that, rather than focus on the poorest regions, a 
long-term European cohesion policy could aim to 
compensate richer, more productive regions in 
poor Member States for the burden of the transfers 
they make to underdeveloped regions. 
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5.5.3 The Impact of Non-Regional Policy 
Changes on Interregional Cohesion 
Regional policy must take into account the fact that 
changes in institutional or fiscal policies could have di-
rect implications for the level of the flows of budget-in-
duced transfers. For example, fiscal decentralisation, 
which is in process in many countries, has a direct im-
plication for the volume of public funds managed at 
the national level and, related, for the intensity of the 
interregional redistribution of income. In another field, 
the EU convergence criteria which aim to reduce the 
public deficit (ie. public expenditures) have a direct im-
pact on the scale of interregional transfers. Any har-
monisation of national tax systems in European coun-
tries could also produce changes in the structure of 
government revenues, and thus change the spatial 
progressivity of the fiscal system. For example, in 
France, Ile de France contributes 25 percent of VAT, 36 
percent of personal income tax and 65 percent of the 
tax on wealth. Any change ¡n the structure of tax rev-
enue has an immediate regional impact. As a result, 
those in charge of regional policies must develop a 
better understanding of budgetary cohesion mecha-
nisms and become more involved in many, indeed 
most, non-regional policy changes. 
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Figure 5.6: Interregional Transfers in Germany 
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Figure 5.7: Interregional Transfers in Italy 
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Figure 5.8: Interregional Transfers in Portugal 
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Figure 5.9: Interregional Transfers in Spain 
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Figure 5.10: Interregional Transfers in Sweden 
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Figure 5.11 : Interregional Transfers in the United Kingdom 
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Figure 5.12: Interregional Transfers in Selected EU Countries (Flow Analysis) 
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6. Conclusions 
6.1 Main Findings 
This report has focused on two principal categories of 
government spending that impact on economic and 
social cohesion in the EU Member States: the auto-
matic transfers induced by government taxation and 
expenditures; and the spending policies pursued 
proactively by governments, whether or not with co-
hesion in mind. The substantive conclusions for each 
of the areas considered are set out at the end of each 
of the preceding chapters. The purpose of this con-
cluding section is to draw together some of the more 
general issues that arise from the study. 
A key point to bear in mind in considering the overall 
results of the work concerns the scale of the transfers 
and spending concerned; budget induced interregion-
al transfers are massive compared with spending on 
proactive government policies. This is best illustrated 
by example: the value of the transfer flows to Lorraine 
is about 40 times the spend on regional incentive pol-
icy in the region. Moreover, this is a modest example; 
Lorraine is not even one of the principal beneficiaries 
of transfers in France (transfer flows to Midi-Pyrénées 
and Limousin amounted to 5 and 6 percent of region-
al GDP, respectively compared to just 2 percent for 
Lorraine), but Lorraine does receive more regional aid 
as a proportion of regional GDP than any other French 
region. The same calculation for Limousin shows that 
transfers are worth 600 times more than regional in-
centive spending in the region. 
The same holds true for expenditure on horizontal poli-
cies. In Chapter 4, it was noted that the contribution 
of EU governments to private sector spending on R&D 
was of the same broad order of magnitude as their 
spending on regional incentive policy. In all the coun-
tries discussed, this spending is very heavily skewed in 
favour of the more prosperous regions, even in relation 
to regional GDP. Taking France as an example again, 
government funding of private sector R&D in île de 
France amounts to around one-fifth of the value of the 
transfer flows out of the region. Again, this is a very 
conservative example. Of the countries considered in 
Chapter 4, government funding of private sector R&D 
accounts for a higher proportion of regional GDP (0.57 
percent) In the Paris region than anywhere else; the 
comparable proportions for Madrid and Piemonte are 
0.26 percent and 0.13 percent of their regional GDP 
figures respectively. Moreover, the value of the transfer 
flows away from these regions are significantly higher 
than those away from Paris; 10 percent of regional 
GDP in the case of Piemonte and 9 percent in the 
case of Madrid. This means that the value of the trans-
fer flows away from Madrid is some 70 times the val-
ue of government R&D policy in the region. 
In the wider context of cohesion at the European lev-
el, these figures are clearly of considerable signifi-
cance. Not only does île de France receive substan-
tially more in government funded R&D as a proportion 
of regional GDP than does Madrid, but the transfer 
flows away from Madrid are substantially larger than 
those away from Paris. All this must be set in the con-
text of the fact that the GDP of Madrid is 97 percent 
of the EU average while that of île de France is 166 
percent of the EU average. 
Not only do the expenditures considered in this report 
differ substantially in scale, they also differ in nature. 
Automatic transfers are the inevitable outcome of dif-
ferences between the amount of taxation collected in 
a given region, which is closely related to the prosper-
ity of that region, and the value of government expen-
ditures ¡n a region, which is more closely related to the 
population of that region. The pattern of much of this 
expenditure reflects the needs arising from the de-
mands made on welfare and public services provision, 
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including health, education and unemployment bene-
fits. In consequence, in regional terms, transfers flow, 
in a neutral way, to those regions where the need aris-
es. In so doing, they remove much of the impact on 
regional incomes of external economic shocks. Also 
key, transfer mechanisms are long-term, providing a 
kind of mutual insurance policy between the regions of 
a nation. In France, for example, the status of regions 
as contributors or beneficiaries from the central gov-
ernment has changed over time as the competitive ad-
vantage of regions has changed; in the 1960s, the 
Nord Pas de Calais region was a contributor to the 
budget - it is now a beneficiary. It is unclear how com-
mon this change of status is; however, it is clear that 
if regions that are beneficiaries are to have any chance 
of becoming contributors, then government funding 
must continue to provide for the basic needs of the re-
gion, irrespective of how much it currently contributes 
to the central budget. 
Proactive policies contrast sharply with automatic 
transfers. By their nature, they are explicit and direct-
ed at specific developmental objectives; they tend to 
be implemented on short to medium-term timescales. 
Far from being neutral and automatic, they frequently 
involve considerable policymaker discretion and re-
quire expert input into policy design, delivery and im-
plementation. Nevertheless, the impact of proactive 
policies is unclear. The difficulties involved in policy 
evaluation mean that an understanding of the real ef-
fects of the range of government policies (on cohesion 
or more generally) "remains elusive". 
parity; the wealthier a region is, the more government 
tends to spend on promoting R&D within that region. 
Conversely, the poorer a region is, the smaller the 
spend on R&D as a proportion of regional GDP. 
This study has examined the situation of regions prima-
rily within their national contexts. However, it is impor-
tant to stress that, taking an EU perspective, there is no 
direct relationship between the prosperity of a region 
and its status as a contributor to the national budget or 
a beneficiary from it; similarly, it does not follow that re-
gions of equivalent prosperity in a European context will 
be equal beneficiaries of Member States' regional or 
horizontal policies. The Midi-Pyrénées and Cataluna re-
gions, which have the same level of prosperity in rela-
tion to the EU average illustrate this point. Midi-
Pyrénées is designated for French regional policy pur-
poses and receives a net flow transfer from the govern-
ment budget equal to 5 percent of regional GDP; in 
contrast, Cataluña is not designated for national re-
gional policy purposes and makes a net flow contribu-
tion to the government budget of 5 percent of its GDP. 
More than this, not only does Cataluña receive nothing 
from the national regional policy budget, but it also re-
ceives less than Midi-Pyrénées in R&D policy spend; 
the R&D spend in Midi-Pyrénées is worth 0.44 percent 
of regional GDP; in Cataluña it is worth just 0.06 per-
cent. 
6.2 Outstanding Issues 
Notwithstanding the differences in the nature and the 
volume of the expenditures studied, and the difficulties 
involved in policy evaluation, it can be said that, over-
all, national expenditures tend to flow from the more 
prosperous towards the less prosperous regions with-
in a country. Not surprisingly, regional policy spending 
tends to flow in the direction of the worst-off regions 
within countries although, as has been shown, the pat-
terns of spend are somewhat uneven. Regional policy 
spending is buttressed by automatic transfers; the re-
sults from this part of the study are unambiguous - the 
direction of the flows supports economic and social 
cohesion within the national context. Member States' 
other spatial policies also support cohesion, although 
it is notable that, as far as these policies are con-
cerned, the overriding objectives are political and so-
cial, rather than economic. The pattern for horizontal 
policies is less clear cut. Member States' employment 
policies tend, by their nature, to support social, and 
perhaps economic, cohesion. However, the pattern of 
expenditures on policies aimed at improving the com-
petitiveness of national economies by promoting RTD 
is virtually a mirror image of patterns of regional dis-
The analysis presented in this report is very far from 
having exhausted the topic of the relationships be-
tween regional policies and cohesion mechanisms. 
Three sets of issues deserving further work appear 
particularly important. 
The first set is related to time. The analyses undertak-
en are basically static. They relate to a given year and 
do not take into account the time dimension, which is 
of course essential to the cohesion process. In partic-
ular, they take no account of the benefits that can ac-
crue from past accumulated infrastructure investments. 
It can be hypothesised that the poorer regions, even if 
they now receive as much as, or more than, the richer 
regions in terms of specific or general expenditures, re-
main at a disadvantage because they received less in 
the past, and do not benefit from similar infrastructure 
endowments. If appropriate cohesion policies are to be 
developed more research is required in order to under-
stand the impact of history on cohesion mechanisms. 
Second, "non-spending" policies have not been con-
sidered. Non-spending policies are regulatory policies 
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that have a differential impact upon different regions. 
Examples of such policies would be environmental 
policies (they are more costly in congested or ecolog-
ically fragile regions), social policies (a national mini-
mum wage policy ¡s more constraining in low wage re-
gions), or deregulation policies (the relaxation of uni-
versal service provision requirements which they often 
imply brings benefits for richer regions). In the same 
category, are fiscal expenditures, that is tax breaks or 
exemptions for specific purposes, such as housing 
construction or environmental improvements: their re-
gional impacts are very unlikely to be identical for the 
various regions of a country. The regional implications 
of all these "non spending" policies are one of the 
"blind spots" of regional development analysis - and 
policies. They are difficult to evaluate, but they are cer-
tainly important. 
Thirdly, the analysis (especially that of budget-induced 
transfers) has ignored the true long term impacts of 
public expenditures. They have, in essence, Implicitly 
assumed that one ecu spent in a given region is equal 
to one ecu spent in another region, and that one ecu 
spent in a given fashion is equal to one ecu spent in an-
other fashion. This simplifying assumption is of course 
not very realistic. From a cohesion viewpoint, the im-
pacts of all these ecus are likely to be very different. 
What is required but is not available is a typology of the 
long-term impacts of various types of expenditures in 
various types of regions. It could be, for instance, that 
the "cohesion benefit" of an ecu is larger for welfare as-
sistance than for infrastructure investments in a very 
poor region but that the reverse is true for a medium in-
come region. In the absence of such information, 
adding ecus is a rather crude way of estimating the 
magnitude of what is being done for regions. 
6.3 Policy Implications 
This report was not recommendations-oriented. Nev-
ertheless, the analyses - imperfect as they are - have 
some policy implications. A number of them have al-
ready been evoked or discussed in the various chap-
ters of the report. Four, rather general, but important, 
implications will be mentioned briefly here. 
The first is that policy decisions which impact on eco-
nomic and social cohesion emanate from all parts of 
the Commission, not just the Regional Policy Direc-
torate (DG XVI). Decisions taken in all Directorates 
have regional and cohesion consequences. Some of 
these consequences can be as important, or more im-
portant, for cohesion objectives, than the decisions 
and the expenditures controlled by DG XVI. What is 
done in the fields of environment, transportation, re-
search, taxation, agriculture, education, consumer and 
competition policies, etc. matters. This has been 
recognised for quite some time at the national level, 
where regional policies increasingly strive to achieve 
harmonisation with sectoral policies. The same thing is 
of course a goal at the European level, but, as docu-
mented by this report, must probably be pursued and 
undertaken even more systematically. 
The second implication is that the sum of Member 
States commitments to national cohesion does not 
add up to EU cohesion. It is in many cases the other 
way around. As a result of national cohesion policies, 
the richer regions of the poorer countries (Cataluña) 
have to pay for the poorer regions of their countries, 
whereas the poorer regions of the richer countries (the 
Midi-Pyrénées) are subsidised by the richer regions of 
their own country. Equals (Cataluña and Midi-
Pyrénées) are not treated equally. National cohesion 
policies frequently run counter to European cohesion 
policies. This basic contradiction must be analysed, 
appreciated and addressed. It is a major challenge for 
regional policy at the EU level. 
Thirdly, the analysis suggests that the role presently 
played by regional GDP per capita in the design of EU 
regional policies should perhaps be reconsidered. GDP 
per capita is an indicator of the wealth of a region be-
fore national redistributive policies. What matters, or 
what matters also, is probably the wealth of each re-
gion after national redistributive policies. Regional in-
come per capita - which is not even available for all 
countries - is likely to be an Indicator as important for 
EU policies as GDP per capita. 
Finally, our analysis suggests that more attention 
should be given to the longer term impacts of assis-
tance policies. Because of the magnitude of national 
redistributive policies, the poorer regions of the poor 
countries (the Alentejos) benefit from the wealth of the 
richer regions of these countries (the Lisbons). Giving 
money to Lisbon is thus a way to give money to Alen-
tejo. This ¡s true in the short term. But it is probably 
truer in the long term. If, as is likely, the money spent 
in Lisbon induces more growth than the money spent 
in Alentejo, then an ecu spent now In Lisbon will mean 
an increased flow of benefits for Alentejo over the 
years. There might be a time when it is better for Alen-
tejo itself that the assistance money be spent in Lis-
bon, not to mention the fact that it would be better for 
Portugal. This is at this stage hardly more than an hy-
pothesis, that should be further researched, but it is an 
hypothesis that has serious policy implications for the 
European Union. 
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1, Introduction 
The tables and charts in this annex provide information at the national and then the regional level on the trends, 
scale and intensity of regional incentive expenditure in the EU Member States (EU 12) over the 1989-93 period. The 
annex divides into two main sections. 
First, in Section 2, overview tables and charts are provided at the national level for EU 12. The tables contain the 
following information for the years 1989 to 1993 (in as far as data is available): 
• expenditure trends (national currencies): Table 1a 
• expenditure trends (ECU, 1993 prices); Table 1b 
• expenditure as a percentage of national GDP: Table 2 
• expenditure per capita (national population): Table 3 
• expenditure per capita (recipient assisted areas): Table 4 
The four charts which follow relate in turn to Tables 1b, 2, 3 and 4. 
The adjustments made to the data in moving from Table 1a through to Table 4 are straightforward: 
• the original data was drawn from country-specific sources and contacts; its coverage is discussed further in 
Section 2 
• to allow trends to be identified (in Table 1 a) the original data was translated to 1993 prices by utilising the Eu-
rostat "price index" (GDP change in prices 1989-93) 
• to bring the Table 1 a data on to a common currency, ECU exchange rates for 1993 were applied (Table 1 b) 
• two measures of the scale of policy were derived: 
— one involved relating the original expenditure data to national GDP (see Table 2) 
— the other involved adjusting the Table 1b data to a per capita basis utilising Eurostat national population fig-
ures for 1989-93 (Table 3) 
• in estimating the intensity of policy, national-level expenditure was related to the national population located in 
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designated assisted areas; information on the population coverage of such areas was drawn from country 
sources and DGIV. 
Second, in Section 3, tables and charts are provided at the regional level for those countries where regional ex­
penditure data is available: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United King­
dom. Of the other four countries: 
• there has been no regional incentive on offer in Denmark since January 1991 
• there is no national­level data for Greece, and hence no regional breakdown 
• In both Ireland and Luxembourg the NUTS breakdown means that, again, no regional breakdown is available. 
In presenting regional­level data, the countries concerned are grouped as follows to reflect the discussion in Sec­
tion 3.3 of the report: 
• the Cohesion countries (Portugal and Spain) 
• Italy and Germany 
• the 'northern European' countries (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) 
The tables provided at the regional level broadly mirror those in Section 2 of this annex. They show for each re­
gion covered: 
• expenditure trends (ECU, 1993 prices): Table 1 
• expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP: Table 2 
• expenditure per capita (regional population): Table 3 
• expenditure per capita (recipient regional assisted areas): Table 4 
The three charts which follow relate, in turn, to Tables 2, 3 and 4. Finally, a further chart is provided which gives 
an indication of the overall "mosaic'Of the regional intensity of policy, setting per capita expenditure in the assisted 
areas of each recipient region against regional GDP. 
The adjustments involved in moving from Table 1 to Table 4 at the regional level are very similar to those adopted 
nationally: 
• the original data was drawn from country­specific sources and contacts; its coverage is discussed further in 
Section 3 
• frénete have been identified by utilising the Eurostat "price index" (GDP change in prices 1989­93 
• to bring the data on to a common currency ECU exchange rates for 1993 were applied (Table 1) 
• two measures of scale were derived: 
• one involved relating the original expenditure data to regional GDP (see Table 2) 
• the other involved adjusting the Table 1 data on to a per capita basis utilising Eurostat regional population 
figures for 1989­93 (Table 3) 
• in estimating the regional intensity of policy, regional­level expenditure was related to the regional population Ιο­
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cated in designated assisted areas; information on the population coverage of such areas at the regional level 
has been obtained from DGIV. 
One final point to note is that some of the expenditure on national regional incentives may be co-financed by the 
Structural Funds, particularly in Objective 1 regions. Unfortunately, information on this is not readily available. Sta-
tistics have, however, been produced on the degree of Structural Fund support for the productive environment (in-
dustry and services) over the 1989-93 period as part of the CSFs agreed for Objective 1 regions. These show the 
percentage contribution of the Structural Funds to have been as follows: 
Country Grouping Objective 1 CSF Percent 
Cohesion countries Greece 62.2 
Ireland 61.7 
Portugal 65.8 
Spain 50.0 
Italy/Germany Italy 42.5 
Germany 50.0 
Other Member States Northern Ireland 54.8 
Corsica 45.0 
Source: Directorate-General for Regional Policy. 
While these percentages give some indication of the potential for Structural Fund support for the main regional in-
centives on offer in those regions which qualify for Objective 1 support, no information is available on the actual lev-
els of co-financing which have taken place. 
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2, National-Level Data 
This section provides a series of tables and related charts which highlight trends ¡n regional incentive expenditure 
at the national level, together with indicators of the scale and intensity of the national regional policy spend. The da-
ta in the tables and charts generally relate to expenditure committed under the main regional capital grant(s) of the 
countries concerned (EU 12). The focus is on capital grants for two main reasons: first, such grants are far and 
away the most significant regional incentive measure in nearly all of the countries covered; and second, it is only in 
respect of regional capital grants that information is available at the regional level on the spatial distribution of ex-
penditure (see Section 3). 
Before reviewing, country by .country, the coverage of the data in the tables and charts which follow, it is useful to 
be aware of the broad relationship between regional capital grant expenditure and regional incentive spending more 
generally. Such information is provided in the recent Commission Survey on State Aids'1'. This shows, over the 1990-
92 period, between 97 percent and 100 percent of regional State aid spending took the form of grant support in 
five countries: Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. In a further two countries (Belgium and 
Great Britain), around 90 percent of expenditure was grant-based, while in another four countries (Ireland, west 
Germany, Northern Ireland and Greece) around three-quarters of the regional State aid spend was attributable to 
grants. Only ¡n parts of three countries - Germany (in the east and along the now-defunct Zonal Border Area), France 
and Italy - have grants played a lesser role in expenditure terms. In general, grants very much represent the main-
stay of regional incentive spending across the EU Member States. 
Turning to a more detailed, country-by-country review of data coverage, in Belgium the data relates to the capital 
grant/interest subsidy in Flanders and Wallonia. These are, by some way, the main regional incentives in Belgium, 
though support is also available In the form of a State guarantee, an accelerated depreciation allowance and ex-
emptions from capital registration duties and real estate income tax. Over the 1990-92 period, the Fourth Com-
mission Survey on State Aids estimates that some 92 percent of regional State aid spending took the form of grants, 
with most of the remainder being accounted for by the State guarantee. A substantial revision of the Wallonian re-
gional incentives in 1993 has created a discontinuity in the Wallonian statistics. From 1993 the Wallonian investment 
grant was limited to firms with more than 250 employees or turnover exceeding ECU 20 million. Projects from small-
er firms are processed under separate small firm legislation (available nationally). 
In Denmark the regional incentive package (which, by that time, consisted solely of the investment grant scheme) 
was abolished as from 1 January 1991, though an assisted area location may still be used to justify awarding grants 
to industry on an ad hoc basis. However, this facility has not so far been used. Over the 1990-92 period the State 
Aids Survey identified all Danish regional incentive expenditure as being in the form of grant support. 
In France the main regional incentive is the regional policy grant, PAT (prime d'amenagement du territoire). In ad-
'" Fourth Survey from the Commission on State Aid in the European Union in the Manufacturing and Certain Other Sectors (COM (95), 365 final, 
Brussels, 26.07.1995). 
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dition, regional incentive support is available in the form of the local business tax concession (exoneration de la taxe 
professionnelle), aid to decentralisation (aide a la decentralisation) and the reduction in property transfer/land tax (re-
duction du droit de mutation ou de la taxe de publicite foncier). Further, a wide range of more general support to 
regional development is provided as part of the concept of amenagement du territoire (for more details, see Sec-
tion 3.3.1.3 In the main report). According to the State Aids Survey, all regional incentive support in France over the 
1990-92 period took the form either of grants (ie. mainly the PAT) or tax concessions. In metropolitan France just 
over 56 percent of regional State aid support was accounted for by the PAT; in contrast, in the overseas territories 
(which qualify for aid under Article 92 3(a)) all but 2 percent of support was in the form of tax concessions. One fi-
nal point to note in the French context is that, although the local business tax concession is not insignificant in terms 
of tax revenue foregone, its impact on investment and location decisions is less clear. The fact is that richer local-
ities can often offer more attractive prospects for business development - including lower general rates of local busi-
ness tax - than can poorer localities via time-limited local business tax concessions. 
In Germany, regional policy has been the joint responsibility of the Federal and Land levels since 1969. The key re-
gional incentive under the Joint Task for the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe 
Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur) is the investment grant (Investitionszuschuss). However, it should 
be noted that, until 1989, there was also an important investment allowance available (Investitionszulage). More-
over, until 1994 it was possible to receive a special depreciation allowance in the now-abolished Zonal Border Area. 
Further, small locally-oriented firms (those which do not exhibit the 'primary effect') are eligible for support under the 
ERP regional soft loan. Also of note is the fact that, prior to unification, separate support measures were available 
in Berlin. Such assistance is currently being phased out. Finally, the obvious point must be made that investment 
grant assistance is only part of the support package directed towards the new Länder. Broader policies for the new 
Länder are discussed more fully In Section 3.4.1.4 of the main report. According to the State Aids Survey, some 
three-quarters of regional State aid in west Germany over the 1990-92 period took the form of a grant, with most 
of the remainder being a tax concession. In the new Länder, in contrast, just 63 percent of regional State aid was 
accounted for by grant support, with the activities of the Treuhandanstalt representing a large proportion of the re-
maining expenditure. Finally, support for Berlin and for the now-defunct Zonal Border Area, mainly in the form of 
tax concessions, was a very important component of regional State aid spending in Germany over the 1990-92 pe-
riod (representing over two-fifths of the total according to the State Aids Survey). However, as noted above, such 
support is currently being phased out. 
In Greece, two incentive packages are available: a fiscal package comprising a tax allowance combined with an in-
creased depreciation allowance; and an (alternative) financial package comprising an investment grant and interest 
rate subsidy, again combined with the increased depreciation allowance. No award statistics are available for the 
fiscal elements of the package. For the financial incentives, no data is available after 1988. The Greek figure in the 
tables Is 1988 expenditure committed under the investment grant scheme for manufacturing projects only. The fig-
ure would be more than doubled were all sectors taken Into account. Moreover, adding Interest rate subsidy ex-
penditure would further increase the outcome by more than 13 percent. The combined investment grant/interest 
rate subsidy figure for all sectors in 1988 was Drs 82,599 million; this compares with investment grant spending 
on manufacturing of Drs 32,387 million. While regional State aid figures for Greece over the 1990-92 period are in-
cluded in the State Aids Survey (showing that three-quarters of such expenditure is accounted for by grant sup-
port), the Survey makes the point that "since the figures are still essentially estimates, the results for Greece should 
still be treated with caution" <2>. 
In Ireland, IDA-lreland operates incentive programmes for new industry, major expansions and international servic-
es while Forbairt focuses on schemes for small industries, product and process development and enterprise devel-
opment. The data ¡n the table covers grants approved under the IDA new industry and internationally-traded serv-
ices programmes. No data is available for 1993. According to the State Aids Survey, over the 1990-92 period 
grants represented almost 78 percent of the regional State aid spend in Ireland; a further 15 percent was in the 
form of tax concessions with some 7 percent as equity support. 
In Italy, the data in the tables relates to Law 64/86. This has effectively been suspended since the summer of 1992, 
leaving a large number of applications and payments unprocessed. Subsequently, a new legal basis for policy was 
passed (Law 488/92) but it has not yet been fully implemented. The data provided covers the capital grant and in-
121 Ibid p. 4. 
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terest subsidy available under Law 64/86. In addition, major social security concessions operated in favour of Mez-
zogiorno firms. Finally, tax concessions were also available In respect of the IRPEG and ILOR taxes. No expendi-
ture information is available in respect of these tax concessions. In the State Aids Survey, grants accounted for 25 
percent of regional State aid expenditure over the 1990-92 period. Almost all of the remaining spend took the form 
of social security concessions. These have subsequently been revised both in the context of the Italian regional 
policy package and with a view to phasing them out completely by the end of the decade. 
In Luxembourg, regional assistance is mainly in the form of grants, but interest rate subsidies, loan guarantees and 
tax concessions are also provided for under the Framework Law. The statistics in the tables relate to the capital 
grant. Over the 1990-92 period, the State Aids Survey records all regional State aid spending in Luxembourg as 
being in the form of grant support. 
In the Netherlands, there Is just one key regional Incentive, the investment premium, IPR (Investering-
spremieregelung). The data in the tables relate to this scheme. The State Aids Survey shows 100 percent of re-
gional State aid expenditure in the Netherlands to have taken the form of grant assistance over the 1990-92 peri-
od. 
In Portugal, the SIR replaced the SIBR in 1994. The figures in the tables are in respect of the SIBR (Sistema de 
Incentivos de Base Regional), the regional Incentives system. The SIBR is essentially a grant-based system; this 
is confirmed by the State Aids Survey which identifies 97 percent of regional State aid expenditure over the 1990-
92 period as being grants based. 
In Spain, there is a single regional incentive on offer, the regional investment grant (subvención a la inversion). The 
figures in the tables relate to this scheme. Unsurprisingly, 100 percent of regional State aid expenditure over the 
1990-92 period is recorded as being in the form of grants in the State Aids Survey. 
Finally, in the United Kingdom, a distinction must be drawn between the British and Northern Irish regional incen-
tive packages. In Britain, the main element of the package ¡s Regional Selective Assistance (RSA). The figures ¡n 
the tables are in respect of RSA. In addition, minor support (less than £20 million per annum in terms of expendi-
ture committed) is available for small firms in the assisted areas under the Regional Enterprise Grant scheme. In 
Northern Ireland, regional incentive support is provided via the Selective Financial Assistance scheme. In consider-
ing recent trends in regional incentive expenditure in the UK, it should be noted that previously-important compo-
nents of the regional incentive package were withdrawn in 1988 - the Regional Development Grant in Britain and 
the Capital Grant in Northern Ireland. In both Britain and Northern Ireland, the regional incentives currently on of-
fer are very much grants-oriented. Although RSA in Britain has historically involved a relatively wide range of in-
centives, in recent years it has become increasingly (indeed, almost exclusively) grants-based. The State Aids Sur-
vey records almost 90 percent of British regional State aid spending between 1990 and 1992 as being in the form 
of grants. In Northern Ireland, the grants component is almost three-quarters of total expenditure over the 1990-
92 period, most of the remainder taking the form of tax concessions. 
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National Level Data: Tables and Charts 
Table 1a: Expenditure trends for main regional incentives (1993 prices, national currencies) 
COUNTRY 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany (West) 
Germany (East) 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Great Britain 
N Ireland 
INCENTIVE 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Regional Development Grant 
PAT (Regional Policy Grant) 
Investment Grant - west 
Investment Grant - east 
Investment Grant 
IDA (Industrial Development Authority) 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
IPR (Investment Premium) 
SIBR (Regional Incentive System) 
RIG (Regional Investment Grant) 
Regional Selective Assistance 
Selective Financial Assistance 
1989 
10133,9 
73,1 
752,5 
819,9 
0,0 
60074,4 
236,5 
3290,9 
1219,0 
160,0 
46313,2 
265818,8 
324,0 
94,8 
EXPENDITURE COMMITTED 
(national currency, millions, 1993 prices)11 
1990 
7490,4 
64,2 
901,2 
1089,0 
146,0 
n.a. 
172,8 
7556,8 
1342,1 
262,4 
32671,9 
110636,3 
393,4 
81,3 
1991 
5936,9 
0.0 
703,8 
827,8 
7650,3 
n.a. 
112,7 
1880,3 
1911,0 
218,0 
28285,6 
39205,7 
226,9 
88,9 
1992 
5599,7 
0,0 
575,2 
671,2 
5715,1 
n.a. 
125,4 
350,8 
2211,0 
181,9 
25947,2 
32569,4 
231,1 
48,7 
1993 
4583,0 
0,0 
251,6 
489,5 
5775,5 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0,0 
1412,0 
52,0 
44845,8 
29192,7 
341,7 
53,7 
) 
Mean 
6748,8 
27,5 
636,9 
779,5 
6428,9 
60074,4 
161,9 
2615,8 
1619,0 
174,9 
35612,8 
95484,6 
303,4 
73,5 
(1) Italian commitments in billions of lira 
Table 1b: Expenditure trends for main regional incentives, 1989-93 (1993 prices, ECU, millions) 
COUNTRY 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany (West) 
Germany (East) 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Great Britain 
N Ireland 
INCENTIVE 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Regional Development Grant 
PAT (Regional Policy Grant) 
Investment Grant - west 
Investment Grant - east 
Investment Grant 
IDA (Industrial Development Authority) 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
IPR (Investment Premium) 
SIBR (Regional Incentive System) 
RIG (Regional Investment Grant) 
Regional Selective Assistance 
Selective Financial Assistance 
EXPENDITURE COMMITTED - MECU 
1989 
250,4 
9,6 
113,4 
423,4 
0,0 
223,7 
295,6 
1787,4 
30,1 
73,6 
245,9 
1782,5 
415,3 
121,6 
I 
1990 
185,1 
8,5 
135,9 
562,4 
75,4 
n.a. 
216,1 
4104,2 
33,2 
120,6 
173,4 
741,9 
504,4 
104,2 
Ί 993 prices) 
1991 
146,7 
0,0 
106,1 
427,5 
3950,8 
n.a. 
140,9 
1021,2 
47,2 
100,2 
150,2 
262,9 
290,9 
114,0 
1992 
138,4 
0,0 
86,7 
346,6 
2951,4 
n.a. 
156,8 
190,5 
54,6 
83,6 
137,7 
218,4 
296,3 
62,4 
1993 
113,2 
0,0 
37,9 
252,8 
2982,6 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0,0 
34,9 
23,9 
238,1 
195,8 
438,1 
68,8 
Mean 
166,8 
3,6 
96,0 
402,5 
3320,1 
223,7 
202,3 
1420,7 
40,0 
80,4 
189,1 
640,3 
389,0 
94,2 
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Table 2: Expenditure on main regional incentives, 1989-93, as a percentage of national GDP 
COUNTRY 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany (West) 
Germany (East) 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Great Britain 
N Ireland 
INCENTIVE 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Regional Development Grant 
PAT (Regional Policy Grant) 
Investment Grant - west 
Investment Grant - east 
Investment Grant 
IDA (Industrial Development Authority) 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
IPR (Investment Premium) 
SIBR (Regional Incentive System) 
RIG (Regional Investment Grant) 
Regional Selective Assistance 
Selective Financial Assistance 
1989 
0,147% 
0,009% 
0,011% 
0,032% 
0,000% 
0,367% 
0,902% 
0,218% 
0,388% 
0,030% 
0,420% 
0,461 % 
0,052% 
0,015% 
EXPENDITURE COMMITTED 
as a % of national GDP 
1990 
0,105% 
0,008% 
0,013% 
0,040% 
0,004% 
n.a. 
0,604% 
0,491% 
0,414% 
0,047% 
0,280% 
0,185% 
0,062% 
0,013% 
1991 
0,082% 
0,000% 
0,010% 
0,029% 
0,224% 
n.a. 
0,385% 
0,121% 
0,572% 
0,039% 
0,238% 
0,064% 
0,037% 
0,014% 
1992 
0,076% 
0,000% 
0,008% 
0,023% 
0,186% 
n.a. 
0,409% 
0,022% 
0,649% 
0,032% 
0,216% 
0,053% 
0,038% 
0,008% 
1993 
0,064% 
0,000% 
0,004% 
0,017% 
0,204% 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0,000% 
0,405% 
0,009% 
0,370% 
0,048% 
0,055% 
0,009% 
Mean 
0,095% 
0,003% 
0,009% 
0,028% 
0,206% 
0,367% 
0,575% 
0,170% 
0,486% 
0,031% 
0,305% 
0,162% 
0,049% 
0,012% 
Table 3: Expenditure per capita on main regional incentives, 1989-93 (1993 prices, ECU, national 
population) 
COUNTRY 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany (All) 
Germany (West) 
Germany (East) 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Great Britain 
N Ireland 
INCENTIVE 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Regional Development Grant 
PAT (Regional Policy Grant) 
Investment Grant - all 
Investment Grant - west 
Investment Grant - east 
Investment Grant 
IDA (Industrial Development Authority) 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
IPR (Investment Premium) 
SIBR (Regional Incentive System) 
RIG (Regional Investment Grant) 
RSA and SFA 
Regional Selective Assistance 
Selective Financial Assistance 
EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA (NATIONAL POPULATION 
(ECU) 
1989 
25,22 
1,88 
2,02 
6,86 
6,86 
0,00 
22,24 
84,09 
31,55 
80,34 
4,97 
24,70 
45,88 
9,39 
7,27 
2,13 
1990 
18,60 
1,65 
2,40 
10,18 
8,97 
1,20 
n.a. 
61,61 
72,39 
87,43 
8,10 
17,48 
19,06 
10,62 
8,80 
1,82 
1991 
14,69 
0,00 
1,86 
54,90 
5,36 
49,54 
n.a. 
40,02 
18,00 
122,84 
6,68 
15,21 
6,74 
7,02 
5,04 
1,98 
1992 
13,81 
0,00 
1,52 
41,08 
4,32 
36,77 
n.a. 
44,25 
3,36 
140,15 
5,53 
13,97 
5,59 
6,20 
5,12 
1,08 
1993 
11,25 
0,00 
0,66 
39,95 
3,12 
36,83 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0,00 
88,28 
1,57 
24,13 
5,00 
8,73 
7,54 
1,19 
Mean 
16,71 
0,70 
1,69 
30,59 
5,73 
41,45 
22,24 
57,49 
25,06 
103,81 
5,37 
19,10 
16,46 
8,39 
6,75 
1,64 
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Table 4: Expenditure on main regional incentives 
prices, ECU) 
per capita of recipient assisted areas (1993 
COUNTRY 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany (West) 
Germany (East) 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Great Britain 
N Ireland 
INCENTIVE 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Regional Development Grant 
PAT (Regional Policy Grant) 
Investment Grant - west 
Investment Grant - east 
Investment Grant 
IDA (Industrial Development Authority) 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
IPR (Investment Premium) 
SIBR (Regional Incentive System) 
RIG (Regional Investment Grant) 
Regional Selective Assistance 
Selective Financial Assistance 
EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA IN ELIGIBLE AREAS 
(ECU per capita of eligible populatior 
1989 
76,20 
8,37 
5,17 
23,67 
0,00 
38,34 
84,09 
88,62 
80,34 
24,97 
24,70 
78,29 
21,35 
76,90 
1990 
56,21 
7,95 
5,73 
30,97 
4,41 
n.a. 
61,61 
203,34 
87,43 
40,70 
17,48 
32,53 
25,86 
65,70 
1991 
44,38 
0,00 
4,45 
25,72 
217,25 
n.a. 
40,02 
50,55 
122,84 
33,55 
15,21 
11,51 
14,82 
71,63 
1992 
41,71 
0,00 
3,62 
20,60 
164,38 
n.a. 
44,25 
9,43 
140,15 
27,78 
13,97 
9,54 
15,04 
38,95 
, 1993 prices) 
1993 
33,98 
0,00 
1,57 
14,83 
167,03 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0,00 
110,63 
9,45 
49,25 
8,54 
22,82 
42,36 
Mean 
50,49 
3,27 
4,11 
23,16 
184,35 
38,34 
57,49 
70,39 
108,28 
27,29 
24,12 
28,08 
19,98 
59,11 
Main regional incentive expenditure trends in the Member States, 1989-1993 (1993 prices, ECU, millions) 
See Member State Table 1 b 
4500 
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Expenditure on main regional incentives 1989-93, as a percentage of national GDP 
See Member States Table 2 
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Main regional incentives: Expenditure per capita in the recipient assisted areas only, 1989-93 (ECU, 1993 prices) 
See Member States Table 4 
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3. Regional-Level Data 
This section consists of a series of tables and related charts which highlight trends in regional Incentive expenditure 
at the regional level. In addition, indicators of the scale and Intensity of regional incentive spending at the regional 
level are provided. As in Section 2, the focus is on grant expenditure; this is the only information which was avail-
able on the spatial distribution of regional incentive expenditure amongst the regions. The relationship of grant-
based expenditure to more general regional incentive spending has already been discussed in Section 2. 
As noted earlier (in Section 1), regional breakdowns are available for only eight of the EU 12 countries: Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. The regional breakdowns are as 
follows: 
Belgium 2 regions 
France 22 regions 
Germany 16 Länder 
Italy 20 regions 
Netherlands 12 provinces 
Portugal 5 CCR plus 2 autonomous regions 
Spain 17 autonomous communities plus Ceuta and Melilla 
United Kingdom: 10 standard regions (plus Northern Ireland)·3' 
For each country four tables are provided for the main regional capital grant on offer: 
• expenditure trends (ECU, 1993 prices): Table 1 
• expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP: Table 2 
• expenditure per capita (regional population): Table 3 
• expenditure per capita (recipient regional assisted areas): Table 4 
In addition, charts have been produced for Tables 2-4 for each country. Finally, a chart is provided for each coun-
try which relates the intensity of policy at the regional level to regional GDP. 
131 A problem in the UK is that the available regional data sets relate to two different categories of region: the regional expenditure data is for DTI re-
gions while other data is for so-called UK standard regions. The main differences of relevance to the current study are in the North and North West 
of the country, and, more specifically, in the treatment of Cumbria. Steps are currently being taken to minimise the impact of these regional dis-
continuities which exaggerate expenditure slightly in the North West and understate it for the North. 
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The country groupings which follow reflect the discussion in Section 3.3 of the main report. Accordingly, the charts 
and tables are in the country order set out below: 
Cohesion countries 
Italy/Germany 
Other Member States 
Portugal 
Spain 
Italy 
Germany 
Belgium 
France 
the Netherlands 
Great Britain 
Finally, there is an overview set of three charts which relate regional-level policy intensity to regional GDP for the: 
• Cohesion countries 
• Italy/Germany 
• Other Member States 
In these overview charts all of EU 12 are included, with national data being utilised where regional-level data is not 
available. 
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Regional Level Data: Portugal 
Table 1. Portugal: Regional Incentive System (SIBR) 
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU) 
pt11 
pt12 
pt13 
pt14 
pt15 
Pt2 
pt3 
pt 
Region 
Norte 
Centro (Ρ) 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
Acores 
Madeira 
Portugal 
1989 
36,92 
47,45 
144,87 
4,42 
2,43 
5,79 
3,95 
245,83 
1990 
45,45 
48,98 
53,00 
13,19 
1,42 
8,29 
3,21 
173,55 
1991 
23,35 
21,01 
41,09 
21,06 
0,43 
32,32 
10,95 
150,19 
1992 
30,62 
35,37 
27,62 
8,63 
0,32 
20,21 
15,05 
137,8 
1993 
44,04 
27,96 
60,58 
17,53 
0,21 
13,85 
73,91 
238,07 
Mean, 
89-93 
36,07 
36,15 
65,43 
12,96 
0,96 
16,09 
21,41 
189,09 
Table 2. Portugal: Regional Incentive System (SIBR) 
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP, 1989-93 
pt11 
pt12 
pt13 
pt14 
pt15 
pt2 
pt3 
Pt 
Region 
Norte 
Centro (P) 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
Acores 
Madeira 
Portugal 
1989 
0,168% 
0,542% 
0,458% 
0,180% 
0,121% 
0,495% 
0,297% 
0,368% 
1990 
0,197% 
0,539% 
0,156% 
0,544% 
0,065% 
0,714% 
0,243% 
0,245% 
1991 
0,103% 
0,234% 
0,123% 
0,880% 
0,020% 
3,041 % 
0,906% 
0,209% 
1992 
0,133% 
0,390% 
0,082% 
0,357% 
0,014% 
1,881% 
1,231 % 
0,189% 
1993 
0,193% 
0,311 % 
0,180% 
0,729% 
0,010% 
1,298% 
6,090% 
0,329% 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,16% 
0,40% 
0,20% 
0,54% 
0,05% 
1,49% 
1,75% 
0,27% 
Table 3. Portugal: Regional Incentive System (SIBR) 
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU) 
pt11 
pt12 
pt13 
pt14 
pt15 
pt2 
pt3 
Pt 
Region 
Norte 
Centro (P) 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
Acores 
Madeira 
Portugal 
1989 
10,18 
26,61 
41,91 
7,80 
7,10 
22,83 
14,44 
23,86 
1990 
13,08 
28,27 
16,08 
23,98 
4,19 
34,66 
12,65 
17,55 
1991 
6,72 
12,19 
12,48 
38,64 
1,25 
135,72 
43,17 
15,22 
1992 
8,81 
20,59 
8,39 
15,96 
0,92 
85,08 
59,38 
13,98 
1993 
12,63 
16,32 
18,39 
32,61 
0,60 
58,22 
291,22 
24,13 
Mean, 
89-93 
10,28 
20,80 
19,45 
23,80 
2,81 
67,30 
84,17 
18,95 
Table 4. Portugal: Regional Incentive System (SIBR) 
Expenditure per capita of eligible population 
See Table 3: 100% of the population is eligible. 
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Portugal: Regional Incentive System (SIBR) 
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP, 1989-93 
See Portugal Table 2 
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Portugal: Regional Incentive System (SIBR) 
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU) 
See Portugal Table 3 
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Portugal: Mean annual Regional Incentive System (SIBR) 
Expenditure per capita of eligible regional population 1989­93 v. regional GDP per 
capita 1992 (both in ECU) 
90 
CD 
CO en 
Ζ) O 
LU 
α o 
Q . 
"cö 
c 
g 
O) 
Ρ 
80 
70 
60 
M 5 0 
Ώ 
CD 
40 
Q . ca o 
ω a 
LT 
CO 
c 
o 
Ρ 
TD 
S 30 
20 
10 
φ 
· 
10 12 
Regional GDP per capita, ECU, 1992 
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Regional Level Data: Spain 
Table 1. Spain: Regional Investment Grant (RIG) 
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU) 
es11 
es12 
es13 
es21 
es22 
es23 
es24 
es3 
es41 
es42 
es43 
es51 
es52 
es53 
es61 
es62 
es63 
es7 
es 
Table 2. 
es11 
es12 
es13 
es21 
es22 
es23 
es24 
es3 
es41 
es42 
es43 
es51 
es52 
es53 
es61 
es62 
es63 
es7 
es 
Region 
Galicia 
Asturias 
Cantabria 
Pais Vasco 
Navarra 
Rioja 
Aragon 
Madrid 
Castilla-Leon 
Castilla-La Mancha 
Extremadura 
Cataluna 
Valencia 
Baleares 
Andalucía 
Murcia 
Ceuta y Melllla 
Canarias 
Spain 
1989 
95,92 
24,44 
12,54 
32,77 
-
-
23,82 
-
133,62 
101,15 
90,84 
-
22,19 
-
277,68 
907,67 
0,78 
59,12 
1.782,54 
1990 
43,86 
264,81 
3,77 
13,31 
-
-
17,52 
-
56,10 
38,65 
90,92 
-
28,97 
-
141,38 
15,51 
2,95 
24,15 
741,91 
Spain: Regional Investment Grant (RIG) 
Expenditure 
Region 
Galicia 
Asturias 
Cantabria 
Pais Vasco 
Navarra 
Rioja 
Aragon 
Madrid 
Castilla-Leon 
Castilla-La Mancha 
Extremadura 
Cataluna 
Valencia 
Baleares 
Andalucía 
Murcia 
Ceuta y Melilla 
Canarias 
Spain 
1991 
24,46 
39,90 
2,32 
0,92 
-
-
6,97 
-
31,66 
24,38 
39,21 
-
5,83 
-
62,47 
11,54 
-
13,23 
262,91 
as a percentage of regional GDP 
1989 
0,441 % 
0,228% 
0,236% 
0,128% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,175% 
0,000% 
0,568% 
0,709% 
1,242% 
0,000% 
0,059% 
0,000% 
0,546% 
9,718% 
0,073% 
0,410% 
0,461% 
1990 
0,199% 
2,493% 
0,072% 
0,051% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,127% 
0,000% 
0,236% 
0,261 % 
1,202% 
0,000% 
0,074% 
0,000% 
0,259% 
0,154% 
0,268% 
0,164% 
0,185% 
1991 
0,110% 
0,368% 
0,044% 
0,004% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,049% 
0,000% 
0,132% 
0,162% 
0,502% 
0,000% 
0,014% 
0,000% 
0,111% 
0,114% 
0,000% 
0,088% 
0,064% 
1992 
20,16 
9,27 
5,31 
17,58 
-
-
9,41 
-
47,70 
17,60 
17,28 
-
7,78 
-
49,70 
10,17 
0,14 
6,29 
218,41 
1992 
0,090% 
0,085% 
0,099% 
0,067% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,068% 
0,000% 
0,201% 
0,115% 
0,219% 
0,000% 
0,019% 
0,000% 
0,088% 
0,103% 
0,013% 
0,041 % 
0,053% 
1993 
15,42 
5,57 
1,12 
0,20 
-
-
7,05 
-
35,70 
17,54 
10,91 
-
3,99 
-
88,60 
4,06 
0,18 
5,42 
195,76 
1993 
0,070% 
0,051 % 
0,021% 
0,001 % 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,050% 
0,000% 
0,144% 
0,117% 
0,139% 
0,000% 
0,010% 
0,000% 
0,161% 
0,041 % 
0,016% 
0,035% 
0,048% 
Mean, 
89-93 
39,96 
68,80 
5,01 
12,96 
-
-
12,96 
-
60,96 
39,87 
49,83 
-
13,75 
-
123,97 
189,79 
0,81 
21,64 
640,30 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,182% 
0,645% 
0,094% 
0,050% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,094% 
0,000% 
0,256% 
0,273% 
0,661 % 
0,000% 
0,035% 
0,000% 
0,233% 
2,026% 
0,074% 
0,148% 
0,162% 
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Table 3. Spain: Regional Investment Grant (RIG) 
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU) 
es11 
es12 
es13 
es21 
es22 
es23 
es24 
es3 
es41 
es42 
es43 
es51 
es52 
es53 
es61 
es62 
es63 
es7 
es 
Table 4. 
es11 
es12 
es13 
es21 
es22 
es23 
es24 
es3 
es41 
es42 
es43 
es51 
es52 
es53 
es61 
es62 
es63 
es7 
es 
Region 
Galicia 
Asturias 
Cantabria 
Pais Vasco 
Navarra 
Rioja 
Aragon 
Madrid 
Castilla-Leon 
Castilla-La Mancha 
Extremadura 
Cataluna 
Valencia 
Baleares 
Andalucía 
Murcia 
Ceuta y Melilla 
Canarias 
Spain 
1989 
34,13 
21,61 
23,80 
15,41 
-
-
19,58 
-
50,78 
59,09 
80,71 
-
5,88 
-
40,42 
891,36 
6,26 
40,17 
45,88 
1990 
15,63 
234,86 
7,16 
6,25 
-
-
14,43 
-
21,35 
22,56 
80,66 
-
7,66 
-
20,48 
15,15 
23,64 
16,32 
19,06 
Spain: Regional Investment Grant (RIG) 
Expenditure per capita of recipient ι 
(1993 prices, 
Region 
Galicia 
Asturias 
Cantabria 
Pais Vasco 
Navarra 
Rioja 
Aragon 
Madrid 
Castilla-Leon 
Castilla-La Mancha 
Extremadura 
Cataluna 
Valencia 
Baleares 
Andalucía 
Murcia 
Ceuta y Melilla 
Canarias 
Spain 
ECU) 
1989 
34,13 
21,61 
23,80 
54,63 
-
-
59,15 
-
50,78 
59,09 
80,71 
-
19,59 
-
40,42 
891,36 
6,26 
40,17 
78,29 
1990 
15,63 
234,86 
7,16 
22,17 
-
-
43,60 
-
21,35 
22,56 
80,66 
-
25,53 
-
20,48 
15,15 
23,64 
16,32 
32,53 
1991 
8,73 
35,48 
4,41 
0,43 
-
-
5,76 
-
12,07 
14,23 
34,74 
-
1,54 
-
9,01 
11,21 
-
8,88 
6,74 
1992 
7,21 
8,27 
10,08 
8,25 
-
-
7,79 
-
18,21 
10,26 
15,29 
-
2,05 
-
7,13 
9,82 
1,13 
4,20 
5,59 
region assisted population 
1991 
8,73 
35,48 
4,41 
1,53 
-
-
17,40 
-
12,07 
14,23 
34,74 
-
5,12 
-
9,01 
11,21 
-
8,88 
11,51 
1992 
7,21 
8,27 
10,08 
29,26 
-
-
23,53 
-
18,21 
10,26 
15,29 
-
6,83 
-
7,13 
9,82 
1,13 
4,20 
9,54 
1993 
5,53 
4,99 
2,12 
0,10 
-
-
5,85 
-
13,64 
10,21 
9,64 
-
1,05 
-
12,66 
3,90 
1,38 
3,60 
5,00 
1993 
5,53 
4,99 
2,12 
0,34 
-
-
17,67 
-
13,64 
10,21 
9,64 
-
3,50 
-
12,66 
3,90 
1,38 
3,60 
8,54 
Mean, 
89-93 
14,24 
61,05 
9,51 
6,09 
-
-
10,68 
-
23,21 
23,27 
44,21 
-
3,63 
-
17,94 
186,29 
6,48 
14,63 
16,46 
Mean, 
89-93 
14,24 
61,05 
9,51 
21,59 
-
-
32,27 
-
23,21 
23,27 
44,21 
-
12,11 
-
17,94 
186,29 
6,48 
14,63 
28,08 
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Spain: Regional Investment Grant (RIG) 
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP 
See Spain Table 2 
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Spain: Regional Investment Grant) 
Expenditure per capita of recipient regional assisted area population, 
1989-93 (1993 prices, ECU) 
See Spain Table 4 
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Spain: Mean annual Regional Investment Grant (RIG) 
expenditure per capita of eligible regional population, 1989-93, v. regional GDP per 
capita 1992 (both in ECU) 
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Regional Level Data: Italy 
Table 1. Italy: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU) 
Region 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Mean, 
89-93 
it11 
iti 2 
¡t13 
it2 
¡t31 
it32 
¡t33 
it4 
it51 
it52 
it53 
it6 
itS 
it71 
it72 
¡t91 
it92 
it93 
ita 
¡tb 
it 
Piemonte 
Valle d'Aosta 
Liguria 
Lombardia 
Trentino-Alto Adige 
Veneto 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
Emilia Romagna 
Toscana 
Umbria 
Marche 
Lazio 
Campania 
Abruzzo 
Molise 
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
Italy 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
59,69 
383,55 
321,11 
377,37 
43,23 
59,69 
198,29 
62,44 
146,15 
135,85 
1.787,36 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,27 
-
287,47 
2.051,79 
544,98 
396,46 
17,85 
86,69 
251,77 
79,68 
158,08 
228,19 
4.104,22 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
52,72 
283,74 
172,38 
42,06 
37,91 
220,36 
40,87 
139,20 
31,99 
1.021,22 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,70 
79,95 
43,09 
-
-
61,24 
4,54 
-
-
190,52 
0,25 
69,43 
497,95 
245,96 
197,86 
20,63 
36,86 
146,33 
37,50 
88,68 
79,21 
1.420,67 
Table 2. Italy: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP 
it11 
it12 
¡t13 
it2 
¡t31 
it32 
it33 
it4 
it51 
it52 
it53 
it6 
it8 
¡t71 
it72 
it91 
it92 
it93 
ita 
¡tb 
¡t 
Region 
Piemonte 
Valle d'Aosta 
Liguria 
Lombardia 
Trentino-Alto Adige 
Veneto 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
Emilia Romagna 
Toscana 
Umbria 
Marche 
Lazio 
Campania 
Abruzzo 
Molise 
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
Italy 
1989 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,288% 
0,466% 
0,574% 
2,405% 
1,178% 
0,142% 
3,572% 
0,345% 
0,307% 
0,803% 
0,218% 
1990 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,002% 
0,000% 
1,357% 
2,385% 
0,940% 
2,443% 
0,478% 
0,204% 
4,421% 
0,462% 
0,318% 
1,308% 
0,491% 
1991 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,060% 
0,488% 
1,038% 
1,098% 
0,086% 
3,823% 
0,222% 
0,272% 
0,173% 
0,121% 
1992 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,002% 
0,136% 
0,257% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
1,051% 
0,024% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,022% 
1993 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,329% 
0,583% 
0,427% 
1,229% 
0,551% 
0,086% 
2,573% 
0,211% 
0,179% 
0,457% 
0,170% 
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Table 3. Italy: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU) 
Mean, 
Region 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 89-93 
t i l 
t12 
t13 
t2 
t31 
t32 
t33 
t4 
t51 
t52 
t53 
t6 
t8 
t71 
t72 
t91 
t92 
t93 
ta 
tb 
Piemonte 
Valle d'Aosta 
Liguria 
Lombardia 
Trentino-Alto Adige 
Veneto 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
Emilia Romagna 
Toscana 
Umbria 
Marche 
Lazio 
Campania 
Abruzzo 
Molise 
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
42,02 
75,23 
57,42 
304,38 
130,83 
14,91 
324,54 
29,98 
29,44 
83,09 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,36 
-
202,03 
401,10 
97,22 
318,88 
54,00 
21,59 
412,00 
38,33 
31,82 
139,29 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
10,28 
50,49 
138,33 
127,22 
9,42 
360,65 
19,70 
28,01 
19,45 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,33 
14,20 
34,50 
-
-
100,39 
2,19 
-
-
0,07 
48,81 
97,39 
43,87 
159,22 
62,41 
9,18 
239,52 
18,04 
17,85 
48,37 
Italy 31,55 72,39 18,00 3,36 - 25,06 
Table 4 Italy: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted population (ECU, 1993 prices) 
Mean, 
Region 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 89-93 
t11 
t12 
t13 
t2 
t31 
t32 
t33 
t4 
t51 
t52 
t53 
t6 
t8 
t71 
t72 
t91 
t92 
t93 
ta 
tb 
Piemonte 
Valle d'Aosta 
Liguria 
Lombardia 
Trentino-Alto Adige 
Veneto 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
Emilia Romagna 
Toscana 
Umbria 
Marche 
Lazio 
Campania 
Abruzzo 
Molise 
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
18,04 - - - 3,61 
1.036,04 
43,87 
159,22 
62,41 
9,18 
239,52 
18,04 
17,85 
48,37 
165,55 
800,35 
57,42 
304,38 
130,83 
14,91 
324,54 
29,98 
29,44 
83,09 
797,25 
4.267,03 
97,22 
318,88 
54,00 
21,59 
412,00 
38,33 
31,82 
139,29 
-
109,31 
50,49 
138,33 
127,22 
9,42 
360,65 
19,70 
28,01 
19,45 
-
3,52 
14,20 
34,50 
-
-
100,39 
2,19 
-
-
Italy 83,65 191,76 48,46 9,04 - 66,58 
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Italy: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Expenditure by region, 1989-92, as a percentage of regional GDP 
See Italy Table 2 
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Italy: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted area population, 1989-92, (1993, 
prices, ECU) 
See Italy Table 4 
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Italy: Mean annual Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy (CG/IS) 
expenditure per capita of eligible regional population, 1989­93, v. regional GDP per 
capita 1992 (both in ECU) 
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Regional Level Data: Germany 
Table 1. Germany: Investment Grant (IG) 
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU) 
de l 
de2 
de5 
de6 
de7 
de9 
dea 
deb 
dec 
def 
de3 
de4 
de8 
ded 
dee 
deg 
de 
Region 
West Germany 
Baden Wurttenburg 
Bayern 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
Hessen 
Niedersachsen 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Saarland 
Schleswig Holstein 
West Germany (exe. Berlin) 
East Germany 
Berlin 
Brandenburg 
Macklenburg-Vorpommern 
Sachsen 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Thüringen 
1989 
0,00 
33,07 
1,29 
0,00 
16,38 
76,93 
178,54 
27,01 
57,61 
32,64 
423,47 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
Easf Germany (inc. all Berlin) 0,00 
Germany (all) 423,47 
1990 
0,02 
65,70 
1,52 
0,00 
39,15 
213,27 
116,05 
45,88 
28,20 
52,47 
562,26 
0,04 
11,39 
30,85 
7,50 
0,11 
25,54 
75,43 
637,70 
1991 
0,32 
49,57 
1,97 
0,00 
9,72 
100,39 
158,99 
52,23 
37,63 
16,52 
427,34 
252,41 
1015,87 
312,57 
619,43 
1016,36 
733,84 
3950,47 
4377,81 
1992 
0,00 
32,71 
6,82 
0,00 
5,38 
87,84 
88,70 
36,75 
83,53 
4,96 
346,68 
100,05 
322,64 
328,64 
827,69 
859,89 
511,89 
2950,78 
3297,46 
1993 
0,00 
17,69 
5,16 
0,00 
4,68 
61,92 
87,73 
24,85 
43,52 
7,22 
252,77 
181,83 
660,63 
290,37 
552,50 
610,19 
687,08 
2982,61 
3235,37 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,07 
39,75 
3,35 
0,00 
15,06 
108,07 
126,00 
37,34 
50,10 
22,7 
402,5 
178,11 
670,17 
320,81 
669,04 
828,85 
652,78 
3319,76 
3722,27 
Table 2. Germany: Investment Grant (IG) 
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP 
del 
de2 
de5 
de6 
de7 
de9 
dea 
deb 
dec 
def 
de3 
de4 
de8 
ded 
dee 
deg 
Region 
West Germany 
Baden Wurttenburg 
Bayern 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
Hessen 
Niedersachsen 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Saarland 
Schleswig Holstein 
East Germany 
Berlin 
Brandenburg 
Macklenburg-Vorpommern 
Sachsen 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Thüringen 
1989 
0,000% 
0,014% 
0,007% 
0,000% 
0,012% 
0,059% 
0,052% 
0,040% 
0,284% 
0,071% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
1990 
0,000% 
0,026% 
0,008% 
0,000% 
0,026% 
0,155% 
0,032% 
0,064% 
0,132% 
0,107% 
0,000% 
0,050% 
0,212% 
0,020% 
0,000% 
0,142% 
1991 
0,000% 
0,018% 
0,010% 
0,000% 
0,006% 
0,069% 
0,043% 
0,071% 
0,172% 
0,032% 
0,354% 
4,757% 
2,271 % 
1,736% 
4,628% 
4,329% 
1992 
0,000% 
0,012% 
0,034% 
0,000% 
0,003% 
0,059% 
0,024% 
0,050% 
0,380% 
0,010% 
0,153% 
1,457% 
2,151% 
2,130% 
3,552% 
2,667% 
1993 
0,000% 
0,006% 
0,026% 
0,000% 
0,003% 
0,042% 
0,024% 
0,034% 
0,201% 
0,014% 
0,284% 
2,443% 
1,626% 
1,204% 
2,183% 
2,786% 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,000% 
0,015% 
0,017% 
0,000% 
0,010% 
0,077% 
0,035% 
0,052% 
0,234% 
0,047% 
0,264% 
2,903% 
2,087% 
1,697% 
3,454% 
3,309% 
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Table 3. Germany: Investment Grant (IG) 
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU) 
del 
de2 
de5 
de6 
de7 
de9 
dea 
deb 
dec 
def 
de3 
de4 
de8 
ded 
dee 
deg 
Region 
West Germany 
Baden Wurttenburg 
Bayern 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
Hessen 
Niedersachsen 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Saarland 
Schleswig Holstein 
East Germany 
Berlin 
Brandenburg 
Macklenburg-Vorpommern 
Sachsen 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Thüringen 
1989 
0,00 
2,99 
1,95 
0,00 
2,94 
10,71 
10,58 
7,39 
54,65 
12,73 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
1990 
0,00 
5,86 
2,26 
0,00 
6,92 
29,28 
6,79 
12,39 
26,48 
20,22 
0,02 
4,42 
16,04 
1,53 
0,04 
9,78 
1991 
0,03 
4,33 
2,89 
0,00 
1,69 
13,59 
9,16 
13,88 
35,07 
6,29 
73,51 
394,01 
162,46 
130,02 
353,64 
281,03 
1992 
0,00 
2,82 
9,97 
0,00 
0,92 
11,75 
5,07 
9,62 
77,57 
1,87 
29,03 
126,89 
173,73 
176,90 
304,57 
199,02 
1993 
0,00 
1,50 
7,53 
0,00 
0,79 
8,17 
4,96 
6,40 
40,15 
2,69 
52,47 
259,81 
155,70 
119,05 
218,16 
269,89 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,01 
3,50 
4,92 
0,00 
2,65 
14,70 
7,31 
9,94 
46,78 
8,76 
51,68 
261,71 
169,31 
142,50 
292,13 
253,24 
Table 4. Germany: Investment Grant (IG) 
Expenditure committed per head of recipient region assisted population 
(ECU, 1993 prices) 
del 
de2 
de5 
de6 
de7 
de9 
dea 
deb 
dec 
def 
de3 
de4 
de8 
ded 
dee 
deg 
Region 
West Germany 
Baden Wurttenburg 
Bayern 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
Hessen 
Niedersachsen 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Saarland 
Schleswig Holstein 
East Germany 
Berlin 
Brandenburg 
Macklenburg-Vorpommern 
Sachsen 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Thüringen 
1989 
0,00 
17,71 
1,95 
0,00 
45,96 
18,37 
28,07 
25,41 
61,61 
17,51 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
1990 
3,60 
34,65 
2,26 
0,00 
108,08 
50,22 
18,00 
42,59 
29,86 
27,82 
0,02 
4,42 
16,04 
1,53 
0,04 
9,78 
1991 
65,65 
25,62 
2,89 
0,00 
26,36 
23,31 
24,31 
47,69 
39,54 
8,65 
73,51 
394,01 
162,46 
130,02 
353,64 
281,03 
1992 
0,00 
16,69 
9,97 
0,00 
14,41 
20,15 
13,44 
33,05 
87,45 
2,57 
29,03 
126,89 
173,73 
176,90 
304,57 
199,02 
1993 
0,00 
8,89 
7,53 
0,00 
12,34 
14,02 
13,16 
22,00 
45,27 
3,71 
52,47 
259,81 
155,70 
119,05 
218,16 
269,89 
Mean, 
89-93 
13,85 
20,71 
4,92 
0,00 
41,43 
25,21 
19,39 
34,15 
52,74 
12,05 
51,68 
261,71 
169,31 
142,50 
292,13 
253,24 
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Germany: Investment Grant 
Expenditure by region, as a percentage of regional GDP, 1989­93 
See Germany Table 2 
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Germany: Investment Grant 
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted area population, 1989-93 
(1993 prices, ECU) 
See Germany Table 4 
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Germany: Mean annual Investment Grant (IG) expenditure 
per capita of eligible population, 1989­93, v. regional GDP per capita 1992 
(both in ECU) 
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Regional Level Data: Belgium 
Table 1. Belgium: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU) 
Mean, 
Region 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 89-93 
bel 
be2 
be3 
Brussels 
Vlaams Gewest 
Region Wallonne 
0 
92,09 
158,18 
0 
100,92 
84,09 
0 
71,83 
74,79 
0 
56,69 
81,71 
0 
81,86 
31,38 
0 
80,68 
86,03 
be Belgium 250,28 185,00 146,63 138,40 113,24 166,71 
Table 2. Belgium: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP 
bel 
be2 
be3 
be 
Region 
Brussels 
Vlaams Gewest 
Region Wallonne 
Belgium 
1989 
0,000% 
0,093% 
0,354% 
0,147% 
1990 
0,000% 
0,098% 
0,182% 
0,105% 
1991 
0,000% 
0,069% 
0,159% 
0,082% 
1992 
0,000% 
0,053% 
0,171% 
0,076% 
1993 
0,000% 
0,078% 
0,066% 
0,063% 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,000% 
0,078% 
0,187% 
0,095% 
Table 3. Belgium: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU) 
bel 
be2 
be3 
be 
Region 
Brussels 
Vlaams Gewest 
Region Wallonne 
Belgium 
1989 
0,00 
16,09 
48,90 
25,21 
1990 
0,00 
17,58 
25,92 
18,60 
1991 
0,00 
12,45 
22,95 
14,68 
1992 
0,00 
9,78 
24,94 
13,81 
1993 
0,00 
14,05 
9,53 
11,25 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,00 
13,99 
26,45 
16,71 
Table 4. Belgium: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted population (1993 prices, ECU) 
bel 
be2 
be3 
be 
Region 
Brussels 
Vlaams Gewest 
Region Wallonne 
Belgium 
1989 
0,00 
71,36 
79,23 
76,14 
1990 
0,00 
78,03 
42,03 
56,17 
1991 
0,00 
55,33 
37,24 
44,34 
1992 
0,00 
43,51 
40,54 
41,71 
1993 
0,00 
62,54 
15,50 
33,97 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,00 
62,16 
42,91 
50,47 
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Belgium: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Expenditure by region, 1989­93, as a percentage of regional GDP 
See Belgium Table 2 
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Belgium: Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted area population, 1989-93, 
(1993 prices, ECU) 
See Belgium Table 4 
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Belgium: Mean annual expenditure on Capital Grant/Interest Subsidy 
per capita of eligible regional population 1989-93 v. regional GDP per capita 1992 
(both in ECU) 
70 
60 
co 9 ά 
co 
D 
O 
c 
o 
Ρ 
Q. 
O 
Q. 
g 
ra È 
Ρ 
.g 
ρ o ro 
±; 
Q . 
CO 
CJ 
fe 
Q. 
Ò 
Ü c o 
ID c 
O) 
Q. X Ρ 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
m 
10 15 20 
Regional GDP per capita, ECU, 1992 
25 30 
156 Economic and Social Cohesion in the European Union: The Impact of Member States' Own Policies: Final Report 
Regional Level Data: France 
Table 1. France: Regional Development Grant (PAT) 
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU) 
f r i 
fi-21 
fr22 
fr23 
fr24 
fr25 
fr26 
fr3 
fr41 
fr42 
fr43 
fr51 
fr52 
fr53 
fr61 
fr62 
fr63 
fr71 
fr72 
fr81 
fr82 
fr83 
fr 
Region 
Ile de France 
Champagne-Ardenne 
Picardie 
Haute-Normandie 
Centre 
Basse-Normandie 
Bourgogone 
Nord Pas de Calais 
Lorraine 
Alsace 
Franche Comte 
Pays de la Loire 
Bretagne 
Poitou Charentes 
Aquitaine 
Midi-Pyrenees 
Limousin 
Rhone Alpes 
Auvergne 
Languedoc Roussillon 
PACA 
Corse 
France 
1989 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1990 
0,00 
0,43 
2,29 
2,47 
0,59 
3,99 
1,76 
15,89 
19,59 
3,56 
0,93 
28,82 
8,24 
2,82 
13,95 
11,02 
2,42 
2,96 
7,35 
0,95 
5,84 
0,00 
135,86 
1991 
0,00 
6,47 
1,89 
2,68 
0,00 
2,05 
2,84 
21,92 
24,13 
2,52 
0,14 
2,84 
9,46 
1,89 
5,68 
4,10 
0,33 
4,73 
3,00 
7,41 
1,47 
0,37 
106,09 
1992 
0,00 
0,39 
0,76 
1,03 
0,00 
5,55 
7,09 
10,21 
33,00 
0,74 
0,00 
2,62 
6,32 
2,33 
1,00 
3,59 
0,22 
2,70 
2,93 
4,13 
2,02 
0,05 
86,71 
1993 
0,00 
0,87 
0,53 
0,18 
2,25 
2,25 
1,63 
5,89 
3,47 
0,21 
0,15 
5,32 
4,51 
0,00 
2,07 
3,17 
1,22 
1,91 
0,98 
1,03 
0,30 
0,00 
37,93 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,00 
2,04 
1,37 
1,59 
0,71 
3,46 
3,33 
13,48 
20,05 
1,76 
0,31 
9,90 
7,13 
1,76 
5,67 
5,47 
1,05 
3,08 
3,56 
3,38 
2,41 
0,15 
91,65 
Table 2. France: Regional Development Grant (PAT) 
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP 
fr i 
fr21 
fr22 
fr23 
fr24 
fr25 
fr26 
fr3 
fr41 
fr42 
fr43 
fr51 
fr52 
fr53 
fr61 
fr62 
fr63 
fr71 
fr72 
fr81 
fr82 
fr83 
fr 
Region 
Ile de France 
Champagne-Ardenne 
Picardie 
Haute-Normandie 
Centre 
Basse-Normandie 
Bourgogone 
Nord Pas de Calais 
Lorraine 
Alsace 
Franche Comte 
Pays de la Loire 
Bretagne 
Poitou Charentes 
Aquitaine 
Midi-Pyrenees 
Limousin 
Rhone Alpes 
Auvergne 
Languedoc Roussillon 
PACA 
Corse 
France 
1989 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1990 
0,000% 
0,002% 
0,008% 
0,008% 
0,001 % 
0,018% 
0,007% 
0,027% 
0,053% 
0,012% 
0,005% 
0,059% 
0,019% 
0,012% 
0,030% 
0,028% 
0,023% 
0,003% 
0,037% 
0,003% 
0,008% 
0,000% 
0,013% 
1991 
0,000% 
0,025% 
0,007% 
0,009% 
0,000% 
0,009% 
0,011% 
0,037% 
0,065% 
0,008% 
0,001 % 
0,006% 
0,022% 
0,008% 
0,012% 
0,010% 
0,003% 
0,005% 
0,015% 
0,024% 
0,002% 
0,016% 
0,010% 
1992 
0,000% 
0,001% 
0,003% 
0,003% 
0,000% 
0,024% 
0,026% 
0,017% 
0,089% 
0,002% 
0,000% 
0,005% 
0,014% 
0,010% 
0,002% 
0,009% 
0,002% 
0,003% 
0,015% 
0,013% 
0,003% 
0,002% 
0,008% 
1993 
0,000% 
0,004% 
0,002% 
0,001 % 
0,006% 
0,009% 
0,006% 
0,010% 
0,009% 
0,001 % 
0,001 % 
0,011% 
0,010% 
0,000% 
0,004% 
0,008% 
0,011 % 
0,002% 
0,005% 
0,003% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,004% 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,000% 
0,008% 
0,005% 
0,005% 
0,002% 
0,015% 
0,012% 
0,023% 
0,054% 
0,006% 
0,002% 
0,020% 
0,017% 
0,007% 
0,012% 
0,014% 
0,010% 
0,003% 
0,018% 
0,011% 
0,003% 
0,005% 
0,009% 
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Table 3. France: Regional Development Grant (PAT) 
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU) 
f r i 
fr21 
fr22 
fr23 
fr24 
fr25 
fr26 
fr3 
fr41 
fr42 
fr43 
fr51 
fr52 
fr53 
fr61 
fr62 
fr63 
fr71 
fr72 
fr81 
fr82 
fr83 
fr 
Region 
Ile de France 
Champagne-Ardenne 
Picardie 
Haute-Normandie 
Centre 
Basse-Normandie 
Bourgogone 
Nord Pas de Calais 
Lorraine 
Alsace 
Franche Comte 
Pays de la Loire 
Bretagne 
Poitou Charentes 
Aquitaine 
Midi-Pyrenees 
Limousin 
Rhone Alpes 
Auvergne 
Languedoc Roussillon 
PACA 
Corse 
France 
1989 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1990 
0,00 
0,32 
1,26 
1,42 
0,25 
2,87 
1,09 
4,01 
8,49 
2,19 
0,85 
9,42 
2,95 
1,77 
4,99 
4,54 
3,34 
0,55 
5,55 
0,45 
1,37 
0,00 
2,40 
1991 
0,00 
4,80 
1,04 
1,54 
0,00 
1,47 
1,76 
5,53 
10,49 
1,55 
0,13 
0,92 
3,37 
1,18 
2,02 
1,68 
0,46 
0,88 
2,27 
3,47 
0,34 
1,48 
1,86 
1992 
0,00 
0,29 
0,41 
0,59 
0,00 
3,97 
4,40 
2,57 
14,36 
0,45 
0,00 
0,85 
2,25 
1,45 
0,35 
1,46 
0,30 
0,50 
2,22 
1,91 
0,47 
0,21 
1,52 
1993 
0,00 
0,65 
0,29 
0,10 
0,93 
1,60 
1,00 
1,48 
1,51 
0,13 
0,14 
1,71 
1,59 
0,00 
0,73 
1,28 
1,70 
0,35 
0,74 
0,47 
0,07 
0,00 
0,66 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,00 
1,51 
0,75 
0,91 
0,30 
2,48 
2,06 
3,39 
8,71 
1,08 
0,28 
3,23 
2,54 
1,10 
2,02 
2,24 
1,45 
0,57 
2,70 
1,57 
0,56 
0,42 
1,61 
Table 4. France: Regional Development Grant (PAT) 
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted population 
(1993 prices, ECU) 
f r i 
fr21 
fr22 
fr23 
fr24 
fr25 
fr26 
fr3 
fr41 
fr42 
fr43 
fr51 
fr52 
fr53 
fr61 
fr62 
fr63 
fr71 
fr72 
fr81 
fr82 
fr83 
Region 
Ile de France 
Champagne-Ardenne 
Picardie 
Haute-Normandie 
Centre 
Basse-Normandie 
Bourgogone 
Nord Pas de Calais 
Lorraine 
Alsace 
Franche Comte 
Pays de la Loire 
Bretagne 
Poitou Charentes 
Aquitaine 
Midl-Pyrenees 
Limousin 
Rhone Alpes 
Auvergne 
Languedoc Roussillon 
PACA 
Corse 
1989 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1990 
0,00 
1,22 
4,01 
3,95 
2,75 
3,41 
5,38 
5,06 
12,49 
2,52 
3,98 
14,08 
3,23 
1,77 
6,53 
5,85 
3,34 
3,03 
6,47 
0,53 
7,22 
0,00 
1991 
0,00 
18,26 
3,31 
4,27 
0,00 
1,75 
8,68 
6,98 
15,42 
1,78 
0,60 
1,38 
3,70 
1,18 
2,64 
2,16 
0,46 
4,79 
2,65 
4,11 
1,79 
1,48 
1992 
0,00 
1,09 
1,31 
1,63 
0,00 
4,72 
21,66 
3,24 
21,11 
0,52 
0,00 
1,27 
2,46 
1,45 
0,46 
1,88 
0,30 
2,71 
2,59 
2,27 
2,45 
0,21 
1993 
0,00 
2,46 
0,91 
0,29 
10,26 
1,90 
4,95 
1,87 
2,22 
0,15 
0,63 
2,55 
1,74 
0,00 
0,95 
1,65 
1,70 
1,91 
0,87 
0,56 
0,36 
0,00 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,00 
5,75 
2,38 
2,54 
3,25 
2,95 
10,17 
4,29 
12,81 
1,24 
1,30 
4,82 
2,78 
1,10 
2,65 
2,89 
1,45 
3,11 
3,14 
1,87 
2,96 
0,42 
France n.a. 5,324 4,144 3,371 1,468 3,58 
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France: Regional Development Grant (PAT) 
Expenditure by region, as a percentage of regional GDP, 1990­93 
See France Table 2 
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Expenditure per capita of regional population, 1990-93 (1993 prices, ECU) 
See France Table 3 
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France: Regional Development Grant (PAT) 
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted area population, 1990-93 
(1993 prices, ECU) 
See France Table 4 
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France: Mean annual Regional Policy Grant (PAT) 
Expenditure per capita of eligible regional population, 1989-93, v. regional GDP per 
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Regional Level Data: Netherlands 
Table 1. 
nl11 
nl12 
nl13 
nl21 
nl22 
nl23 
nl31 
nl32 
nl33 
nl34 
nl41 
nl42 
nl 
Netherlands: 
Region 
Groningen 
Friesland 
Drenthe 
Overijssel 
Gelderland 
Flevoland 
Utrecht 
Noord-Holland 
Zuid-Holland 
Zeeland 
Noord-Brabant 
Limburg 
Netherlands 
Investment Premium (IPR) 
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, 
1989 
4,08 
3,83 
1,36 
8,42 
12,85 
0,40 
-
-
-
-
20,57 
32,77 
84,28 
1990 
7,53 
7,24 
1,43 
19,89 
16,69 
2,85 
-
-
-
-
7,48 
57,44 
120,54 
1991 
10,93 
8,20 
2,49 
47,27 
8,96 
2,68 
-
-
-
-
3,55 
16,87 
100,96 
MECU) 
1992 
27,05 
11,77 
4,34 
5,42 
1,26 
2,85 
-
-
-
-
6,63 
24,34 
83,68 
1993 
10,67 
3,59 
3,17 
-
-
1,79 
-
-
-
-
-
4,55 
23,77 
Mean, 
89-93 
12,05 
6,92 
2,56 
16,20 
7,95 
2,12 
-
-
-
-
7,65 
27,19 
82,65 
Table 2. Netherlands: Investment Premium (IPR) 
Expenditure as a percentage of regional GDP 
nl11 
nl12 
nl13 
nl21 
nl22 
nl23 
nl31 
nl32 
nl33 
nl34 
nl41 
nl42 
nl 
Region 
Groningen 
Friesland 
Drenthe 
Overijssel 
Gelderland 
Flevoland 
Utrecht 
Noord-Holland 
Zuid-Holland 
Zeeland 
Noord-Brabant 
Limburg 
Netherlands 
1989 
0,037% 
0,045% 
0,021 % 
0,056% 
0,049% 
0,015% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,058% 
0,192% 
0,034% 
1990 
0,065% 
0,083% 
0,021% 
0,129% 
0,061 % 
0,101% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,020% 
0,334% 
0,047% 
1991 
0,085% 
0,093% 
0,037% 
0,303% 
0,032% 
0,091 % 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,009% 
0,098% 
0,039% 
1992 
0,213% 
0,130% 
0,063% 
0,034% 
0,004% 
0,096% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,017% 
0,138% 
0,031% 
1993 
0,086% 
0,041% 
0,049% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,058% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,027% 
0,009% 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,097% 
0,079% 
0,038% 
0,104% 
0,029% 
0,072% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,021% 
0,158% 
0,032% 
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Table 3. Netherlands: Investment Premium (IPR) 
Expenditure per capita of regional population (1993 prices, ECU) 
nl11 
nl12 
nl13 
nl21 
nl22 
nl23 
nl31 
nl32 
nl33 
nl34 
nl41 
nl42 
nl 
Region 
Groningen 
Friesland 
Drenthe 
Overijssel 
Gelderland 
Flevoland 
Utrecht 
Noord-Holland 
Zuid-Holland 
Zeeland 
Noord-Brabant 
Limburg 
Netherlands 
1989 
7,35 
6,39 
3,10 
8,29 
7,16 
1,99 
-
-
-
-
9,47 
29,80 
5,69 
1990 
13,60 
12,08 
3,24 
19,49 
9,25 
13,50 
-
-
-
-
3,42 
52,03 
8,10 
1991 
19,71 
13,66 
5,62 
46,06 
4,93 
12,12 
-
-
-
-
1,61 
15,20 
6,73 
1992 
48,72 
19,56 
9,75 
5,25 
0,69 
12,24 
-
-
-
-
2,98 
21,82 
5,53 
1993 
19,20 
5,94 
7,08 
-
-
7,37 
-
-
-
-
-
4,06 
1,56 
Mean, 
89-93 
21,72 
11,53 
5,76 
15,82 
4,41 
9,44 
-
-
-
-
3,49 
24,58 
5,52 
Table 4. 
nl11 
nl12 
nl13 
nl21 
nl22 
nl23 
nl31 
nl32 
nl33 
nl34 
nl41 
nl42 
nl 
Netherlands: 
Region 
Groningen 
Friesland 
Drenthe 
Overijssel 
Gelderland 
Flevoland 
Utrecht 
Noord-Holland 
Zuid-Holland 
Zeeland 
Noord-Brabant 
Limburg 
Netherlands 
Investment Premium (IPR) 
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted population 
(1993 prices, ECU) 
1989 
8,55 
6,39 
8,56 
14,73 
57,44 
6,93 
-
-
-
-
91,91 
51,73 
28,61 
1990 
15,81 
12,08 
8,94 
34,61 
74,57 
47,03 
-
-
-
-
33,43 
90,33 
40,67 
1991 
22,92 
13,66 
15,53 
81,80 
40,06 
42,23 
-
-
-
-
15,85 
26,40 
33,80 
1992 
56,65 
19,56 
26,94 
9,32 
5,64 
42,65 
-
-
-
-
29,65 
37,88 
27,79 
1993 
22,33 
5,94 
19,55 
-
-
25,67 
-
-
-
-
-
7,05 
9,39 
Mean, 
89-93 
25,25 
11,53 
15,90 
28,10 
35,54 
32,90 
-
-
-
-
34,17 
42,68 
28,05 
ANNEX I: Regional Incentive Expenditure by Nation and Region in the EU Member States 163 
Netherlands: Investment Premium 
Expenditure by region, as a percentage of regional GDP, 1989-93 
See Netherlands Table 2 
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Netherlands: Investment Premium 
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted area population, 1989-93 
(1993 prices, ECU) 
See Netherlands Table 4 
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Netherlands: Mean annual Investment Premium (IPR) 
expenditure per capita of eligible regional population 989-93 v. regional GDP per 
capita 1992 (both in ECU) 
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Regional Level Data: Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
Table 1. Great Britain: Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) 
Northern Ireland: Selective Financial Assistance (SFA) 
Expenditure trends 1989-93 (1993 prices, MECU) 
UK1 
UK2 
UK3 
UK4 
UK5 
UK6 
UK7 
UK8 
UK9 
UKA 
UKB 
Region 
North 
Yorkshire & Humberside 
East Midlands 
East Anglia 
South East 
South West 
West Midlands 
North West 
Wales 
Scotland 
Great Britain 
Northern Ireland 
1989 
103,76 
21,10 
1,32 
-
-
17,86 
27,27 
28,04 
96,69 
119,30 
415,33 
121,55 
1990 
27,74 
31,73 
0,49 
-
-
7,98 
21,17 
38,85 
117,19 
259,24 
504,39 
104,21 
1991 
23,41 
24,90 
2,15 
-
-
6,78 
16,86 
36,51 
107,48 
72,86 
290,94 
114,04 
1992 
33,62 
14,46 
1,06 
-
-
8,45 
9,51 
34,51 
96,74 
97,97 
296,32 
62,42 
1993 
44,86 
22,05 
3,13 
0,31 
0,51 
10,88 
27,90 
37,51 
122,09 
168,86 
438,08 
68,85 
Mean, 
89-93 
46,67 
22,85 
1,63 
0,06 
0,10 
10,39 
20,54 
35,08 
108,04 
143,64 
389,01 
94,21 
Table 2. 
UK1 
UK2 
UK3 
UK4 
UK5 
UK6 
UK7 
UK8 
UK9 
UKA 
UKB 
Great Britain: 
Northern Ireland: 
Region 
North 
Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) 
Selective Financial Assistance (SFA) 
Expenditure as 
Yorkshire & Humberside 
East Midlands 
East Anglia 
South East 
South West 
West Midlands 
North West 
Wales 
Scotland 
Great Britain 
Northern Ireland 
1989 
0,115% 
0,014% 
0,001 % 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,012% 
0,017% 
0,014% 
0,121% 
0,076% 
0,022% 
0,306% 
a percentage of regional G D P 
1990 
0,032% 
0,022% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,006% 
0,014% 
0,021% 
0,151% 
0,167% 
0,028% 
0,268% 
1991 
0,029% 
0,018% 
0,002% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,005% 
0,012% 
0,021 % 
0,149% 
0,050% 
0,017% 
0,300% 
1992 
0,040% 
0,010% 
0,001 % 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,006% 
0,006% 
0,020% 
0,130% 
0,064% 
0,017% 
0,158% 
1993 
0,055% 
0,016% 
0,003% 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,008% 
0,020% 
0,022% 
0,170% 
0,115% 
0,026% 
0,181% 
Mean, 
89-93 
0,054% 
0,016% 
0,001 % 
0,000% 
0,000% 
0,007% 
0,014% 
0,020% 
0,144% 
0,094% 
0,022% 
0,243% 
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Table 3. 
UK1 
UK2 
UK3 
UK4 
UK5 
UK6 
UK7 
UK8 
UK9 
UKA 
UKB 
Great Britain: 
Northern Ireland: 
Region 
North 
Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) 
Selective Financial Assistance (SFA) 
Expenditure per capi ta of regional population (1993 
1989 
33,77 
Yorkshire & Humberside 4,28 
East Midlands 
East Anglia 
South East 
South West 
West Midlands 
North West 
Wales 
Scotland 
Great Britain 
Northern Ireland 
0,33 
-
-
3,85 
5,23 
4,40 
33,75 
23,43 
7,47 
76,90 
1990 
9,02 
6,42 
0,12 
-
-
1,71 
4,06 
6,09 
40,73 
50,87 
9,05 
65,70 
1991 
7,58 
5,01 
0,53 
-
-
1,44 
3,21 
5,72 
37,26 
14,27 
5,19 
71,63 
1992 
10,86 
2,90 
0,26 
-
-
1,79 
1,80 
5,39 
33,42 
19,17 
5,26 
38,95 
prices, 
1993 
14,47 
4,40 
0,77 
0,15 
0,03 
2,29 
5,28 
5,85 
42,06 
33,01 
7,76 
42,36 
ECU) 
Mean, 
89-93 
15,14 
4,60 
0,40 
0,03 
0,01 
2,21 
3,92 
5,49 
37,44 
28,15 
6,95 
59,11 
Table 4. Great Britain: Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) 
Northern Ireland: Selective Financial Assistance (SFA) 
Expenditure per capita of recipient region assisted population 
(1993 prices, ECU) 
UK1 
UK2 
UK3 
UK4 
UK5 
UK6 
UK7 
UK8 
UK9 
UKA 
UKB 
Region 
North 
Yorkshire & Humberside 
East Midlands 
East Anglia 
South East 
South West 
West Midlands 
North West 
Wales 
Scotland 
Great Britain 
Northern Ireland 
1989 
39,92 
9,15 
1,92 
-
-
18,05 
8,32 
9,23 
47,80 
38,40 
21,58 
76,90 
1990 
10,67 
13,71 
0,72 
-
-
8,04 
6,45 
12,76 
57,69 
83,39 
26,15 
65,70 
1991 
8,95 
10,70 
3,10 
-
-
6,77 
5,10 
11,99 
52,78 
23,40 
15,02 
71,63 
1992 
12,84 
6,19 
1,53 
-
-
8,38 
2,87 
11,31 
47,33 
31,43 
15,25 
38,95 
1993 
17,10 
9,41 
4,46 
2,10 
0,47 
10,74 
8,39 
12,27 
59,58 
54,11 
22,49 
42,36 
Mean, 
89-93 
17,90 
9,83 
2,35 
0,42 
0,09 
10,40 
6,23 
11,51 
53,04 
46,15 
20,10 
59,11 
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Great Britain: 
0,35% 
Regional Selective Assistance 
Expenditure by region, as a percentage of regional GDP, 1989-93 
See Great Britain Table 2 
(Also includes Northern Irish Selective Financial Assistance) 
0,00% 
Great Britain: Regional Selective Assistance 
Expenditure per capita of regional population, 1989-93 (1993 prices, ECU) 
See Great Britain Table 3 
(Also includes Northern Irish Selective Financial Assistance) 
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Great Britain: Regional Selective Assistance 
Expenditure committed per capita of recipient region asssted area population, 
1989-93 (1993 prices, ECU) 
See Great Britain Table 4 
(Also includes Northern Irish Selective Financial Assistance) 
CO 
CD 
CO 
3 
o 
LU 
■ 
■ 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
170 Economic and Social Cohesion in the European Union: The Impact of Member States' Own Policies: Final Report 
Great Britain: Mean annual Regional SelectiveAssistance (RSA) 
Expenditure per capita of eligible population,1989­93, v. regional GDP per capita 
1992 (both in ECU) 
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Overview Charts: Regional-Level Expenditure Data 
v. Regional GDP 
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Cohesion Countries: Mean expenditure/capita of eligible population on main 
regional incentive by region, 1989-93, in ECU v. regional GDP/capita, 1992, in ECU 
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Italy Germany: Mean expenditure/capita of eligible population on main regional 
incentive by region, 1989-93, in ECU v. regional GDP/capita, 1992, in ECU 
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Other States: Mean expenditure/capita of eligible population on main regional 
incentive by region, 1989-93, in ECU v. regional GDP/capita, 1992, in ECU 
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Mean expenditure/capita of eligible population on main regional incentive by 
region, 1989­93, in ECU v. regional GDP/capita, 1992, in ECU 
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ANNEX II: Interregional Transfers from 
Central Government Budgets: 
Research Results 
A. Budgetary Breakdowns and Regional Allocations 181 
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France 184 
Italy 187 
Spain 190 
Sweden 193 
United Kingdom 195 
Germany 197 
Portugal 200 
C. Regional Maps of the Results 203 
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F. GDP and Transfers Ranked by Country and by GDP 229 
1. Transfers and GDP of the Regions, Ranked by Country 230 
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ANNEX II: Interregional Transfers from Central Government Budgets: Research Results 179 

A, Budgetary Breakdowns and Regional Allocations 
The methodology utilised in the study is described in detail in Section 5.3 of the report. Basically, the methodology 
involves three steps: 
first, detailed national budgets are established. These have to be (i) consolidated (ii) balanced 
ecuted and (v) broken down into as many items of revenue and expenditure as possible. 
recent (iv) ex-
• second, to allow the regional allocation of these budgetary items, allocation criteria or "keys" are sought for each 
item. Regional allocation keys are chosen on the basis of their economic sense: the research methodology is 
guided by economic reasoning and by the theory of incidence in the selection of criteria 
• third, for each region, the amounts estimated for each item of revenue and of expenditure are summed with a 
view to indicating how much each region has contributed (in revenues) to the budget and how much it has 
gained (in expenditures) from the budget. 
Detailed budgetary breakdowns as specified in step one were produced for each of the case study countries. The 
extent of breakdown by country is shown in the Table A.1 : 
Table A.1 : Decomposition of National Budgets 
Expenditure 
items 
Revenue 
items 
Total number 
of items 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
312 
106 
140 
82 
478 
80 
850 
62 
37 
24 
198 
66 
49 
56 
370 
150 
186 
137 
540 
130 
887 
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As mentioned, regional allocation keys were sought for each item in step two of the methodology. The number of 
regional allocation criteria used by country is set out in Table A.2: 
Table A.2: Number of Criteria Used by Country 
France 135 
Germany 111 
Italy 200 
Portugal 45 
Spain 180 
Sweden 110 
United Kingdom 316 
The final results of the exercise are presented in Annex IIB. 
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Β. Final Results 
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1. FRANCE 
Total 
ALSACE 
AQUITAINE 
AUVERGNE 
BOURGOGNE 
BRETAGNE 
CENTRE 
CHAMPAGNE ARDENNES 
CORSE 
FRANCHE COMTE 
ILE DE FRANCE 
LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON 
LIMOUSIN 
LORRAINE 
MIDI PYRENNEES 
NORD PAS DE CALAIS 
BASSE NORMANDIE 
HAUTE NORMANDIE 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE 
PICARDIE 
POITOU CHARENTES 
PACA 
RHONES ALPES 
Moy 
prélev 
MF 
-1.734.807 
-48.792 
-76.262 
-36.908 
-43.407 
-74.203 
-67.933 
-38.715 
-6.138 
-28.775 
-463.225 
-55.968 
-19.301 
-61.790 
-65.910 
-99.942 
-36.805 
-48.231 
-82.530 
-47.761 
-42.819 
-124.449 
-164.944 
Moy 
depbenf 
MF 
1.734.807 
46.004 
84.662 
39.205 
47.819 
83.524 
68.444 
40.739 
9.415 
31.179 
343.748 
74.195 
23.734 
70.133 
80.401 
119.924 
43.305 
51.354 
89.364 
51.005 
47.689 
128.887 
160.078 
Moy 
depflux 
MF 
1.734.790 
48.901 
82.503 
38.539 
42.890 
81.598 
70.315 
38.406 
8.413 
25.876 
404.306 
74.461 
23.470 
67.558 
80.097 
105.716 
41.197 
45.652 
80.821 
42.536 
44.346 
133.233 
153.956 
Solde 
bén. 
MF 
-1 
-2.670 
8.220 
2.219 
4.358 
9.243 
598 
2.015 
3.233 
2.346 
-118.056 
17.566 
4.331 
8.263 
14.310 
19.854 
6.327 
3.140 
6.783 
3.257 
4.785 
4.336 
-4.460 
Solde 
flux. 
MF 
-17 
197 
6.161 
1.699 
-551 
7.385 
2.386 
-273 
2.280 
-2.783 
-58.663 
18.296 
4.164 
5.847 
14.171 
5.621 
4.409 
-2.563 
-1.627 
-5.149 
1.476 
8.477 
-10.976 
Moy 
prélev 
MECU 
-261.660 
-7.359 
-11.503 
-5.567 
-6.547 
-11.192 
-10.246 
-5.839 
-926 
-4.340 
-69.868 
-8.442 
-2.911 
-9.320 
-9.941 
-15.074 
-5.551 
-7.275 
-12.448 
-7.204 
-6.458 
-18.771 
-24.878 
Moy 
depbenf 
MECU 
261.660 
6.939 
12.770 
5.913 
7.213 
12.598 
10.323 
6.145 
1.420 
4.703 
51.847 
11.191 
3.580 
10.578 
12.127 
18.088 
6.532 
7.746 
13.479 
7.693 
7.193 
19.440 
24.144 
Moy 
depflux 
MECU 
261.658 
7.376 
12.444 
5.813 
6.469 
12.307 
10.606 
5.793 
1.269 
3.903 
60.981 
11.231 
3.540 
10.190 
12.081 
15.945 
6.214 
6.886 
12.190 
6.416 
6.689 
20.095 
23.221 
Solde 
bén. 
MECU 
0 
-403 
1.240 
335 
657 
1.394 
90 
304 
488 
354 
-17.806 
2.649 
653 
1.246 
2.158 
2.995 
954 
474 
1.023 
491 
722 
654 
-673 
Solde 
flux. 
MECU 
-3 
30 
929 
256 
-83 
1.114 
360 
-41 
344 
-420 
-8,848 
2.760 
628 
882 
2.137 
848 
665 
-387 
-245 
-777 
223 
1.279 
-1.655 
1. FRANCE (Continued) 
Total 
ALSACE 
AQUITAINE 
AUVERGNE 
OURGOGNE 
BRETAGNE 
CENTRE 
HAMPAGNE ARDENNES 
CORSE 
FRANCHE COMTE 
ILE DE FRANCE 
LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON 
LIMOUSIN 
LORRAINE 
MIDI PYRENNEES 
NORD PAS DE CALAIS 
BASSE NORMANDIE 
HAUTE NORMANDIE 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE 
PICARDIE 
POITOU CHARENTES 
PACA 
RHONES ALPES 
Moy 
prélèv 
M PPS 
-36.990 
-1.038 
-1.623 
-785 
-924 
-1.579 
-1.446 
-824 
-131 
-612 
-9.856 
-1.191 
-411 
-1.315 
-1.479 
-2.127 
-783 
-1.026 
-1.756 
-1.016 
-911 
-2.648 
-3.510 
Moy 
depbenf 
M PPS 
37.007 
979 
1.801 
834 
1.017 
1.777 
1.456 
867 
200 
663 
7.314 
1.579 
505 
1.492 
1.805 
2.552 
921 
1.093 
1.901 
1.085 
1.015 
2.742 
3.406 
Moy 
depflux 
M PPS 
37.006 
1.041 
1.755 
820 
913 
1.736 
1.496 
817 
179 
551 
8.603 
1.584 
499 
1.438 
1.798 
2.249 
877 
971 
1.720 
905 
944 
2.835 
3.276 
Solde 
bén. 
M PPS 
17 
-57 
175 
47 
93 
197 
13 
43 
69 
50 
-2.512 
374 
92 
176 
321 
422 
135 
67 
144 
69 
102 
92 
-95 
Solde 
flux. 
M PPS 
16 
4 
131 
36 
-12 
157 
51 
-6 
49 
-59 
-1.248 
389 
89 
124 
318 
120 
94 
-55 
-35 
-110 
31 
180 
-234 
Moy 
prélèv 
%du 
GDP reg. 
-24% 
-24% 
-24% 
-28% 
-25% 
-25% 
-25% 
-24% 
-28% 
-23% 
-23% 
-27% 
-27% 
-25% 
-26% 
-25% 
-23% 
-24% 
-25% 
-25% 
-26% 
-26% 
-25% 
Moy 
depbenf 
%du 
GDP reg. 
24% 
22% 
27% 
29% 
27% 
29% 
25% 
25% 
43% 
25% 
17% 
36% 
34% 
29% 
3 1 % 
30% 
28% 
25% 
27% 
26% 
29% 
27% 
24% 
Moy 
depflux 
%du 
GDP reg. 
24% 
24% 
26% 
29% 
25% 
28% 
26% 
23% 
38% 
21% 
20% 
36% 
33% 
28% 
3 1 % 
27% 
26% 
23% 
25% 
22% 
27% 
28% 
23% 
Solde 
ben. 
%du 
GDP reg. 
0% 
- 1 % 
3% 
2% 
3% 
3% 
0% 
1% 
15% 
2% 
-6% 
8% 
6% 
3% 
6% 
5% 
4% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
3% 
1% 
- 1 % 
Solde 
flux. 
%du 
GDP reg. 
0% 
0% 
2% 
1% 
0% 
3% 
1% 
0% 
10% 
-2% 
-3% 
9% 
6% 
2% 
5% 
1% 
3% 
- 1 % 
0% 
-3% 
1% 
2% 
-2% 
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1. FRANCE (Continued) 
Total 
ALSACE 
AQUITAINE 
AUVERGNE 
OURGOGNE 
BRETAGNE 
CENTRE 
HAMPAGNE ARDENNES 
CORSE 
FRANCHE COMTE 
ILE DE FRANCE 
LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON 
LIMOUSIN 
LORRAINE 
MIDI PYRENNEES 
NORD PAS DE CALAIS 
BASSE NORMANDIE 
HAUTE NORMANDIE 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE 
PICARDIE 
POITOU CHARENTES 
PACA 
RHONES ALPES 
Moy 
prélev 
%des 
dépenses 
-100% 
-3% 
-4% 
-2% 
-3% 
-4% 
-4% 
-2% 
0% 
-2% 
-27% 
-3% 
- 1 % 
-4% 
-4% 
-6% 
-2% 
-3% 
-5% 
-3% 
-2% 
-7% 
-10% 
Moy 
depbenf 
%des 
dépenses 
100% 
3% 
5% 
2% 
3% 
5% 
4% 
2% 
1% 
2% 
20% 
4% 
1% 
4% 
5% 
7% 
2% 
3% 
5% 
3% 
3% 
7% 
9% 
Moy 
depflux 
%des 
dépenses 
100% 
3% 
5% 
2% 
2% 
5% 
4% 
2% 
0% 
1% 
23% 
4% 
1% 
4% 
5% 
6% 
2% 
3% 
5% 
2% 
3% 
8% 
9% 
Solde Solde 
bén. flux. 
% des % des 
dépenses dépenses 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
1% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
-7% 
1% 
0% 
0% 
1% 
1% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
-3% 
1% 
0% 
0% 
1% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
- 1 % 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
kF/hab. 
-29,7 
-26,9 
-28,0 
-26,8 
-26,3 
-28,3 
-28,7 
-24,4 
-25,9 
-42,7 
-25,8 
-26,9 
-26,9 
-26,8 
-25,1 
-26,3 
-27,5 
-26,6 
-26,0 
-26,5 
-28,6 
-30,2 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
kF/hab. 
28,0 
29,9 
29,8 
29,6 
29,6 
28,5 
30,2 
37,4 
28,1 
31,7 
34,2 
33,1 
30,6 
32,7 
30,2 
30,9 
29,3 
28,8 
27,7 
29,6 
29,6 
29,3 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
kF/hab. 
29,8 
29,1 
29,3 
26,5 
28,9 
29,3 
28,5 
33,4 
23,3 
37,3 
34,3 
32,7 
29,4 
32,6 
26,6 
29,4 
26,0 
26,1 
23,1 
27,5 
30,6 
28,2 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
kF/hab. 
-1,6 
2,9 
1,7 
2,7 
3,3 
0,2 
1,5 
12,8 
2,1 
-10,9 
8,1 
6,0 
3,6 
5,8 
5,0 
4,5 
1,8 
2,2 
1,8 
3,0 
1,0 
-0,8 
Solde 
flux 
par hab. 
kF/hab. 
0,1 
2,2 
1,3 
-0,3 
2,6 
1,0 
-0,2 
9,0 
-2,5 
-5,4 
8,4 
5,8 
2,5 
5,8 
1,4 
3,1 
-1,5 
-0,5 
-2,8 
0,9 
1,9 
-2,0 
1. FRANCE (Continued) 
Total 
ALSACE 
AQUITAINE 
AUVERGNE 
OURGOGNE 
BRETAGNE 
CENTRE 
HAMPAGNE ARDENNES 
CORSE 
FRANCHE COMTE 
ILE DE FRANCE 
LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON 
LIMOUSIN 
LORRAINE 
MIDI PYRENNEES 
NORD PAS DE CALAIS 
BASSE NORMANDIE 
HAUTE NORMANDIE 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE 
PICARDIE 
POITOU CHARENTES 
PACA 
RHONES ALPES 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
-4,5 
-4,1 
-4,2 
-4,0 
-4,0 
-4,3 
-4,3 
-3,7 
-3,9 
-6,4 
-3,9 
-4,1 
-4,1 
-4,0 
-3,8 
-4,0 
-4,1 
-4,0 
-3,9 
-4,0 
-4,3 
-4,6 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab 
k 
ECU/hab. 
4,2 
4,5 
4,5 
4,5 
4,5 
4,3 
4,6 
5,6 
4,2 
4,8 
5,2 
5,0 
4,6 
4,9 
4,5 
4,7 
4,4 
4,3 
4,2 
4,5 
4,5 
4,4 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
4,5 
4,4 
4,4 
4,0 
4,4 
4,4 
4,3 
5,0 
3,5 
5,6 
5,2 
4,9 
4,4 
4,9 
4,0 
4,4 
3,9 
3,9 
3,5 
4,1 
4,6 
4,3 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
-0,2 
0,4 
0,3 
0,4 
0,5 
0,0 
0,2 
1,9 
0,3 
-1,6 
1,2 
0,9 
0,5 
0,9 
0,8 
0,7 
0,3 
0,3 
0,3 
0,4 
0,2 
-0,1 
Solde . 
flux 
par hab 
k 
ECU/hab. 
0,0 
0,3 
0,2 
-0,1 
0,4 
0,1 
0,0 
1,4 
-0,4 
-0,8 
1,3 
0,9 
0,4 
0,9 
0,2 
0,5 
-0,2 
-0,1 
-0,4 
0,1 
0,3 
-0,3 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,5 
-0,6 
-0,9 
-0,5 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,5 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,6 
-0,6 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/tiab. 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,8 
0,6 
0,7 
0,7 
0,7 
0,7 
0,7 
0,6 
0,7 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,7 
0,5 
0,8 
0,7 
0,7 
0,6 
0,7 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,6 
0,5 
0,6 
0,7 
0,6 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
0,0 
0,1 
0,0 
0,1 
0,1 
0,0 
0,0 
0,3 
0,0 
-0,2 
0,2 
0,1 
0,1 
0,1 
0,1 
0,1 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,1 
0,0 
0,0 
Solde 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,1 
0,0 
0,0 
0,2 
-0,1 
-0,1 
0,2 
0,1 
0,1 
0,1 
0,0 
0,1 
0,0 
0,0 
-0,1 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
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1. FRANCE (Continued) 
Population 
k 
Population 
% 
GDP 1993 
MF 
GDP 1993 
MECU 
GDP 1993 
MPPS 
Total 
ALSACE 
AQUITAINE 
AUVERGNE 
OURGOGNE 
BRETAGNE 
CENTRE 
HAMPAGNE ARDENNES 
CORSE 
FRANCHE COMTE 
ILE DE FRANCE 
LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON 
UMOUSIN 
LORRAINE 
MIDI PYRENNEES 
NORD PAS DE CALAIS 
BASSE NORMANDIE 
HAUTE NORMANDIE 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE 
PICARDIE 
POITOU CHARENTES 
PACA 
RHONES ALPES 
57.328 
1.641 
2.832 
1.316 
1.618 
2.821 
2.399 
1.349 
252 
1.109 
10.853 
2.170 
718 
2.294 
2.460 
3.976 
1.402 
1.753 
3.102 
1.840 
1.613 
4.354 
5.456 
100% 
3% 
5% 
2% 
3% 
5% 
4% 
2% 
0% 
2% 
19% 
4% 
1% 
4% 
4% 
7% 
2% 
3% 
5% 
3% 
3% 
8% 
10% 
7.084.268 
206.166 
311.709 
133.482 
174.236 
292.171 
269.026 
164.676 
22.012 
125.453 
2.026.062 
208.606 
70.762 
243.089 
258.384 
393.365 
157.224 
202.261 
328.026 
194.299 
162.296 
478.878 
662.085 
1.068.517 
31.096 
47.015 
20.133 
26.280 
44.068 
40.577 
24.838 
3.320 
18.922 
305.590 
31.464 
10.673 
36.665 
38.972 
59.331 
23.714 
30.507 
49.476 
29.306 
24.479 
72.229 
99.862 
1.001.402 
29.085 
43.973 
18.831 
24.580 
41.217 
37.953 
23.232 
3.105 
17.698 
285.823 
29.429 
9.983 
34.296 
38.451 
55.493 
22.180 
28.533 
46.275 
27.411 
22.895 
67.557 
93.402 
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ITALY 
Total 
Abruzzo 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Campania 
Emilia R. 
Friuli V. G. 
Lazio 
Liguria 
Lombardia 
Marche 
Molise 
Piemonte 
Puglia 
Sardegna 
Sicilia 
Toscana 
Trentino A. A. 
Umbria 
Valle d' Aosta 
Veneto 
Moy 
prélèv 
ML 
-745.956.064 
-13.150.038 
-4.698.996 
-15.509.250 
-47.889.099 
-66.074.403 
-17.585.394 
-75.653.133 
-26.109.183 
-157.798.790 
-18.102.493 
-2.838.957 
-67.178.076 
-34.390.104 
-15.630.062 
-42.319.766 
-52.766.312 
-12.754.148 
-9.703.446 
-1.988.110 
-63.816.305 
Moy 
depbenf 
ML 
738.934.875 
18.464.398 
10.096.758 
28.159.074 
69.986.579 
52.088.261 
16.714.137 
72.041.545 
23.553.932 
112.026.446 
18.138.939 
5.720.164 
53.884.297 
48.546.275 
23.555.722 
65.022.007 
44.533.660 
12.018.873 
9.985.570 
1.857.426 
52.540.792 
Moy 
depflux 
ML 
745.955.902 
16.287.449 
7.665.689 
22.469.820 
67.426.802 
53.144.235 
17.765.524 
91.274.423 
24.200.582 
118.589.201 
17.685.843 
4.090.876 
54.194.041 
42.393.017 
22.489.825 
59.608.346 
45.932.237 
15.966.165 
9.869.278 
2.478.012 
52.424.538 
Solde 
bén. 
ML 
-144.738 
5.314.322 
5.288.179 
12.422.501 
21.890.860 
-13.018.347 
-684.098 
-2.711.605 
-2.185.176 
-43.144.860 
207.832 
2.829.785 
-12.341.392 
13.992.837 
7.850.894 
22.370.506 
-7.495.798 
-539.326 
369.520 
-102.381 
-10.458.992 
Solde 
flux. 
ML 
0 
2.924.443 
2.854.098 
6.731.233 
18.625.333 
-12.620.726 
153.145 
16.794.071 
-1.880.288 
-36.913.107 
-597.577 
1.185.526 
-12.786.303 
7.475.952 
6.592.108 
16.486.771 
-6.792.633 
2.972.827 
98.566 
481.548 
-11.784.987 
Moy 
prélèv 
MECU 
-405.191 
-7.143 
-2.552 
-8.424 
-26.013 
-35.890 
-9.552 
-41.093 
-14.182 
-85.714 
-9.833 
-1.542 
-36.490 
-18.680 
-8.490 
-22.987 
-28.662 
-6.928 
-5.271 
-1.080 
-34.664 
Moy 
depbenf 
M ECU 
401.377 
10.030 
5.484 
15.296 
38.016 
28.293 
9.079 
39.132 
12.794 
60.851 
9.853 
3.107 
29.269 
26.370 
12.795 
35.319 
24.190 
6.528 
5.424 
1.009 
28.539 
Moy 
depflux 
M ECU 
405.191 
8.847 
4.164 
12.205 
36.625 
28.867 
9.650 
49.579 
13.145 
64.416 
9.607 
2.222 
29.437 
23.027 
12.216 
32.378 
24.950 
8.673 
5.361 
1.346 
28.476 
Solde 
bén. 
MECU 
-79 
2.887 
2.872 
6.748 
11.891 
-7.071 
-372 
-1.473 
-1.187 
Solde 
flux. 
MECU 
0 
1.589 
1.550 
3.656 
10.117 
-6.855 
83 
9.122 
-1.021 
-23.436-20.051 
113 
1.537 
-6.704 
7.601 
4.264 
12.151 
-4.072 
-293 
201 
-56 
-5.681 
-325 
644 
-6.945 
4.061 
3.581 
8.955 
-3.690 
1.615 
54 
262 
-6.401 
2. ITALY (Continued) 
Total 
Abruzzo 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Campania 
Emilia R. 
Friuli V. G. 
Lazio 
Liguria 
Lombardia 
Marche 
Molise 
Piemonte 
Puglia 
Sardegna 
Sicilia 
Toscana 
Trentino A. A. 
Umbria 
Valle d' Aosta 
Veneto 
Moy 
prélèv 
M PPS 
-450.785 
-7.947 
-2.840 
-9.372 
-28.940 
-39.929 
-10.627 
-45.718 
-15.778 
-95.359 
-10.939 
-1.716 
-40.596 
-20.782 
-9.445 
-25.574 
-31.887 
-7.707 
-5.864 
-1.201 
-38.564 
Moy 
depbenf 
MPPS 
446.543 
11.158 
6.101 
17.017 
42.294 
31.477 
10.100 
43.535 
14.234 
67.698 
10.961 
3.457 
32.563 
29.337 
14.234 
39.293 
26.912 
7.263 
6.034 
1.122 
31.750 
Moy 
depflux 
MPPS 
450.785 
9.843 
4.632 
13.579 
40.747 
32.115 
10.736 
55.158 
14.625 
71.664 
10.687 
2.473 
32.750 
25.618 
13.590 
36.022 
27.757 
9.648 
5.964 
1.497 
31.680 
Solde 
bén. 
MPPS 
-87 
3.212 
3.196 
7.507 
13.229 
-7.867 
-413 
-1.639 
-1.321 
-26.073 
126 
1.710 
-7.458 
8.456 
4.744 
13.519 
-4.530 
-326 
223 
-62 
-6.320 
Solde 
flux. 
MPPS 
0 
1.767 
1.725 
4.068 
11.256 
-7.627 
93 
10.149 
-1.136 
-22.307 
-361 
717 
-7.727 
4.518 
3.983 
9.963 
-4.105 
1.796 
60 
291 
-7.122 
Moy 
prélèv 
%du 
GDP reg. 
-48% 
-44% 
-44% 
-47% 
-46% 
-50% 
-47% 
-46% 
-49% 
-51% 
-46% 
-41% 
-51% 
-43% 
-46% 
-44% 
-52% 
-43% 
-45% 
-49% 
-47% 
Moy 
depbenf 
%du 
GDP reg. 
47% 
61% 
94% 
85% 
67% 
39% 
44% 
44% 
44% 
36% 
46% 
83% 
41% 
61% 
69% 
68% 
44% 
40% 
46% 
46% 
39% 
Moy 
depflux 
%du 
GDP reg. 
48% 
54% 
71% 
67% 
65% 
40% 
47% 
55% 
45% 
38% 
45% 
59% 
41% 
53% 
66% 
63% 
45% 
54% 
46% 
61% 
38% 
Solde 
bén. 
%du 
GDP reg. 
0% 
18% 
49% 
37% 
21% 
-10% 
-2% 
-2% 
-4% 
-14% 
1% 
41% 
-9% 
18% 
23% 
23% 
-7% 
-2% 
2% 
-3% 
-8% 
Solde 
flux. 
%du 
GDP reg. 
0% 
10% 
27% 
20% 
18% 
-10% 
0% 
10% 
-4% 
-12% 
-2% 
17% 
-10% 
9% 
19% 
17% 
-7% 
10% 
0% 
12% 
-9% 
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2. ITALY (Continued) 
Moy 
prélèv 
%des 
dépenses 
Moy 
depbenf 
%des 
dépenses 
Moy 
depflux 
%des 
dépenses 
Solde 
bén. 
%des 
dépenses 
Solde 
flux. 
%des 
dépenses 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
kLVhab. 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
kL/hab. 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
kL/hab. 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
kL/hab. 
Solde 
flux 
par hab. 
kL/hab. 
Total 
Abruzzo 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Campania 
Emilia R. 
Friuli V. G. 
Lazio 
Liguria 
Lombardia 
Marche 
Molise 
Piemonte 
Puglia 
Sardegna 
Sicilia 
Toscana 
Trentino A. A. 
Umbria 
Valle d' Aosta 
Veneto 
-101% 
-2% 
- 1 % 
-2% 
-6% 
-9% 
-2% 
-10% 
-4% 
-21% 
-2% 
0% 
-9% 
-5% 
-2% 
-6% 
-7% 
-2% 
- 1 % 
0% 
-9% 
100% 
2% 
1% 
4% 
9% 
7% 
2% 
10% 
3% 
15% 
2% 
1% 
7% 
7% 
3% 
9% 
6% 
2% 
1% 
0% 
7% 
101% 
2% 
1% 
3% 
9% 
7% 
2% 
12% 
3% 
16% 
2% 
1% 
7% 
6% 
3% 
8% 
6% 
2% 
1% 
0% 
7% 
0% 
1% 
1% 
2% 
3% 
-2% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
-6% 
0% 
0% 
-2% 
2% 
1% 
3% 
- 1 % 
0% 
0% 
0% 
- 1 % 
0% 
0% 
0% 
1% 
3% 
-2% 
0% 
2% 
0% 
-5% 
0% 
0% 
-2% 
1% 
1% 
2% 
- 1 % 
0% 
0% 
0% 
-2% 
-10.273 
-7.543 
-7.330 
-8.284 
-16.527 
-14.426 
-14.372 
-15.340 
-17.400 
-12.382 
-8.399 
-15.306 
-8.327 
-9.276 
-8.303 
-14.661 
-13.954 
-11.677 
-16.568 
-14.238 
14.425 
16.207 
13.308 
12.106 
13.029 
13.711 
13.686 
13.839 
12.353 
12.407 
16.924 
12.277 
11.755 
13.980 
12.757 
12.374 
13.150 
12.016 
15.479 
11.723 
12.725 
12.304 
10.619 
11.664 
13.293 
14.574 
17.339 
14.219 
13.076 
12.097 
12.103 
12.348 
10.265 
13.347 
11.695 
12.762 
17.468 
11.876 
20.650 
11.697 
4.152 
8.488 
5.871 
3.787 
-3.256 
-561 
-515 
-1.284 
-4.757 
142 
8.372 
-2.812 
3.388 
4.659 
4.389 
-2.083 
-590 
445 
-853 
-2.334 
2.285 
4.581 
3.181 
3.222 
-3.157 
126 
3.190 
-1.105 
-4.070 
-409 
3.507 
-2.913 
1.810 
3.912 
3.235 
-1.887 
3.253 
119 
4.013 
-2.629 
2. ITALY (Continued) 
Total 
Abruzzo 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Campania 
Emilia R. 
Friuli V. G. 
Lazio 
Liguria 
Lombardia 
Marche 
Molise 
Piemonte 
Puglia 
Sardegna 
Sicilia 
Toscana 
Trentino A. A. 
Umbria 
Valle d' Aosta 
Veneto 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
-5,6 
-4,1 
-4,0 
-4,5 
-9,0 
-7,8 
-7,8 
-8,3 
-9,5 
-6,7 
-4,6 
-8,3 
-4,5 
-5,0 
-4,5 
-8,0 
-7,6 
-6,3 
-9,0 
-7,7 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab 
k 
ECU/hab. 
7,8 
8,8 
7,2 
6,6 
7,1 
7,4 
7,4 
7,5 
6,7 
6,7 
9,2 
6,7 
6,4 
7,6 
6,9 
6,7 
7,1 
6,5 
8,4 
6,4 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
6,9 
6,7 
5,8 
6,3 
7,2 
7,9 
9,4 
7,7 
7,1 
6,6 
6,6 
6,7 
5,6 
7,2 
6,4 
6,9 
9,5 
6,5 
11,2 
6,4 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
2,3 
4,6 
3,2 
2,1 
-1,8 
-0,3 
-0,3 
-0,7 
-2,6 
0,1 
4,5 
-1,5 
1,8 
2,5 
2,4 
-1,1 
-0,3 
0,2 
-0,5 
-1,3 
Solde. 
flux 
par hab 
k 
ECU/hab. 
1,2 
2,5 
1,7 
1,8 
-1,7 
0,1 
1,7 
-0,6 
-2,2 
-0,2 
1,9 
-1,6 
1,0 
2,1 
1,8 
-1,0 
1,8 
0,1 
2,2 
-1,4 
Prélev. 
par hab, 
k 
PPS/hab. 
-6,2 
-4,6 
-4,4 
-5,0 
-10,0 
-8,7 
-8,7 
-9,3 
-10,5 
-7,5 
-5,1 
-9,2 
-5,0 
-5,6 
-5,0 
-8,9 
-8,4 
-7,1 
-10,0 
-8,6 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
8,7 
9,8 
8,0 
7,3 
7,9 
8,3 
8,3 
8,4 
7,5 
7,5 
10,2 
7,4 
7,1 
8,4 
7,7 
7,5 
7,9 
7,3 
9,4 
7,1 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
7,7 
7,4 
6,4 
7,0 
8,0 
8,8 
10,5 
8,6 
7,9 
7,3 
7,3 
7,5 
6,2 
8,1 
7,1 
7,7 
10,6 
7,2 
12,5 
7,1 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
2,5 
5,1 
3,5 
2,3 
-2,0 
-0,3 
-0,3 
-0,8 
-2,9 
0,1 
5,1 
-1,7 
2,0 
2,8 
2,7 
-1,3 
-0,4 
0,3 
-0,5 
-1,4 
Solde 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
1,4 
2,8 
1,9 
1,9 
-1,9 
0,1 
1,9 
-0,7 
-2,5 
-0,2 
2,1 
-1,8 
1,1 
2,4 
2,0 
-1,1 
2,0 
0,1 
2,4 
-1,6 
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2. ITALY (Continued) 
Population 
k 
Population 
% 
GDP 1993 
ML 
GDP 1993 
MECU 
GDP 1993 
MPPS 
Total 
Abruzzo 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Campania 
Emilia R. 
Friuli V. G. 
Lazio 
Liguria 
Lombardia 
Marche 
Molise 
Piemonte 
Puglia 
Sardegna 
Sicilia 
Toscana 
Trentino A. A. 
Umbria 
Valle d' Aosta 
Veneto 
58.099 
1.280 
623 
2.116 
5.781 
3.998 
1.219 
5.264 
1.702 
9.069 
1.462 
338 
4.389 
4.130 
1.685 
5.097 
3.599 
914 
831 
120 
4.482 
100% 
2% 
1% 
4% 
10% 
7% 
2% 
9% 
3% 
16% 
3% 
1% 
8% 
7% 
3% 
9% 
6% 
2% 
1% 
0% 
8% 
1.559.917.961 
30.179.513 
10.734.871 
33.296.326 
104.185.872 
131.926.060 
37.786.525 
165.336.528 
53.718.539 
310.342.893 
39.620.161 
6.909.273 
132.498.611 
79.936.220 
34.157.914 
95.325.139 
102.366.964 
29.684.284 
21.607.817 
4.074.133 
136.230.318 
847.321 
16.393 
5.831 
18.086 
56.592 
71.660 
20.525 
89.808 
29.179 
168.573 
21.521 
3.753 
71.971 
43.420 
18.554 
51.779 
55.604 
16.124 
11.737 
2.213 
73.998 
942.667 
18.238 
6.487 
20.121 
62.961 
79.724 
22.834 
99.914 
32.463 
187.542 
23.942 
4.176 
80.070 
48.306 
20.641 
57.606 
61.861 
17.938 
13.057 
2.462 
82.324 
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SPAIN 
Total 
Andalucía 
Aragon 
Asturias 
Baleares 
Canarias 
Cantabria 
Castilla La Mancha 
Castilla Leon 
Cataluña 
Ceuta Y Melilla 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
La Rioja 
Madrid 
Murcia 
Navarra 
Pais Vasco 
Valencia 
Moy 
prélev 
MPtas 
-19.563.741 
-2.511.969 
-705.178 
-551.418 
-421.309 
-580.208 
-257.841 
-688.471 
-1.255.174 
-3.756.716 
-48.515 
-346.169 
-1.086.717 
-154.695 
-3.351.675 
-426.918 
-322.449 
-1.269.686 
-1.828.633 
Moy 
depbenf 
MPtas 
19.563.633 
3.884.583 
566.060 
571.451 
308.573 
882.821 
253.965 
788.229 
1.303.285 
3.133.405 
52.352 
551.384 
1.560.685 
125.345 
2.095.373 
464.800 
258.175 
914.752 
1.848.395 
Moy 
depflux 
MPtas 
19.563.636 
3.612.265 
631.943 
565.099 
311.452 
830.622 
245.794 
763.976 
1.339.623 
3.130.515 
71.844 
525.332 
1.407.747 
143.930 
2.474.505 
456.761 
267.728 
952.333 
1.832.163 
Solde 
bén. 
MPtas 
-108 
1.368.574 
-135.931 
21.282 
-113.965 
299.536 
-2.413 
104.414 
52.184 
-641.474 
4.373 
208.501 
474.948 
-29.083 
-1.260.841 
38.462 
-62.634 
-351.994 
25.951 
Solde 
flux. 
MPtas 
-116 
1.108.639 
-67.054 
16.685 
-105.253 
265.355 
-11.543 
75.936 
80.915 
-613.313 
24.113 
179.467 
309.941 
-11.763 
-900.818 
29.997 
-59.992 
-335.901 
14.474 
Moy 
prélev 
MECU 
-131.195 
-16.845 
-4.729 
-3.698 
-2.825 
-3.891 
-1.729 
-4.617 
-8.417 
-25.193 
-325 
-2.321 
-7.288 
-1.037 
-22.476 
-2.863 
-2.162 
-8.515 
-12.263 
Moy 
depbenf 
MECU 
131.194 
26.050 
3.796 
3.832 
2.069 
5.920 
1.703 
5.286 
8.740 
21.013 
351 
3.698 
10.466 
841 
14.052 
3.117 
1.731 
6.134 
12.395 
Moy 
depflux 
MECU 
131.194 
24.224 
4.238 
3.790 
2.089 
5.570 
1.648 
5.123 
8.984 
20.993 
482 
3.523 
9.440 
965 
16.594 
3.063 
1.795 
6.386 
12.287 
Solde 
bén. 
MECU 
-1 
9.178 
-912 
143 
-764 
2.009 
-16 
700 
350 
-4.302 
29 
1.398 
3.185 
-195 
-8.455 
258 
-420 
-2.360 
174 
Solde 
flux. 
MECU 
-1 
7.435 
-450 
112 
-706 
1.779 
-77 
509 
543 
-4.113 
162 
1.204 
2.078 
-79 
-6.041 
201 
-402 
-2.253 
97 
3. SPAIN (Continued) 
Total 
Andalucía 
Aragon 
Asturias 
Baleares 
Canarias 
Cantabria 
Castilla La Mancha 
Castilla Leon 
Cataluña 
Ceuta Y Melilla 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
La Rioja 
Madrid 
Murcia 
Navarra 
Pais Vasco 
Valencia 
Moy 
prélèv 
MPPS 
-155.034 
-19.906 
-5.588 
-4.370 
-3.339 
-4.598 
-2.043 
-5.456 
-9.947 
-29.770 
-384 
-2.743 
-8.612 
-1.226 
-26.560 
-3.383 
-2.555 
-10.062 
-14.491 
Moy 
depbenf 
MPPS 
155.033 
30.783 
4.486 
4.528 
2.445 
6.996 
2.013 
6.246 
10.328 
24.831 
415 
4.370 
12.367 
993 
16.605 
3.683 
2.046 
7.249 
14.647 
Moy 
depflux 
M PPS 
155.033 
28.625 
5.008 
4.478 
2.468 
6.582 
1.948 
6.054 
10.616 
24.808 
569 
4.163 
11.156 
1.141 
19.609 
3.620 
2.122 
7.547 
14.519 
Solde 
bén. 
MPPS 
-1 
10.845 
-1.077 
169 
-903 
2.374 
-19 
827 
414 
-5.083 
35 
1.652 
3.764 
-230 
-9.992 
305 
-496 
-2.789 
206 
Solde 
flux. 
MPPS 
-1 
8.785 
-531 
132 
-834 
2.103 
-91 
602 
641 
-4.860 
191 
1.422 
2.456 
-93 
-7.139 
238 
-475 
-2.662 
115 
Moy 
prélèv 
% d u 
GDP reg. 
-32% 
- 3 1 % 
-34% 
-34% 
-29% 
-25% 
-33% 
-31% 
-34% 
-33% 
-29% 
-30% 
-33% 
-34% 
-34% 
-29% 
-32% 
-33% 
-31% 
Moy 
depbenf 
% d u 
GDP reg. 
32% 
47% 
27% 
35% 
21% 
38% 
32% 
35% 
35% 
27% 
31% 
47% 
47% 
28% 
21% 
31% 
26% 
24% 
32% 
Moy 
depflux 
% d u 
GDP reg. 
32% 
44% 
30% 
35% 
22% 
36% 
31% 
34% 
36% 
27% 
43% 
45% 
43% 
32% 
25% 
31% 
27% 
25% 
31% 
Solde 
bén. 
% d u 
GDP reg. 
0% 
17% 
-7% 
1% 
-8% 
13% 
0% 
5% 
1% 
-6% 
3% 
18% 
14% 
-6% 
-13% 
3% 
-6% 
-9% 
0% 
Solde 
flux. 
% d u 
GDP reg. 
0% 
14% 
-3% 
1% 
-7% 
11% 
- 1 % 
3% 
2% 
-5% 
14% 
15% 
9% 
-3% 
-9% 
2% 
-6% 
-9% 
0% 
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3. SPAIN (Continued) 
Moy 
prélèv 
% des 
dépenses 
Moy 
depbenf 
%des 
dépenses 
Moy 
depflux 
%des 
dépenses 
Solde 
bén. 
%des 
dépenses 
Solde 
flux. 
%des 
dépenses 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
kPtas/hab. 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
kPtas/hab. 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
kPtas/hab. 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
kPtas/hab. 
Solde 
flux 
par hab. 
kPtas/hab. 
Total 
Andalucía 
Aragon 
Asturias 
Baleares 
Canarias 
Cantabria 
Castilla La Mancha 
Castilla Leon 
Cataluña 
Ceuta Y Melilla 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
La Rioja 
Madrid 
Murcia 
Navarra 
Pais Vasco 
Valencia 
-100% 
-13% 
-4% 
-3% 
-2% 
-3% 
- 1 % 
-4% 
-6% 
-19% 
0% 
-2% 
-6% 
- 1 % 
-17% 
-2% 
-2% 
-6% 
-9% 
100% 
20% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
5% 
1% 
4% 
7% 
16% 
0% 
3% 
8% 
1% 
11% 
2% 
1% 
5% 
9% 
100% 
18% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
4% 
1% 
4% 
7% 
16% 
0% 
3% 
7% 
1% 
13% 
2% 
1% 
5% 
9% 
0% 
7% 
- 1 % 
0% 
- 1 % 
2% 
0% 
1% 
0% 
-3% 
0% 
1% 
2% 
0% 
-6% 
0% 
0% 
-2% 
0% 
0% 
6% 
0% 
0% 
- 1 % 
1% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
-3% 
0% 
1% 
2% 
0% 
-5% 
0% 
0% 
-2% 
0% 
-357 
-594 
-506 
-577 
-380 
-489 
-415 
-498 
-617 
-385 
-328 
-398 
-586 
-668 
-401 
-617 
-608 
-469 
552 
476 
525 
423 
579 
482 
475 
517 
514 
415 
522 
572 
475 
417 
436 
494 
438 
474 
514 
532 
519 
427 
544 
466 
460 
531 
514 
570 
497 
516 
545 
493 
429 
512 
456 
470 
195 
-114 
20 
-156 
196 
-5 
63 
21 
-105 
35 
197 
174 
-110 
-251 
36 
-120 
-169 
7 
158 
-56 
15 
-144 
174 
-22 
46 
32 
-101 
191 
170 
114 
-45 
-179 
28 
-115 
-161 
4 
3. SPAIN (Continued) 
Total 
Andalucía 
Aragon 
Asturias 
Baleares 
Canarias 
Cantabria 
Castilla La Mancha 
Castilla Leon 
Cataluña 
Ceuta Y Melilla 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
La Rioja 
Madrid 
Murcia 
Navarra 
Pais Vasco 
Valencia 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
-2,4 
-4,0 
-3,4 
-3,9 
-2,5 
-3,3 
-2,8 
-3,3 
-4,1 
-2,6 
-2,2 
-2,7 
-3,9 
-4,5 
-2,7 
-4,1 
-4,1 
-3,1 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab 
k 
ECU/hab. 
3,7 
3,2 
3,5 
2,8 
3,9 
3,2 
3,2 
3,5 
3,4 
2,8 
3,5 
3,8 
3,2 
2,8 
2,9 
3,3 
2,9 
3,2 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
3,4 
3,6 
3,5 
2,9 
3,7 
3,1 
3,1 
3,6 
3,4 
3,8 
3,3 
3,5 
3,7 
3,3 
2,9 
3,4 
3,1 
3,1 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
1,3 
-0,8 
0,1 
-1,0 
1,3 
0,0 
0,4 
0,1 
-0,7 
0,2 
1,3 
1,2 
-0,7 
-1,7 
0,2 
-0,8 
-1,1 
0,0 
Solde . 
flux 
par hab 
k 
ECU/hab. 
1,1 
-0,4 
0,1 
-1,0 
1,2 
-0,1 
0,3 
0,2 
-0,7 
1,3 
1,1 
0,8 
-0,3 
-1,2 
0,2 
-0,8 
-1,1 
0,0 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
-2,8 
-4,7 
-4,0 
-4,6 
-3,0 
-3,9 
-3,3 
-3,9 
-4,9 
-3,1 
-2,6 
-3,2 
-4,6 
-5,3 
-3,2 
-4,9 
-4,8 
-3,7 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
4,4 
3,8 
4,2 
3,3 
4,6 
3,8 
3,8 
4,1 
4,1 
3,3 
4,1 
4,5 
3,8 
3,3 
3,5 
3,9 
3,5 
3,8 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
4,1 
4,2 
4,1 
3,4 
4,3 
3,7 
3,6 
4,2 
4,1 
4,5 
3,9 
4,1 
4,3 
3,9 
3,4 
4,1 
3,6 
3,7 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
1,5 
-0,9 
0,2 
-1,2 
1,6 
0,0 
0,5 
0,2 
-0,8 
0,3 
1,6 
1,4 
-0,9 
-2,0 
0,3 
-0,9 
-1,3 
0,1 
Solde 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
1,2 
-0,4 
0,1 
-1,1 
1,4 
-0,2 
0,4 
0,3 
-0,8 
1,5 
1,3 
0,9 
-0,4 
-1,4 
0,2 
-0,9 
-1,3 
0,0 
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3. SPAIN (Continued) 
Population Population GDP 1993 GDP 1993 GDP 1993 
k % MPtas MECU MPPS 
Andalucía 
Aragon 
Asturias 
Baleares 
Canarias 
Cantabria 
Castilla La Mancha 
Castilla Leon 
Cataluña 
Ceuta Y Melilla 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
La Rioja 
Madrid 
Murcia 
Navarra 
País Vasco 
Valencia 
7.033 
1.188 
1.089 
730 
1.526 
527 
1.660 
2.521 
6.093 
126 
1.056 
2.729 
264 
5.019 
1.065 
523 
2.088 
3.902 
18% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
4% 
1% 
4% 
6% 
16% 
0% 
3% 
7% 
1% 
13% 
3% 
1% 
5% 
10% 
8.190.267 
2.086.189 
1.624.961 
1.446.762 
2.308.527 
792.424 
2.228.598 
3.706.974 
11.501.327 
168.356 
1.166.715 
3.288.842 
454.667 
9.774.369 
1.477.332 
999.700 
3.844.314 
5.842.074 
54.924 
13.990 
10.897 
9.702 
15.481 
5.314 
14.945 
24.859 
77.128 
1.129 
7.824 
22.055 
3.049 
65.547 
9.907 
6.704 
25.780 
39.177 
64.904 
16.532 
12.877 
11.465 
18.294 
6.280 
17.661 
29.377 
91.142 
1.334 
9.246 
26.062 
3.603 
77.457 
11.707 
7.922 
30.465 
46.295 
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4. SWEDEN 
Stockholm 
East Mid Sweden 
Smal/lslands 
South Sweden 
West Sweden 
North Mid Sweden 
Mid Norrtand 
North Norrland 
Moy 
prélèv 
MSEK 
-182.458 
-117.849 
-63.822 
-102.024 
-145.496 
-69.741 
-32.695 
-43.177 
Moy 
depbenf 
MSEK 
150.547 
125.427 
66.575 
104.357 
144.171 
86.150 
38.462 
54.080 
Moy 
depflux 
MSEK 
164.279 
123.996 
63.385 
102.362 
139.586 
83.498 
37.885 
54.668 
Solde 
bén. 
MSEK 
-31.852 
7.836 
3.120 
2.710 
-690 
14.459 
5.893 
11.031 
Solde 
flux. 
MSEK 
-18.769 
6.175 
-503 
161 
-6.115 
14.818 
5.186 
11.459 
Moy 
prélèv 
M ECU 
-20.006 
-12.922 
-6.998 
-11.187 
-15.954 
-7.647 
-3.585 
-4.734 
Moy 
depbenf 
MECU 
16.507 
13.753 
7.300 
11.443 
15.808 
9.446 
4.217 
5.930 
Moy 
depflux 
MECU 
18.013 
13.596 
6.950 
11.224 
15.306 
9.156 
4.154 
5.994 
Solde 
bén. 
MECU 
-3.493 
859 
342 
297 
-76 
1.585 
646 
1.210 
Solde 
flux. 
MECU 
-2.058 
677 
-55 
18 
-670 
1.625 
569 
1.257 
4. SWEDEN (Continued) 
Stockholm 
East Mid Sweden 
Smal/lslands 
South Sweden 
West Sweden 
North Mid Sweden 
Mid Norrland 
North Norrland 
Moy 
prélèv 
MPPS 
-17.200 
-11.110 
-6.017 
-9.618 
-13.716 
-6.574 
-3.082 
-4.070 
Moy 
depbenf 
MPPS 
14.192 
11.824 
6.276 
9.838 
13.591 
8.121 
3.626 
5.098 
Moy 
depflux 
M PPS 
15.486 
11.689 
5.976 
9.649 
13.159 
7.871 
3.571 
5.153 
Solde 
bén. 
MPPS 
-3.003 
739 
294 
255 
-65 
1.363 
555 
1.040 
Solde 
flux. 
MPPS 
-1.769 
582 
-47 
15 
-576 
1.397 
489 
1.080 
Moy 
prélèv 
%du 
GDP reg. 
-54% 
-53% 
-51% 
-52% 
-52% 
-53% 
-50% 
-51% 
Moy 
depbenf 
%du 
GDP reg. 
45% 
56% 
53% 
53% 
52% 
65% 
59% 
64% 
Moy 
depflux 
%du 
GDP reg. 
49% 
56% 
5 1 % 
52% 
50% 
63% 
58% 
65% 
Solde 
bén. 
%du 
GDP reg. 
-9% 
4% 
2% 
1% 
0% 
11% 
9% 
13% 
Solde 
flux. 
%du 
GDP reg. 
-6% 
3% 
0% 
0% 
-2% 
11% 
8% 
14% 
4. SWEDEN (Continued) 
Moy Moy Moy Solde Solde Dép. Dép. Solde Solde 
prélèv depbenf depflux bén. flux. Prélev. bénéf. flux bénéf. flux 
% des % des % des % des % des par hab. par hab. par hab. par hab. par hab. 
dépenses dépenses dépenses dépenses dépenses kSEK/hab. kSEK/hab. kSEK/hab. kSEK/hab. kSEK/hab. 
Stockholm 
East Mid Sweden 
Smal/lslands 
South Sweden 
West Sweden 
North Mid Sweden 
Mid Norrland 
North Norrland 
-24% 
-15% 
-8% 
-13% 
-19% 
-9% 
-4% 
-6% 
20% 
16% 
9% 
14% 
19% 
11% 
5% 
7% 
21% 
16% 
8% 
13% 
18% 
11% 
5% 
7% 
-4% 
1% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
2% 
1% 
1% 
-2% 
1% 
0% 
0% 
- 1 % 
2% 
1% 
1% 
-109 
-79 
-81 
-82 
-84 
-81 
-82 
-82 
90 
84 
84 
84 
83 
100 
97 
103 
98 
83 
80 
82 
80 
97 
95 
104 
-19 
5 
4 
2 
0 
17 
15 
21 
-11 
4 
-1 
0 
-4 
17 
13 
22 
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4. SWEDEN (Continued) 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
k ECU/hab. 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab 
k ECU/hab. 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k ECU/hab. 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k ECU/hab.k 
Solde. 
flux 
par hab 
ECU/hab. 
Pretev. 
par hab. 
k PPS/hab. 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k PPS/hab. 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k PPS/hab. 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k PPS/hab. 
Solde 
flux 
par hab. 
k PPS/hab. 
Stockholm 
East Mid Sweden 
Smal/lslands 
South Sweden 
West Sweden 
North Mid Sweden 
Mid Norrland 
North Norrland 
-11,9 
-8,7 
-8,9 
-9,0 
-9,2 
-8,8 
-9,0 
-9,0 
9,8 
9,3 
9,2 
9,2 
9,1 
10,9 
10,6 
11,3 
10,7 
9,2 
8,8 
9,0 
8,8 
10,6 
10,5 
11,4 
-2,1 
0,6 
0.4 
0,2 
0,0 
1,8 
1,6 
2,3 
-1,2 
0,5 
-0,1 
0,0 
-0,4 
1,9 
1,4 
2,4 
-10,3 
-7,5 
-7,6 
-7,7 
-7,9 
-7,6 
-7,8 
-7,8 
8,5 
8,0 
7,9 
7,9 
7,8 
9,4 
9,1 
9,7 
9,2 
7,9 
7,6 
7,8 
7,6 
9,1 
9,0 
9,8 
-1,8 
0,5 
0,4 
0,2 
0,0 
1,6 
1,4 
2,0 
-1,1 
0,4 
-0,1 
0,0 
-0,3 
1,6 
1,2 
2,1 
4. SWEDEN (Continued) 
Population 
k 
Population 
% 
GDP 1993 
MSEK 
GDP 1993 
MECU 
GDP 1993 
MPPS 
Stockholm 
East Mid Sweden 
Smal/lslands 
South Sweden 
West Sweden 
North Mid Sweden 
Mid Norrland 
North Norrland 
1.678 
1.485 
790 
1.242 
1.740 
865 
397 
524 
19% 
17% 
9% 
14% 
20% 
10% 
5% 
6% 
336.336 
222.017 
125.455 
196.800 
278.607 
132.815 
65.390 
84.515 
36.879 
24.344 
13.756 
21.579 
30.549 
14.563 
7.170 
9.267 
31.706 
20.930 
11.827 
18.552 
26.264 
12.520 
6.164 
7.967 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
Total 
North 
Y&H 
EMids 
EAng 
SE 
sw 
WMids 
NW 
Wales 
Scot 
Nlre 
Moy 
prélèv 
ME 
-249.651.252 
-11.392.621 
-19.421.591 
-16.495.371 
-8.778.468 
-92.447.846 
-19.930.888 
-20.100.504 
-24.509.929 
-10.277.697 
-20.971.108 
-5.325.229 
Moy 
depbenf 
ME 
249.651.252 
14.121.749 
20.160.731 
16.745.493 
8.436.088 
75.561.256 
19.714.700 
21.460.761 
27.927.176 
13.099.393 
24.517.589 
7.906.316 
Moy 
depflux 
ME 
249.651.252 
14.222.284 
19.155.965 
15.859.280 
8.200.613 
80.585.943 
20.417.380 
20.392.200 
27.250.942 
12.401.043 
23.470.465 
7.695.136 
Solde 
bén. 
ME 
0 
2.730.344 
716.798 
256.933 
-332.121 
-16.788.984 
-186.024 
1.349.579 
3.406.984 
2.810.526 
3.467.166 
2.568.800 
Solde 
flux. 
ME 
0 
2.839.720 
-278.493 
-638.343 
-583.302 
-11.837.455 
468.827 
308.116 
2.753.223 
2.108.817 
2.492.354 
2.366.535 
Moy 
prélèv 
MECU 
-320.066 
-14.606 
-24.899 
-21.148 
-11.254 
-118.523 
-25.552 
-25.770 
-31.423 
-13.177 
-26.886 
-6.827 
Moy 
depbenf 
MECU 
320.066 
18.105 
25.847 
21.469 
10.815 
96.873 
25.275 
27.514 
35.804 
16.794 
31.433 
10.136 
Moy 
depflux 
MECU 
320.066 
18.234 
24.559 
20.332 
10.514 
103.315 
26.176 
26.144 
34.937 
15.899 
30.090 
9.866 
Solde 
bén. 
MECU 
0 
3.500 
919 
329 
-426 
-21.524-
-238 
1.730 
4.368 
3.603 
4.445 
3.293 
Solde 
flux. 
MECU 
0 
3.641 
-357 
-818 
-748 
15.176 
601 
395 
3.530 
2.704 
3.195 
3.034 
5. UNITED KINGDOM (Continued) 
Total 
North 
Y&H 
EMids 
EAng 
SE 
SW 
WMids 
NW 
Wales 
Scot 
Nlre 
Moy 
prélèv 
MPPS 
■362.984 
-16.565 
-28.238 
-23.984 
-12.764 
-134.416 
-28.979 
-29.225 
-35.636 
-14.943 
-30.491 
-7.743 
Moy 
depbenf 
MPPS 
362.984 
20.533 
29.313 
24.348 
12.266 
109.864 
28.665 
31.203 
40.605 
19.046 
35.648 
11.495 
Moy 
depflux 
MPPS 
362.984 
20.679 
27.852 
23.059 
11.923 
117.170 
29.686 
29.649 
39.622 
18.031 
34.125 
11.188 
Solde 
bén. 
MPPS 
0 
3.970 
1.042 
374 
-483 
-24.411 
-270 
1.962 
4.954 
4.086 
5.041 
3.735 
Solde 
flux. 
MPPS 
0 
4.129 
-405 
-928 
-848 
-17.211 
682 
448 
4.003 
3.066 
3.624 
3.441 
Moy 
prélèv 
%du 
GDP reg. 
-40% 
-38% 
-39% 
-40% 
-38% 
-41% 
-41% 
-38% 
-39% 
-39% 
-39% 
-38% 
Moy 
depbenf 
%du 
GDP reg. 
40% 
47% 
41% 
41% 
37% 
34% 
40% 
4 1 % 
45% 
49% 
45% 
56% 
Moy 
depflux 
%du 
GDP reg. 
40% 
47% 
39% 
38% 
36% 
36% 
42% 
39% 
44% 
47% 
43% 
55% 
Solde 
bén. 
%du 
GDP reg. 
0% 
9% 
1% 
1% 
- 1 % 
-7% 
0% 
3% 
5% 
11% 
6% 
18% 
Solde 
flux. 
%du 
GDP reg. 
0% 
9% 
- 1 % 
-2% 
-3% 
-5% 
1% 
1% 
4% 
8% 
5% 
17% 
5. UNITED KINGDOM (Continued) 
Total 
North 
Y&H 
EMids 
EAng 
SE 
SW 
WMids 
NW 
Wales 
Scot 
Nlre 
Moy 
prélèv 
%des 
dépenses 
-100% 
-5% 
-8% 
-7% 
-4% 
-37% 
-8% 
-8% 
-10% 
-4% 
-8% 
-2% 
Moy 
depbenf 
% des 
dépenses 
100% 
6% 
8% 
7% 
3% 
30% 
8% 
9% 
11% 
5% 
10% 
3% 
Moy 
depflux 
% des 
dépenses 
100% 
6% 
8% 
6% 
3% 
32% 
8% 
8% 
11% 
5% 
9% 
3% 
Solde Solde 
bén. flux. 
% des % des 
dépenses dépenses 
0% 
1% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
-7% 
0% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
0% 
1% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
-5% 
0% 
0% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
kE/hab. 
-3.680 
-3.881 
-4.049 
-4.200 
-5.213 
-4.189 
-3.808 
-3.830 
-3.544 
-4.104 
-3.271 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k£/hab. 
4.561 
4.029 
4.110 
4.036 
4.261 
4.143 
4.065 
4.364 
4.517 
4.798 
4.856 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k£/hab. 
4.594 
3.828 
3.893 
3.924 
4.544 
4.291 
3.863 
4.259 
4.276 
4.593 
4.727 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
kE/hab. 
882 
143 
63 
-159 
-947 
-39 
256 
532 
969 
679 
1.578 
Solde 
flux 
par hab. 
k£/hab. 
917 
-56 
-157 
-279 
-668 
99 
58 
430 
727 
488 
1.454 
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5. UNITED KINGDOM (Continued) 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
k ECU/hab. 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab 
k ECU/hab. 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k ECU/hab. 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k ECU/hab. 
Solde. 
flux 
par hab 
k ECU/hab. 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
k PPS/hab. 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k PPS/hab. 
Dép. Solde Solde 
flux bénéf. flux 
par hab. par hab. par hab. 
k PPS/hab. k PPS/hab. k PPS/hab. 
Total 
North 
Y&H 
EMids 
EAng 
SE 
SW 
WMids 
NW 
Wales 
Scot 
Nlre 
4,7 
•5,0 
5,2 
•5,4 
•6,7 
■5,4 
•4,9 
■4,9 
■4,5 
5,3 
4,2 
5,8 
5,2 
5.3 
5,2 
5,5 
5,3 
5,2 
5,6 
5,8 
6,2 
6,2 
5,9 
4,9 
5,0 
5,0 
5,8 
5,5 
5,0 
5,5 
5,5 
5,9 
6,1 
1,1 
0,2 
0,1 
-0,2 
-1,2 
-0,1 
0,3 
0,7 
1,2 
0,9 
2,0 
1,2 
-0,1 
-0,2 
-0,4 
-0,9 
0,1 
0,1 
0,6 
0,9 
0,6 
1,9 
-5,4 
-5,6 
-5,9 
-6,1 
-7,6 
-6,1 
-5,5 
-5,6 
-5,2 
-6,0 
-4,8 
6,6 
5,9 
6,0 
5,9 
6,2 
6,0 
5,9 
6,3 
6,6 
7,0 
7,1 
6,7 
5,6 
5,7 
5,7 
6,6 
6,2 
5,6 
6,2 
6,2 
6,7 
6,9 
1,3 
0,2 
0,1 
-0,2 
-1,4 
-0,1 
0,4 
0,8 
1,4 
1.0 
2.3 
1,3 
-0,1 
-0,2 
-0,4 
-1,0 
0,1 
0,1 
0,6 
1,1 
0,7 
2,1 
5. UNITED KINGDOM (Continued) (Continued) 
Population 
k 
Population GDP 1993 
ME 
GDP 1993 
MECU 
GDP 1993 
MPPS 
Total 
North 
Y&H 
EMids 
EAng 
SE 
SW 
WMids 
NW 
Wales 
Scot 
Nlre 
58.071 
3.096 
5.004 
4.074 
2.090 
17.733 
4.758 
5.279 
6.399 
2.900 
5.110 
1.628 
100% 
5% 
9% 
7% 
4% 
3 1 % 
8% 
9% 
11% 
5% 
9% 
3% 
627.712.020 
30.025.320 
49.687.560 
41.290.860 
23.051.340 
225.013.620 
48.936.420 
52.386.360 
62.423.400 
26.542.620 
54.288.780 
14.065.740 
804.759 
38.494 
63.702 
52.937 
29.553 
288.479 
62.739 
67.162 
80.030 
34.029 
69.601 
18.033 
912.672 
43.656 
72.244 
60.036 
33.516 
327.163 
71.152 
76.167 
90.761 
38.592 
78.934 
20.451 
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GERMANY 
total 
Baden-Württemberg 
Bayern 
Berlin 
Brandenburg 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
Hessen 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
Niedersachsen 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Saarland 
Sachsen 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Thüringen 
Moy 
prélèv 
MDM 
-457.348 
-67.261 
-75.153 
-19.981 
-8.197 
-5.340 
-15.314 
-42.085 
-5.600 
-41.964 
-104.960 
-21.545 
-5.532 
-13.626 
-8.285 
-15.073 
-7.434 
Moy 
depbenf 
MDM 
457.367 
45.441 
53.879 
31.875 
20.031 
4.842 
9.565 
28.845 
15.756 
38.108 
93.573 
17.367 
7.838 
34.695 
22.234 
12.447 
20.872 
Moy 
depflux 
MDM 
457.365 
47.579 
58.851 
34.552 
17.104 
5.553 
14.032 
30.224 
13.362 
39.748 
92.923 
17.447 
7.324 
28.680 
18.880 
13.688 
17.418 
Solde 
bén. 
MDM 
22 
-21.479 
-21.226 
11.625 
11.761 
-488 
-5.836 
-13.149 
10.137 
-4.194 
-11.011 
-4.133 
2.321 
21.033 
13.909 
-2.600 
13.354 
Solde 
flux. 
MDM 
16 
-19.649 
-16.458 
14.568 
8.846 
209 
-1.426 
-11.858 
7.701 
-2.230 
-11.518 
-4.104 
1.782 
14.989 
10.532 
-1.283 
9.915 
Moy 
prélèv 
MECU 
-235.746 
-34.671 
-38.739 
-10.299 
-4.225 
-2.752 
-7.894 
-21.693 
-2.887 
-21.631 
-54.103 
-11.106 
-2.851 
-7.024 
-4.270 
-7.769 
-3.832 
Moy 
depbenf 
MECU 
235.756 
23.423 
27.773 
16.430 
10.325 
2.496 
4.930 
14.869 
8.122 
19.643 
48.234 
8.952 
4.040 
17.884 
11.461 
6.416 
10.759 
Moy 
depflux 
MECU 
235.755 
24.525 
30.336 
17.810 
8.816 
2.862 
7.233 
15.579 
6.888 
20.489 
47.898 
8.993 
3.775 
14.783 
9.732 
7.056 
8.978 
Solde 
bén. 
MECU 
11 
-11.071 
-10.941 
5.992 
6.062 
-251 
-3.008 
-6.778 
5.225 
-2.162 
-5.676 
-2.131 
1.196 
10.842 
7.170 
-1.340 
6.883 
Solde 
flux. 
MECU 
8 
-10.128 
-8.484 
7.509 
4.560 
108 
-735 
-6.112 
3.970 
-1.149 
-5.937 
-2.115 
918 
7.726 
5.429 
-662 
5.111 
6. GERMANY (Continued) 
Moy 
prélèv 
M PPS 
Moy 
depbenf 
MPPS 
Moy 
depflux 
MPPS 
Solde 
bén. 
MPPS 
Solde 
flux. 
M PPS 
Moy 
prélèv 
%du 
GDP reg. 
Moy 
depbenf 
%du 
GDP reg. 
Moy 
depflux 
%du 
GDP reg. 
Solde Solde 
bén. flux. 
% du % du 
GDP reg. GDP reg. 
total -201.147 201.156 201.155 10 7 -14% 14% 14% 0% 0% 
Baden-Württemberg -29.583 19.986 20.926 -9.447 -8.642 -14% 10% 10% -5% -4% 
Bayern -33.051 23.695 25.882 -9.335 -7.238 -14% 10% 11% -4% -3% 
Berlin -8.788 14.019 15.197 5.113 6.407 -16% 26% 28% 9% 12% 
Brandenburg -3.605 8.811 7.523 5.173 3.891 -16% 38% 33% 22% 17% 
Bremen -2.348 2.129 2.442 -215 92 -14% 13% 15% - 1 % 1% 
Hamburg -6.735 4.207 6.172 -2.567 -627 -13% 8% 12% -5% - 1 % 
Hessen -18.510 12.686 13.293 -5.783 -5.215 -13% 9% 9% -4% -4% 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern -2.463 6.930 5.877 4.458 3.387 -16% 45% 39% 29% 22% 
Niedersachsen -18.456 16.760 17.482 -1.845 -981 -15% 13% 14% - 1 % - 1 % 
Nordrfiein-Westfalen -46.163 41.155 40.869 -4.843 -5.066 -15% 13% 13% -2% -2% 
Rheinland-Pfalz -9.476 7.638 7.674 -1.818 -1.805 -15% 12% 12% -3% -3% 
Saarland -2.433 3.447 3.221 1.021 784 -13% 19% 17% 6% 4% 
Sachsen -5.993 15.260 12.614 9.251 6.593 -15% 39% 32% 24% 17% 
Sachsen-Anhalt -3.644 9.780 8.304 6.118 4.632 -15% 4 1 % 35% 26% 19% 
Schleswig-Holstein -6.629 5.474 6.020 -1.144 -564 -15% 13% 14% -3% - 1 % 
Thüringen -3.270 9.180 7.661 5.873 4.361 -16% 44% 36% 28% 2 1 % 
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6. GERMANY (Continued) 
Moy 
prélèv 
%des 
dépenses 
Moy 
depbenf 
%des 
dépenses 
Moy 
depflux 
%des 
dépenses 
Solde Solde 
bén. flux. Prétev. 
% des % des par hab. 
dépenses dépenses kDM/hab. 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
kDM/hab. 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
kDM/hab. 
Solde Solde 
bénéf. flux 
par hab. par hab. 
kDM/hab. kDM/hab. 
total -100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 
Baden-Wurttemberg -15% 10% 10% -5% -4% -7 4 5 - 2 -2 
Bayern -16% 12% 13% -5% -4% -6 5 5 - 2 -1 
Berlin -4% 7% 8% 3% 3% -6 9 10 3 4 
Brandenburg -2% 4% 4% 3% 2% -3 8 7 5 3 
Bremen - 1 % 1% 1% 0% 0% -8 7 8 - 1 0 
Hamburg -3% 2% 3% - 1 % 0% -9 6 8 -3 -1 
Hessen -9% 6% 7% -3% -3% -7 5 5 - 2 -2 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern - 1 % 3% 3% 2% 2% -3 9 7 5 4 
Niedersachsen -9% 8% 9% - 1 % 0% - 6 5 5 - 1 0 
Nordrhein-Westfalen -23% 20% 20% -2% -3% -6 5 5 -1 -1 
Rheinland-Pfalz -5% 4% 4% - 1 % - 1 % -6 4 4 -1 -1 
Saarland - 1 % 2% 2% 1% 0% -5 7 7 2 2 
Sachsen -3% 8% 6% 5% 3% -3 8 6 5 3 
Sachsen-Anhalt -2% 5% 4% 3% 2% -3 8 7 5 4 
Schleswig-Holstein -3% 3% 3% - 1 % 0% - 6 5 5 - 1 0 
Thüringen -2% 5% 4% 3% 2% -3 8 7 5 4 
6. GERMANY (Continued) 
total 
Baden-Wurttemberg 
Bayern 
Berlin 
Brandenburg 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
Hessen 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
Niedersachsen 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Saarland 
Sachsen 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Thüringen 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
-3,4 
-3,3 
-3,0 
-1,7 
-4,0 
-4,6 
-3,6 
-1,6 
-2,8 
-3,1 
-2,8 
-2,6 
-1,5 
-1,5 
-2,9 
-1,5 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab 
k 
ECU/hab. 
2,3 
2,3 
4,7 
4,1 
3,6 
2,9 
2,5 
4,4 
2,6 
2,7 
2,3 
3,7 
3,9 
4,1 
2,4 
4,2 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
2,4 
2,6 
5,1 
3,5 
4,2 
4,3 
2,6 
3,7 
2,7 
2,7 
2,3 
3,5 
3,2 
3,5 
2,6 
3,5 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
-1,1 
-0,9 
1,7 
2,4 
-0,4 
-1,8 
-1,1 
2,8 
-0,3 
-0,3 
-0,5 
1,1 
2,3 
2,6 
-0,5 
2,7 
Solde . 
flux 
par hab 
k 
ECU/hab. 
-1,0 
-0,7 
2,2 
1,8 
0,2 
-0,4 
-1,0 
2,1 
-0,2 
-0,3 
-0,5 
0,8 
1,7 
1,9 
-0,2 
2,0 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
-2,9 
-2,8 
-2,5 
-1,4 
-3,4 
-4,0 
-3,1 
-1,3 
-2,4 
-2,6 
-2,4 
-2,2 
-1,3 
-1,3 
-2,5 
-1,3 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab, 
k 
PPS/hab. 
2,0 
2,0 
4,0 
3,5 
3,1 
2,5 
2,1 
3,7 
2,2 
2,3 
2,0 
3,2 
3,3 
3,5 
2,0 
3,6 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
2,1 
2,2 
4,4 
3,0 
3,6 
3,6 
2,2 
3,2 
2,3 
2,3 
2,0 
3,0 
2,7 
3,0 
2,2 
3,0 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
-0,9 
-0,8 
1,5 
2,0 
-0,3 
-1,5 
-1,0 
2,4 
-0,2 
-0,3 
-0,5 
0,9 
2,0 
2,2 
-0,4 
2,3 
Solde 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
-0,8 
-0,6 
1,8 
1,5 
0,1 
-0,4 
-0,9 
1,8 
-0,1 
-0,3 
-0,5 
0,7 
1,4 
1,7 
-0,2 
1,7 
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6. GERMANY (Continued) 
Population 
k 
Population 
% 
GDP 1993 
MDM 
GDP 1993 
MECU 
GDP 1993 
MPPS 
total 
Baden-Wurttemberg 
Bayern 
Berlin 
Brandenburg 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
Hessen 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
Niedersachsen 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Saarland 
Sachsen 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Thüringen 
81.181 
10.198 
11.819 
3.471 
2.541 
684 
1.700 
5.946 
1.852 
7.618 
17.725 
3.904 
1.085 
4.624 
2.789 
2.687 
2.538 
100% 
13% 
15% 
4% 
3% 
1% 
2% 
7% 
2% 
9% 
22% 
5% 
1% 
6% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
3.160.809 
469.794 
534.239 
123.972 
52.434 
38.080 
116.177 
319.017 
34.631 
283.483 
715.718 
141.017 
41.898 
88.963 
54.219 
99.344 
47.823 
1.629.283 
242.162 
275.381 
63.903 
27.028 
19.629 
59.885 
164.442 
17.851 
146.125 
368.927 
72.689 
21.597 
45.857 
27.948 
51.208 
24.651 
1.390.163 
206.623 
234.949 
54.525 
23.063 
16.748 
51.097 
140.308 
15.232 
124.680 
314.784 
62.022 
18.428 
39.129 
23.848 
43.693 
21.034 
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PORTUGAL 
Moy 
prélèv 
ME 
Moy 
depbenf 
ME 
Moy 
depflux 
ME 
Solde 
ben. 
ME 
Solde 
flux. 
ME 
Moy 
prélev 
MECU 
Moy 
depbenf 
MECU 
Moy 
depflux 
MECU 
Solde Solde 
bén. flux. 
M ECU M ECU 
total 
Norte 
Centro 
Lisboa e V.T. 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
■6.020.727 
■1.968.085 
-916.103 
■2.686.013 
-246.344 
-204.181 
6.022.758 
1.857.862 
986.001 
2.569.839 
364.790 
244.265 
2.031 
-103.046 
71.018 
-123.780 
118.451 
39.388 
-31.962 
-10.448 
-4.863 
-14.259 
-1.308 
-1.084 
31.973 
9.863 
5.234 
13.643 
1.937 
1.297 
11 
-547 
377 
-657 
629 
209 
7. PORTUGAL (Continued) 
Solde Solde Moy Moy Moy 
bén. flux. prélèv depbenf depflux 
M PPS M PPS % du % du % du 
Solde Solde 
bén. flux. 
% du % du 
GDP reg. GDP reg. 
Moy Moy 
prélèv depbenf 
M PPS M PPS 
Moy 
depflux 
MPPS  
ie . tl . rêlê  f fl  
 PP  d u d u   
GDP reg. GDP reg. GDP reg. 
total 
Norte 
Centro 
Lisboa e V.T. 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
-47.720 
-15.599 
-7.261 
-21.289 
-1.953 
-1.618 
47.736 
14.725 
7.815 
20.368 
2.892 
1.936 
16 
-817 
563 
-981 
939 
312 
-46% 
-46% 
-54% 
-42% 
-54% 
-50% 
46% 
43% 
58% 
4 1 % 
8 1 % 
60% 
0% 
-2% 
4% 
-2% 
26% 
10% 
7. PORTUGAL (Continued) 
Moy 
prélèv 
%des 
dépenses 
Moy 
depbenf 
%des 
dépenses 
Moy 
depflux 
%des 
dépenses 
Solde Solde 
bén. flux. Prélev. 
% des % des par hab. 
dépenses dépenses k£/hab. 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k£/hab. 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k£/hab. 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k£/hab. 
Solde 
flux 
par hab. 
kE/hab. 
total 
Norte 
Centra 
Lisboa e V.T. 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
100% 
-33% 
-15% 
-45% 
-4% 
-3% 
100% 
31% 
16% 
43% 
6% 
4% 
0% 
-2% 
1% 
-2% 
2% 
1% 
-563 
-534 
-815 
-460 
-595 
532 
575 
780 
682 
712 
-29 
41 
-38 
221 
115 
7. PORTUGAL (Continued) 
total 
Norte 
Centra 
Lisboa e V.T. 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
-3,0 
-2,8 
-4,3 
-2,4 
-3,2 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab 
k 
ECU/hab. 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
2,8 
3,1 
4,1 
3,6 
3,8 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
ECU/hab. 
Solde. 
flux 
par hab 
k 
ECU/hab. 
-0,2 
0,2 
-0.2 
1,2 
0,6 
Prélev. 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
-4,5 
-4,2 
-6,5 
-3,6 
-4,7 
Dép. 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
Dép. 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
4,2 
4,6 
6,2 
5,4 
5,6 
Solde 
bénéf. 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
Solde 
flux 
par hab. 
k 
PPS/hab. 
-0,2 
0,3 
-0,3 
1,8 
0,9 
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7. PORTUGAL (Continued) 
Population Population GDP 1993 GDP 1993 GDP 1993 
k % ME MECU MPPS 
total 
Norte 
Centra 
Lisboa e V.T. 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
9.383 
3.495 
1.714 
3.296 
535 
343 
100% 
37% 
18% 
35% 
6% 
4% 
13.195.884 
4.303.689 
1.695.707 
6.336.955 
452.653 
406.879 
70.053 
22.847 
9.002 
33.641 
2.403 
2.160 
104.589 
34.110 
13.440 
50.226 
3.588 
3.225 
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C. Regional Maps of the Results 
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Figure 1: Interregional Transfers in France 
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Figure 2: Interregional Transfers in Germany 
Benefit 
1 \ 
Sehteswig­Holste 
/ Vfl H&(ñbVg j 
ƒ BtòrAn 
/—* Niedersachsen 
\ Nordrhein-Westfalen ^ > 
\ / \ Hessen J*^Ê 
\ Rheínland-PfalíK Ι 
/ Baden­Wurttembera/ 
Ref. : A]l_sb061196 V 
JM Mecklenburg­Vorpor^^rW 
^ H .■■■■'"'νχ^ —­__/ we 
^^■^^^H .HHL. 
■ S ¿srl]n\ 
_«i__H . >­r^ Brandenburg 3 ; π se π ­An h aìr^­­. J M 
Bayern ^ ­ » 
c^­í f 
Flow 
^ 
Íh,esw¡g¿^ B ^ f c 
,_ ν / ~ ­ \ _ < ■ ■ ■■■nburg­Vorpo:­Ä^' 
< ν /7 HVbiVg J f l k 
/ v? ^ — / m 
/­! Niedersachsen ^ _ S j Λ _____^  
V ­ Λ V^­i j > ¿riÄ> 1 
« ** \ ^■,„„­AnLr­^B"m i i C n b lB 
\ Nordrhein­Westfalen ^ > ^^­~^Λ ^ L 
/ ^^^^k Λ « ^ v — / ^ C ^yy^ β Thunngen ­^^ . Sachsen^^^ 
\ _ / \ Hessen^^ P | y ^ ^ ^ 
<S)J­s \ 
^ " ^ / ) B_yem X ^ 
/ Baden­Württemberg/ /*­J 
L_^ . J \ % ^ \ / L ^ / ' "A ™ Réf. : AlLsf V 
Transfer per person: rzn below ­1,000 ECU 
czi between 0 and + 2,000 ECU 
© OEIL­SIRIUS (Université Paris­XII) 
ΕΕΞ3 between ­1,000 and 0 ECU 
mm over + 2,000 ECU 
Fond de carte Argo­lnfographie (Cartographie 2D) 
204 Economic and Social Cohesion in the European Union: The Impact of Member States' Own Policies: Final Report 
Figure 3: Interregional Transfers in Italy 
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Figure 4: Interregional Transfers in Portugal 
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Figure 5: Interregional Transfers in Spain 
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Figure 6: Interregional Transfers in Sweden 
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Figure 7: Interregional Transfers in the United Kingdom 
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Figure 8: Interregional Transfers in Selected EU Countries (Flow Analysis) 
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D. Main Expenditures and Revenues 
by Country-Related Regional Proxies 
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SPAIN 
MAIN REVENUES %of 
expenditures 
Retención al trabajo, actMdades 
profesionales y premios 
IVA operaciones interiores 
Hidrocarburos 
Impuesto sobre sociedades 
Retención al Capital Mobiliario 
Sub total 
-3.736.390 -19,1 RFDTF 
-2.563.275 -13,1 CFHCRE 
-1.215.597 -6,2 FUEL 
-1.153.153 -5,9 SOC1 SOC2 SOC3 
-897.105 -4,6 IEFAMR IEFAME INTFAM 
-11.417.224 -48,9 
MAIN EXPENDITURES FLOW APPROACH BENEFIT APPROACH 
Obras Públicas, Transporte 
y Medio Ambiente Infraestructura 
de carreteraslnversiones reales 341.990 
Trabajo y Seguridad Social Dirección y 
Servicios Generales de Seguridad 
y Protección socialActivos financieros 345.025 
Trsfrt corporaciones locales/ Trsfrt 
corporaciones locales/Diputaciones/ 
T. courants 
Trsfrt corporaciones locales/ 
Ayuntamientos/T. courants 
Clases Pasivas Pensiones de Clases 
pasivasGastos de personal 
Aportación a la CE.E Aporte 
a la CEE/T. courants 
Trabajo y Seguridad Social Inst. Nac 
de EmpleoTransferencias Corrientes 
Transferencias a las Comunidades 
Autonomas Transferencias a las 
Comunidades Autonomas/ 
T. courantsmontants répartis 1.790.608 
Aportación del Estado a la Tesorería 
de la Seguridad Social Seguridad 
Social/T. courants 2.208.161 
Subtotal 8.143.536 
1,7 KMAUT MAROUT 
9,2 TR1 
FUEL KMCARR INVCA MAROU 
1,8 VIEU MORTI HGPOB VIEU MORTI HGPOB PDCRE 
345.111 
608.327 
673.191 
877.887 
953.236 
1,8 
3,1 
3,4 
4,5 
49 
TR1 PDCRE 
TR1 PDCRE 
RA86 EMP86 
CHOMAGR 
CHOM 
TR1 PDCRE 
TR1 PDCRE 
PCI PENAS 
CHOMAGR 
CHOM 
TR1 
11,3 PSATS ESES ESCF MORTI PSATS ESES ESCF MORTI 
47,6 
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SPAIN (continued) 
REGIONAL KEYS 
CFHCRE 
CHOM 
CHOMAGR 
EMP86 
ESCF 
FUEL 
HGPOB 
1EFAMR 
INTFAM 
INVCA 
KMAUT 
KMCARR 
MAROUT 
MORTI 
PCI 
PDCRE 
PENAS 
PSATS 
RA86 
RFDTF 
SOC1 
SOC2 
SOC3 -
TR1 
VIEU 
Consumo final de los hogares-Mili pts 
Nombre de chômeurs 
(50%CHÔMEURS)+(50% VA AGRICOLE) 
Empleo en servicios no venta-Miles de personas 
Establecimientos sanitarios. Camas en funcionamiento-N° de camas 
Establecimientos sanitarios. Establecimientos-N0 de establecimientos 
Consumo de elementos energéticos. Combustibles y carburantes llquidos-miles de TEC 
Habitaciones en establecimientos hoteleros-N° de habitaciones 
Cta de renta de los hogares. Intereses efectivos, dividendos o rentas (cuasi sociedades) 
Recursos-mili pts 
Intereses y dividendos cobrados por familias-Mili pts 
Intereses y dividendos cobrados por familias-Mili pts 
Autopistas y autovías -Km 
Red de carreteras publicas -Km 
Flux de marchandises par route (déchargées) 
Mortalité infantile (indicateur) 
Pensiones contributivas pon invalidez -miles 
Población de derecho-Miles de personas 
Pensiones asistenciales en vigor (media anual )-miles de pensiones 
Profesionales sanitarios colegiados: ATS (enfermeros)-N0 
Remuneración a asalariados en servicios no venta-Mili pts 
Renta familiar disponible deducciones: imp dlrec sobre las familias-Mili pts 
(50% IEFAMR)+(50% RACRE) 
(50% IEFAMR)+(25% RACRE)+(25%CFHRE) 
(25% IEFAMR)+(50% RACRE)+(25%CFHRE) 
Transferencias a las Comunidades Autonomas 1994/Transferencias Corrientes 
Pop more 65 years old 
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FRANCE 
MAIN REVENUES Millions 
Francs 
%of 
expenditures 
TVA Taux normal -489.787 
Impôt sur le revenu: -292.890 
Taxes Intérieures sur les prod, pétroliers -126.425 
Impôt sur les sociétés -102.530 
Sub total -1.011.631 
-28,2 CONSNOR 
-16,9 IRPP 
-7,3 ESSENCE CONSESSENC 
-5,9 ISUN ISDEUX ISTROIS 
-58,3 
MAIN EXPENDITURES FLOW APPROACH BENEFIT APPROACH 
Contrib état à APL (aide au logement) 
Subvention établiss privés 
d'éducation ss contrat 
Rémunérations Ministère Budget 
Form ouvrière, reclass main d'o. FNE 
Salaires enseignants écoles 
Investissement, catégorie "divers" 
Salaires enseignants Collèges et Lycées 
Dépenses en capital Défense 
Dotation Globale de Fonctionnement 
Dépenses Ordinaires Défense 
Pensions allocations, 
charges fonction publique 
Sub total 
28.428 
31.166 
31.640 
32.361 
46.498 
59.048 
73.934 
88.666 
96.219 
100.401 
185.349 
773.709 
1,6 
1,8 
1,8 
1,9 
2,7 
3.4 
4,2 
5,1 
5,5 
5,8 
10,6 
44,4 
AIDESOC 
ENSPRIV 
SALPUB 
CHOMEUR AIDESOC 
ACTSEC 
SALPUB 
INVDIV 
SALPUB 
ARME 
DGF 
SALPUB 
SALPUB POP65 
AIDESOC LOGT BTP PATRI 
ENSPRCON ENSPRIV 
ENSPRCON 
POP 
CHOMEUR AIDESOC 
PIB ACTSEC 
ELEVPRPUB 
INVDIV POP 
ELEVSEPUB PROFSECPUB 
POP 
DGF 
POP 
EFRETR POP POP65 
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FRANCE (Continued) 
REGIONAL KEYS 
ACTSEC 
AIDESOC 
ARME 
BTP 
CHOMEUR 
CONSESSENC 
CONSNOR 
DGF 
EFRETR 
ELEVSEPUB 
ENSPRCON 
ENSPRIV 
ESSENCE 
INVDIV 
IRPP 
ISDEUX 
ISTROIS 
ISUN 
LOGT 
PATRIM 
PIB 
POP65 
PROFSECPUB 
SALPUB 
Actifs ayant un emploi/secondaire 
Bénéficiaires de l'aide sociale (F courants) 
Effectifs industriels travaillant pour l'armement 
Population active secteur BTP 
Demandes emploi non satisfaites 
Consommation d'essence des ménages 
Consommation produits à TVA normale 
Dotation globale de fonctionnement ttes coli loc 
Retraités 
Effectif total élèves secondaire public 
Effectif total élèves secondaire public 
Salaires de l'Etat à l'enseignement privé sous contrat (1992) 
Livraisons essence/super/gasoil mètres cubes 
Investisements Etat divers, 86-90 total 
Rôles de l'IRPP émis, en millions de francs-1993 
50%SAI_AIRES-50%CAPITAL 
50%SALAIRES-25%CONSOMM-25%CAPITAL 
50%CAPITAL-25%SAI_AIRES-25%CONSOMM 
Logements aidés autorisés (accession et locatif) 
Revenu du patrimoine des ménages (millions) 
PIB en millions de francs courants 
Population + de 65 ans 
Enseignants secondaire public 
Salaires versés aux fonctionnaires 
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ITALY 
MAIN REVENUES %of 
expenditures 
Impôts sur le revenu des personnes physiques -136 
TVA -75 
taxe/pétrole -38 
Taxe sur revenu capitaux -37 
taxe locale/revenu -18 
Taxe/profits -18 
Sub total -322 
-18,2 IRPP 
-10,1 TVA 82A 111A 
-5,1 TAXPET 
-4,9 TAXREVK 
-2,5 IRPP TLR 
-2,4 ISDEUX ISTROIS ISUN 
-43,7 
MAIN EXPENDITURES BENEFIT APPROACH 
Défense Nationale 
Pensions ordinaires 
Interventions en faveur des régions 
Prévention-santé/Fonds sanitaire national 
Prévoyance sociale 
Interventions en faveur des 
Provinces et communes 
Administration générale 
Sub total 
21 
28 
31 
40 
43 
44 
51 
237 
2,9 
3,7 
4,2 
5,3 
5,7 
5,9 
6,9 
31,8 
200A 
303A 
350A 
52A 200A 550A 
53A 17B 
351A 
200A 
MAIN EXPENDITURES FLOW APPROACH 
Transferts aux ménages 
Achats de biens et services 
Personnels en retraite/pensions 
Transferts aux Communes et Provinces 
Sommes non allouées 
(sommes réservées à la trésorerie) 
Transferts aux organismes de prévoyance 
Transferts aux Régions/2 Provinces Autonomes 64 
personnels en activité 
Sub total 
16 
26 
30 
30 
31 
45 
64 
87 
130 
2,2 
3,5 
4,1 
4,1 
4,1 
6.0 
8.6 
11,6 
44,2 
305A 54A 
304A 
303A 
308A 
200A 
200A 63A 53A 54A 
307A 
302A 
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ITALY (continued) 
REGIONAL KEYS 
IRPP 
111A 
17B 
200A 
302A 
303A 
304A 
305A 
307A 
308A 
350A 
351A 
52A 
53A 
54A 
550A 
63A 
82A 
IRPP 
ISDEUX 
ISTROIS 
ISUN 
TAXPET 
TAXREVK 
TLR 
TVA 
IRPP 
constotale/ménage 
nombre de chômeurs 
Population 
personnels en activité 
Personnels en retraite/pensions 
Achats de biens et services 
Transferts aux ménages 
Transferts aux Régions/2 Provinces Autonomes 
Transferts aux Communes et Provinces 
Total transferts Régions & provinces autonomes 
Total transferts Provinces&Communes 
Dépenses de santé 
Dépenses de prévoyance 
dépenses d'assistance 
Nombre de médecins 
Pop active (milliers) 
Consomation finale interne 
IRPP 
Tax /profits 50%Capital/50%salariés(VA) 
Tax /profits: 25%Capltal/50%salariés/25% consom 
Tax /profits: 50%Capital/25%salariés/25% consom 
taxe/pétrole 
Taxe sur revenu capitaux 
taxe locale/revenu 
TVA 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
MAIN REVENUES 
Income tax 
Value added tax 
Social security contributions 
Corporation tax 
Business rates 
Fuel duties, of which: Petrol 
Other receipts 
Tobacco duties 
Sub total 
-58.400.000 -23,4 INCTAX 
-38.959.000 -15,6 VAT 
-38.700.000 -15,5 NICONTRIB1 
-14.900.000 -6,0 CORP1 CORP2 CORP3 
-12.600.000 -5,0 CORP1 CORP2 CORP3 
-8.890.300 -3,6 PETROLCAR 
-6.900.000 -2,8 GDP 
-6.518.000 -2,6 TOBACCO 
-185.867.300 -74,5 
MAIN EXPENDITURES FLOW APPROACH BENEFIT APPROACH 
Revenue support grant and payment 
of non-domestic rates 4.811.559 
Invalidity benefit, basic 5.856.000 
Family benefits:child benefit 6.049.756 
Personnel : armed forces 6.875.000 
Equipment 8.039.000 
To LAs- Non-domestic rates payments 11.559.000 
Income support: non pensioners 12.170.418 
To LAs- Revenue Support Grant 17.051.517 
Current advances to and payments 
on behalf of health authorities, 
& payments by the NHS Exec for 
contracted services 21.384.711 
HOSPITALE 
Retirement Pension, basic 26.526.000 
Sub total 120.322.961 
1,9 S100 
2.3 16+EWS 
2.4 POP0-15EWS 
2.8 DEFPERSON 
3,2 DEFEQUIP DEFEMPLOY 
4,6 BUSINESSRATEE 
4.9 INCSUPPEWS 
6.8 REVSUPPE 
8,6 NHSCURRENTE 
S100 
16+EWS 
POPEWS POP0-15EWS 
DEFPERSON POP 
POP DEFEQUIP DEFEMPLOY 
MANUFGDP GDP 
BUSINESSRATEE 
INCSUPPEWS 
REVSUPPE 
NHSCURRENTE 
10,6 65+EWS 
48,2 
65+EWS 
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UNITED KINGDOM (continued) 
REGIONAL KEYS 
16+EWS 
65+EWS 
BUSINESSRATEE 
CORP1 
CORP2 
CORP3 
DEFEMPLOY 
DEFEQUIP 
DEFPERSON 
GDP 
HOSPITALE 
INCSUPPEWS 
INCTAX 
MANUFGDP 
NHSCURRENTE 
NICONTRIB 
NICONTRIB1 
PETROLCAR 
PETROLMILE 
POP 
POP0-15EWS 
POP0-15EWS 
POPEWS 
RATEVALUE 
REVSUPPE 
REVSUPPE 
S100 
TOBACCO 
VAT 
Population over 16 in England 
OVER 65 
Business rate expenditures 1993/4 Emillion - ACTUAL FOR ENGLAND 
50%SALAIRES-50%CAPITAL 
50%SALAIRES-25%CONSOMM-25%CAPITAL 
50%CAPITAL-25%SAI_AIRES-25%CONSOMM 
Defence: Directly supported employment, (thous.) 
Defence: Expenditure on equipment 
Defence: Services personnel only, (thous.) 
GDP - Factor cost:current prices, ( mill's ) 
Hospital activity 1993-4 (daycases, outpatients and accident/emergency) No figs for in-
patients yet 
Income Support to Non-Pensioners - number of benefit units 
Total Income Tax Payable,(million) 
GDP of Manufact. Indus., ( Mill's ) 
NHS current expenditure.E'OOOs, 1992-3 
Expenditure on Nl contributions by household 
Attributable National Insurance contributions in classi, employers+employees 
share of petrol, S&NI known, rest divided by no. of cars 
share of petrol, S & Nl known, rest divided by miles travelled by private road vehicles 
per year 
Population '000s 
Pop. 0 - 1 5 , (thous.) 
Pop. 0 - 1 5 , (thous.) 
POPULATION OF ENG, WALES, SCOTLAND 
Non Domestic Rates raised (English figs from Non-domestic rating of property, at 1 
April 1994, E million) 
Revenue Support Grant In England 1993/4 Emulions 
Revenue Support Grant in England 1993/4 Emulions 
Scotland 100% 
Expenditure on tobacco products by household 
Household expenditure VAT is charged on 
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SWEDEN 
MAIN REVENUES 
Social security contribution, gross 
Value added tax 
Tax on petrol 
Tax on energy 
Corporate income tax 
Miscellaneous revenues from 
government activities 
Tax redistribution levy on municipalities 
Tax on real estate (50% on households) 
Tax on real estate (50% on firms) 
Sub total 
-222.333 
-117.832 
-19.449 
-14.803 
-12.199 
-8.838 
-8.778 
-8.056 
-8.056 
-420.344 
-28,9 
-15,3 
-2,5 
-1,9 
-1,6 
-1,1 
-1,1 
-1,0 
-1,0 
-54,6 
301Β 
131B 
136B 
136B 
2000A 2001A 2002A 
1002A 
202B 
111B 
2000A 2001A 2002A 
MAIN EXPENDITURES 
Financial bank support ("Swedish bank cris' 
R & D (including higher education) 
Labour market policy measures 
Unemployment benefits 
Interest Subsidies 
State authorities 
Sickness benefits 
ATP-pension and other pensions 
Sub total 
') 23.518 
24.250 
28.080 
32.045 
33.665 
44.040 
44.123 
166.718 
396.439 
3,1 
3,2 
3,6 
4,2 
4,4 
5,7 
5,7 
21,7 
57,5 
1302A 
108A 
201A 
204A 206A 
610A 
104A 
607A 
601A 
1302A 1307A 
108A 1307A 
201A 1323A 
204A 206A 115B 203A 
610A 
1002A 104A 
607A 
601A 
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SWEDEN (continued) 
REGIONAL KEYS 
1002A 
104A 
108A 
111B 
115B 
1302A 
1307A 
131B 
1323A 
136B 
2000A 
2001A 
2002A 
201A 
202B 
203A 
204A 
206A 
301Β 
601A 
607A 
610A 
population 
employees and location 
receiver, location and employees/R & D (Including higher education) 
residence of payer 
total employment 
weighted personal and corporated income and fortune tax 
gdp (milions sek) 
Consumption /total 
unemployed 
dellveryof petrol 
(Capltar2)-Consumptlon- salary 
Capital-salaries 
(salaries*2)-capital-consumption 
receiver/Labour market policy measures 
place of registration/redistribution levy on municipalities 
employees 
residence receiver 
unemployment and location of receiver 
total salary payments of residence 
recelver/ATP-pension and other pensions 
receiver/Sickness benefits 
receiver/Interest Subsidies 
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GERMANY 
MAIN REVENUES 
tax on consumption 
On personnal income 
Petroleum Tax 
Calculated borrowing requirment . 
on corporate income 
Sub total 
-125.482 
-120.210 
-56.113 
-50.154 
-28.198 
-380.157 
-27,4 
-26,3 
-12,3 
-11,0 
-6,2 
-83 
GDP WAGES 
STEEK 
HORSEP 
TAX 
CORP1 CORP2 CORP3 
MAIN EXPENDITURES (FLOW) 
Commercial Enterprises, Common Original 
and Capital 
the old Federal States 
"Deutsche Einheit" Fund 
Wages and purchase 
of goods&services: 15% 
Unemployment Insurance 
Child Benefit 
German Defense Forces wages: 
Pension funds public sector 
Unemployment Benefit 
old L 
German Defense Forces: investment 
Sub total 
28.437 
28.183 
27.694 
25.887 
20.756 
17.968 
16.181 
13.862 
12.671 
11.955 
203.593 
6,2 
6,2 
6,1 
5,7 
4,5 
3,9 
3,5 
3,0 
2,8 
2,6 
44,5 
APERS GDP 
BEV65UMA 
BEVGESO 
APERS 
ALOGES 
BEVU20 
APERS 
APERS 
AL01UM 
BESRAUM FUEVER 
MAIN EXPENDITURES (FLOW) 
the old Federal States 
Commercial Enterprises, 
Common Original and Capital 
"Deutsche Einheit" Fund 
Unemployment Insurance 
Child Benefit 
German Defense Forces wages: old L 
Unemployment Benefit 
Pension funds public sector 
Miners' Social Insurance Scheme 
German Defense Forces: investment 
other scientific research 
War Victims Welfare Service 
Sub total 
33.156 
28.437 
27.694 
24.419 
21.139 
16.181 
14.907 
13.862 
12.857 
11.955 
11.451 
11.289 
227.347 
7,2 
6,2 
6,1 
5,3 
4,6 
3,5 
3,3 
3,0 
2,8 
2,6 
2,5 
2,5 
49,7 
BEV65UMA 
APERS GDP GDP 
BEVGESO 
ALOGES 
BEVU20 
BEVGES 
AL01UM 
APERS 
BESBERG 
BEVGES 
FUEBUN HSWISH GDP 
VERKR 
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GERMANY (continued) 
REGIONAL KEYS 
AL01UM 
ALOGES 
APERS 
BENEF 
BESBERG 
BESRAUM 
BEV65UMA 
BEVGES 
BEVGESO 
BEVU20 
CORP1 
CORP2 
CORP3 
FUEBUN 
FUEVER 
GDP 
HORSEP 
HSWISH 
STEEK 
TAX 
VERKR 
WAGES 
Share of over one-year unemployed persons 30.9.1993 
Unemployed persons 10.9.1993 
Personnel expenditure. Wages of civil servant 
Calculated 
Workers in mining industry 
Workers in air and space industry 
65 years old and over/OLd landers 
Population 
Population In the new federal states 
Population of under 20-year-old 
0,5wages (WAGES), 0,5 Capital (STEEK) 
0,5wages,0,25cons (GDP), 0,25Capital 
0,5capital, 0,25wages, 0,25cons 
Financing to non univ research centers 
Expenditure for defense. Defense contracts 
1993 GDP, millions of ecu 
1993 Car horsepower/region 
Scientific personnel (full-time) 
Income and Corporate Tax 
Calculated 
War victims welfare service, beneficiaries 
Wages 
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PORTUGAL 
MAIN REVENUES 
Contributions - General Plan - 963.416.435 
Personal Income Tax - 826.270.017 
V.A.T. - 797.294.447 
Tax on oil products - 369.627.927 
Corporate Income Tax - 279.106.071 
"Imposto de Selo" - 222.684.947 
Exterior - 152.786.633 
Tax on tobacco consumption - 132.327.261 
Subtotal -3.743.513.737 
-16,0 WAGES CONTRIB 
-13,7 INCOME 
-13,2 INCOME 
-6,1 CIRCTAX 
-4,6 CORP1 CORP2 CORP3 
-3,7 CREDIT INCOME 
-2,5 POP 
-2,2 INCOME POP 
-62,2 
MAIN EXPENDITURES (FLOW) 
Community and familie 
Non located 
Supported by ESF 
Current Expenses 
Old age 
'Supported by the State Budget 
Current Expenses 
Paid to other institutions 
Handicap and Rehabilitation 
Current Expenses 
Current Expenses 
Paid to households 
Current Expenses 
without debt interest 
Subtotal 
136.401.400 
145.491.610 
168.887.142 
174.221.492 
181.004.500 
214.120.560 
234.977.933 
324.630.956 
547.650.500 
548.185.005 
569.467.600 
571.335.702 
604.677.698 
4.421.052.099 
2,3 
2.4 
2,8 
2,9 
3,0 
3,6 
3,9 
5,4 
9,1 
9,1 
9,5 
9,5 
10,0 
73,4 
POP POP<15 
INVPL-AN EMPBTP 
CSF 
FMAI 
POP>64 
INVPI-AN1 EMPBTP 
POP 
DEPOUP CAPINC 
POP 
FME 
FMS 
DEPOUP CAPINC 
FMF 
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PORTUGAL (continued) 
REGIONAL KEYS 
CAPINC 
CIRCTAX 
CONTRIB 
CORP1 
CORP2 
CORP3 
CREDIT 
CSF 
DEPOUP 
EMPBTP 
FMAI 
FME 
FMF 
FMS 
INCOME 
INVPL_AN 
INVPLAN1 
POP 
POP<15 
POP>64 
WAGES 
Households Capital Income 
Tax on circulation of vehicles, 1990 (Local Tax) 
Social Contributions payed, 1990 
50% WAGES-50% CAPITAL 
50%WAGES-25%CONSUMPTION (income) -25%CAPITAL 
50%CAPITAL-25%WAGES-25%CONSUMPTION (income) 
Banking credit to non financial enterprises and private individuals 1993 
1 st Community Support Framework Funds Allocation 
Saving Deposits in Banks 1993 
Employment i Building and construction, 1989 
Functionarys of Ministry of Interior 
Functionarys of Ministry of Education 
Functionarys of Ministry of Finance 
Functionarys of Ministry of Health 
Hoseholds income before tax 
Investments of the Plan 
Investments Supported by the State Budget 
Total Population Estimation for 1994 (31-XII) 
Estimation for population under 15 years old, 1994 (31 -XII) 
Estimation for population above 64 years old, 1994 (31 -XII) 
Total Wage Distribution 
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E. Concentration of Results 
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FRANCE 
1 Alsace 
2 Aquitaine 
3 Auvergne 
4 Bourgogne 
5 Bretagne 
6 Centre 
7 Champagne Ardennes 
8 Corse 
9 Franche-Comté 
10 Ile-de-France 
11 Languedoc-Roussillon 
12 Limousin 
13 Lorraine 
14 Midi-Pyrénées 
15 Nord-Pas-de Calais 
16 Basse Normandie 
17 Haute Normandie 
18 Pays de la Loire 
19 Picardie 
20 Poitou-Charentes 
21 Provence-A.C.A. 
22 Rhône-Alpes 
Average 
Standard Error 
Exp(benef) 
s/M 
0,02 
0,01 
0,01 
0,02 
0,02 
0,01 
0,03 
0,03 
0,01 
0,03 
0,07 
0,03 
0,02 
0,02 
0,02 
0,03 
0,01 
0,01 
0,02 
0,02 
0,01 
0,01 
0,02 
0,01 
Exp(benef) 
Min/Max 
0,92 
0,94 
0,92 
0,93 
0,92 
0,93 
0,90 
0,86 
0,92 
0,88 
0,79 
0,87 
0,93 
0,90 
0,93 
0,89 
0,93 
0,95 
0,91 
0,93 
0,93 
0,96 
0,91 
0,04 
Exp(flow) 
s/M 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,02 
0,00 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,02 
0,02 
0,02 
0,01 
0,01 
0,00 
0,01 
0,00 
0,02 
0,00 
0,02 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
Exp(flow) 
Min/Max 
0,97 
0,96 
0,96 
0,96 
0,98 
0,97 
0,98 
0,97 
0,98 
0,95 
0,95 
0,93 
0,96 
0,97 
0,99 
0,98 
0,98 
0,95 
0,98 
0,96 
0,98 
0,98 
0,97 
0,01 
Contrib 
s/M 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
0,00 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
0,00 
-0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
-0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
-0,01 
0,00 
Contrib 
Min/Max 
0,98 
0,99 
0,97 
0,96 
0,98 
0,98 
0,99 
0,97 
0,97 
0,98 
0,97 
0,97 
0,98 
0,98 
0,99 
0,98 
0,99 
0,99 
0,98 
0,97 
0,99 
0,99 
0,98 
0,01 
ITALY 
Abruzzo 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Campania 
Emilia-Romagna 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
Lazio 
Liguria 
Lombardia 
Marche 
Molise 
Piemonte 
Puglia 
Sardegna 
Sicilia 
Toscana 
Trentino-Alto Adige 
Umbria 
Valle d'Aosta 
Veneto 
Average 
Standard Error 
Exp(benef) 
s/M 
0,11 
0,13 
0,12 
0,11 
0,10 
0,09 
0,09 
0,09 
0,12 
0,09 
0,13 
0,10 
0,11 
0,11 
0,11 
0,10 
0,09 
0,09 
0,09 
0,10 
0,10 
0,01 
Exp(benef) 
Min/Max 
0,81 
0,66 
0,69 
0,73 
0,80 
0,85 
0,91 
0,86 
0,74 
0,94 
0,68 
0,83 
0,78 
0,73 
0,75 
0,86 
0,82 
0,89 
0,79 
0,83 
0,80 
0,08 
Exp(flow) 
s/M 
0,05 
0,05 
0,05 
0,05 
0,02 
0,01 
0,05 
0,01 
0,06 
0,04 
0,05 
0,02 
0,05 
0,04 
0,04 
0,02 
0,05 
0,05 
0,03 
0,03 
0,04 
0,02 
Exp(flow) 
Min/Max 
0,83 
0,81 
0,81 
0,79 
0,90 
0,95 
0,86 
0,95 
0,80 
0,88 
0,79 
0,93 
0,80 
0,86 
0,86 
0,91 
0,79 
0,84 
0,88 
0,88 
0,86 
0,05 
Contrib 
s/M 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
-0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
-0,01 
-0,01 
0,00 
-0,01 
-0,01 
0,00 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
0,00 
-0,01 
0,00 
Contrib 
Min/Max 
0,97 
0,97 
0,98 
0,97 
0,99 
0,99 
0,99 
0,99 
0,99 
0,99 
0,98 
0,98 
0,98 
0,98 
0,98 
1,00 
0,97 
0,98 
0,97 
0,99 
0,98 
0,01 
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SPAIN 
Andalucía 
Aragón 
Asturias 
Baleares 
Canarias 
Cantabria 
Castilla La Mancha 
CastlIla-y-León 
Cataluña 
Ceuta y Melilla 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
La Rioja 
Madrid 
Murcia 
Navarra 
País Vasco 
Valencia 
Average 
Standard Error 
Exp(benef) 
s/M 
0,05 
0,04 
0,02 
0,06 
0,06 
0,03 
0,03 
0,02 
0,04 
0,07 
0,06 
0,04 
0,04 
0,08 
0,03 
0,05 
0,06 
0,03 
0,04 
0,02 
Exp(benef) 
Min/Max 
0,81 
0,83 
0,89 
0,76 
0,75 
0,86 
0,87 
0,92 
0,85 
0,71 
0,81 
0,82 
0,81 
0,73 
0,88 
0,77 
0,78 
0,90 
0,82 
0,06 
Exp(flow) 
s/M 
0,05 
0,05 
0,03 
0,09 
0,08 
0,06 
0,02 
0,04 
0,02 
0,10 
0,02 
0,02 
0,02 
0,03 
0,07 
0,05 
0,10 
0,03 
0,05 
0,03 
Exp(flow) 
Min/Max 
0,82 
0,83 
0,87 
0,72 
0,74 
0,81 
0,91 
0,88 
0,92 
0,59 
0,89 
0,89 
0,91 
0,89 
0,79 
0,78 
0,71 
0,89 
0,82 
0,09 
Contrib 
s/M 
-0,08 
-0,04 
-0,03 
-0,07 
-0,14 
-0,06 
-0,01 
-0,04 
-0,01 
-0,20 
-0,02 
-0,03 
-0,01 
-0,03 
-0,07 
-0,05 
-0,10 
-0,01 
-0,06 
0,05 
Contrib 
Min/Max 
0,80 
0,88 
0,92 
0,82 
0,70 
0,84 
0,97 
0,88 
0,97 
0,62 
0,92 
0,90 
0,95 
0,93 
0,82 
0,87 
0,76 
0,96 
0,86 
0,10 
UNITED KINGDOM 
North 
Y&H 
EMids 
EAng 
SE 
SW 
WMIds 
NW 
Wales 
Scot 
Nlre 
Average 
Standard Error 
Exp(benef) 
s/M 
0,02 
0,01 
0,01 
0,02 
0,01 
0,03 
0,01 
0,02 
0,01 
0,01 
0,02 
0,02 
0,01 
Exp(benef) 
Min/Max 
0,91 
0,95 
0,94 
0,90 
0,96 
0,90 
0,95 
0,93 
0,95 
0,96 
0,94 
0,94 
0,02 
Exp(flow) 
s/M 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0,01 
0,00 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,00 
Exp(flow) 
Min/Max 
0,97 
0,98 
0,98 
0,97 
0,98 
0,98 
0,99 
0,98 
0,95 
0,97 
0,98 
0,98 
0,01 
Contrib 
s/M 
-0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
-0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
-0,01 
-0,01 
0,00 
Contrib 
Min/Max 
0,97 
0,98 
0,98 
0,98 
0,98 
0,98 
0,96 
0,98 
0,99 
0,99 
0,97 
0,98 
0,01 
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SWEDEN 
Stockholm 
East Mid Sweden 
Smal/lslands 
South Sweden 
West Sweden 
North Mid Sweden 
Mid Norrland 
North Norrland 
Average 
Standard Error 
Exp(benef) 
s/M 
0,04 
0,02 
0,02 
0,02 
0,02 
0,10 
0,03 
0,03 
0,03 
0,03 
Exp(benef) 
Min/Max 
0,83 
0,93 
0,90 
0,94 
0,93 
0,74 
0,88 
0,88 
0,88 
0,07 
Exp(flow) 
s/M 
0,02 
0,02 
0,02 
0,02 
0,02 
0,10 
0,02 
0,02 
0,03 
0,03 
Exp(flow) 
Min/Max 
0,94 
0,94 
0,94 
0,97 
0,97 
0,77 
0,93 
0,93 
0,92 
0,06 
Contrib 
s/M 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
Contrib 
Min/Max 
0,99 
1,00 
1,00 
1,00 
1,00 
1,00 
1,00 
1,00 
1,00 
0,00 
GERMANY 
Baden-Württemberg 
Bayern 
Berlin 
Brandenburg 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
Hessen 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
Niedersachsen 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Saarland 
Sachsen 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Thüringen 
Average 
Standard Error 
Exp(benef) 
s/M 
0,02 
0,01 
0,03 
0,01 
0,02 
0,04 
0,02 
0,01 
0,04 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0,02 
0,01 
Exp(benef) 
Min/Max 
0,94 
0,95 
0,87 
0,96 
0,88 
0,84 
0,93 
0,94 
0,91 
0,96 
0,95 
0,96 
0,95 
0,95 
0,97 
0,95 
0,93 
0,04 
Exp(flow) 
s/M 
0,02 
0,03 
0,02 
0,01 
0,05 
0,10 
0,03 
0,01 
0,00 
0,04 
0,01 
0,03 
0,02 
0,01 
0,07 
0,01 
0,03 
0,02 
Expfflow) 
Min/Max 
0,95 
0,90 
0,94 
0,95 
0,86 
0,74 
0,91 
0,95 
0,98 
0,89 
0,97 
0,92 
0,93 
0,94 
0,83 
0,95 
0,91 
0,06 
Contrib 
s/M 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,02 
-0,04 
-0,02 
-0,03 
-0,02 
-0,04 
-0,01 
-0,01 
0,00 
-0,02 
-0,04 
-0,04 
-0,01 
-0,04 
-0,02 
0,01 
Contrib 
Min/Max 
0,95 
0,97 
0,93 
0,87 
0,93 
0,92 
0,93 
0,86 
0,98 
0,98 
0,98 
0,93 
0,87 
0,87 
0,97 
0,85 
0,92 
0,05 
PORTUGAL 
Norte 
Centro 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
Average 
Standard Error 
Exp(benef) 
s/M 
Exp(benef) 
Min/Max 
Exp(flow) 
s/M 
0,03 
0,02 
0,03 
0,03 
0,04 
0,03 
0,01 
Exp(flow) 
Min/Max 
0,88 
0,92 
0,89 
0,88 
0,84 
0,88 
0,03 
Contrib 
s/M 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
-0,01 
0,00 
Contrib 
Min/Max 
0,97 
0,97 
0,97 
0,97 
0,98 
0,97 
0,01 
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F. GDP and Transfers Ranked 
by Country and by GDP 
1. Transfers and GDP of the Regions, Ranked by Country 
2. Transfers and GDP of the Regions, Ranked by Growing GDP/capita 
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Transfers and GDP of the regions, ranked by country 
FRANCE 
Alsace 
Aquitaine 
Auvergne 
Bourgogne 
Bretagne 
Centre 
Champagne-Ardennes 
Corse 
France-Comté 
Ile-de-France 
Languedoc-Roussillon 
Limousin 
Lorraine 
Midi-Pyrénées 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
Basse-Normandie 
Haute-Normandie 
Pays de la Loire 
Picardie 
Poitou-Charentes 
Provence-A.C.A. 
Rhône-Alpes 
trsf (benef) 
% reg. GDP 
- 1 % 
3% 
2% 
3% 
3% 
0% 
1% 
15% 
2% 
-6% 
8% 
6% 
3% 
6% 
5% 
4% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
3% 
1% 
- 1 % 
trsf (flow) 
% reg. GDP 
0% 
2% 
1% 
0% 
3% 
1% 
0% 
10% 
-2% 
-3% 
9% 
6% 
2% 
5% 
1% 
3% 
- 1 % 
0% 
-3% 
1% 
2% 
-2% 
trsf (benef) 
k ECU/cap. 
-0,2 
0,4 
0,3 
0,4 
0,5 
0,0 
0,2 
1,9 
0,3 
-1,6 
1,2 
0,9 
0,5 
0,9 
0,8 
0,7 
0,3 
0,3 
0,3 
0,4 
0,2 
-0,1 
trsf (flow) 
k ECU/cap. 
0,0 
0,3 
0,2 
-0,1 
0,4 
0,1 
0,0 
1,4 
-0,4 
-0,8 
1,3 
0,9 
0,4 
0,9 
0,2 
0,5 
-0,2 
-0,1 
-0,4 
0,1 
0,3 
-0,3 
GDP 1993 
ECU/cap 
18.949 
16.601 
15.299 
16.242 
15.621 
16.914 
18.412 
13.175 
17.062 
28.157 
14.500 
14.865 
15.983 
15.842 
14.922 
16.914 
17.403 
15.950 
15.927 
15.176 
16.589 
18.303 
GDP 1993 
PPS/cap 
17.724 
15.527 
14.309 
15.192 
14.611 
15.820 
17.222 
12.321 
15.959 
26.336 
13.562 
13.904 
14.950 
15.630 
13.957 
15.820 
16.277 
14.918 
14.897 
14.194 
15.516 
17.119 
ITALY 
Abruzzo 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Campania 
Emilia Romagna 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
Lazio 
Liguria 
Lombardia 
Marche 
Molise 
Piemonte 
Puglia 
Sardegna 
Sicilia 
Toscana 
Trentino Alto-Adige 
Umbria 
Valle d'Aosta 
Veneto 
trsf (benef) 
% reg. GDP 
18% 
49% 
37% 
21% 
-10% 
-2% 
-2% 
-4% 
-14% 
1% 
41% 
-9% 
18% 
23% 
23% 
-7% 
-2% 
2% 
-3% 
-8% 
trsf (flow) 
% reg. GDP 
10% 
27% 
20% 
18% 
-10% 
0% 
10% 
-4% 
-12% 
-2% 
17% 
-10% 
9% 
19% 
17% 
-7% 
10% 
0% 
12% 
-9% 
trsf (benef) 
k ECU/cap. 
2,3 
4,6 
3,2 
2,1 
-1,8 
-0,3 
-0,3 
-0,7 
-2,6 
0,1 
4,5 
-1,5 
1,8 
2,5 
2,4 
-1,1 
-0,3 
0,2 
-0,5 
-1,3 
trsf (flow) 
k ECU/cap. 
1,2 
2,5 
1,7 
1,8 
-1,7 
0,1 
1,7 
-0,6 
-2,2 
-0,2 
1,9 
-1,6 
1,0 
2,1 
1,8 
-1,0 
1,8 
0,1 
2,2 
-1,4 
GDP 1993 
ECU/cap 
12.807 
9.360 
8.547 
9.789 
17.924 
16.838 
17.061 
17.144 
18.588 
14.720 
11.104 
16.398 
10.513 
11.011 
10.159 
15.450 
17.641 
14.124 
18.442 
16.510 
GDP 1993 
PPS/cap 
14.248 
10.413 
9.509 
10.891 
19.941 
18.732 
18.981 
19.073 
20.679 
16.376 
12.355 
18.243 
11.696 
12.250 
11.302 
17.188 
19.626 
15.712 
20.517 
18.368 
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SPAIN 
Andalucía 
Aragón 
Asturias 
Baleares 
Canarias 
Cantabria 
Castilla La Mancha 
Castilla-y-León 
Cataluña 
Ceuta y Melilla 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
La Rioja 
Madrid 
Murcia 
Navarra 
País Vasco 
Valencia 
trsf (benef) 
% reg. GDP 
17% 
-7% 
1 % 
-8% 
13% 
0% 
5% 
1 % 
-6% 
3% 
18% 
14% 
-6% 
-13% 
3% 
-6% 
-9% 
0% 
trsf (flow) 
% reg. GDP 
14% 
-3% 
1 % 
-7% 
1 1 % 
- 1 % 
3% 
2% 
-5% 
14% 
15% 
9% 
-3% 
-9% 
2% 
-6% 
-9% 
0% 
trsf (benef) 
k ECU/cap. 
1,3 
-0,8 
0,1 
-1,0 
1,3 
0,0 
0,4 
0,1 
-0,7 
0,2 
1,3 
1,2 
-0,7 
-1,7 
0,2 
-0,8 
-1,1 
0,0 
trsf (flow) 
k ECU/cap. 
1,1 
-0,4 
0,1 
-1,0 
1,2 
-0,1 
0,3 
0,2 
-0,7 
1,3 
1,1 
0,8 
-0,3 
-1,2 
0,2 
-0,8 
-1,1 
0,0 
GDP 1993 
ECU/cap 
7.809 
11.776 
10.006 
13.290 
10.145 
10.083 
9.003 
9.861 
12.658 
8.960 
7.409 
8.082 
11.549 
13.060 
9.302 
12.818 
12.347 
10.040 
GDP 1993 
PPS/cap 
9.228 
13.916 
11.825 
15.705 
11.988 
11.917 
10.639 
11.653 
14.958 
10.587 
8.756 
9.550 
13.648 
15.433 
10.992 
15.147 
14.591 
11.864 
SWEDEN 
Stockholm 
East Mid Sweden 
Smal/lslands 
South Sweden 
West Sweden 
North Mid Sweden 
Mid Norrland 
North Norrland 
trsf (benef) 
% reg. GDP 
-9% 
4% 
2% 
1 % 
0% 
1 1 % 
9% 
13% 
trsf (flow) 
% reg. GDP 
-6% 
3% 
0% 
0% 
-2% 
1 1 % 
8% 
14% 
trsf (benef) 
k ECU/cap. 
-2,1 
0,6 
0,4 
0,2 
0,0 
1,8 
1,6 
2,3 
trsf (flow) 
k ECU/cap. 
-1,2 
0,5 
-0,1 
0,0 
-0,4 
1,9 
1,4 
2,4 
GDP 1993 
ECU/cap 
21.978 
16.393 
17.413 
17.374 
17.557 
16.836 
18.060 
17.685 
GDP 1993 
PPS/cap 
18.895 
14.094 
14.971 
14.937 
15.094 
14.474 
15.526 
15.204 
UNITED KINGDOM 
trsf (benef) 
% reg. GDP 
trsf (flow) 
% reg. GDP 
trsf (benef) 
k ECU/cap, 
trsf (flow) 
k ECU/cap. 
GDP 1993 
ECU/cap 
GDP 1993 
PPS/cap 
North 
Y&H 
EMids 
EAng 
SE 
SW 
WMids 
NW 
Wales 
Scot 
Nlre 
9% 
1% 
1% 
- 1 % 
-7% 
0% 
3% 
5% 
11% 
6% 
18% 
9% 
- 1 % 
-2% 
- 3 % 
-5% 
1% 
1% 
4% 
8% 
5% 
17% 
1,1 
0,2 
0,1 
-0,2 
-1,2 
-0,1 
0,3 
0,7 
1,2 
0,9 
2,0 
1,2 
-0,1 
-0,2 
-0,4 
-0,9 
0,1 
0,1 
0,6 
0,9 
0,6 
1,9 
12.433 
12.730 
12.994 
14.140 
16.268 
13.186 
12.722 
12.507 
11.734 
13.621 
11.077 
14.101 
14.437 
14.736 
16.036 
18.449 
14.954 
14.428 
14.184 
13.308 
15.447 
12.562 
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GERMANY 
Baden-Württemberg 
Bayern 
Berlin 
Brandenburg 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
Hessen 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
Niedersachsen 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Saarland 
Sachsen 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Thüringen 
trsf (benef) 
% reg. GDP 
-5% 
- 4 % 
9% 
22% 
- 1 % 
-5% 
-4% 
29% 
- 1 % 
-2% 
-3% 
6% 
24% 
26% 
-3% 
28% 
trsf (flow) 
% reg. GDP 
-4% 
-3% 
12% 
17% 
1 % 
- 1 % 
-4% 
22% 
- 1 % 
- 2 % 
-3% 
4% 
17% 
19% 
- 1 % 
2 1 % 
trsf (benef) 
k ECU/cap. 
-1,1 
-0,9 
1,7 
2,4 
-0,4 
-1,8 
-1,1 
2,8 
-0,3 
-0,3 
-0,5 
1,1 
2,3 
2,6 
-0,5 
2,7 
trsf (flow) 
k ECU/cap. 
-1,0 
-0,7 
2,2 
1,8 
0,2 
-0,4 
-1,0 
2,1 
-0,2 
-0,3 
-0,5 
0,8 
1,7 
1,9 
-0,2 
2,0 
GDP 1993 
ECU/cap 
23.746 
23.300 
18.411 
10.637 
28.697 
35.226 
27.656 
9.639 
19.182 
20.814 
18.619 
19.905 
9.917 
10.021 
19.058 
9.713 
GDP 1993 
PPS/cap 
20.261 
19.879 
15.709 
9.076 
24.485 
30.057 
23.597 
8.225 
16.367 
17.759 
15.887 
16.984 
8.462 
8.551 
16.261 
8.288 
PORTUGAL 
Norte 
Centro 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 
Alentejo 
Alganye 
trsf (benef) 
% reg. GDP 
trsf (flow) 
% reg. GDP 
-2% 
4% 
-2% 
26% 
10% 
trsf (benef) 
k ECU/cap. 
trsf (flow) 
k ECU/cap. 
-0,2 
0,2 
-0,2 
1,2 
0,6 
GDP 1993 
ECU/cap 
6.537 
5.252 
10.207 
4.492 
6.297 
GDP 1993 
PPS/cap 
9.760 
7.841 
15.238 
6.707 
9.402 
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Transfers and GDP of the regions, 
ranked by growing GDP/capita 
Alentejo 
Centro 
Algarve 
Norte 
Extremadura 
Andalucía 
Galicia 
Calabria 
Ceuta y Melilla 
Castilla La Mancha 
Murcia 
Basilicata 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
Thüringen 
Campania 
Castilla-y-León 
Sachsen 
Asturias 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Valencia 
Cantabria 
Canarias 
Sicilia 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 
Puglia 
Brandenburg 
Sardegna 
Nlre 
Molise 
La Rioja 
Wales 
Aragón 
País Vasco 
North 
NW 
Cataluña 
WMids 
Y&H 
Abruzzo 
Navarra 
EMids 
Madrid 
Corse 
SW 
Baleares 
Scot 
Umbria 
EAng 
Languedoc-R. 
trsf (benef) 
% reg. GDP 
18% 
17% 
14% 
37% 
3% 
5% 
3% 
49% 
29% 
28% 
2 1 % 
1 % 
24% 
1 % 
26% 
0% 
0% 
13% 
23% 
18% 
22% 
23% 
18% 
4 1 % 
-6% 
1 1 % 
-7% 
-9% 
9% 
5% 
-6% 
3% 
1 % 
18% 
-6% 
1 % 
-13% 
15% 
0% 
-8% 
6% 
2% 
- 1 % 
8% 
trsf (flow) 
% reg. GDP 
26% 
4% 
10% 
-2% 
15% 
14% 
9% 
20% 
14% 
3% 
2% 
27% 
22% 
2 1 % 
18% 
2% 
17% 
1 % 
19% 
0% 
- 1 % 
1 1 % 
17% 
-2% 
9% 
17% 
19% 
17% 
17% 
-3% 
8% 
-3% 
-9% 
9% 
4% 
-5% 
1 % 
- 1 % 
10% 
-6% 
-2% 
-9% 
10% 
1 % 
-7% 
5% 
0% 
-3% 
9% 
trsf (benef) 
k ECU/cap. 
1,3 
1,3 
1,2 
3,2 
0,2 
0,4 
0,2 
4,6 
2,8 
2,7 
2,1 
0,1 
2,3 
0,1 
2,6 
0,0 
0,0 
1,3 
2,4 
1,8 
2,4 
2,5 
2,0 
4,5 
-0,7 
1,2 
-0,8 
-1,1 
1,1 
0,7 
-0,7 
0,3 
0,2 
2,3 
-0,8 
0,1 
-1,7 
1,9 
-0,1 
-1,0 
0,9 
0,2 
-0,2 
1,2 
trsf (flow) 
k ECU/cap. 
1,2 
0,2 
0,6 
-0,2 
1,14 
1,06 
0,76 
1,73 
1,28 
0,31 
0,19 
2,49 
2,1 
2,0 
1,75 
0,22 
1,7 
0,10 
1,9 
0,02 
-0,15 
1,17 
1,76 
-0,2 
0,98 
1,8 
2,13 
1,86 
1,91 
-0,30 
0,93 
-0,38 
-1,08 
1,18 
0,55 
-0,68 
0,07 
-0,07 
1,24 
-0,77 
-0,20 
-1,20 
1,36 
0,13 
-0,97 
0,63 
0,06 
-0,36 
1,27 
GDP 1993 
ECU/cap 
4.492 
5.252 
6.297 
6.537 
7.409 
7.809 
8.082 
8.547 
8.960 
9.003 
9.302 
9.360 
9.639 
9.713 
9.789 
9.861 
9.917 
10.006 
10.021 
10.040 
10.083 
10.145 
10.159 
10.207 
10.513 
10.637 
11.011 
11.077 
11.104 
11.549 
11.734 
11.776 
12.347 
12.433 
12.507 
12.658 
12.722 
12.730 
12.807 
12.818 
12.994 
13.060 
13.175 
13.186 
13.290 
13.621 
14.124 
14.140 
14.500 
GDP 1993 
PPS/cap 
6.707 
7.841 
9.402 
9.760 
8.756 
9.228 
9.550 
9.509 
10.587 
10.639 
10.992 
10.413 
8.225 
8.288 
10.891 
11.653 
8.462 
11.825 
8.551 
11.864 
11.917 
11.988 
11.302 
15.238 
11.696 
9.076 
12.250 
12.562 
12.355 
13.648 
13.308 
13.916 
14.591 
14.101 
14.184 
14.958 
14.428 
14.437 
14.248 
15.147 
14.736 
15.433 
12.321 
14.954 
15.705 
15.447 
15.712 
16.036 
13.562 
ANNEX II: Interregional Transfers from Central Government Budgets: Research Results 233 
Marche 
Limousin 
Nord-P.C. 
Poitou-C. 
Auvergne 
Toscana 
Bretagne 
Midi-P. 
Picardie 
Pays de la Loire 
Lorraine 
Bourgogne 
SE 
East Mid Sweden 
Piemonte 
Veneto 
Provence-A.C.A. 
Aquitaine 
North Mid Sweden 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
Centre 
B.-Normandie 
Lazio 
France-Comté 
Liguria 
South Sweden 
H.-Normandie 
Smal/lslands 
West Sweden 
Trentino-Alto Adige 
North Norrland 
Emilia Romagna 
Mid Norrland 
Rhône-Alpes 
Berlin 
Champagne-A. 
Valle d'Aosta 
Lombardia 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Alsace 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Niedersachsen 
Saarland 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Stockholm 
Bayern 
Baden-Württemberg 
Hessen 
Ile-de-France 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
trsf (benef) 
% reg. GDP 
1 % 
6% 
5% 
3% 
2% 
-7% 
3% 
6% 
2% 
2% 
3% 
3% 
-7% 
4% 
-9% 
-8% 
1 % 
3% 
1 1 % 
- 2 % 
0% 
4% 
-2% 
2% 
-4% 
1 % 
2% 
2% 
0% 
-2% 
13% 
-10% 
9% 
- 1 % 
9% 
1 % 
-3% 
-14% 
-3% 
- 1 % 
-3% 
- 1 % 
6% 
-2% 
-9% 
- 4 % 
-5% 
- 4 % 
-6% 
- 1 % 
-5% 
trsf (flow) 
% reg. GDP 
-2% 
6% 
1 % 
1 % 
1 % 
-7% 
3% 
5% 
-3% 
0% 
2% 
0% 
-5% 
3% 
-10% 
-9% 
2% 
2% 
1 1 % 
0% 
1 % 
3% 
10% 
- 2 % 
- 4 % 
0% 
- 1 % 
0% 
-2% 
10% 
14% 
-10% 
8% 
-2% 
12% 
0% 
12% 
-12% 
-3% 
0% 
- 1 % 
- 1 % 
4% 
-2% 
-6% 
-3% 
- 4 % 
- 4 % 
-3% 
1 % 
- 1 % 
trsf (benef) 
k ECU/cap. 
0,1 
0.9 
0.8 
0,4 
0,3 
-1,1 
0,5 
0,9 
0,3 
0,3 
0,5 
0,4 
-1,2 
0,6 
-1,5 
-1,3 
0,2 
0,4 
1,8 
-0,3 
0,0 
0,7 
-0,3 
0,3 
-0,7 
0,2 
0,3 
0,4 
0,0 
-0,3 
2,3 
-1,8 
1,6 
-0,1 
1,7 
0,2 
-0,5 
-2,6 
-0,5 
-0,2 
-0,5 
-0,3 
1,1 
-0,3 
-2,1 
-0,9 
-1,1 
-1,1 
-1,6 
-0,4 
-1,8 
trsf (flow) 
k ECU/cap. 
-0,22 
0,87 
0,21 
0,14 
0,19 
-1,03 
0,39 
0,87 
-0,42 
-0,08 
0,38 
-0,05 
-0,86 
0,46 
-1,58 
-1,43 
0,29 
0,33 
1,88 
0,07 
0,15 
0,47 
1,73 
-0,38 
-0,60 
0,01 
-0,22 
-0,07 
-0,39 
1,77 
2,40 
-1,71 
1,43 
-0,30 
2,2 
-0,03 
2,18 
-2,21 
-0,5 
0,02 
-0,2 
-0,2 
0,8 
-0,3 
-1,23 
-0,7 
-1,0 
-1,0 
-0,82 
0,2 
-0,4 
GDP 1993 
ECU/cap 
14.720 
14.865 
14.922 
15.176 
15.299 
15.450 
15.621 
15.842 
15.927 
15.950 
15.983 
16.242 
16.268 
16.393 
16.398 
16.510 
16.589 
16.601 
16.836 
16.838 
16.914 
16.914 
17.061 
17.062 
17.144 
17.374 
17.403 
17.413 
17.557 
17.641 
17.685 
17.924 
18.060 
18.303 
18.411 
18.412 
18.442 
18.588 
18.619 
18.949 
19.058 
19.182 
19.905 
20.814 
21.978 
23.300 
23.746 
27.656 
28.157 
28.697 
35.226 
GDP 1993 
PPS/cap 
16.376 
13.904 
13.957 
14.194 
14.309 
17.188 
14.611 
15.630 
14.897 
14.918 
14.950 
15.192 
18.449 
14.094 
18.243 
18.368 
15.516 
15.527 
14.474 
18.732 
15.820 
15.820 
18.981 
15.959 
19.073 
14.937 
16.277 
14.971 
15.094 
19.626 
15.204 
19.941 
15.526 
17.119 
15.709 
17.222 
20.517 
20.679 
15.887 
17.724 
16.261 
16.367 
16.984 
17.759 
18.895 
19.879 
20.261 
23.597 
26.336 
24.485 
30.057 
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G. GDP Per Capita and BAGDP Per Capita 
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GDP per capita vs BAGDP per capita 
(Budgetary Adjusted GDP) -1993 
Alentejo 
Centro 
Algarve 
Norte 
Extremadura 
Andalucía 
Galicia 
Calabria 
Ceuta y Melilla 
Castilla La Mancha 
Murcia 
Basilicata 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
Thüringen 
Campania 
Castilla-y-León 
Sachsen 
Asturias 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Valencia 
Cantabria 
Canarias 
Sicilia 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 
Puglia 
Brandenburg 
Sardegna 
Nlre 
Molise 
La Rioja 
Wales 
Aragón 
País Vasco 
North 
NW 
Cataluña 
WMids 
Y&H 
Abruzzo 
Navarra 
EMids 
Madrid 
Corse 
SW 
Baleares 
Scot 
Umbria 
EAng 
Languedoc-R. 
GDP 
rank 
100 
99 
98 
97 
96 
95 
94 
93 
92 
91 
90 
89 
88 
87 
86 
85 
84 
83 
82 
81 
80 
79 
78 
77 
76 
75 
74 
73 
72 
71 
70 
69 
68 
67 
66 
65 
64 
63 
62 
61 
60 
59 
58 
57 
56 
55 
54 
53 
52 
GDP 
ECU/cap 
4.492 
5.252 
6.297 
6.537 
7.409 
7.809 
8.082 
8.547 
8.960 
9.003 
9.302 
9.360 
9.639 
9.713 
9.789 
9.861 
9.917 
10.006 
10.021 
10.040 
10.083 
10.145 
10.159 
10.207 
10.513 
10.637 
11.011 
11.077 
11.104 
11.549 
11.734 
11.776 
12.347 
12.433 
12.507 
12.658 
12.722 
12.730 
12.807 
12.818 
12.994 
13.060 
13.175 
13.186 
13.290 
13.621 
14.124 
14.140 
14.500 
BAGDP 
rank 
99 
100 
97 
98 
96 
94 
95 
85 
86 
93 
92 
75 
76 
77 
79 
88 
78 
87 
72 
89 
91 
82 
73 
90 
80 
68 
60 
63 
62 
84 
66 
81 
83 
58 
61 
71 
64 
67 
56 
70 
65 
74 
51 
59 
69 
54 
55 
57 
42 
BAGDP 
ECU/cap 
5.667 
5.472 
6.907 
6.381 
8.549 
8.867 
8.843 
10.275 
10.244 
9.310 
9.491 
11.848 
11.782 
11.726 
11.539 
10.076 
11.588 
10.109 
11.967 
10.065 
9.937 
11.311 
11.916 
10.007 
11.497 
12.431 
13.136 
12.940 
13.009 
11.250 
12.666 
11.398 
11.268 
13.609 
13.058 
11.983 
12.797 
12.659 
14.048 
12.049 
12.793 
11.856 
14.539 
13.312 
12.324 
14.246 
14.188 
13.782 
15.771 
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GDP 
rank 
GDP 
ECU/cap 
BAGDP 
rank 
BAGDP 
ECU/cap 
Marche 
Limousin 
Nord-P.C. 
Poitou-C. 
Auvergne 
Toscana 
Bretagne 
Midi-P. 
Picardie 
Pays de la Loire 
Lorraine 
Bourgogne 
SE 
East Mid Sweden 
Piemonte 
Veneto 
Provence-A.C.A. 
Aquitaine 
North Mid Sweden 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
Centre 
B.-Normandie 
Lazio 
France-Comté 
Liguria 
South Sweden 
H.-Normandie 
Smal/lslands 
West Sweden 
Trentino-Alto Adige 
North Norrland 
Emilia Romagna 
Mid Norrland 
Rhône-Alpes 
Berlin 
Champagne-A. 
Valle d'Aosta 
Lombardia 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Alsace 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Niedersachsen 
Saarland 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Stockholm 
Bayern 
Baden-Württemberg 
Hessen 
He de France 
Bremen 
Hamburg 
51 
50 
49 
48 
47 
46 
45 
44 
43 
42 
41 
40 
39 
38 
37 
36 
35 
34 
33 
32 
31 
30 
29 
28 
27 
26 
25 
24 
23 
22 
21 
20 
19 
18 
17 
16 
15 
14 
13 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
14.720 
14.865 
14.922 
15.176 
15.299 
15.450 
15.621 
15.842 
15.927 
15.950 
15.983 
16.242 
16.268 
16.393 
16.398 
16.510 
16.589 
16.601 
16.836 
16.838 
16.914 
16.914 
17.061 
17.062 
17.144 
17.374 
17.403 
17.413 
17.557 
17.641 
17.685 
17.924 
18.060 
18.303 
18.411 
18.412 
18.442 
18.588 
18.619 
18.949 
19.058 
19.182 
19.905 
20.814 
21.978 
23.300 
23.746 
27.656 
28.157 
28.697 
35.226 
52 
43 
48 
47 
45 
53 
40 
33 
44 
41 
37 
39 
46 
32 
50 
49 
31 
29 
19 
30 
28 
23 
18 
34 
35 
24 
26 
25 
27 
14 
12 
38 
13 
22 
10 
20 
9 
36 
21 
16 
17 
15 
7 
11 
8 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
14.498 
15.740 
15.136 
15.314 
15.493 
14.425 
16.016 
16.711 
15.505 
15.871 
16.367 
16.191 
15.412 
16.849 
14.816 
15.082 
16.883 
16.929 
18.714 
16.906 
17.064 
17.389 
18.794 
16.684 
16.544 
17.389 
17.182 
17.343 
17.172 
19.408 
20.083 
16.209 
19.493 
18.000 
20.574 
18.382 
20.621 
16.377 
18.077 
18.968 
18.811 
19.031 
20.752 
20.479 
20.752 
22.582 
22.753 
26.628 
27.342 
28.855 
34.794 
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